VZCZCXRO5191
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2969/01 2700618
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 270618Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1684
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002969 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MOPS KJUS AF PAK
SUBJECT: BUILDING A POLICE FORCES IN BABAJI, HELMAND 
PROVINCE 
 
Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt B 
. Yee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Helmand has a critical shortage of trained 
police.  To address this challenge U.S. Special Forces, Task 
Force 72, will begin training 100 Afghans in the Babaji area. 
 This force will be trained at FOB Price, and after they 
complete their training the new police will be based in their 
local communities.  TF72 will provide sustained mentoring of 
the new force and engage with the local communities to 
address any issues that arise from this force.  Governor 
Mangal and Task Force Helmand (TFH) have endorsed this effort 
but insisted that the new police must be officially part of 
the ANP.  Local elders also insisted that any new police 
force must not be a militia but an official police force 
where the officers are uniformed and have regular pay.  This 
model may be able to generate additional trained police for 
Helmand, but continued support from the local communities, 
the Provincial Government and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) 
will be essential to success.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Police Needed Now 
------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Across Helmand the shortage of trained police is 
acute.  Both UK and U.S. forces are highly motivated to 
generate trained police as soon as possible.  Over the past 
several years TF72, which is based in Forward Operating Base 
(FOB) Price just outside Gereshk, has worked extensively with 
the local armed group led by Haji Kaduz.  This "Kaduz Armed 
Group" operated multiple checkpoints around the area and at 
times protected local residents but also preyed on them. 
Local elders often asked that the armed group be incorporated 
into the official police so the men would be trained, 
uniformed and paid.  They believed these changes would help 
them have some accountability over this force and lessen 
there efforts to extort money from the local community. 
Governor Mangal and Task Force Helmand (TFH) both supported 
this local request and worked with TF72 to coordinate their 
offer to Kaduz.  After some initial push-back from Kaduz, it 
was agreed the force would be trained locally by TF72 and the 
new police would be based in their communities and not at a 
purpose built FOB.  TF72, with the cooperation of the local 
elders, vetted each police candidate and the proposed 
leadership.  TF72 agreed to provide long term mentoring and 
coordinate the entire effort with TFH, the PRT and the 
Provincial Chief of Police.  The local elders have endorsed 
the agreement and are working closely with TF72 to support 
the implementation. 
 
Training and Support 
----------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) TF72 is working with CSTC-A and the Regional 
Training Centers (RTCs) to ensure their training package 
meets Focused District Development (FDD) standards.  They are 
also working with these elements to procure the required 
material to equip the new unit.  All agree that one training 
standard has to be used across the country and TF72 is 
working to implement the correct training package.  The 
limited training capacity at the RTCs would not allow this 
force to receive the required FDD training soon and this 
local effort may be the solution if implemented correctly. 
Material support can come from the Provincial Chief of Police 
but this will have to be authorized by CSTC-A. 
 
Long Term Mentoring 
------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) What may set this effort apart from past failures to 
establish a similar local program in Helmand is the 
relationship TF72 had with Haji Kaduz and the fact that long 
term mentoring is an integral part of this effort.  Previous 
local police training efforts did not incorporate this and 
the units quickly melted away.  Also the incorporation of the 
new police into the official Afghan police system gives the 
local community and the Provincial leadership a real sense of 
control of the force.  The men will be registered, uniformed, 
and paid through the GIRoA, and the Helmand Chief of Police 
will have legal control of this force, with the authority to 
discipline or remove poorly performing police. 
 
Comment 
----- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) All the involved parties in this program have 
learned hard lessons from previous failures.  Taking these 
lessons into account, TF72  will try to produce a trained 
local police force that answers to GIRoA.  Before starting 
 
KABUL 00002969  002 OF 002 
 
 
training, TF72 will require CSTC-A and MoI approval.  If 
payment and logistics issues can be resolved, this training 
initiative has the potential to strengthen the police 
presence and security in Helmand province. 
EIKENBERRY