VZCZCXRO5646
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHNEH
DE RUEHNE #1814/01 2440310
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 010310Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7868
INFO RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 5059
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 4280
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 4098
RUEHNEH/AMCONSUL HYDERABAD PRIORITY 0913
RHMCSUU/TSA HQ WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 2327
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001814 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/INSB, SCA/RA, EEB/TRA/OTP, AND DS/OFM/TPB 
DHS PASS TO TSA/OCC MSHARABI, TSA/OGS DMCQUAID, JCASTLEBERRY 
SINGAPORE FOR TSA/TKEENE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC EAIR PREL PTER OVIPIN
SUBJECT: TSA REP DISCUSSES BCAS AND FAMS MOU, VIP SCREENING 
 
(U) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED; PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.  DO NOT 
RELEASE OUTSIDE USG CHANNELS. 
 
¶1.  (U) SUMMARY:  Transportation Safety Administration 
Representative (TSA South Asia Regional Rep newly stationed in 
Singapore) Thomas Keene visited New Delhi August 4-7 to meet with 
Government of India (GOI) officials and U.S. airlines 
representatives to discuss aviation security issues.  During his 
initial visit, Keene presented a new U.S. text for the Airport 
Technical Visit Memorandum of Understanding with the Bureau of Civil 
Aviation Security (the BCAS MOU); sought agreement on the draft 
Federal Air Marshals Memorandum of Understanding (FAMS MOU); and 
discussed VIP security screenings, including the recent controversy 
in India's Parliament about Continental Airline's April screening of 
Former President Kalam.  GOI aviation officials promised to respond 
to the new BCAS MOU in 10-15 days and seemed close to agreement on 
the FAMS MOU as well as eager to pursue joint training 
opportunities.  Both sides increased their understanding of the 
others' concerns about VIP screening, but no resolution was reached. 
 Comment: As evidenced by the media controversy surrounding 
Bollywood star Sharukh Khan's recent secondary screening by U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection in Newark and public statements by 
Minister of Civil Aviation Praful Patel that such incidents will not 
be accepted by India and will be taken up with the U.S. government, 
this issue is not going away and is likely to become even more 
sensitive in the lead-up to Prime Minister Singh's official state 
visit to Washington in November.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
BCAS TO COMMENT ON AIRPORT VISIT MOU IN 10-15 DAYS 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2. (SBU) During his August 4 introductory meeting with Ministry of 
Civil Aviation (MOCA) Secretary Nambiar, MOCA Joint Secretary for 
International Cooperation Sukul, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security 
(BCAS) D.S. Chauhan and BCAS M.T. Baig, TSA Rep Keene explained that 
the Airport Technical Visit MOU (BCAS MOU) was in its third 
iteration.  In late 2007, TSA had presented BCAS with the original 
proposal, BCAS subsequently offered a counter-proposal and he was 
now delivering the "counter-counter-proposal."  Keene said the text 
was largely agreed.  He believed the only significant remaining 
areas of potential dispute were access control (TSA requested access 
control of the overall airport versus just access to the area around 
the gate being used by the airline) and the need to share national 
aviation security programs.  Keene explained that if there were 
sensitivities about providing such national program information in 
written form, it could be discussed orally. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Nambiar commented that these should not be insurmountable 
issues and instructed BCAS Chauhan and Baig to review the draft and 
work to see if an agreement could be reached.  Nambiar also 
instructed Chauhan and Baig to start verbal discussions with Keene 
and get back to him if there were any additional issues.  Nambiar 
was also receptive to the Keene's mention of the possibility of 
mutual capacity building programs and consultations after completion 
of the BCAS MOU.  When Keene met with BCAS Commissioner Sahi and 
Deputy Commissioner Malaviya on August 6, however, they explained 
that they were not yet prepared to discuss the text in detail, but 
would provide written comments in 10 to 15 days.  (Note: as of 
August 31, no comments have yet been received.  End Note.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) TSA Keene also met Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) 
Director General N. R. Das to discuss airport security issues and 
learn more about the mission and structure of CISF.  CISF falls 
under the Home Ministry and provides security for 282 industries 
mainly revolving around the energy sector (power, oil), but also at 
information technology (IT) centers and airports.  In previous years 
CISF only handled security at government facilities but since 2007, 
after the CISF Act was amended, CISF provides security for private 
industry entities like Infosys as well.  CISF provides security at 
57 of India's 84 airports and is responsible for all security at the 
airport including passenger screening.  However, if a law and order 
problem occurs the Delhi Police and/or National Security Guard will 
be brought in.  Private security groups are also present at the 
airport, such as G4, but they are employed by the carriers and 
handle baggage and cargo screenings only. 
 
