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S E C R E T GENEVA 000774 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
RUSSIAN-PROPOSED TREATY TEXT, SEPTEMBER 16, 2009 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-007. 
 
¶2.  (U) At paragraph 3 is the official translation of the 
Russian-proposed treaty text. 
 
¶3.  (S) Begin text. 
 
                                     Official Translation 
 
                       To be Turned Over to the U.S. Side 
 
                             Document of the Russian Side 
                                    of September 16, 2009 
 
                          TREATY 
 
                BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
               AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
     ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION 
                  OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS 
 
     The Russian Federation and the United States of America, 
hereinafter referred to as the Parties, 
 
     Committed to the historic goal of freeing humanity from 
the nuclear threat, and to consistent implementation of the 
obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968; 
 
     Endeavoring to help reduce the role and significance of 
nuclear arms in ensuring international security, and 
expressing support for efforts being undertaken on a global 
scale in the field of non-proliferation; 
 
     Continuing along the path of strengthening strategic 
stability and of establishing new relations in the strategic 
area, based on mutual trust, openness, predictability, and 
cooperation; 
 
     Considering it necessary to bring their nuclear posture 
into alignment with the new relations in the post-Cold War 
era-relations which are built on the basis that the Russian 
Federation and the United States of America are no longer 
enemies, that there is no prospect of a war starting between 
them, and that they are cooperating in areas where it is 
mutually beneficial; 
 
     Taking into account the stabilizing effect on the world 
situation which has resulted from the radical, verifiable 
reduction of nuclear arsenals at the turn of the 21st century; 
 
     Taking note of the existence of an indissoluble 
interrelationship between the reduction of strategic 
offensive arms and the deployment of missile defense systems; 
 
     In agreement that ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear 
configuration have an impact on strategic stability; 
 
     Considering that the Treaty between the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 
 
31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty, has 
been implemented in full; 
 
     Taking note that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic 
of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have completely fulfilled the 
obligations they assumed in accordance with the Protocol of 
May 23, 1992, to the Treaty between the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; 
 
     Deeply appreciating the contribution of the Republic of 
Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the cause 
of general and complete nuclear disarmament and strengthening 
international peace and security as non-nuclear-weapon states; 
 
     Seeking to preserve continuity in, and provide new 
impetus to, the process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms 
while maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear 
arsenals, and with a view to multilateralization of this 
process in the future; 
 
     Desiring to create a mechanism for verifying compliance 
with the obligations under this Treaty, based on the 
procedures that were elaborated in the START Treaty, and 
supplemented by transparency and confidence-building measures; 
 
     Guided by the principle of equal security and believing 
that global challenges and threats require continued use of 
qualitatively new approaches to interaction on the whole 
range of strategic relations, 
 
     Have agreed as follows: 
 
                          Article I 
 
     ¶1. Each Party shall implement measures aimed at 
strengthening trust, openness, and predictability of the 
development of strategic relations, and shall reduce and 
limit its strategic offensive arms and shall carry out the 
other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its Annex. 
 
     ¶2. The obligations under this Treaty shall be 
assumedNOTE1 by the Parties in conditions where they have 
strategic missile defense systems, hereinafter referred to as 
MD systems, at the level existing at the time of Treaty 
signature. 
 
     ¶3. The terms and definitions adopted for purposes of 
this Treaty are given in Section I of the Annex to this 
Treaty. 
 
                          Article II 
 
     ¶1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM 
launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, HBs, ICBM warheads, SLBM 
warheads, and HB nuclear armaments, so that seven years after 
entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate 
numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this 
Treaty, do not exceed: 
 
        (a) 500, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and 
     deployed HBs; 
 
        (b) 1,675, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed 
 
     SLBMs, and deployed HBs; 
 
        (c) 600, (("for" missing in Russian - Trans.)) ICBM 
      and SLBM launchers. 
 
     ¶2. Each Party shall determine for itself the composition 
and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the 
aggregate limits provided for in this Article. 
 
                         Article III 
 
     ¶1. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate 
limit provided for in subparagraph 1 (a) of Article II of 
this Treaty: 
 
        (a) Each deployed ICBM shall be counted as one unit; 
 
        (b) Each deployed SLBM shall be counted as one unit; 
 
        (c) Each deployed HB shall be counted as one unit. 
 
     ¶2. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate 
limit provided for in subparagraph 1 (b) of Article II of 
this Treaty: 
 
        (a) Each reentry vehicle on deployed ICBMs or SLBMs 
     shall be counted as one warhead; 
 
        (b) Each long-range nuclear ALCM and each other HB 
     nuclear armament, other than a long-range nuclear ALCM, 
     on deployed HBs shall be counted as one warhead. 
 
     ¶3. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate 
limit provided for in subparagraph 1 (c) of Article II of 
this Treaty, each deployed launcher of ICBMs and SLBMs, as 
well as each non-deployed launcher of ICBMs and SLBMs shall 
be counted as one unit. 
 
