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S E C R E T GENEVA 000784 
 
SIPDIS 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, RUSSIAN PRESENTATION OF 
PROPOSED TREATY ELEMENTS, SEPTEMBER 21, 2009 
 
REF: GENEVA 0774 (SFO-GVA-V-007) 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-003. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 21, 2009 
                Time:  3:15 - 5:30 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) During the second plenary meeting conducted on 
September 21, 2009, the U.S. and Russian Delegations 
continued discussions of the Russian draft treaty (REFTEL). 
The Russian Delegation explained why it was not in favor of 
including telemetry provisions in its version of the treaty 
and expressed concerns over mobile ICBM restrictions proposed 
by the United States.  The Russian legal advisor also 
presented views on the principle of "equal security." 
 
¶4.  (S) The Russian Delegation outlined its approach to 
counting rules, conversion or elimination (C or E) practices, 
notification procedures, inspections, visits, and 
exhibitions.  They also explained that they do not want to 
retain telemetry provisions because certain START limitations 
that telemetry was meant to verify will not be retained in 
the new treaty.  Telemetry data was helpful to the United 
States in building a global missile defense system, they 
claimed.  They also perceived an imbalance between the 
treatment of road-mobile missile systems in the U.S. draft as 
compared to other systems of concern from the Russian 
perspective, particularly ballistic missile nuclear 
submarines (SSBNs) and heavy bombers. 
 
----------------- 
RUSSIAN VERSION 
OF COUNTING RULES 
----------------- 
 
¶5. (S) Col Novikov reviewed the limits contained within the 
Russian draft START Follow-on Treaty.  Specifically, there 
were three central limits:  a) deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and 
heavy bombers; b) warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy 
bombers; c) ICBM and SLBM launchers.  For deployed systems, 
each deployed system counted as one unit toward the aggregate 
limit.  For warheads, each reentry vehicle on deployed ICBMs 
and SLBMs was counted as one warhead and each long-range 
nuclear ALCM or other nuclear armament deployed on a heavy 
bomber was also counted as one warhead.  For launchers, each 
deployed and non-deployed launcher of ICBMs and SLBMS counted 
as one unit toward the aggregate limit.  He explained that, 
for the first central limit, ICBMs and SLBMs would count from 
the time they were placed on or in a launcher and would no 
longer count once they were removed from a launcher.  For 
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments they would be 
counted when the bomber first arrived at an air base and 
would no longer be counted upon completion of conversion or 
elimination procedures.  Also, non-deployed heavy bombers in 
storage or at C or E facilities would not be counted. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Warheads would cout on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs when 
each reentry ehicle (RV) was placed on the ICBM or SLBM and 
wuld no longer count when RVs were removed from the 
launcher.  Warheads would count on deployed heav bombers 
when a long-range nuclear ALCM or other uclear armament was 
loaded onto the heavy bomberand would not count when those 
nuclear armaments were removed from the bomber.  He noted 
that the Russian Federation had not included a category for 
non-nuclear warheads as it proposed to ban them. 
 
¶7.  (S) Silo launchers for ICBMs would count against the 
limit when the silo door was first installed and closed and 
would no longer count once the silo door was dismantled. 
Mobile launchers of ICBMs would count when they first arrived 
at an ICBM base and would no longer count after C or E 
procedures were complete.  An SLBM launcher would count when 
a submarine is first launched, and would no longer count 
after conversion or elimination procedures were complete. 
 
¶8.  (S) Mr. Elliott asked Novikov if he would clarify whether 
or not warheads would count toward treaty limits if nuclear 
weapons were not loaded onto a heavy bomber.  Novikov stated 
if they were not loaded, they would not count but that the 
heavy bomber would count against the delivery vehicle limits. 
 Dr. Warner pointed out that heavy bombers' nuclear weapons 
were a large component of the warheads for both sides and it 
would not be well received by the U.S. Senate that they were 
not being accounted for. 
 
------------------------- 
RUSSIAN VIEWS ON 
CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION 
------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Mr. Smirnov explained that the Russian Federation 
took into account ways to simplify C or E procedures as well 
as to make them less expensive.  He noted that each Party 
would define its own procedures with the goal that the 
procedures would be irreversible and that verification would 
be accomplished via national technical means (NTM) in concert 
with the appropriate notification.  The procedures would also 
render the strategic offensive arms (SOA) inoperable and no 
longer usable for its intended purpose.  He assured the U.S. 
Delegation that the Russian Federation would agree to display 
eliminated items in the open to ensure visibility by NTM.  He 
explained that further confirmation would be obtained through 
a visit to look at the eliminated SOA. 
 