AGREEMENT APPEARS CLOSE BUT NOT REACHED ON FAMS MOU 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 
NEW DELHI 00001814  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶5. (U) During his August 4 meeting with Nambiar, Keene explained 
that the FAMS MOU sought to formalize in writing what already took 
place in practice.  He shared his understanding that the FAMS MOU 
had been cleared by MOCA, BCAS, and the Ministry of External Affairs 
and was now at the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) for 
action.  Keene noted that completion of the MOU could open the way 
for training programs with India's sky marshals, an initiative that 
the Indian Embassy had requested several months ago.  Nambiar was 
enthusiastic about prospects for establishing joint training after a 
needs assessment and commented to Sukul that efforts should be made 
to finalize the MOU.  When Keene met with DGCA Director General 
Zaidi on August 6, Zaidi also seemed eager to finalize the agreement 
and said Keene should contact DGCA Director K P Maggon, the 
following day regarding possible final resolution of the MOU.  TSA 
Keene met with DGCA Maggon on August 7 and DGCA Maggon made some 
suggestions for minor edits on the FAMS MOU which TSA Keene has 
forwarded to TSA's legal team.  TSA Keene expects to hear back from 
TSA legal in the short term and will follow up with DGCA to continue 
to move the process forward. 
 
INCREASED UNDERSTANDING BUT NO RESOLUTION ON VIP SCREENINGS 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) After the highly publicized and politicized reporting of 
former President Kalam being publicly screened by Continental 
Airlines in April, the issue of VIP screenings was the most 
contentious issue discussed.  All of TSA Rep Keene's interlocutors 
wanted to prevent a similar incident from occurring in the future 
and sought an agreed course of action.  At an August 4 meeting with 
Keene, Continental Airline Senior Country Manager Laurent Recoura 
expressed relief that the Kalam incident was largely over.  He said 
Continental was alert to the possibility of GOI VIP passengers and 
would redirect them to Air India (AI) when possible.  He expressed a 
desire for clear black and white TSA rules on VIP exceptions to 
screening, rather than gray areas which the airlines would have to 
try to interpret. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Nambiar acknowledged that India's current list of 31 
categories of VIPs exempted from screening was excessive.  He 
suggested a compromise of an agreed reciprocal VIP list of 
exemptions that, in addition to active heads of state, would include 
former Prime Ministers and Presidents.  Nambiar said this would be 
approximately 5-6 individuals on the Indian side, since Prime 
Ministers, Presidents and Vice Presidents traveled on private 
aircraft.  Keene said he would forward the suggestion to TSA 
headquarters but did not want to unduly raise expectations that such 
an agreement on a reciprocal VIP list for exceptions to screening 
would be reached.  Keene explained that TSA would be issuing clear 
written guidance to all airlines flying direct to the Unites States 
in the near future explaining that only active heads of state 
traveling with Sec ret Service or Diplomatic Security would be exempt 
from screening when boarding direct flights to the United States, 
but also noting that airlines could and should conduct private 
screenings to ensure that VIP visitors were treated with appropriate 
respect.  Keene also explained that the Indian Embassy could also 
request additional limited exceptions to airport screenings in the 
United States for GOI VIP officials through the State Department's 
Office of Protocol. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Nambiar agreed that rules and regulations for aviation 
security were of the utmost importance to ensure passenger security, 
but stated there was also a need for some special exemptions for 
iconic individuals such as President Kalam.  He suggested this would 
require some out of the box thinking and stressed the need to work 
out some policy of handling lightly such individuals.  Nambiar also 
said the current policy of having all GOI employees fly AI (for 
financial reasons) should avoid the problem.  When reminded that AI 
also was subject to the same TSA requirements on direct flights to 
the United States, Nambiar said it would just be easier for AI to 
work out a policy of screening lightly while ensuring appropriate 
security.  He also suggested that Keene and BCAS officials discuss 
AI's VIP screening procedures when they next met. (Note:  Keene 
privately explained to Embassy ECONoffs that this issue would 
primarily be the responsibility of TSA's International Industry 
Representative (IIR) for AI and that he had alerted the IIR (also 
based in Singapore) to the issue.  End note.) 
 
