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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 000558 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/BSC, 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL SNAR BR AVERY
SUBJECT: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PCC? 
 
REF: A. ASUNCION 701 (08) 
     ¶B. ASUNCION 338 (07) 
     ¶C. INCSR BRAZIL 2008 
     ¶D. SAO PAULO 228 (08) 
     ¶E. SAO PAULO 66 (08) 
     ¶F. SAO PAULO 873 (07) 
     ¶G. SAO PAULO 447 (07) 
     ¶H. SAO PAULO 975 (06) 
     ¶I. SAO PAULO 526 (06) 
     ¶J. SAO PAULO 319 (06) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: For three days in May 2006, the 
imprisoned leaders of the Sao Paulo-based criminal 
organization, the First Capital Command (PCC), orchestrated 
uprisings in Sao Paulo's streets and in Brazil's prisons 
that killed almost fifty police, captured global headlines 
and paralyzed the nerve center of the world's 
eighth-largest economy.  Police struck back, killing scores 
of PCC members (Refs H, I and previous).  The violent 
outburst ended as 
swiftly as it began and the PCC has not since launched any 
similar mass attack.  While observers attribute the uneasy 
peace to better police capabilities, limits on imprisoned 
PCC leaders' access to outside contacts, and the housing of 
key PCC leaders in a new "supermax" prison in Parana State 
(Ref I), the PCC remains strong, benefiting from lucrative 
drug and arms smuggling operations that reach across Brazil 
and extend deeply into neighboring Paraguay with 
international links to 
Bolivia and even Portugal (Refs A, B, C, H).  Locally, the 
PCC 
retains its insurrectionary capability, at times reacting to 
police drug 
raids with neighborhood-level uprisings that last for a 
night. 
To truly eliminate the  PCC criminal threat, Brazil must 
further 
professionalize its police, both expand and tighten its 
porous prison 
system, and see that greater state services and 
opportunities reach the marginalized youth of the poorest 
neighborhoods where the PCC recruits its followers.  End 
Summary. 
 
Three Days that Shook Sao Paulo 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Following the transfer of some of its imprisoned 
leadership to isolated facilities, the Sao Paulo-based 
criminal organization First Capital Command (PCC) waged war 
against police, judicial and prison authorities for three 
days (May 12-15) in 2006.  Organized PCC gang members 
openly attacked police stations and police officers at 
home, took over several prisons, burned buses, and 
effectively paralyzed the country,s financial nerve 
center.  Almost 50 police were killed in the attacks, which 
captured headlines around the world.  Initially taken by 
surprise, the police struck back, killing over 150 alleged 
PCC members and, according to critics, at least some 
innocents caught in cross fires (Refs H, I).  The violence 
ended suddenly on May 15, when PCC leaders announced a 
"truce" with local government authorities (something the 
latter denied) (Ref F).  Even so, in the ensuing months, 
Sao Paulo remained jittery, as smaller incidents of 
apparent PCC-related violence flared.  Since that time, the 
PCC has lowered its overall profile.  The organization 
remains strong, however, benefiting from lucrative trades 
in drugs and arms, a strong presence in prisons, and a 
demonstrated capability to mobilize violent neighborhood 
uprisings against police intervention in the narcotics 
trade. 
 
PCC Origins: Born in the Prison System 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The PCC was founded in 1993 by eight inmates of 
Sao Paulo State's Taubate prison, allegedly as an 
organization dedicated to fighting for prisoner rights. 
Unlike more typical criminal organizations, it has a series 
of founding statutes that emphasize its goals to reform the 
 
SAO PAULO 00000558  002 OF 004 
 
 
prison system and to promote "peace and justice."  (Members 
refer to the organization as "the Party.")  Operationally, 
the PCC modeled itself after the Sicilian Mafia with strict 
entrance requirements, organized contribution obligations 
for members and an agreed death penalty for disloyalty. 
The group grew quickly in Sao Paulo's overcrowded, laxly 
administered prison system, using smuggled-in cell phones 
to coordinate outside actions, primarily trade in illegal 
drugs and guns, but also other criminal activities. 
 
Less Violent Efforts to Control PCC Take Root 
 
¶4.  (SBU) State and national authorities responded to the 
PCC's 2006 uprising with commensurate violence on suspected 
PCC members that left scores dead and reportedly included 
extrajudicial executions and the deaths of some innocents. 
(COMMENT: Human Rights watchers argue that these cases have 
never been fully investigated.  END COMMENT).  Since 2006, 
Brazilian authorities have taken more subtle but, experts 
say, effective measures against the group such as 
controlling the entry of cell phones into prisons which are 
the PCC,s key tool for coordinating its operations inside 
and outside of Brazil,s prisons.  Likewise, the GOB 
constructed a maximum security prison in Catanduvas in 
Parana State and transferred some forty senior PCC members 
to this facility.  Finally, the Brazilian police have 
enhanced their operational capabilities to monitoring PCC 
cell phone communications and carry out larger, more 
complex law enforcement operations. 
 
How the PCC Perpetuates Itself 
 
¶5.  (SBU)Several key factors keep the PCC going: 
 
--Plenty of Money: Despite the loss of numerous members in 
2006, restrictions on their communications and police 
pressure, the PCC persists.  Trade in guns and drugs 
provide lucrative sources of income.  Many of Sao Paulo's 
poorest neighborhoodshave little or no state presence and 
the PCC can easily generate illicit financial opportunities 
for the unemployed.  Sao Paulo Civil Police Chief Alberto 
Angerami 
told Poloff that he knew of the case of a young drug user 
who, after being arrested, was threatened with death if he 
revealed the names of his drug suppliers and, upon his 
release, was offered USD 2500/month to oversee the 
distribution of drugs in his neighborhood.  The PCC's drug 
tentacles spread far outward from Sao Paulo. During a March 
trip to the Paraguay-Brazil border in Matto Grosso do Sul 
State and September travel to Foz de Iguacu, local 
authorities in both areas complained to Poloff of PCC 
drug-running in their cities, moving illegal narcotics from 
Paraguay to markets in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and 
the associated violence this generates in poor 
neighborhoods where the PCC has taken root. 
 
