VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNJ #0406/01 2611627
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181627Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7244
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000406 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C AND S/USSES 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM SU LY QA FR PKO MARR
ECON, EFIN, CD 
SUBJECT: AN EER FOR CHAD 
 
REF: A. 08 NDJAMENA 165 
     ¶B. 08 NDJAMENA 200 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 306 
     ¶D. NDJAMENA 353 
     ¶E. NDJAMENA 224 
     ¶F. NDJAMENA 355 
 
------- 
OVERVIEW 
-------- 
 
¶1. (SBU)  We learned two days ago of President Deby's 
decision to accept the invitation to lunch with POTUS and 
other African heads of state during upcoming UNGA meetings. 
This visit affords Embassy a good opportunity to lay out 
Chad's record of progress since its nadir of contemporary 
existence as a state in early 2008.  The death, destruction, 
and disruption caused by 2008 rebel attacks, which nearly 
toppled the Chadian regime, left the country militarily, 
politically, economically and diplomatically prostrate.  In 
the months following the attacks, Chad has recovered to a 
noteworthy degree, due largely to the government's 
willingness to follow the advice of its friends, including 
the USG.  At the behest of the international community, and 
because it had few other promising alternatives, the Chadian 
government has taken steps to end its diplomatic isolation 
and promote national reconciliation, political reform, 
socio-economic development, and strategic security. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  Chad's efforts have not been uniformly successful, 
nor are any of Chad's diplomatic partners giving the Deby 
regime "straight As" on its performance in the past 18 
months.  But there has been significant progress in key 
areas, and the GOC under Deby's key collaborators -- PM 
Youssouf Saleh Abbas and FORMIN Moussa Faki Mahamat, among 
others  -- has proceeded in ways that the USG has proposed 
and recommended. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The USG should seek to promote continued GOC 
progress along the paths traveled since February 2008. 
Increasing USG leverage in Chad will reinforce commitment to 
positive steps already taken.  Our continued involvement with 
the GOC is essential to achieving strategic U.S. goals in the 
region, starting with resolution of the Darfur crisis and 
return of Sudanese refugees to their homes. 
 
----------------------- 
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 
----------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Chad's current government is headed by Prime 
Minister Youssouf Saleh Abbas, who hails from the eastern 
town of Abeche.  Abbas's selection by President Deby in April 
2008 marked a departure from the traditional choice of a 
southern Chadian for this slot, and likely represented the 
President's desire to reach out to Chadians in regions that 
are host to Sudanese refugees and rebel movements (Ref A). 
In part in response to international, including USG, 
pressure, the Abbas cabinet was "opened" to the political 
opposition, with four senior opposition leaders named to 
significant ministries -- Defense, Justice, Agriculture, and 
Urban Planning (Ref B). 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  In the 19 months since the rebel attacks, 
"intra-Chadian diplomacy" and national reconciliation has had 
a revival.  Abderamane Moussa, the National Mediator and 
close advisor of President Deby, has been helping to woo 
rebels and exiles home.  Hundreds of rebels have returned to 
Chad, with rebel leader Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane (Ref C) 
the most prominent.  Former President Goukouni Oueddei has 
also returned to support the GOC in its "reconciliation with 
rebels" (Ref D). 
 
