VZCZCXRO8042
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0595/01 2601354
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171354Z SEP 09 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0162
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1530

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000595 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER UPBEAT AFTER START 
OF SECOND ROUND OF UN-BROKERED PEACE TALKS 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 577 
     ¶B. PANICO-NETOS SEPTEMBER 3 E-MAIL 
     ¶C. NICOSIA 576 
     ¶D. NICOSIA 561 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4( 
d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In a September 11 meeting with the 
Ambassador, Turkish Cypriot (T/C) leader Mehmet Ali Talat 
said that the September 10 meeting launching the second round 
of UN-brokered talks went "extraordinarily well."  He was 
nonplussed by Greek Cypriot (G/C) leader Demetris 
Christofias' postponement of the original September 3 
kick-off date (Ref C) and described his G/C counterpart as 
"totally constructive."  On electing the federal executive 
(the subject matter of the Sept 10 meeting), Talat noted that 
the Turkish Cypriots had "walked back" the Annan Plan by 
accepting a President/Vice President indirect election model. 
 He dismissed the G/C bicommunal, single ticket direct 
election scheme as "impossible" given that rightist parties 
would be unable to find bicommunal partners.  He was 
heartened by Christofias' apparent willingness to discuss 
expediting the talks--a "first" according to him. 
Nevertheless, Talat lobbied for increased U.S. and UN 
involvement and warned "no serious steps" were possible given 
the present "timidity" of the international community.  He 
said the risk of his ouster by an anti-solution candidate in 
April 2010 was serious and would derail the entire process. 
He is traveling to the United States for the UN General 
Assembly and hopes for meetings with both the Secretary and 
UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon.  The Ambassador told Talat that the U.S. 
government would continue to support his negotiating efforts 
and urged him to think of ways that Ankara could broadcast 
its pro-solution policy in a language understandable to the 
Greek Cypriots, possibly through a small, but symbolic 
gesture.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Start of Second Round: "Went Extraordinarily Well" 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2. (C) Talat was upbeat after the start of the second round 
of UN-brokered negotiations on September 10, after 
Christofias canceled the original September 3 meeting in 
protest over the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing "debacle" (Ref 
D).  Talat commented that they had lost a day "without any 
reason," then praised the September 10 meeting as having gone 
"extraordinarily well."  He said he had been expecting the 
worst, but instead found Christofias to be "very 
understanding" as the two worked on how to elect the federal 
executive, one of the main goals of the second reading, along 
with devising a property regime. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
T/Cs Abandon Annan Plan Position for a  Presidential System 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Talat was energized about the T/C governance proposal 
presented September 10, which he said both overcame Turkish 
sensitivities and represented a significant departure from 
the previous T/C position that had been similar to provisions 
in the Annan Plan.  (Note:  According to our contacts, Talat 
reportedly previewed the proposal on September 1 to Turkish 
FM Davutoglu, who had no major objections(Ref B).  End Note.) 
 With this proposal, Talat said, the T/Cs dropped their first 
round proposal of a weak Swiss-style "Presidential Council" 
in favor of two rotating "members of the presidency." 
According to the new T/C proposal, the two would be chosen 
from and by the communally elected Senate (equally divided 
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots) on a single, bicommunal 
ticket.  The winning ticket would have to get 50 percent from 
both communities in the first two rounds, or 40 percent from 
both on the third and final vote.  Failing that, a 
transitional government would be formed and new senate 
elections would be called within a year.  Talat said he was 
"100 percent" sure the plan would work since it addressed 
both T/C needs (communal voting) and G/C concerns (a strong 
executive), while allowing right-wing candidates to build 
coalitions in the small, collegial senate.  He said 
Christofias had told him that he would "consider" the new 
idea, without commenting on its merits. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
G/C Executive Proposal: "A Real Threat" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
NICOSIA 00000595  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶4. (C) Talat dismissed a G/C proposal of weighted direct 
