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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RIO DE JANEIRO 000329 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2019 
TAGS: PINS SOCI SNAR ECON PBTS PREL BR
SUBJECT: COUNTER-INSURGENCY DOCTRINE COMES TO RIO'S FAVELAS 
 
Classified By: Principal Officer Dennis W. Hearne. Reasons (1.4 b,d) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1. (SBU) Beginning in December 2008, Rio de Janeiro Governor 
Sergio Cabral, with support from Rio Mayor Eduardo Paes, 
launched a comprehensive program to "pacify" Rio de Janeiro's 
violent favelas (i.e., vast shantytowns that are spread 
around the city's core) by establishing and maintaining a 
sustained police and state presence.  The key component of 
the Favela Pacification Program is the Pacification Police 
(UPP), whose ranks number approximately 500 officers.  From a 
security perspective, the Favela Pacification Program has 
thus far been successful in the four Rio favelas under UPP 
control, but the subsequent delivery of basic services and 
social assistance programs has reportedly been uneven.  In 
addition to the obvious security factors involved with the 
pacification program, there are also significant economic 
interests at stake, with some analysts estimating Rio de 
Janeiro's economy would grow by 38 billion Brazilian Reals 
(21 billion USD) should favelas be reincorporated into 
mainstream society and markets.  The Favela Pacification 
Program shares some characteristics with U.S. 
counter-insurgency doctrine and strategy in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  The program's success will ultimately depend not only 
on effective and sustained coordination between the police 
and state/municipal governments, but also favela residents' 
perception of the legitimacy of the state.  End Summary. 
 
FAVELA PACIFICATION PROGRAM 
 
¶2. (U) Beginning in December 2008, Rio de Janeiro Governor 
Sergio Cabral, with support from Rio Mayor Eduardo Paes, 
launched a comprehensive program to "pacify" Rio de Janeiro's 
violent favelas by establishing and maintaining a sustained 
police and state presence.  To date, police units have 
entered four such favelas - City of God, Jardim do Batan, 
Santa Marta, and Chapeu Mangueira/Babylonia - and continue to 
maintain a presence within them.  While Rio's favelas have 
often been a target of police operations with a goal of 
disrupting narco-trafficking activities, the Favela 
Pacification Program marks the first time that state, 
municipal, or federal authorities are attempting a "clear and 
hold" approach, the success of which is predicated upon 
pushing criminal elements out of the community, establishing 
a permanent police and government presence, then providing 
basic services and civic privileges to favela residents. 
This approach closely resembles U.S. counter-insurgency 
doctrine in Afghanistan and Iraq, and highlights the extent 
to which favelas have been outside state authority.  Favelas, 
which first emerged in the late 19th century and grew 
extensively in Rio de Janeiro over the past three decades, 
are urban communities of varying size whose residents 
generally do not hold title to their homes.  Due to the 
inherently marginalized nature of favelas, various criminal 
elements have historically flourished within them, using the 
communities as platforms from which to conduct drug 
trafficking activities, pirate services for its residents, 
and launch other criminal activities throughout the city. 
There are approximately 1,000 favelas in Rio de Janeiro, with 
an estimated 1 million inhabitants. 
 
RIO SECURITY CHIEF: "WE ARE AT WAR" 
 
¶3. (C) In a September 22 meeting with Principal Officer, 
State Secretary for Public Security Jose Beltrame explained 
the Favela Pacification Program and its importance to Rio de 
Janeiro's overall security.  "You cannot imagine what 
government neglect of the favelas have done to this city.  It 
is a failure of public service," he said.  Stating the Rio 
government was now "at war," Beltrame explained, "We have a 
few hundred criminals causing terror in a few million." 
Stating the state needed to act, he emphasized the goal of 
the program is not to eliminate all violence and drug 
trafficking in the favelas, but rather to establish a state 
presence that can allow for the delivery of basic services, 
such as trash collection, and social programs, such as health 
attention and education.  Under the program, state police 
special operations units (BOPE) enter a favela by force. 
Once criminal elements that control a favela are purged, 
state-administered pacification police units (UPP) then 
replace traditional police forces, in order to maintain 
order, foster long-term ties between the state and the 
community, and assist with the delivery of basic services to 
the favela. 
 