¶10.  (S) A/S Gottemoeller asked if these visits would be 
exhibitions after C or E was accomplished and whether it was 
correct that under the Russian proposal there would be no 
demonstration in advance of the C or E.  Smirnov clarified 
that exhibitions would demonstrate the distinguishing 
features of new SOA, whereas a visit would be conducted to 
confirm the completion of C or E.  Elliott noted that, under 
START, conversion was only addressed in relation to heavy 
bombers and asked if the Russian concept would allow the 
conversion of SLBM launchers.  Smirnov stated that the 
Russian concept would not allow for the conversion of SLBM 
launchers.  (Begin comment:  Smirnov's initial answer led to 
considerable discussion among the Russian Delegation.  This 
issue remains to be clarified.  End comment.)  Gottemoeller 
 
 
queried Smirnov regarding his earlier statement that each 
Party would determine its own procedures and that those 
procedures would be irreversible.  She asked if the other 
side would be able to check to see whether the process was 
indeed irreversible, to which the Russian Delegation 
responded that this issue would be discussed at the working 
group level.  Elliott noted that the United States had looked 
at the history of C or E in START and had envisioned more 
stringent requirements than the Russian side. 
 
--------------------------------- 
NOTIFICATIONS ACCORDING TO MOSCOW 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Col Petrov opined that notifications were one of the 
most important elements of the new treaty and remarked upon 
the success of the process under START, but noted that a 
considerable number of notifications were never used under 
START.  The Russian Federation proceeded from that premise 
and recommended using notifications for the following 
categories:  a) categories of data as agreed during 
negotiations; b) movement of SOA between facilities to 
include the movement of heavy bombers; c) flight tests of 
ICBMs or SLBMs; d) C or E of SOA to include the elimination 
of facilities; e) new types of SOA; and, f) the conduct of 
visits, inspections, and exhibitions.  Mr. Trout asked if 
movement notifications applied to non-deployed missiles, to 
which Petrov responded that the movement of any SOA would be 
notified just as it is currently in START. 
 
------------------------------- 
IS IT A VISIT OR AN INSPECTION? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Petrov emphasized that on-site inspections were as 
important as notifications but were inconvenient and 
expensive to conduct so the Russian Federation had adjusted 
the procedures.  He explained that the Russian proposal 
envisaged three categories -- inspections, visits, and 
exhibitions.  An inspection would be conducted to verify the 
number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMS and heavy bombers, as well as 
to confirm the number of warheads loaded onto them.  Also, an 
inspection would be conducted to confirm the number of 
deployed SLBM and ICBM launchers.  No more than five 
inspections would be conducted each year and only one at any 
one facility.  He underscored that the Russian Federation did 
not envision any activities related to continuous monitoring. 
 Visits, on the other hand, would be conducted to confirm the 
number of non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, as 
well as the numbers of non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and 
SLBMs.  Data on new facilities as well as technical 
characteristics of SOAs and confirming the conversion process 
would be included in visits.  No more than five such visits 
would be conducted each year with no more than one at any one 
facility.  Exhibitions would be conducted to confirm the 
technical characteristics and differences of new SOA as well 
as to confirm that the procedures for conversion had been 
accomplished.  He concluded by stating that the legal status 
of inspectors, as well as their rules for transportation and 
the rules governing points of entry (POEs), would be retained 
as they are in START.  Warner asked if the objectives of 
inspections and visits were similar and were conducted by 
inspectors, why the Russian Federation chose to differentiate 
 
 
between the two.  Petrov stated that it was in order to draw 
the distinction between the activities carried out at various 
facilities.  For reentry vehicles at their deployment sites, 
inspections are appropriate, but for storage facilities or 
test ranges, visits are appropriate. 
 