     ¶4. Strategic offensive arms shall be counted toward the 
aggregate limits provided for in this Treaty as follows: 
 
        (a) ICBMs -  from the time an ICBM is placed in (on) 
     an ICBM launcher, to the time the ICBM is removed from 
     (taken off) the ICBM launcher; 
 
        (b) SLBMs -  from the time an SLBM is placed in an 
     SLBM launcher, to the time the SLBM is removed from the 
     SLBM launcher; 
 
        (c) HBs -  from the time a heavy bomber equipped for 
     nuclear armaments first arrives at an air base for heavy 
     bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, to the time when 
     the HB conversion or elimination procedures have been 
     completed; 
 
        (d) warheads: 
 
            (i) on ICBMs -  from the time each reentry 
        vehicle is placed on a deployed ICBM, to the time 
        each reentry vehicle is taken off the deployed ICBM 
        or the deployed ICBM with the front section 
containing 
        reentry vehicles is removed from (taken off) the 
        launcher; 
 
 
            (ii) on SLBMs -  from the time each reentry 
        vehicle is placed on a deployed SLBM, to the time 
        each reentry vehicle is taken off the deployed 
        SLBM or the deployed SLBM with the front section 
        containing reentry vehicles is removed from the 
        launcher; 
 
            (iii) on HBs - from the time each long-range 
        nuclear ALCM or each other nuclear armament, other 
        than a long-range nuclear ALCM, is placed on a 
        deployed HB, to the time the enumerated nuclear 
        armaments are taken off the deployed HB; 
 
        (e) ICBM and SLBM launchers: 
 
            (i) silo launcher of ICBMs - from the time the 
        doorNOTE2 is first installed and closed, to the 
        time the door of the silo launcher of ICBMs is 
        dismantled; 
 
            (ii) mobile launcher of ICBMs - from the time 
        a mobile launcher of ICBMs arrives at an ICBM base, 
        to the time when the conversion or elimination 
        procedures for a mobile launcher of ICBMs have been 
        completed, or the time of its return to a production 
        facility; 
 
            (iii) SLBM launcher - when (sic) a submarine 
        coming from a production facility arrives at a base 
        for submarines with SLBM launchers, to the time when 
        the conversion or elimination procedures for an SLBM 
        launcher have  been completed. 
 
                          Article IV 
 
     ¶1. As of the date of signature of this Treaty: 
 
        (a) Existing types of ICBMs are: 
 
            (i) for the Russian Federation, the types of 
        ICBMs designated by the Russian Federation as 
        RS-12M, RS-18, and RS-20, which are known to the 
        United States of America as SS-25, SS-19, and 
        SS-18, respectively; 
 
            (ii) for the United States of America, the 
        types of ICBMs designated by the United States of 
        America and known to the Russian Federation as 
        (BLANK).                         ; 
 
        (b) Existing types of SLBMs are: 
 
            (i) for the Russian Federation, the types of 
        SLBMs designated by the Russian Federation as 
        RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56, which are 
        known to the United States of America as SS-N-18, 
        SS-N-20, SS-N-23, and RSM-56, respectively; 
 
            (ii) for the United States of America, the 
        types of SLBMs designated by the United States of 
        America and known to the Russian Federation as 
        (BLANK).                          ; 
 
        (c) Existing types of heavy bombers are: 
 
            (i) for the Russian Federation, the types of 
        bombers designated by the Russian Federation as 
        Tu-95MS and Tu-160, which are known to the United 
        States of America as Bear H and Blackjack, 
        respectively; 
 
            (ii) for the United States of America, the 
        types of bombers designated by the United States 
        of America and known to the Russian Federation as 
        (BLANK). 
 
     ¶2. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall 
begin to be subject to the limitations provided for in this 
Treaty as follows: 
 
        (a) ICBMs - when an ICBM or the first stage of an 
     ICBM that are (sic) maintained, stored, and transported 
     in stages, first leaves the production facility; 
 
        (b) SLBMs - when an SLBM or the first stage of an 
     SLBM that are (sic) maintained, stored, and transported 
     in stages, first leaves the production facility; 
 
        (c) HBs: when an HB airframe is first brought out of 
     the shop, plant, or building where the entire airframe 
     is assembled from HB components; 
 
        (d) ICBM and SLBM launchers: 
 
            (i) silo launcher of ICBMs: when the door is 
        first installed and closed; 
 
            (ii) mobile launcher of ICBMs: when a mobile 
        launcher of ICBMs first leaves the production 
        facility; 
 
            (iii) SLBM launcher: when a submarine, on which 
        the aforesaid launcher is installed, is first 
launched. 
 
     ¶3. In those cases not provided for by the provisions of 
this Treaty, strategic offensive arms shall begin to be 
subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty in 
accordance with procedures to be agreed by the Parties in the 
Bilateral Consultative Commission. 
 
     ¶4. Ballistic missiles that have been developed and 
tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on 
the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be 
ballistic missiles to which the limitations provided for in 
this Treaty apply.  Such missiles shall not be given the 
capabilities of ICBMs or SLBMs; these missiles and their 
launchers shall have verifiable differences from the existing 
types of ICBMs and SLBMs and their launchers. 
 
     The procedures for confirming the presence of the 
above-mentioned differences shall be subject to agreement by 
the Parties in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. 
 
