INFO  LOG-00   MFA-00   AF-00    A-00     CA-00    CIAE-00  INL-00   
      WHA-00   DS-00    EAP-00   DHSE-00  OIGO-00  FBIE-00  UTED-00  
      OBO-00   TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    MMP-00   MOFM-00  MOF-00   
      CDC-00   DCP-00   NSAE-00  OCS-00   OIG-00   CAEX-00  PER-00   
      PPT-00   DOHS-00  IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    MR-00    T-00     
      VO-00    NCTC-00  FMP-00   CBP-00   ECA-00   DSCC-00  NFAT-00  
      SAS-00   FA-00    PESU-00  SANA-00    /000W

R 301624Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0151
NVC PORTSMOUTH 0031
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMCONSUL MONTREAL 
RWANDA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS KINSHASA 000898 
 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP; CA/FPP PLEASE PASS DHS CIS/FDNS; FOR CA/VO/KCC; 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC CG
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - KINSHASA 
 
REF: A) State 57623; B) State 997431; C) Kinshasa 17; 
D) Kinshasa 346 
 
 
¶1.  Per reftel A, post is updating its country fraud summary, 
covering March 1, 2009 to August 31, 2009. 
 
 
¶A.  COUNTRY CONDITIONS 
 
¶2.  The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is slowly recovering 
from a war begun in 1998 that led to the deaths of more than five 
million persons.  Conflict flares periodically in the mineral-rich 
eastern part of the country, and the war's after effects continue to 
hamper economic growth and the formation of stable government.  Most 
Congolese citizens live on less than $120 per year, and every day 
Congolese citizens die as a result of preventable diseases and lack 
of access to basic medical care.  Approximately 70% of the 
population is malnourished. 
 
¶3.  Two principal challenges exist for anti-fraud work.  First, 
fraud and corruption are wide spread, both from applicants trying to 
obtain immigration benefits and from Congolese officials trying to 
supplement low salaries by selling fake civil documents or bona fide 
documents based on false information.  Second, government 
administrative capacity, at all levels, is weak to nonexistent, and 
even when government officials express interest in combating fraud, 
they often lack the tools necessary to enhance transparency.  Most 
government offices, for example, do not have access to computers. 
As a result, basic civil documents -- passports, birth certificates, 
and marriage certificates - are easy to obtain: often, applicants 
simply appear at a government office and pay a fee. 
 
¶4.  Lack of standardization of Congolese names adds an additional 
challenge.  Every day, the consular section sees applicants with two 
or three valid passports, each with a different name.  The name 
"Jean Jacques Mulongo Makengo," for example, could appear as a 
surname in four different ways: "Makengo;" "Mulongo Makengo;" 
"Jacques Mulongo Makengo;" or even "Jean Jacques Mulongo Makengo," 
first name unknown.  Congolese civil servants, in general, do not 
verify biographic information, and cultural traditions allow 
individuals to change names throughout their life.  Mala fide 
applicants exploit this custom to acquire new names in order to hide 
prior refusals or ineligibilities. 
 
¶B.  NIV FRAUD 
 
¶5.  Mala fide G-2 applicants represent the largest source of NIV 
fraud.  DRC officials frequently apply for visas in large groups at 
the last-minute, with incomplete applications and diplomatic notes 
missing essential information.   In many cases, the reason for 
travel has ended before the Embassy receives the NIV application. 
Interviewing officers face a daily challenge of sorting genuine 
officials from hangers-on.  A more serious problem involves 
administrative control over diplomatic notes.  The Cabinet includes 
more than 40 ministers, each with a separate office of protocol; 
Parliament and the Presidency also have protocol offices.  The 
result is a flood of diplomatic notes, often for travelers who are 
not officials or who are traveling for pleasure.  The consular 
section has met three times in the past year with the MFA's chief of 
protocol, who has admitted that the MFA lacks the ability to control 
the issuance of diplomatic passports, official passports, or 
diplomatic notes.  The Embassies of Canada, Belgium, and Great 
Britain report similar problems with applications from Congolese 
officials. 
 