--------------- 
GOOD GOVERNANCE 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  The President has given the Prime Minister wider 
latitude than his predecessors to run the government, 
although Deby continues to oversee the "Presidential" 
portfolios of foreign affairs and defense.  PM Abbas, a 
former opposition figure long closely associated with former 
President Goukouni Oueddei and rebel leader Youssouf Togoimi, 
came to power with a program calling for "national 
reconciliation," political reform, and improved governance, 
including anti-corruption and anti-impunity for wrong-doers, 
as well as better relations with IFIs.  Abbas has had 
considerable success in some areas and less in others. 
Still, the PM's authority is limited (and those of his ally, 
the Finance Minister, bounded) by Infrastructure Minister 
Younousmi's Presidentially-approved prerogative on public 
spending and lack of enthusiasm on Younousmi's part for 
better relations with IFIs. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  The GOC responded to opposition party and 
international pressure by participating in an ad hoc 
Commission of Inquiry that investigated the events 
surrounding the rebel near-takeover of the capital last year. 
 The GOC continues to pursue legal investigations pursuant to 
the findings of the Commission into abuses committed at that 
time (although no facts have come to light about the 
disappearance of prominent opposition leader Ibni Oumar). 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  The GOC, again with considerable pressure from 
donors and the international community, has re-launched the 
moribund political reform process agreed to on August 13, 
2007 by members of the Government, the ruling party 
coalition, and opposition.  An Electoral Reform Committee 
created to implement the August 13 process has been able to 
formulate draft laws and other measures aimed at facilitating 
credible legislative and communal (local) elections in 2010, 
and credible presidential polling in 2011.  The National 
Assembly has passed, and the GOC adopted, a new electoral 
code and laws providing for necessary censuses (mapping, 
demographic, and "electoral") and for an Independent National 
Electoral Commission (CENI).  The CENI was formed and began 
work in July 2009. 
 
------------------------ 
NATIONAL DEFENSE 
AND EVERYDAY ENVIRONMENT 
------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Following the 2008 rebel attacks on N'Djamena, the 
government invested heavily in national security and military 
equipment.  The government decisively defeated subsequent 
rebel attempts to advance, most recently in May 2009.  Still, 
security and law enforcement are some of the more troubled 
sectors in Chadian society, particularly with respect to 
their understanding of human rights standards.  State control 
is weak down the chain of command and away from the capital. 
Soldiers sometimes act with impunity and have been implicated 
in a number of human rights cases.  The GOC has begun to 
tackle one aspect of the problem, child soldiers, by 
launching awareness campaigns and reviewing troops to try to 
identify under-aged fighters.  It has also handed hundreds of 
child soldiers captured from rebel ranks to the international 
community (Ref E). 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  The GOC has invested time and effort in 
reinforcing internal security, including at the local and 
community levels.  It has carried out major national 
campaigns to seize illegal weapons and to determine who of 
many uniformed individuals are actually members of the 
national army. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  In the environmental realm, Abbas has undertaken 
a comprehensive effort to address increasing desertification 
in Chad, especially around N'Djamena.  The GOC has banned 
charcoal as cooking fuel, in part to end the practice of 
felling live trees, and started a tree-planting campaign. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  While print and electronic media outlets continue 
to grow in number, the majority of Chadians, especially 
outside the capital, receive news from the radio, as well as 
from community, tribal and religious leaders.  Ordinance 
Five, which limited press freedoms after the February 2008 
attacks, is still on the books, but "independent media" 
delight in skewering government and other well-known figures, 
and anti-corruption is the most favored journalistic theme. 
 
------------------------------ 
RESPONSIBLE REVENUE MANAGEMENT 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
------------------------------ 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  In the past 18 months, the GOC has made progress 
in normalizing relationships with international financial 
institutions.  The government has restored its links with the 
World Bank, met requirements for a preliminary program with 
the IMF, and is seeking to reestablish ties with the European 
Investment Bank.  In an effort to clean up government 
payrolls, in mid-2009 the Ministry of Finance started 
bancarizating government employees' salaries. 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  The GOC won IMF backing in April 2009 for a 
six-month IMF Staff-Monitored Program, as a result of an 
agreement to revise the 2009 national budget to account for 
decreased revenue in the wake of reduced world oil prices. 
The budget revision was a serious first step by the 
government to improve management of public finances.  With 
IMF endorsement, the EU has offered Chad significant 
financial support and technical assistance in this area.  The 
IMF's first SMP review is under way as of this writing; GOC 
officials have admitted that they have missed some 
mid-program targets, but we await the IMF's formal assessment 
before declaring Chad's progress to be inadequate. 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  As part of its budget revision process, the GOC 
is specifically aiming to improve management of 
infrastructure spending.  Lack of predictable electricity 
availability and rising costs of living pose problems, but 
the GOC is endeavoring to use oil revenue for development 
around the country, including to build roads, schools, and 
health clinics. 
 
