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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 001531 
 
SIPDIS 
 
Classified by: POL M/c James L. Wayman. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR SOCI KS JN
SUBJECT: MOFAT Previews FM Yu's Upcoming Visit to Tokyo 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) In a preview of Foreign Minister Yu's upcoming visit 
to Japan, MOFAT DG for Northeast Asia Cho Tai-young noted the 
potential for negative fallout from next year's 100th 
anniversary of Japan's annexation of Korea.  He said a 
pending Japanese decision on textbook guidelines relating to 
the Liancourt Rocks would pose an early test for the new 
government in Tokyo, particularly in advance of the sensitive 
anniversary.  Observing that no Japanese Emperor has visited 
the ROK, Cho said the difficulty of predicting public 
reaction to such a visit would probably mean Emperor Akihito 
would not accept President Lee Myung-bak,s invitation to 
come to Korea.  There are multiple ROK-Japan senior-level 
meetings scheduled for the coming weeks, beginning with a 
ROK-Japan-PRC trilateral in China.  End Summary. 
 
Asia's Past Much More Than Prologue 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) During a September 23 lunch with Emboffs, DG Cho noted 
that unresolved historical issues remain very much alive and 
influence nearly every aspect of Korea,s relations with 
China and Japan.  Cho claimed that hardly a day went by 
without a mention of some historical dispute in Korea's major 
daily newspapers.  He remarked that with Japan, historical 
issues may dominate 2010 as it marks the 100th anniversary of 
Japan's annexation of Korea.  The two countries were 
consulting on how best to ensure that the anniversary becomes 
an opportunity for healing old wounds and not creating new 
ones. 
 
Timing is Critical:  Textbook Guidelines 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Deputy Director for Japan Affairs Lee Dong-gy, 
observed that a key early hurdle for the new Japanese 
government will be a decision on textbook guidelines relating 
to territorial sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks (claimed 
as the Takeshima Isles by Japan and the Dok Islets by the 
ROK).  Cho and Lee said that a decision by the new government 
to support the existing policy of strong language claiming 
Japanese sovereignty could incite a new wave of anti-Japanese 
sentiment and get bilateral relations off to a rocky start. 
Furthermore, the timing of the announcement could also 
complicate the scheduling of high-level official visits. 
(Comment:  Japanese Embassy colleagues told us they are 
hoping to squeeze in ministerial and summit meetings before 
December, when the textbook decision is expected to be 
announced.  They said Tokyo fears a strong ROK public 
backlash could again freeze high-level exchanges with Seoul. 
End comment.) 
 
Managing Public Expectations 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Cho related that latent public antipathy toward Japan 
over historical issues was a major headache for him.  He 
observed that Seoul was still uncertain how best to prepare 
for the 100th anniversary, but sought to consult with Tokyo 
as soon as possible.  As for the ROK position, Cho explained, 
there were two "camps."  The first camp argued that Korea 
should ask the Japanese government to make a dramatic 
conciliatory gesture to preempt an upsurge in anti-Japanese 
public sentiment.  The second camp argued that Seoul should 
seek to downplay the anniversary and create no public 
expectations of a grand gesture.  Cho personally subscribed 
to the latter philosophy, suggesting that the government had 
little ability to control public opinion regarding such a 
volatile issue and therefore could never guarantee that a 
grand Japanese gesture would be well received. 
 
Emperor Visit:  Crickets from Tokyo 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Noting that ROK President Lee Myung-bak had invited 
Japanese Emperor Akihito to visit Seoul in 2010 to "put an 
end to the sense of distance" between the two countries, Cho 
 
SEOUL 00001531  002 OF 002 
 
 
said the ball remained in Tokyo's court.  The Blue House had 
politely prodded Tokyo with President Lee's September 15 
Kyodo News Service interview in which LMB reiterated the 
invitation.  Cho pointed out that the emperor had visited 
China in 1992 but had never come to Korea; fear of public 
protests, impossible to control in democratic Korea, was 
likely the reason. 
 
Stream of High-Level Official Exchanges in Pipeline 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶6. (C) DG Cho indicated that following UNGA, senior ROK and 
Japanese leaders would have multiple opportunities to meet 
formally before the end of 2009.  Deputy Director Lee noted 
that Foreign Minister Yu would meet his Japanese and Chinese 
counterparts in Shanghai on September 28 and that Yu would 
then fly to Tokyo on September 29 for further bilateral 
consultations.  Lee (and our Japanese Embassy contacts) also 
indicated that PM Hatoyama would most likely make his first 
official visit to Seoul in early October en route to the 
trilateral summit in China.  DG Cho explained that the summit 
agenda had two major items:  reviewing the progress of the 
"concrete projects" the three countries agreed to at last 
year's meeting and discussing important regional issues, 
North Korean denuclearization foremost among them. 
 
 
 
 
STEPHENS