¶6.  As a result, the consular section interviews all G-2 and A-2 
applicants, except ministers and officials with U.S. travel in the 
past two years.  In March, the DRC submitted more than 250 
applications for a UN conference on woman's issues.  Post 
interviewed one-half of the applicants and found that 30% were not 
government officials; some were applying on tourist passports.  The 
GDRC withdrew the remaining applications.  Also in March, the 
consular section conducted a field investigation for three A-visa 
applicants who were unable to explain the purpose of their trip. 
The investigation revealed that the applicants had genuine 
diplomatic notes, but none actually worked for the government.  To 
help reduce mala fide applications, post held an open house for all 
DRC protocol offices in June, and in August, for the first time in 
years, the DRC did not submit a large-number of questionable 
applications for the UNGA.  Post plans to continue to liaison with 
other missions, hold semi-annual open houses, and interview the 
majority of government officials.  The consular section will also 
continue to insist on complete documentation for official visas and 
to decline requests for interviews after-hours. 
 
¶7.  In contrast to G-2 applicants, the consular section finds few 
problems with G-4 applicants, and during the reporting period, post 
waived the personal appearance for G-4 travelers.  Post liaisons 
closely with the protocol office from the UN, which provides the 
lion's share of applications, many from visa waiver countries.  In 
April, however, post discovered a mala fide traveler using a genuine 
UN diplomatic note.  The UN conducted a full investigation, 
discovered that the applicant's husband - a UN employee - had 
acquired the note, and fired the husband.  No similar incident took 
place during the reporting period. 
 
¶8.  All B-1/B-2 applications are ripe with fake documents: false 
bank statements, forged employment letters, and questionable 
property deeds, but applicants who are part of a group - a church, 
service organization, or business association- provide the second 
largest source of mala fide applicants.  In a typical pattern, the 
group applies in stages, with the best qualified applying first.  In 
June, for example, post issued a B-1 visa to a Malian trader going 
to New York.  Fourteen more Malians applied in the next month for 
the same purpose; all were denied.  Post relies on past experience, 
search engines, and contacts within the local community to determine 
bona fide intent for these types of travelers.  Post also maintains 
an electronic fraud toolkit which includes information on how to 
identify valid DRC documents, and the consular section is enrolling 
all staff in FSI's online anti-fraud training.  In June, post 
conducted a workshop for leaders of various community organizations 
to explain visa processing and to encourage screening of 
applications.  More than 40 representatives attended, and the 
consular section plans another workshop for the next reporting 
period. 
 
¶9.  Several changes were made in the reporting period to use 
anti-fraud resources more effectively.   The consular section moved 
away from document verification as the primar method of detecting 
fraud to place greater emphasis on interviewing.  In this regard, 
the consular section greatly benefited from a two-month TDY by a WAE 
who demonstrated effective interviewing techniques.  Post 
discontinued the practice of issuing one-month visas as an 
anti-fraud measure and ended the call-back program: borderline 
applicants are now simply denied.  These changes freed resources to 
perform more field investigations, which focused on serious fraud, 
including alien smuggling, imposters, and mala fide relationships. 
 
¶C.  IV FRAUD 
 
¶10.  A reorganization of anti-fraud resources also took place in the 
immigrant visa section.  The consular section no longer verifies 
every civil document presented in immigrant visas cases.  The 
verifications represented a considerable commitment of time, 
particularly given the difficulties of travel in the DRC, and often 
produced inconclusive results.  In addition, all documents are not 
central to adjudicating every kind of immigrant visa case.  As in 
NIV work, emphasis has moved to spending more time on interviews and 
field investigations.  The consular section pays particular 
attention to minors.  A 2007 NIV validation study showed a 
high-incidence of overstays for children, particularly boys, between 
the ages of 10 and 14.  Post believes a similar kind of risk exists 
in immigrant cases for children, who may be petitioned by persons 
lacking a biological relationship. 
 
¶11.  DNA testing provides an invaluable tool in anti-fraud work 
across immigrant visa categories, most notably for Visas 92/93, and 
post welcomes the changes brought by reftel B.  The primary value of 
DNA testing for the consular section is deterrence.  In fiscal year 
2008, post monitored 85 DNA tests; 80 came back positive.  Post 
estimates, however, that perhaps twice that many tests were 
recommended but never completed, suggesting at least some mala fide 
applicants dropped claims rather than risk being exposed.  The 
general public is aware that the consular section regularly suggests 
DNA testing. 
 
