VZCZCXRO8256
PP RUEHRN
DE RUEHLGB #0618/01 2731630
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301630Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6330
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP 0077
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0284

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIGALI 000618 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2019 
TAGS: PREL MOPS PINS PINR KJUS CG RW
SUBJECT: RDF GENERAL EMPHASIZES REGIONAL STABILITY, URGES 
USG ACTION AGAINST FDLR 
 
REF: USUN 791 
 
KIGALI 00000618  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Anne Casper for reasons 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a September 23 meeting, a senior Rwandan 
military officer stressed that regional peace and stability, 
especially with regard to the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), was in Rwanda's vital interest.  He requested 
USG action against U.S.-based supporters of the Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an armed group 
operating in eastern DRC.  Other senior Rwandan officials 
have made this same point in recent weeks.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) CDA and polcouns met on September 23 with Rwandan army 
Brigadier General Jerome Ngendahimana, at the latter's 
request, in his office at the Rwandan defense ministry. 
There were no other participants.  Tone of the meeting was 
friendly. 
 
¶3. (C) Ngendahimana, who until 2003 was the J-2 or 
intelligence chief for the Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), said he was currently serving as 
Rwandan army chief Gen. James Kabarebe's military assistant 
for intelligence and security.  (Note:  The FDLR is a Rwandan 
politico-military group whose armed wing, perhaps 4000-6000 
strong, operates in the DRC but whose political leaders live 
in Europe and elsewhere.  End Note.)  After recounting his 
own repatriation to Rwanda in 2003 (see para 6), Ngendahimana 
explained that Rwanda needed peace and stability in 
surrounding countries, especially the DRC, in order to secure 
its own economic development and attract foreign investment. 
Relations between Rwanda and the DRC have greatly improved, 
he continued, noting his own role as the senior Rwandan 
officer during the January-February 2009 combined 
Rwandan-Congolese military campaign in the DRC against the 
FDLR.  "The Congolese population didn't trust us to leave" 
the DRC, he said, "but now they trust us."  Again emphasizing 
the importance of economics, he urged USG support for 
Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), in order 
to solidify the improved ties between Rwanda and the DRC. 
 
¶4. (C) Turning more specifically to the FDLR, Ngendahimana 
listed the reasons why many FDLR rank and file continue to 
remain in the DRC, despite increased military pressure from 
Rwandan, Congolese and UN forces.   One reason, he said, was 
simply "jobs."  Many FDLR members lacked formal education or 
were illiterate, and lacked the skills necessary to find 
civilian employment.  "Propaganda and ideology" was another, 
as FDLR leaders indoctrinate the rank and file, restrict 
their access to outside information, and instill hatred of 
Tutsis and the Government of Rwanda (GOR).  A third reason 
was that for the past several years, "there has been no 
military pressure, and the FDLR have gone into business" by 
extracting the DRC's mineral wealth.  Finally, he argued, 
"the international community," specifically NGOs and members 
of MONUC, had no interest in seeing the FDLR go away, as it 
would mean those NGOs and MONUC would lose their raison 
d'etre.  Also, the "hard core" of FDLR leaders included many 
who had participated in the 1994 genocide and would face 
severe punishment were they to return to Rwanda. (Comment: 
Rwandan officials have long accused MONUC, the UN and 
international NGOs of bad faith, naivete or inefficiency.  We 
note that Ngendahimana omitted one other oft-cited reason, 
Qnote that Ngendahimana omitted one other oft-cited reason, 
namely, coercion by senior and mid-level FDLR leaders.  End 
Comment.) 
 
¶5. (C) Continuing in the same vein, Ngendahimana said top 
FDLR leaders and their families lived and worked unhindered 
in Europe and the United States, and urged the USG to take 
action against those on U.S. territory.  When pressed for 
specific details, he promised to check with the Rwandan 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ascertain what information the 
GOR had previously provided the USG.  (Comment: It was 
unclear to us whether he was referring to FDLR names the GOR 
has previously submitted to us for the UN sanctions process, 
or whether he had a different set of individuals in mind. 
End Comment.) 
 
¶6. (C) BIO NOTE: Ngendahimana is an ethnic Hutu, married with 
three daughters, two sons, and three stepchildren.  His wife, 
a Hutu from the Gisenyi area, has been a member of parliament 
since 2008 and has reportedly played an active role in 
encouraging FDLR members to return to Rwanda.  Ngendahimana, 
describing his earlier career, said he was originally an 
officer in the gendarmerie, and served as a company commander 
 
KIGALI 00000618  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
and then battalion commander near Ruhengeri during the 
1990-94 war.  In 1994 he entered the DRC with remnants of the 
former government's armed forces and remained in the Kivus 
for the duration, eventually achieving the rank of colonel, 
as J-2 of FDLR, before he quit the DRC in 2003.  Ngendahimana 
said that between 1994 and 2003, he had had no communication 
with his wife, who remained in Rwanda, but Kabarebe located 
her and convinced her to travel to the DRC to encourage her 
husband to switch sides and return to Rwanda.  After hearing 
her testimony and questioning her at length, he did indeed 
return in 2003, escaping only by deceiving his fellow FDLR 
cadres.  In 2004, fully rehabilitated and given a house by 
the GOR, he was promoted to brigadier general.  Though he did 
not mention it, Ngendahimana was also a member of the GOR's 
own "Mucyo Commission," which investigated and reported on 
France's role in the 1994 genocide. 
 
¶7. (C) COMMENT: Ngendahimana's emphasis on economics, and his 
statement that Rwanda needs peace and stability in the region 
in order to prosper, echo what other senior GOR officials 
have been saying in recent months.  Consistent with our own 
assessment, he did not depict the FDLR's military wing in the 
DRC as a significant or immediate threat to Rwanda.  His call 
for action against FDLR political cadres and other "negative 
forces" living outside Rwanda reflects the strong influence 
FDLR leaders wield over the rank and file in the bush.  Other 
GOR officials have delivered this same message in recent 
weeks (reftel).  Post will review the status of our 
information exchange with the GOR on FDLR sanctions, in 
response to and anticipation of this.  END COMMENT. 
CASPER