--------- 
DIPLOMACY 
--------- 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  The government continues to exercise diplomatic 
skill in carrying out responsibilities under the accords it 
has signed, including with respect to fair treatment for 
returning rebels from Sudan and normalizing relations with 
Sudan itself.  The GOC remains committed to fulfilling its 
obligations under the Dakar Accord (aimed at normalizing 
Chad-Sudan relations) and has been waiting since last year 
for Khartoum to take a turn housing the Contact Group.  (Chad 
hosted in November 2008.)  The Dakar Accord calls for 
international monitoring of the Chad-Sudan border, a concept 
the that GOC has pursued with SE Gration, with Libyan 
interlocutors, and with MINURCAT officials, among others. 
 
¶17.  (SBU)  The GOC demurred at joining new mediation efforts 
following the May 2008 rebels attacks, instead emphasizing 
its commitment to the Sirte Accord process, which lays out 
terms for return of Chadian rebels to their homeland. 
President Deby and other senior GOC officials have publicly 
welcomed returning rebels and made clear the government's 
desire to integrate returnees into la vie tchadienne.  Rebels 
feel so welcome that they often return with outrageous 
demands for ministerial or flag-rank military positions, 
which they sometimes obtain as Chad attempts to demonstrate 
that it will not discriminate against them (Ref F). 
 
¶18.  (SBU)  The GOC views itself as a necessary element in 
the Darfur peace equation, and has attempted to exert a 
positive influence on international peace initiatives. 
President Deby has hosted SE Gration during both of the 
latter's visits to Chad, and has made personal efforts to 
rein in the JEM's Khalil Ibrahim. 
 
----------------------- 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
AND PEACEKEEPING 
----------------------- 
 
¶19.  (SBU)  This is quite a bright spot for the GOC, which 
has performed well in cooperating with massive international 
humanitarian efforts in eastern and southern Chad, especially 
the former, where 300,000 Darfur refugees and 200,000 Chadian 
IDPs receive assistance worth $250 million per year. 
Overall, we and our PRM colleagues would give the GOC a 6.5 
or 7.0 on a scale of one to ten in these areas.  The GOC is 
generally responsive to international norms regarding 
refugees.  No egregious errors regarding responsibilities as 
a host nation have occurred.  We think that lack of capacity 
rather than lack of political will, and unintentional 
negligence rather than malfeasance, explain why Chad does not 
deserve better marks in this area.  The GOC has continued to 
make major efforts to deal constructively with two separate 
UNSC-authorized PKOs, the temporary EUFOR until mid-2008, and 
its UN partner and successor, the longer-lasting MINURCAT 
since then.  The government remains welcoming to all UN 
agencies as well as to the UN peace-keeping operation, and to 
the range of international NGOs that operate here.  Indeed, 
Chadian leaders and citizens view the UN and other 
international players as important partners not only in terms 
of managing Darfur refugees but also on the democratization 
and development fronts. 
 
--------------------- 
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
--------------------- 
 
¶20.  (SBU)  Chad's deficiencies are well known to 
international statisticians.  The nation ranks second to last 
on the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index.  It 
ranks ninth from last on the UNDP's development index of 179 
countries.  It ranks second to last among African states on 
the Ibrahim Index of African Governance.  It ranks seventh 
from last on Transparency International's Corruption 
Perception Index.  It is the world's fourth-most failed state 
on the Fund for Peace Index.  Against this backdrop, Chad's 
generosity to refugee populations and good relations with the 
international community based here to assist with the Darfur 
crisis deserve recognition and thanks.  That President Deby's 
authoritarian tendencies may be moderating slightly is one 
possible interpretation that could be brought to bear to 
explain the government's restraint in pursuing retribution 
against rebel who engaged in attacks in May of this year.  We 
would like to think that the GOC will honor its commitments 
to greater political opening and to including opposition 
voices in public debate in the months ahead. 
 
¶21.  (U)  Minimize considered. 
BREMNER