¶D.  DV FRAUD 
 
¶12.  In fiscal year 2008, post saw a 30% rise in DV adjudications, 
the second year of such an increase.  "Pop-up" marriages - marriages 
that took place after the principal applicant entered the lottery - 
represent the largest number and most difficult of fraud cases. 
Post conducts separate interviews for the husband and wife in pop-up 
marriages and requires convincing secondary evidence.  Still, many 
interviews lead to field investigations, and post estimates that 
half of these marriages are not issued DVs.  Post has continued the 
practice of verifying all DRC high school diplomas, and fake 
diplomas constitute the second largest source of DV fraud. 
Applicants also present certificates and training program diplomas 
to claim an education equivalent to an American high school diploma. 
 The consular section usually does not accept these claims. 
Finally, post confirmed 12 cases of imposters during the DV season. 
 
¶13.  The WAE TDYer helped train the section in uncovering patterns 
of fraud by using Lexis/Nexus and CCD to find visa fixers in the 
United States and by identifying potentially problematic cases that 
needed additional attention.   For example, post found that one 
address in the United States yielded 11 2009 DV winners.  Of these 
cases, two were issued, two were denied for pre-existing 
derivatives, one missed the interview, five had "pop-up" marriages, 
and two were subjects of field investigations.  The consular section 
plans greater use of computer-assisted anti-fraud tools during the 
next DV season. 
 
¶14.  Post has reported on the DRC's efforts to introduce biometric 
passports and on the difficulties applicants face in acquiring 
passports (reftels C and D).  The delays affect all categories of 
applicants, but DV winners are particularly hard hit.  Most DV 
winners receive their passports in the last two months of the fiscal 
year, and the sudden rush of applicants taxes the fraud unit.  DV 
cases in the DRC are high risk - exceeded only by Visas 92/93 - and 
post will continue public outreach to encourage DV applicants to 
become documentarily qualified as soon as possible. 
 
 
¶E.  ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD 
 
¶15.  Post had one case of ACS fraud: an imposter tried to obtain a 
US passport using genuine documents.  The ACS FSN was alerted when a 
comparison of the application and documents showed errors.  During 
the interview with the officer, the applicant was unfamiliar with 
the biographical details of his application.  The case was turned 
over to the RSO, who elicited a confession. 
 
¶F.  ADOPTION FRAUD 
 
¶16.  Adoptions cases are numerous and problematic.  Congolese law 
governing adoptions is complicated and confusing - and frequently 
ignored by courts.  For example, the law forbids couples with two 
children from adopting a third; local judges, however, frequently 
ignore this prohibition and issue valid acts of adoption to couples 
with large families.  In addition, informal adoptions are 
commonplace.  In the typical scenario, a child goes to live with a 
family member who is better off financially (or who is immigrating 
to the United States), but no legal adoption takes place, and the 
biological parents remain active in the child's life.  For these 
reasons, adoption cases take up a large portion of anti-fraud 
resources, because a large number of documents must be authenticated 
and because a field investigation is usually required. 
 
¶G.  USE OF DNA TESTING 
 
¶17.  As mentioned earlier, DNA testing is vital to Embassy 
Kinshasa's anti-fraud work, particularly in Visas 92/93 cases, where 
documents are often missing or unavailable.  Despite the poverty 
found in the DRC, most applicants do not object to the costs 
associated with the testing, since it often provides the only means 
to establish a biological relationship.  Instead, applicants express 
concern about the time needed to receive results, but even then, the 
testing can be faster than trying to obtain documents from local 
officials in areas racked by war. 
 
