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DE RUEHBUL #2807/01 2580500
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O 150500Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1471
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002807 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KJUS MOPS AF PAK
SUBJECT: ELECTION DAY COMMUNITY BASED SECURITY PLAYS ROLE 
BUT LESS ROBUST THAN PREVIEWED 
 
REF: KABUL2384 
 
¶1.    (SBU) Begin Summary.  Community based security (CBS) 
was an important element on election day, but was not as 
expansive or as problematic as previewed in advance of the 
elections.  While many provincial leaders noted their 
intention to tap into local men to provide security, these 
forces did not materialize in many provinces as a result of a 
mix of reasons: lack of timely funding by Kabul security 
agencies, inability to recruit personnel and concerns of 
provincial leadership about potential misuse of CBS.  In some 
provinces, particularly in the East, the CBS appears to have 
provided enhanced security on election day, particularly in 
provinces with more established tribal structures.  In the 
South, the use of CBS was limited with the exception of 
Uruzgan province, where the CBS was somewhat useful.  Herat 
Province in the West had a much more robust CBS program than 
was anticipated, but the program fizzled in the North's Ghor 
Province when provincial leaders realized they would need to 
be paired with local Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). 
Lack of payment of CBS remains a complaint across the 
provinces and although payment of 8,000 Afghanis was promised 
for a month's work, in almost each case, CBS worked only on 
August 20.  End Summary. 
 
RC-North ) Limited Role for Community Based Security 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (SBU) In Kunduz, the State PRT Rep reported that about 300 
people were deployed as CBS for the election.  They were not 
allocated weapons, so the provincial ANP chief made use of 
what the ANP had.  The CBS was deployed together with the ANP 
to provide security to the districts, but the ANP Chief told 
State PRT officer that they were not deployed at polling 
centers.  While the salary was to be 8,000 Afghanis for a 
month, many have not been paid yet.  Unlike in other 
provinces, the CBS was given a three week training course at 
the INL Regional Training Center in Kunduz. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In Ghor, despite the intention to make use of CBS on 
election day as part of the Tribal Security Augmentee Program 
(TSAP), all security was provided by the ANP without 
assistance from CBS.  The decision to use only ANP stemmed 
from concerns about implementation of the IEC requirement 
that a polling site would not open without ANSF being 
present.  Plans to use locals only to secure 100 polling 
sites were quickly scrapped three days prior to the election 
and the TSAP was not implemented. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In Faryab, CBS was slated to provide security in 
about 40 polling stations, including 20 in the Ghormach 
district, but the IEC limitations on use of local forces 
without ANSF presence appears to have limited the use of the 
forces on election day.  This particularly impacted the 
Ghormach district where ANSF were unable to go on election 
day; reportedly, however, two polling centers in Quaysar 
district opened on election day with only CBS present.  The 
PRT indicated that locals reported that the CBS entered some 
polling places and attempted to influence voting, but it is 
not clear whether or not this had any impact. 
 
RC-West ) Robust CBS in Herat, Nothing in Farah 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) While initial plans in Herat were for limited use of 
CBS in the insecure districts, in the end, CBS was hired in 
each of Herat's 15 districts.  The ANP Chief reported to 
State PRT Officer that 150 were hired in Shindand and Guzara 
districts, and 50 were hired in the other 13 districts. 
Reportedly, though, more than 1000 CBS were hired throughout 
Herat, so some of the districts had more than the allotted 
CBS numbers.  The ANP Chief said that in some districts CBS 
was hired as much for political as security reasons, so that 
residents would not complain they were treated differently. 
The CBS helped provide outer ring security for polling 
centers, and did not deploy to the polling centers 
themselves.  The CBS was supposed to be paid the standard 
8,000 Afghanis (5000 for salary and 3000 for food, tranport, 
and other expenses) for a month's work; however, funds have 
only been received for the 350 guards in Shindand, Adraskan, 
and Guzara.  The other 600 plus CBS have not been paid and 
the local shuras are demanding payment. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In Farah, the PRT noted that the CBS initiative 
never materialized because the MOI did not provide funding. 
 