 
RIO DE JAN 00000329  002 OF 004 
 
 
PACIFICATION POLICE CHIEF: "WE DO NOT NEED A RAMBO" 
 
¶4. (C) The key component of the Favela Pacification Program 
is the Pacification Police (UPP).  There are currently 500 
pacification police (UPP) officers in the four "pacified" 
favelas, with the number of officers assigned to each favela 
depending on levels of existing criminal activity.  For 
example, only 55 UPP officers are required to maintain order 
in the favela of Jardim do Batan which has approximately 
40,000 residents, while 160 UPP officers are required in the 
favela Santa Marta, which has only 3,000 residents. UPP 
commander Colonel Jose Carvalho - a former United Nations 
Peacekeeping Commander - told us on August 25 that only new 
police academy recruits are selected into the UPP program. 
"We need fresh, strong minds, not a Rambo," Carvalho stated. 
"The older generation of cops is more oriented to kicking 
down doors and shooting people."  Following acceptance into 
the UPP, officers receive additional training in human rights 
and community outreach, in addition to community profile 
briefings specific to the officer's assigned favela. 
Carvalho said active UPP officers are also subject to 
internal affairs undercover operations, to ensure UPP 
officers are not abusing their power within the favelas. 
 
PROGRESS, BUT MANY CHALLENGES 
 
¶5. (C) From a security perspective, the Favela Pacification 
Program has thus far been successful in the four Rio favelas 
under UPP control, but the subsequent delivery of basic 
services and social programs appears to be uneven.  BOPE 
Lieutenant Wolney Francisco de Paula told us on August 19 
that BOPE units entering the favelas encountered no 
resistance from the narco-trafficking gangs that had de facto 
control of the communities, while UPP Colonel Carvalho 
claimed there have been no UPP-related fatalities in the 
favelas under pacification.  That said, the delivery of basic 
services and implementation of social programs are reported 
to be uneven among the four favelas.  Carvalho explained, for 
example, that his officers had to quell a near riot in the 
Chapeu Mangueira/Babylonia favela, after its residents 
protested that they were not receiving equal benefits as 
other "pacified" favelas.  Carvalho blamed the Rio de Janeiro 
state government for failing to provide essential services, 
stating "There are no services there, and the state is not 
organized enough to provide them."   Favela representatives, 
while generally supporting the pacification program, 
universally cite the need for more social programs and basic 
services.  During a September 18 symposium on favela 
development sponsored by the BNDES - the Brazilian 
development bank - Rio favela resident association 
representatives recognized efforts by the state, municipal, 
and federal governments to address the plight of the favelas, 
but voiced concerns over how money was being spent.  For 
example, a community leader from pacified favela Santa Marta, 
Jose Mario dos Santos, questioned why state money was being 
used to construct a wall around that community.  Rosino de 
Castro Diniz, president of the Federation of Favela 
Associations in Rio de Janeiro, told us the pacification 
program could not succeed without a concerted effort to 
provide jobs and social services to residents. 
 
¶6. (C) Another significant factor for the project's success 
will be how receptive favela residents are to assuming civic 
responsibilities, such as paying for legitimate services and 
taxes.  BOPE Lieutenant Francisco de Paula, who is also a 
resident of the Jardim de Batan favela, told us many in his 
community were resistant to the idea of having to switch from 
paying pirated sources of services, such as electricity and 
water, to higher-priced legitimate providers.  Carvalho also 
said his officers encountered wide-spread confusion among 
residents that, until now, have been paying for electricity 
and cable TV service through pirated sources.  "It is very 
difficult for them to all of a sudden have to pay for 
services they previously received for less or even free," he 
said.  Carvalho also lamented the overall mentality of favela 
residents who lived for decades under the sway of 
narco-trafficking groups.  "This generation is lost," he 
said. "We need to focus on children through providing sports 
and education programs." 
 
¶7. (SBU) Security experts see a possible link between the 
pacification program and an increase in crime in Rio de 
Janeiro's more affluent neighborhoods, such as Ipanema, 
Leblon, and Copacabana, collectively known as "Zona Sul." 
Rio de Janeiro's Public Security Institute (ISP) reported a 
50 percent increase in residential theft and a 52 percent in 
 
RIO DE JAN 00000329  003 OF 004 
 
 
robberies of businesses in Zona Sul from December 2008 to 
July 2009, compared with the same period the year prior. 
Julita Lemgruber, director for the Center for Security and 
Civics (CESEC) and a former police ombudsman, said this 
increase was due to drug traffickers - forced out of the drug 
trade in UPP-occupied favelas - now branching out into other 
criminal activities outside of the favelas.  Beltrame had a 
similar theory, explaining the structure of narco-trafficking 
networks played a role in the increase.  "When we hit these 
guys at the top, they lose jobs at the bottom. This results 
in more street crime." 
 