¶H.  ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD 
 
¶18.  Visa 92/93 cases present unique anti-fraud challenges.  A 
typical mala fide applicant holds the same profile as a typical bona 
fide applicant: a child who knows little or nothing about the 
petitioner and lacks documents proving the relationship.  DNA 
testing is vital for confirming biological relationships but cannot 
authentic marriages or adoptions, which are common.  Most Visas 
Qauthentic marriages or adoptions, which are common.  Most Visas 
92/93 applicants, moreover, are poorly educated, bewildered by the 
bureaucratic demands of immigrant visa processing, and living close 
to poverty.  The end result can be cases that stretch out for 
months.  As an example, in October 2008, the consular section 
interviewed seven children petitioned by their father in a Visas 
92/93 case.  The two oldest children did not look like the other 
five, had no secondary evidence of their relationship to the 
petitioner, and at the interview, appeared to be coached.  Post 
asked for DNA testing.  The two youngest children were tested in 
March 2009, and visas were issued, but the other five have never 
reappeared.  During the reporting period, post confirmed several 
cases of fraudulent relationships but no cases of imposters. 
 
¶I.  ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST 
        TRAVEL 
 
¶19.  Trafficking remains a serious concern for post.  Consular 
officers pay close attention to children in all visa categories. 
During the reporting period, post did not issue any tourist visas to 
children traveling alone or to domestics.  Post scrutinizes 
Kinshasa's large Lebanese community, some of who may be involved in 
terrorist fund-raising.  In August, one Lebanese businessman was 
denied a visa when his SAO indicated ineligibility.  In September 
the DRC sent a diplomatic note for two Cubans working as 
presidential physicians; both had applied in 2008 with different 
names in Congolese passports.  The applicants have been found 
ineligible under 212(a)(6)(C), and post plans to ask the DRC for a 
formal explanation. 
 
¶J.  DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 
 
¶20.  Post had one DS criminal fraud investigation. 
 
¶K.  HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY 
 
¶21.  Post had concerns about the security of the interim biometric 
passports the DRC began issuing in 2008, but the Department 
determined that the passports were valid travel documents, and the 
DRC stopped issuing them in March 2009.  The old, non-biometric 
passports are still valid, most with a validity date until 2012. 
These passports provide biographic information written in ink, which 
is often difficult to read, and lack rudimentary security features. 
Of more concern are the administratve procedures involved in 
acquiring passports.   Application procedures are not standardized, 
and it is possible for an applicant to obtain a passport without 
supporting documentation.  Even that supporting documentation can be 
suspect.  Congolese law requires that all births be registered 
within three months.  But if a birth is not registered, two 
witnesses can make a sworn statement, a local magistrate can issue a 
judgment based on that statement, and a birth certificate can be 
issued.  The majority of DV and Visas 92/93 applicants seen in the 
reporting period provided birth certificates registered in 2009. 
Marriage certificates are even more problematic.  Congolese law 
recognizes three types of marriages, customary, civil, and 
religious.  Customary marriages are regulated by local governments, 
which show little interest in providing administrative oversight. 
 
¶L.  COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
 
¶22.  The consular section enjoys a solid working relationship with 
the MFA's office of protocol and with the Director General of 
immigration.  Local officials, with a few exceptions, work willingly 
with fraud investigators.  But these relationships have built-in 
limits: both the Director General and the  Chief of protocol have 
made multiple visa recommendations for mala fide travelers.  Even 
those host government officials willing to work with the consular 
section are hampered by administrative constraints, such as 
intermittent power supplies, incomplete administrative records, and 
low employee morale. 
 
¶M.  AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN 
 
¶23.  The vacant entry-level officer position is the section's 
number-one concern.  The junior officer position - one of two 
officers in the section - has been vacant for six months and is 
unlikely to be filled before January.  This officer is normally the 
visa chief and head of the anti-fraud unit.  Fraud prevention 
remains a top priority, but reorganization and shifting resources 
can only go so far, and effective fraud work requires a second 
officer.  Because of the staffing gap, the consul was forced to 
cancel attendance at the anti-fraud course in June. 
 
¶N.  STAFFING AND TRAINING 
 
¶24.  The Consul and the FSN Consular Assistant serve as the Fraud 
Prevention Unit.  Two consular FSNs have applied for fraud training 
QPrevention Unit.  Two consular FSNs have applied for fraud training 
in Washington in November, but currently post does not have any 
officers who have completed fraud prevention training. 
 
BROCK