voting (60:40) on a bicommunal ticket as "a real threat."  He 
said that G/Cs had merely sweetened the pot over their 
first-round proposal, which had been the same arrangement but 
weighted 70:30.  He further claimed the scheme would 
marginalize those on the right in both communities, who would 
be hard pressed to find compatible, bicommunal partners. 
"Rightists are the majority in the north," Talat complained, 
"but Christofias told me 'to get rid of them.'" Talat worried 
that the results also might not be legitimate in T/C eyes, 
since the executive could possibly be elected with only 
minimal support from the T/C community.  He added that the 
National Unity Party (UBP), the "ruling" party in the north 
that has even rejected Talat's proposal, would never accept 
the G/C idea. 
----------------------- 
Speeding Up the Process 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Talat said he was encouraged by Christofias' agreeing 
to discuss expediting the negotiations at their next meeting 
on September 17.  He dubbed this "a first" for Christofias, 
who had hitherto rejected increasing the pace or intensity of 
the process.  Talat said that he, personally, was open to a 
number of modalities, including conducting longer meetings 
(now about 2.5 to 3 hours) or more focused ones (e.g., 
Christofias-Talat tete-a-tete, followed by a session to read 
out their position papers).  Talat, who is acutely aware of 
the passing of time, was hopeful a compromise could be struck 
to speed things up.  (Note:  After the September 17 meeting, 
UN SRSG Taye-Brook Zerihoun announced publicly that the 
leaders had decided to defer the October 2 meeting, but would 
meet October 7 and 8 and also October 14 and 15; he added 
that the leaders had decided to maintain an accelerated pace. 
 End note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
No "Serious Steps" Possible without the Intl Community 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶6. (C) In a familiar refrain, Talat said that the USG and the 
UN were still "a bit reluctant" to engage on the Cyprus 
problem.  He lauded the activism of Swedish FM Carl Bildt and 
said that the international community needed to cast off its 
"timidity."  Otherwise, he warned, no "serious steps" would 
be achieved. For example, he advocated a joint meeting in New 
York with President Christofias under the aegis of the UNSYG 
and said that he had already informed UNSYG SA Downer of this 
desire.  (Note:  Downer told us that he was against a joint 
meeting during UNGA given strong G/C antipathy.  End Note.) 
Talat said he is planning a U.S. visit during UNGA (9/19-22 
in Washington and 9/23-24 in New York) and inquired about the 
possibility of a meeting with the Secretary.  He said that he 
already had a confirmed meeting with British FM David 
Miliband and a likely one with FM Bildt. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Risk of Defeat in April 2010 Elections "Real" 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Talat said his reelection in April 2010 "Presidential 
elections" was far from assured, adding that the elections 
posed a "real threat."  He warned Christofias, he said, that 
it would be "impossible" to negotiate with his likely 
electoral opponent, "TRNC PM" Dervish Eroglu, a hard-liner 
who does not speak English.  (Comment:  We largely agree with 
both assessments.  End Comment) 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Talat at a Loss on Possible Gestures from Ankara 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶8. (C) Talat was unable to respond to the Ambassador's 
question about small gestures Ankara might make to ease G/C 
suspicions and foster good will.  He could not think of any 
symbolic action and said it was impossible for any Turkish 
government to implement the Additional Ankara Protocol 
without the Greek Cypriots lifting T/C isolation.  The return 
of Varosha to G/C administration, he added, was part of the 
comprehensive solution.  Consequently, Talat said that he had 
told Christofias to cease pressuring Turkey.  This appeal, he 
said, was met by silence from Christofias. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment:  Talat's governance proposal represents the 
most serious negotiation toward common ground since talks 
began a year ago.  Talat's precarious domestic position was 
put in dramatic relief when his proposal to the G/Cs was 
 
NICOSIA 00000595  003 OF 003 
 
 
quickly pounced on by his own right-wing "government" and 
nationalists, who together control about 55-60% of the vote 
in the north.  They charged Talat with "selling out" Turkish 
Cypriot "sovereignty," forcing him to invoke Ankara to dampen 
criticism. We expect such attacks to increase in volume and 
intensity as the process moves forward (in tandem with the 
anti-solution chorus in the south), making Talat's position 
all the more difficult and Ankara's vocal support for his 
efforts more important.  End Comment. 
 
 
 
 
URBANCIC