--International Connections: The PCC strong presence at 
Brazil's 
borders indicates its international linkages.  Brazil Federal 
Police in Foz de Iguacu complained that PCC leaders live 
openly 
in Paraguay, due to the generally lax administration of the 
law in their neighbor's country.  (Note: Brazil Federal Police 
did praise Paraguay's SENAD.  Nonetheless, the weakness of 
other 
Paraguayan institutions makes that country an attractive 
place for 
PCC leaders to maintain residences.  End Note.)  Over the 
last 
several years, reports have indicated further PCC 
drug-smuggling 
linkages to Bolivia and even Portugal.  PCC members have been 
arrested 
in both Paraguay and Portugal (Refs A, B, C, H). 
 
--Porous Prisons: Though the prisons are less rebellious 
than three years ago, liberal rules regarding visits (which 
permit conjugal meetings between prisoners and their 
 
SAO PAULO 00000558  003 OF 004 
 
 
romantic partners) create multiple opportunities to smuggle 
cell phones into the prisons as well as transfer messages 
in and out (Ref E).  Moreover, Sao Paulo's prisons, probably 
among 
the best in Brazil, remain overcrowded with guards 
underpaid.  Most likely, the increased orderliness of Sao 
Paulo State's prison system results from an "agreement" 
between prison authorities and PCC leaders to keep things 
quiet, according to University of Sao Paulo Professor and 
penitentiary expert Fernando Salla. 
 
--Long-Term Vision: Federal Police sources grudgingly 
praise the PCC for its "long-term" vision.  The 
organization, they say, is cultivating its own lawyers, 
working to get control of key judges and backing select 
local politicians in Rio and Sao Paulo.  One officer 
interviewed predicted that the PCC will eventually either 
establish or "rent" a political party that can promote its 
interests. 
 
Adjusting Tactics, But Still Dangerous 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Although no major uprisings have taken place in 
Sao Paulo since 2006, the PCC maintains an insurrectionary 
capability.  Just this year -- on February 8-9, August 26, 
and September 1 -- drug arrests by police in different Sao 
Paulo neighborhoods that resulted in the deaths of local 
residents 
sparked rioting and bus burning in the style, if not the 
scale, of the 2006 uprisings.  Police reacted in all cases 
by flooding the area with riot police and using helicopters 
to monitor developments.  Order was quickly restored in each 
case, but 
many observers believe that local elements of the PCC 
directed the riots to remind authorities of the PCC,s hold 
over Sao Paulo,s poorest neighborhoods. 
 
Long-Term Solution: Police Professionalism, Improved 
Prisons, and Youth Outreach 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Several key human rights issues are closely 
interwoven with efforts to control the PCC.  Most 
importantly, police violence has frequently been the spark 
for PCC riots and neighborhood uprisings usually after 
police kill someone during a law enforcement operation. 
These incidents generally take place in poor neighborhoods 
where citizen trust of the police is low to non-existent. 
Brazil,s Civil Police, who are usually on the front lines 
of urban police work, receive low pay and enjoy little 
prestige.  They have a human rights office, but, according 
to Consulate RSO, the program is not well funded or 
effective.  Until professional levels are raised, the Civil 
Police will likely remain trapped in a vicious circle of 
unprofessional behavior and citizen mistrust. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Likewise, Brazil's prisons remain far from 
adequate for containing and cutting off highly 
organized criminals with communications 
ability.  Police sources told Poloff that, despite 
augmented control efforts, cell phones are still smuggled 
into penitentiaries and permit PCC members to coordinate 
activities with those on the outside, thanks to 
easily-corrupted, 
often-underpaid prison guards. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Finally, too many of Sao Paulo's peripheral 
neighborhoods remained ungoverned spaces with little or no 
state presence, fertile recruiting grounds for 
PCC-connected gangs who can offer criminal opportunities to 
local unemployed youth.  However, PCC associations come 
back to haunt many youth.  The Sao Paulo Human Rights 
Commission runs a shelter for PCC-threatened youth. 
Originally designed to respond to problems of family 
violence, the program has become, instead, a kind of 
witness protection program for young men fleeing reprisals 
from drug gangs supported by the PCC.  More than half of 
the 90 youth enrolled in the program are seeking refuge from 
narcotics traffickers, who torture and even kill youths who 
 
SAO PAULO 00000558  004 OF 004 
 
 
decide to leave drug smuggling organizations, according to 
Commission official Celia Christina Whitaker. 
 
Comment: The PCC is Still There 
 
¶10.  (SBU) While Brazil has not faced a large-scale PCC 
outburst since 2006 and a number of tactical responses by 
law enforcement authorities have helped check PCC 
operational capability, the PCC remains a serious criminal 
threat.  With a rudimentary ideology, criminal connections 
that span the country and extend into neighboring states, 
and an impressive operational capacity, the group's present 
lowered profile should not lull observers into believing 
it has gone away.  The PCC will continue to damage Brazilian 
society and threaten community security, until the GOB 
adopts a more comprehensive and long-term strategy to 
improve law enforcement professionalism and opportunities for 
under-privileged youth. 
WHITE