RC-South ) Uruzgan Is Exception 
------------------------ 
 
 
KABUL 00002807  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) A Partners Coordination Board Meeting held at the 
civilian regional platform at RC-South on August 29 concluded 
that CBS did not play a significant role in providing 
protection on election day, and to the best of everyone's 
knowledge, the ANSF were present at all polling centers. 
Uruzgan was the exception, where a large CBS was deployed, 
and Helmand Province authorized and paid CBS in some 
districts, but the CBS does not appear to have been active on 
election day.  Zabul and Kandahar State PRT Representatives 
reported that CBS was not used on election day. 
 
¶8. (SBU) In Uruzgan, the PRT estimates roughly 1,000 men from 
assorted tribal and political affiliations made up the CBS. 
Each group of men, varying in number, was headed by a 
commander who reported to an influential tribal and militia 
leader, Mohammad Nabi Khan Tokhi.  The PRT understands that 
these men stayed between one and two kilometers away from the 
polls, providing a ring of security around the various 
polling centers.  PRT believes their primary role on election 
day was to provide directions to those looking for polling 
centers.  Reportedly, the CBS was unarmed, though the PRT 
were told that if an event occurred they had weapons nearby 
to assist the ANSF.  Team commanders were to be paid $100 for 
the month, and foot soldiers were paid about $20; while not 
paid as of September 5, the salary money reportedly was 
transferred to a local bank for payment.  While the CBS, as a 
whole, were well behaved on election day, local officials 
told the PRT they were not impressed by the CBS and do not 
plan to incorporate them into the provincial security network 
on a full-time basis. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In Helmand, while the CBS was established for a 
month, their role on election day was minimized after the 
ANSF and ISAF discouraged its use.  The CBS was coordinated 
at the Provincial level by Deputy Governor Satar, but the 
district governors controlled their activities.  Satar 
authorized 100 CBS in Gereshk, 100 in Garmsir, 100 in Nad 
Ali, and 50 in Nawa.  PRT reports that despite these 
authorized positions, CBS played no evident security function 
on election day. 
 
RC-East ) CBS Played Important Role in Some Provinces 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶10. (SBU) In the more tribal or conflicted provinces of 
RC-East, CBS appeared to play a positive role.  However, in 
some provinces like Bamyan, Kunar, Parwan, Panjshir, and 
Logar there were no confirmed CBS on election day, although 
this does not rule out that some informal tribal security was 
used.  Also, in Logar, approximately 250 Anyak copper mine 
police forces were used for election security in polling 
centers located in the districts of Mohammad Aga and 
Pul-e-Alam. 
 
¶11. (SBU) In Laghman, the provincial Chief of Police had 
instructed all district authorities to hire local tribal 
militia to support IEC delivery and security of polling 
centers in their districts.  The CoP reportedly promised one 
bag of wheat to each tribal militia, but never delivered on 
this promise.  A breakdown of district CBS, who were under 
the command of ANP, is as follows: Qarghai district recruited 
230 men to secure 23 polling centers, with most unarmed; 
Alingar district recruited 130 armed men who were stationed 
500 meters from the polling center; Alishang district 
recruited about 200 armed men; and Dawlat Shah district 
recruited 720 men to secure 18 polling centers. 
 
¶12. (SBU) In Nuristan, there was not a province-wide CBS 
program, although Governor Jamlauddin claimed he obtained 
funds for 150 men at USD100 per month from the MOI.  PRT 
cannot confirm whether he used this money for CBS.  PRT 
reports that district-level CBS worked well in western 
Nuristan and Alingar (Laghman), and local leaders believe it 
was the key to successful voting on election day. 
 
¶13. (SBU) In Paktya, CBS played a role at some polling sites 
on election day but this depended significantly on the 
particular district.  Deputy Governor Mangal assessed the 
role of the CBS as key in securing the polling centers as he 
said there were not enough ANSF in the province.  Polling 
centers in Ahmad Aba, Sayed Karam, Mirzaka, and Ahmad Khel 
reported to the PRT that CBS provided security.  Direction of 
the CBS varied by district, with ANP controlling in some 
cases and the ANA controlling in others.  CBS received 8,000 
Afghanis for their services, and the tribal elder who 
recruited the CBS was paid 10,000 Afghani, with the funds 
coming from the Independent Administration of Highways 
Protection, according to local leaders.  While the PRT cannot 
confirm all CBS was paid, it notes that the PRT helped 
 
KABUL 00002807  003 OF 003 
 
 
facilitate travel by Deputy Governor Mangal to Chamkani, 
where Mangal personally made payments for CBS via regional 
sub-governors during a shura. 
 