¶8. (C) Wilson Carlos Carvalho, a senior adviser to Governor 
Cabral on security matters, told us on August 28 that the 
federal government needed to do more to assist with the 
favela problem and the crime increasing in other parts of the 
city, highlighting the large flow of arms and drugs into Rio 
de Janeiro.  "We do not have any arms factories or coca 
fields in Rio de Janeiro.  More needs to be done to control 
the borders," he said (Note: Beltrame also expressed concern 
over the proliferation of military-grade weapons in Rio de 
Janeiro, and said most illegal arms were of American origin 
and issued to foreign armies, such as Colombia, Bolivia, and 
Paraguay.  End Note). 
 
EXPANDING THE PACIFICATION 
 
¶9. (C) State Security Secretary Beltrame offered to share the 
strategic plan for the favela program with Consulate officers 
and to take the PO into a "pacified" favela in the near 
future.  Beltrame stated of the 50 favelas he envisions 
pacified by the end of 2010, "Complexo de Alemao" was the 
principal target.  The Complexo de Alemao is an enormous 
favela with over 200,000 residents and heavily armed criminal 
groups entrenched.  The scope of an operation into Complexo 
de Alemao would be vast and the scale of violence potentially 
"traumatic," Beltrame said.  Beltrame seemed determined, 
however, noting the operation would likely take place in 
early 2010.  "This favela is totally outside of state 
authority, and it is the epicenter of the fight," he stated. 
Although Wilson Carlos Carvalho, the Cabral adviser, told us 
that the Intelligence Branch of the State Secretariat for 
Public Security had mapped more than 90 favelas in the city 
for eventual UPP operations, Beltrame said only 10-12 
favelas, including Complexo de Alemao, would be critical to 
the program.  "We do not need to take over 100 favelas.  The 
real violence is concentrated in only about a dozen," he 
explained.  In order to meet the manpower requirements for 
extending the pacification program, Wilson Carlos Carvalho 
said the Military Police would recruit 7,000 new police 
officers, 3,500 of whom would join the UPP ranks by next 
year. Beltrame's estimate of police recruitment was more 
expansive, with a projection of 30,000 new police officers on 
Rio's streets by 2016. 
 
ECONOMICS OF FAVELA PACIFICATION 
 
¶10. (SBU) In addition to the security factors involved with 
the pacification program, there are also significant economic 
interests at stake.  Some economists have forecast an 
increase of 90 million Brazilian Reals (45 million USD) in 
new property and service taxes that would go towards the Rio 
municipal government, should all favelas come under the 
authority of Rio state.  The president of Rio electricity 
provider "Light" estimated the economy of Rio de Janeiro 
could grow by around 38 billion Brazilian Reals (21 billion 
USD) through increased commerce and new jobs.  According to 
Andre Urani, an economist with the Institute of Labor and 
Social Research (IETS), Light loses at least 200 million USD 
per year due to pirated electricity in the favelas (Note: 
Light donated 600 low energy consumption refrigerators to 
residents in Santa Marta favela, in order to encourage their 
integration as utility customers.  End Note).  Emphasizing 
the potential market in favelas, Urani stated, "Imagine the 
revenue increase if Light could successfully turn the one 
million illegal users of its services into customers." 
According to data provided by the Rio State Secretariat for 
Security, operations to fully pacify and reintegrate favelas 
would cost the state between 90 million to 340 million 
Brazilian Reals (48 million to 183 million USD). 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶11. (SBU) The Favela Pacification Program shares some 
characteristics with U.S. counter-insurgency strategy in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  Like counter-insurgency, the 
 
RIO DE JAN 00000329  004 OF 004 
 
 
population is the true center of gravity, and the program's 
success will ultimately depend not only on effective and 
sustained coordination between the police and state/municipal 
governments, but on favela residents' perception of the 
legitimacy of state.  One of the principal challenges in this 
project is to convince favela populations that the benefits 
of submitting to state authority (security, legitimate land 
ownership, access to education) outweigh the costs (taxes, 
utility fees, civil obedience).  As with American 
counter-insurgency doctrine, we should not expect results 
overnight.  If the program is limited to Governor Cabral's 
2010 reelection campaign or constitutes little more than an 
initiative crafted to bolster Rio de Janeiro's 2016 bid for 
the Olympics, as some critics have charged, it offers little 
chance of success.  If, however, the program wins over 
"hearts and minds" in the favelas, and continues to enjoy 
genuine support from the governor and the mayor, bolstered by 
private enterprise lured by the prospects of reintegrating 
some one million favela residents into mainstream markets, 
this program could remake the social and economic fabric of 
Rio de Janeiro.  Post will work closely with the relevant 
state authorities to facilitate exchanges, seminars, and 
institutional partnerships towards this end.  End Comment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HEARNE