VZCZCXRO6845
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0368/01 2451135
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021135Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7201
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000368 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C AND S/USSES 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL UN PKO LY SU CD
SUBJECT: SRSG ANGELO ON CHAD-SUDAN, CHAD REBELS, AND DIS 
SUCCESSES 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 355 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) MINURCAT SRSG Angelo told Ambassador August 31 that 
he had taken the initiative to engage with the GOC on 
Chad-Sudan normalization issues and had presented the GOC 
with a list of graduated confidence building measure, which 
Sudan SRSG Adada also would present to the GOS.  Angelo said 
that he estimated that some 1,000 Chad rebels had returned to 
Chad since last year, not the 3,000-5,000 the GOC claimed, 
but still a substantial number.  The SRSG also said that he 
expected to sign a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) with 
the GOC before long, as soon as contentious but not 
insurmountable tax issues had been resolved and that the DIS, 
with UNPOL support and with GOC security apparatus 
cooperation, were proving increasingly effective, for which 
he cited examples.  Angelo reiterated his desire to see the 
U.S.military advisors on the MINURCAT staff increase from two 
to eight and promised to ensure that the request was 
implemented expeditiously. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Angelo said that his main interlocutor with the GOC 
on Chad-Sudan was FORMIN Faki, whom he described as the most 
intelligent of President Deby's close advisors; "the only one 
who could tell Deby things he might not want to hear," and 
"the only one who knew how to put into words that Deby could 
understand" such otherwise unpalatable issues and facts. 
Even so, it would be difficult to move the GOC to action 
vis-a-vis Sudan, because no one was yet willing to "champion" 
the idea of Chad-Sudan normalization as a strategic GOC goal. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  It is very good news, we judge, that the SRSG is 
getting involved in the Chad-Sudan normalization issue and we 
will try to support his efforts, as they parallel those of SE 
Gration and the USG in general.  Angelo's most urgent 
problems continue to be with his PKO bureaucracies in New 
York rather than with Chadian authorities, with whom he 
continues to build relationships of confidence and trust. 
Even the GOC's still-limited willingness to engage with the 
SRSG on Chad-Sudan normalization reflects its increasing 
comfort-level with Angelo as well as an alternative the 
engaging with the AU, which the GOC considers unreliable, 
pro-Sudan, and Arab-oriented.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------- 
MINURCAT TAKES ON 
CHAD-SUDAN ISSUES 
----------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo told Ambassador August 
31 that he had taken the initiative to engage with the GOC on 
Chad-Sudan normalization issues and had presented the GOC 
with a list of "graduated" confidence building measures, 
which SRSG Adada also would present to the GOS; more 
substantial measures, such as border monitoring, would 
follow.  Angelo outlined some of them:  Cessation of 
propaganda, opening of border points, low-level cross-border 
"visits," for instance, were modest first steps.  Angelo said 
that his PKO's involvement with the Chad-Sudan problem was 
the result of the approval of his Strategic Plan that 
included promoting "political dialogue" between Chad and 
Sudan.  Such promotion would contribute to MINURCAT's mandate 
to protect civilians in eastern Chad and would require no 
additional resources of any kind. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Angelo told Ambassador that his main interlocutor 
with the GOC was FORMIN Moussa Faki Mahamat, whom he 
described as the most intelligent of President Deby's close 
advisors; "the only one who could tell Deby things he might 
not want to hear," and "the only one who knew how to put into 
words that Deby could understand" such otherwise unpalatable 
issues and facts.  Even so, Angelo said it would be difficult 
to move the GOC to action vis-a-vis Sudan, because no one was 
yet willing to "champion" the idea of Chad-Sudan 
normalization as a strategic GOC goal.  Ambassador suggested 
that Angelo consider approaching National Mediator Abderamane 
Moussa, who, as a trusted "wise man" without further 
political ambitions, might play a useful role in bringing 
 
NDJAMENA 00000368  002 OF 002 
 
 
things to Deby's attention and recommending irenic courses of 
action.  Angelo said he would arrange to talk to the National 
Mediator. 
 
----------- 
CHAD REBELS 
----------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Angelo said that he estimated that some 1,000 Chad 
rebels had returned to Chad since last year, not the 
3,000-5,000 the GOC claimed, but still a substantial number. 
Angelo said that he knew that the GOS had not permitted Ahmat 
Soubiane to return to Sudan.  The SRSG said that he 
understood that substantial numbers of Chad rebels had 
relocated deeper inside Sudan and away from the Chad border 
but did not know if they did so on their own initiative or 
under Sudanese Government supervision. 
 
-------------------------- 
DIS INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Angelo said that the DIS, with UNPOL support and 
with GOC security apparatus cooperation, were proving 
increasingly effective.  He cited the DIS officer publicly 
decorated last week by MINURCAT for superior achievement. 
The DIS officer had lost a leg successfully defending an NGO 
ambulance from heavily-armed bandit attack.  Angelo said that 
MINURCAT had begun to form "task forces" consisting of DIS, 
UNPOL, and GOC security personnel, to attack specific 
problems.  Angelo cited the success of one such team in 
re-apprehending two rapists who had escaped from custody.  He 
said that another team was focused on foiling the efforts of 
a band of "refugee bandits" operating out of refugee camps 
near Goz Beida. 
 
------------------------- 
SOMA AND MORE U.S. MILADS 
------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  The SRSG also said that he expected to sign a 
Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) with the GOC before long, 
as soon as contentious but not insurmountable tax issues had 
been resolved.  Angelo pronounced his basic relationship with 
the GOC as "very good" and "very constructive," despite the 
inevitable relatively minor obstacles that had to be overcome 
along the way.  "Sometimes in situations like this, he said, 
"you just have to be patient."  Angelo reiterated his desire 
to see the U.S.military advisors on the MINURCAT staff 
increase from two to eight and promised to ensure that the 
request was implemented expeditiously.  He added that the 
slots for all eight were already planned and carefully 
calculated to give the U.S. MILADs insight into all areas of 
the MINURCAT force's operations. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)   It is very good news, we judge, that the SRSG is 
getting involved in the Chad-Sudan normalization issue and we 
will try to support his efforts, as they parallel those of SE 
Gration and the USG in general.  We continue to support the 
assignment of more U.S. MILADs to MINURCAT staff.  Angelo's 
most pressing problems continue to be with his PKO 
bureaucracies in New York, rather than with Chadian 
authorities, with whom he continues to build relationships of 
confidence and trust.  Even the GOC's still-limited 
willingness to engage with the SRSG on Chad-Sudan 
normalization reflects its increasing comfort-level with 
Angelo as well as an alternative the engaging with the AU, 
which the GOC considers unreliable, pro-Sudan, and 
Arab-oriented. 
 
¶10.  (U) Minimize considered. 
NIGRO