¶14. (SBU) In Nangarhar, the provincial governor tapped into 
the tribal structure to assist on election day.  Tribes 
provided perimeter security while the ANP secured the 
immediate area around the polling centers on election day, 
and tribes also often secured the hills around polling areas 
to prevent indirect fire attacks; all were under the command 
of the ANP.  District subgovernors and ANP district chiefs 
met with tribal leaders before the election in each district 
to assign tasks, roles, and responsibilities.  The tribes 
were not paid a salary, but PRT reports that food and water 
were provided in some cases by Provincial Council candidates 
in their areas of strong support as they sought to secure the 
polls for high voter turn-out. 
 
¶15. (SBU) In Ghazni, there were three different groups of 
local CBS hired for election day: about 100 women were hired 
to do security screening of female voters, about 1300 young 
men were nominated by sub-governors and local shuras; and 
about 260 elders already serving as guardians of mosques or 
other significant sites in villages were hired to support 
security efforts.  All were deployed with the ANP at or near 
polling sites and were under the command of the ANP.  CBS was 
promised 8,000 Afghani (5,000 salary and 3,000 for meals and 
expenses) but had not been paid as of September 5. 
Provincial ANP Chief General Sherzai told the PRT that some 
members of the CBS structures have come to him to complain 
about the lack of payment. 
 
¶16. (SBU) In Nangarhar, Governor Sherzai told local security 
leaders they would receive 1,250,000 Afghanis from the MOI 
and they selected ten districts for the CBS, with each 
district governor to be given 120,000 Afghanis to be 
dispersed among tribal elders.  As of September 1, these 
funds had not been paid to the tribal leaders.  The breakdown 
was as follows: Speen Ghar (100); Achin (60); Nazian (100); 
Shirzad (120); Khgyani (120); Pachir (100); Dehbala (60); 
Chaprehar (40); Goshta (40); and Durbaba (40).  PRT reports 
that the provincial government is keen to "institutionalize" 
these community forces. 
 
¶17. (SBU) In Paktika, CBS played an important security role 
on election day, with Governor Katawazay giving the CBS high 
marks.  The CBS was made up of 1,800 "trusted volunteers" 
throughout the province from a list of names submitted to the 
Governor's office by local elders and tribal leaders.  The 
CBS was commanded by the ANP and present at polling centers 
across the province.  As of September 1, 1,200 of the 1,800 
CBS had been paid the allotted 8,000 Afghanis. Governor 
Katawazay said he would like to explore ways to formally 
incorporate CBS into ANP structures. 
 
¶18. (SBU) In Wardak, the Afghan Public Protection Program 
Force (AP3) assisted with local election security under the 
direction of the ANP.  They worked from the districts where 
they are based in Jalrez, Mayden Shah, Nergh, and northern 
Sayed Abad.  Early talks in Wardak of recruiting additional 
local forces did not materialize. 
 
Comment 
----- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Over-all, the CBS elements on election day played a 
moderately useful role and appears to have been placed under 
appropriate command structures with direction by provincial 
and district level ANP and governors.  While there does not 
appear to have been a one-size fits all approach to 
recruitment and payment of CBS, the CBS generally were 
appropriately paired with ANSF at polling sites, with a few 
reported exceptions, as directed by the IEC policy.  With 
payment of CBS remaining an outstanding issue, recruitment of 
CBS could be more challenging for future elections if payment 
issues are not resolved.  In those provinces where provincial 
leadership was concerned about empowering CBS or other tribal 
elements, they appear to have successfully avoided 
establishing the program, or side-lining it on election day 
as was done in Helmand Province.  Still, some provincial 
leaders are keen to explore ways of integrating CBS into 
formal ANSF structures.  Whether this materializes will bear 
watching, and we will work with appropriate Afghan 
institutions and coalition military elements to help ensure 
this evolves appropriately. 
EIKENBERRY