------------ 
NO TELEMETRY 
------------ 
 
¶13.  (S) Novikov provided a statement on telemetry.  He noted 
that it was useful in START for determining throw-weight and 
maximum numbers of warheads, as well as characteristics and 
reliability of ICBMs and SLBMs.  This was important as START 
used attribution rules versus the actual number of deployed 
RVs, hence the need for telemetry to provide confirmation. 
However, the Russian Federation did not see telemetry as 
useful for the new treaty because it would be an "independent 
element" not related to the limited items.  He drew a 
connection to the United States withdrawal from the ABM 
Treaty and alleged that the United States had made use of 
telemetry from Russian systems to continue to develop a 
global ABM system.  He also observed that the U.S. 
relationship with the United Kingdom in the field of 
development of Trident systems allowed for the circumvention 
of START provisions since telemetry on those flight tests was 
not provided to the Russian Federation.  Therefore, it was 
not consistent with Russia's interests to keep a telemetry 
provision.  Novikov also noted that telemetry, as practiced 
under START, was deficient in the exchange of information. 
Finally, he noted that some U.S. telemetry data was not 
playable on the U.S.-provided telemetry playback systems.  He 
opined that it would not be possible to adequately address 
these issues and develop a suitable fix in the time remaining 
to negotiate a new treaty.  He noted that, since these issues 
were not resolved under START, it would be inappropriate to 
incorporate telemetry into a new treaty and at the same time 
incorporate the old problems that went with it. 
 
¶14.  (S) Gottemoeller thanked Novikov for his remarks.  On 
the subject of U.S.-UK collaboration, she reminded the 
Russian Delegation that this activity fell under a pattern of 
existing cooperation that is and has been permissible under 
START.  She also observed that the UK systems had differences 
from U.S. systems that would not facilitate a U.S. 
modernization plan.  She noted that the United States had no 
desire to transfer old issues from START to the new treaty. 
Noting the recent Minuteman III demonstration, she commended 
the U.S. and Russian JCIC members for moving toward resolving 
a difficult issue that had long hampered implementation of 
the START Treaty. 
 
¶15.  (S) Siemon agreed that it was fair to say that there 
were questions from both sides concerning telemetry 
practices.  He explained that the interest in telemetry went 
back to SALT I and stemmed from a provision regarding 
non-interference with NTM since NTM then was the primary 
means of verification.  In Salt II, the noninterference with 
the NTM concept was expanded to specifically include 
noninterference with telemetry.  Under START, the 
noninterference with telemetry provisions were retained and 
significantly expanded to include the exchange of electronic 
media and interpretative data to enhance treaty verification. 
 
 
 The United States still saw value in retaining the exchange 
of telemetry in the current treaty to enhance confidence and 
predictability about the development and deployment of SOA. 
Perhaps the sides should look at the value telemetry as a 
provision related to non-interference with NTM. 
 
¶16.  (S) Antonov thanked all for their remarks.  He noted how 
the discussions had progressed to the point where the sides 
could be sincere in voicing their deepest concerns.  At the 
same time, he advised all that the sides needed to remember 
the principles of trust and confidence-building measures. 
Going back to Novikov's list of issues, he focused on ABM. 
While he felt the recent U.S. decision to 'change the 
architecture of global ABM' was a positive step, it did not 
change the underlying Russian concerns.  Referring to the 
link between telemetry and the use of its data to develop an 
ABM system, he was resolute in stating "we will never help or 
enable efforts to develop a new global ABM system," and this 
was only one of the Russian concerns over telemetry. 
Switching to English, he stated that the Russian side could 
not agree to telemetry provisions until its concerns were 
"assuaged and allayed."  Again, noting the new stage in 
discussions where both sides were more open about their 
concerns, he asked the U.S. side to think about the 
questions.  He was willing to wait however long it took, but 
if the U.S. side did not address the issues already noted, it 
would be a sign that the Russian side was right all along in 
its concerns.  Gottemoeller thanked Antonov, and observed 
that the proposed telemetry provisions were not unilateral in 
nature but reciprocal rights for both sides. 
 
