VZCZCXRO8787
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHSH #0161/01 2470424
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 040424Z SEP 09
FM AMCONSUL SHENYANG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8836
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 0743
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0212
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0155
RUCGEVC/JOINT STAFF WASHDC 0111
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0170

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000161 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/K, EAP/CM, INR 
MOSCOW PASS TO VLADIVOSTOK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION 
TAGS: CH ECON KN KS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: DPRK CHARM IN NE CHINA: WE THINK WE WANT TO TRUST 
YOU 
 
REF: SEOUL 1387 
 
Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman.  Reasons 1.4(b)/(d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  A Shenyang-based DPRK diplomat sought out a 
Korean-speaking Shenyang ConGenOff at social events on the 
margins of two Chinese-sponsored trade fairs to make three 
points:  1) the "political winds" in Pyongyang are changing, 
and DPRK leader Kim Jong-il desires close ties and 
friendship with the United States; 2) the Six-Party Talks 
are no longer viable and should be scuttled; and 3) Kim 
Jong-il would be ready to denuclearize in the event of U.S.- 
DPRK normalization and improved ties.  The North Korean 
Consul General, meanwhile, has been uncharacteristically 
friendly and direct in his engagement with the Consul 
General, departing from his normal practice of communicating 
only in Chinese.  The North Korean diplomats may be acting 
on new instructions, and we note that their line is very 
similar to that used by Kim Jong-il with the Hyundai Asan 
Chairwoman (reftel).  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
¶2. (C) Consul General and ConGenOffs traveled to northeast 
China's Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture August 26-31 to 
participate in a local trade fair and later to Changchun 
September 1-3 to participate in a regional trade fair.  DPRK 
Consul General Ri Ki-bom and cultural affairs consul Jang 
Kyong-il attended the same trade events.  Both North Korean 
diplomats took advantage of the Chinese seating the U.S. and 
DPRK groups together at several representational events to 
communicate with us more directly and easily than ever 
before in Post memory.  Consul General Ri joked expansively 
with his Sino-Korean hosts and, uncharacteristically, 
engaged in prolonged Korean banter with the Consul General 
(previously Ri has clearly preferred to communicate in 
Chinese).  Consul Jang was explicit in showing a desire to 
improve relations with the United States, speaking 
extensively in Korean to ConGenOff on several occasions. 
 
DPRK TO USG: WE THINK WE WANT TO TRUST YOU 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Over the course of several days, Jang Kyong-il, who 
arrived a few months ago from Pyongyang, consistently 
reiterated to ConGenOff that the "political winds" in 
Pyongyang were changing and that Kim Jong-il and the 
North Korean people wanted closer ties with the United 
States.  Claiming that the North Korean government was 
increasingly nervous about the growing influence that 
China had over its affairs, Jang said that the North 
Korean government wanted to improve relations with the 
United States.  He said the Korean War had occurred more 
than 60 years ago and that "bygones were bygones," 
concluding that today it was in the North Korean 
government's best interest to improve relations with the 
United States. 
 
SIX-PARTY TALKS ARE NO LONGER AN OPTION 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The consul said that the Six-Party Talks were a non- 
functioning, ineffectual tool and should be disbanded, 
complaining that it was a forum for other groups, namely the 
Japanese, to pressure the North Koreans on issues separate 
from the immediate tasks at hand -- U.S.-DPRK normalization 
and denuclearization.  He said that Kim Jong-il wanted peace 
and, in particular, peace and friendship with the United 
States.  The competing interests of Japan, South Korea, and 
China had made said peace difficult to achieve.  Jang said 
that he believed China would be dead set against U.S.-DPRK 
normalization because China enjoyed using the leverage of 
the Six-Party Talks and geography to squeeze North Korea. 
 
DPRK READY TO DENUCLEARIZE: IS THE USG READY TO NORMALIZE? 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶5. (C) In addressing the possibility of denuclearization in 
the event of U.S.-DPRK normalization, Jang said he thought 
Kim Jong-il would be more than willing to denuclearize in 
the event of improved U.S.-DPRK ties and assurances of non- 
aggression, with the caveat that this was his personal 
opinion.  He said that North Korea would never preemptively 
 
SHENYANG 00000161  002 OF 002 
 
 
use nuclear weapons against another nation and that the 
DPRK's nuclear program was purely for self-defense.  As for 
the non-aggression assurances, the consul said that the DPRK 
truly feared the USG's military capabilities, citing Iraq 
and Afghanistan as showcases of rapid-response American 
military might.  The consul opined that if the United States 
and DPRK were able to improve cultural, economic and 
political ties, the North Korean government would realize 
that a non-aggression assurance was superfluous and back 
off. 
 
¶6. (C) Jang saw the fundamental roadblock in U.S.-DPRK 
relations to be a lack of trust.  He said that the DPRK 
thought in 2000 that everything was set for a thaw in 
relations, but after the inauguration of President Bush, 
everything the North Koreans expected had been turned 
upside-down.  He saw Iraq and Afghanistan as examples of how 
the fast-moving and unpredictable American political scene 
was capable of changing at a moment's notice.  Jang added, 
however, that the DPRK appreciated working with trusted 
State Department interlocutors who have engaged them over 
the past couple of years. 
 
DPRK ECONOMY: IMPROVED, BUT STILL CONCERNS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) When asked about the economic situation in North 
Korea this summer and the "150-Day Battle," Jang averred 
that electricity was in abundance and no longer being 
rationed.  However, as for the prospects of the upcoming 
harvest, he looked away and said "General Kim Jong-il takes 
care of everything, so one hopes the harvest should be 
enough, right?" 
 
WICKMAN