¶9. (SBU) In Keene's August 6 meeting with BCAS officials Sahi and 
Malaviya, they did not bring up the VIP screening issue and focused 
only on the MOU, despite Keene asking if there were any other issues 
 
NEW DELHI 00001814  003 OF 003 
 
 
BCAS wanted to discuss.  However when FSN ECON Specialist contacted 
BCAS later in the day regarding their request for an August 7 
meeting to deal with a recent FAMS incident (relating to a FAM 
failing to declare ammunition), the representative noted that BCAS 
had not had the authority to discuss the VIP screening issue in its 
earlier meeting but would be prepared to do so on August 7. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) In the August 7 meeting, Keene provided BCAS Commissioner 
Sahi a TSA letter explaining the disciplinary actions that had been 
taken to deal with the procedural violation.  Then, BCAS Deputy 
Commissioner Malaviya made some surprising statements while Sahi 
remained silent.  Malaviya said that on more than one occasion, 
including when Malaviya traveled to the United States and met with 
TSA officials in May 2008, he had informed TSA that any new TSA 
security directives would have to conform to ICAO Standard 2.4.1. 
In essence, TSA would have to make a written request regarding any 
change in security directives and then BCAS would decide whether to 
approve it.  Malaviya said no written request had been made with 
respect to the TSA requirement for secondary screenings for direct 
flights to the United States from India.  Therefore, after the TSA 
security directive regarding secondary screenings was issued, BCAS 
asked home country carriers (Jet and AI) to disregard not only that 
directive but went so far as to direct them to disregard all TSA 
issued directives.  Malaviya said no similar request had yet been 
made to American carriers, but remarked that would also be within 
BCAS's prerogative.  Keene said this was the first time he heard of 
such discussions, asked for written memoranda on the issue (none 
were presented), and said he would be following up with TSA 
headquarters regarding Malaviya's statements.  (Note: when Keene 
later contacted TSA headquarters, TSA officials who had been present 
in the meetings Malaviya mentioned stated that no such discussion 
had taken place.  End note.) 
 
¶11. (SBU) During his out-brief with the DCM (prior to the final BCAS 
meeting), Keene said he understood that the VIP screening issue was 
both a security issue and a political one and that TSA leadership 
was aware of and focused on the problem.  That said, he was not 
optimistic about a quick solution to the contradiction between 
BCAS's large list of VVIPs and TSA's very limited policy for 
exceptions from screening.  He said TSA Headquarters would be 
convening a working group to review its VIP screening policy and 
that the working group would likely include a State Department 
Representative though constituting the group would take some time. 
Meanwhile, Keene planned to follow up with letters thanking his 
interlocutors for their meetings and to continue to work from 
Singapore and during regular visits to India to finalize the MOUs to 
facilitate greater bilateral cooperation on aviation security. 
 
ROEMER