--------------------- 
ALL THINGS MOBILE 
SHOULD BE RE STRICTED 
--------------------- 
 
¶17.  (S) General Poznihir discussed concerns with 
restrictions placed upon mobile missiles in the U.S.-proposed 
draft treaty provisions.  He opined that some of the 
provisions of the U.S. text were useful and could be 
incorporated into an agreement.  He noted that the right for 
each side to determine for itself the size and composition of 
its strategic offensive arms should not be infringed by text 
provisions.  He complained that Article V of the 
U.S.-proposed text was centered on limiting mobile ICBMs. 
Mobile ICBMs have many similar characteristics as submarines 
and heavy bombers in that they have the ability to hide yet 
there are no limitations on these types of SOA.  In his view, 
SLBMs posed more of a threat from a military point of view 
yet only mobile ICBMs were re stricted to geographic areas. 
Provisions for not basing SOA outside national territory 
already accomplished this geographic restriction and NTM 
provided adequate verification.  SLBMs can move outside of 
national waters and are difficult to detect.  The same 
situation was true with bombers since they can fly great 
distances, carry large quantities of nuclear weapons and 
cannot be verified via NTM.  He could not understand the U.S. 
desire to limit mobile ICBMs. 
 
¶18.  (S) Gottemoeller commented that the United States had 
done its best to retain measures meant to assist with 
verification and not meant to constrain operations. 
Historically, there had been concerns regarding mobile ICBMs. 
 
 
 Bombers and submarines are large platforms and the sides 
understand how many they have, whereas mobile ICBMs have a 
special ability to hide and not be detected.  Thus, the 
United States considers it to be important to verify 
non-deployed mobile ICBMs in particular.  The United States 
is trying to find a balance between predictability and 
flexibility. 
 
----------------- 
WAXING PROPHETIC 
ON EQUAL SECURITY 
----------------- 
 
¶19.  (S) Kotkova presented a legal viewpoint of the principle 
of equal security.  The text of the official translation 
follows. 
 
Begin text: 
 
                                      Official Translation 
 
                       Negotiations between Russia and the 
                       U.S. to Work out a New Agreement to 
                       Replace the START Treaty - Round VI 
                       (Geneva, September 21, 2009) 
 
             On the Principle of Equal Security 
 
         (Talking Points for the Presentation of the 
           Russian Draft of the New Treaty on SOAs) 
 
     In our view, the new treaty on SOAs must serve to 
enhance the security of each of the Treaty Parties and to 
strengthen strategic stability in general. 
 
     There exist generally recognized principles of 
international law, which are firmly established, in 
particular, in the UN Charter.  These include, for example, 
the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, 
fulfillment in good faith of international obligations, and 
the sovereign equality of states.  These principles reflect a 
fundamental property of international law as the rights of 
equal subjects (of international law - Trans.)(par in parem 
non habet imperium). 
 
     The special principles of the law of international 
security are based on these generally recognized principles. 
Among them, the Russian doctrine of international law 
distinguishes the principle of undiminished security of other 
states, which derives from the principles of sovereign 
equality and non-interference in internal affairs.  It 
assumes that a state conducts a foreign policy that takes 
into account, to the maximum extent, both its own security 
and the security of the entire global community.  The 
principle of equal security develops and gives concrete 
expression to this approach.  It is understood to mean that 
while ensuring its own security, a state should ensure the 
proportionality of its actions to the capabilities of other 
states to ensure their security. 
 
     Thus, this involves a sort of security parity, where 
neither Party obtains advantages over the other Party in 
terms of ensuring security.  In this connection, what is 
 
 
meant is actual, rather than arithmetical equality in the 
military-strategic area. 
 
End text. 
 
¶20.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- Russia: 
 
    -- Delegation paper On the Principle of Equal Security, 
September 21, 2009. 
 
¶21.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
A/S Gottemoeller 
Amb Ries 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Elliott 
Mr. Evans 
Dr. Fraley 
Col Hartford 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Siemon 
Mr. Sims 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Trout 
Dr. Warner 
Mrs. Zdravecky 
Ms. Gesse (Int) 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Amb Antonov 
Ms. Ivanova 
Col Izrazov 
Mr. Koshelev 
Ms. Kotkova 
Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov 
Mr. Leontiev 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Mr. Lysenko 
Mr. Neshin 
Col Novikov 
MGen Orlov 
Col Petrov 
Mr. Pischulov 
Gen Poznihir 
Mr. Rudenko 
Mr. Semin 
Mr. Shevchenko 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Vasiliev 
MGen Venevtsev 
Mr. Vorontsov 
Col Zaitsev 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
¶22.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
 
 
GRIFFITHS