                          Article V 
 
     ¶1. Each Party shall locate strategic offensive arms 
 
subject to this Treaty only at: ICBM bases, submarine bases, 
air bases, storage facilities, conversion or elimination 
facilities, repair facilities, training facilities, and test 
ranges. 
 
     ¶2. Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only 
at test ranges.  The construction or conversion of such 
launchers at test ranges may be carried out only for purposes 
of testing and training.  The number of such launchers shall 
not be increased above the requirements for testing and 
training purposes. 
 
     ¶3. Training launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located 
only at ICBM bases and test ranges.  Mobile training 
launchers of ICBMs may, in addition, be located at storage 
facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs and at conversion or 
elimination facilities.  The construction or conversion of 
such launchers may be carried out only for training purposes. 
 The number of such launchers shall not be increased above 
the requirements for training purposes. 
 
     ¶4.  Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty 
shall not be based outside the national territory of each 
Party. 
 
     ¶5. In the event of temporary stationing of a heavy 
bomber outside national territory in accordance with 
subparagraph 3 (b) of Article VIII, notification shall be 
provided. 
 
     ¶6. HBs equipped or converted for non-nuclear armaments 
shall be based separately from HBs equipped for nuclear 
armaments. 
 
                         Article VI 
 
     ¶1. Except as prohibited by the provisions of this 
Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive 
arms may be carried out. 
 
     ¶2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBMs or SLBMs in 
a non-nuclear configuration. 
 
     ¶3. Each Party undertakes not to convert HBs equipped for 
non-nuclear armaments into HBs equipped for nuclear 
armaments.  Nuclear armaments shall not be stored at air 
bases of heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments. 
The crews of such bombers shall not undergo training to carry 
out missions involving nuclear weapons. 
 
     ¶4. Each Party undertakes not to convert or use ICBM or 
SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors 
therein. 
 
     ¶5. Each Party undertakes not to convert or use launchers 
of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and 
SLBMs therein. 
 
     ¶6. Each Party undertakes not to locate heavy bombers 
with long-range nuclear ALCMs or other nuclear armaments 
outside the continental portion of national territory. 
 
                         Article VII 
 
     ¶1. Conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms 
and of the facilities where they are located shall be carried 
out pursuant to this Article and in accordance with the 
procedures provided for in Section III of the Annex to this 
Treaty. 
 
     ¶2. Strategic offensive arms and the facilities where 
they are located shall be subject to the limitations provided 
for in this Treaty until such time as they are: 
 
        (a) eliminated; 
 
        (b) removed from accountability as a result of 
     flight or static tests, accidental loss, disablement 
     beyond repair, or transfer to static display. 
 
     ¶3. In fulfilling obligations under this Treaty, each 
Party shall have the right to use ICBMs and SLBMs for placing 
a payload, other than any kind of weapon, into space or the 
upper atmosphere. 
 
     ¶4. Conversion or elimination of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM and 
SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers shall be carried out at 
conversion or elimination facilities, on site or at other 
stipulated sites. In this connection, the procedures employed 
shall ensure that they are rendered inoperable, precluding 
their use for their original purpose. 
 
     ¶5. Notifications of conversion or elimination of 
strategic offensive arms shall be provided in accordance with 
Subsection IV of Section IV of the Annex to this Treaty. 
 
     ¶6. Verification of the Parties' implementation of 
procedures for conversion or elimination of strategic 
offensive arms and the facilities where they are located 
shall be carried out: 
 
        (a) by using national technical means of 
     verification; 
 
        (b) by providing notifications; 
 
        (c) by means of visits, which can be conducted 
     by the inspecting Party, to the sites specified 
     in paragraph 4 of this Article, upon completion 
     of the conversion or elimination procedures. 
 
                        Article VIII 
 
     ¶1. A data base pertaining to the obligations under this 
Treaty is set forth in Section II of the Annex to this 
Treaty, in which data with respect to items subject to the 
limitations provided for in this Treaty are listed according 
to categories of data. 
 
     ¶2. In order to ensure fulfillment of its obligations 
with respect to this Treaty, each Party shall notify the 
other Party of changes in data, as provided for in 
subparagraph 3 (a) of this Article, and shall provide the 
other notifications provided for in paragraph 3 of this 
Article in accordance with the procedure provided for in 
paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this Article and in Section IV of 
the Annex to this Treaty. 
 
     ¶3. Each Party shall provide notification to the other 
Party regarding: 
 
        (a) data according to categories of data contained 
     in Section II of the Annex to this Treaty and other 
     agreed categories of data with respect to items 
     subject to the limitations of this Treaty, except for 
     data pertaining to warheads, which shall be exchanged 
     twice a year; 
 
        (b) movement of items subject to the limitations 
     provided for in this Treaty between declared facilities. 
     Any movement of items subject to the limitations 
     provided for in this Treaty between facilities shall be 
     completed not later than 30 days after it began; 
 
        (c) flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs; 
 
        (d) conversion or elimination of items subject to 
     the limitations of this Treaty, as well as elimination 
     of facilities; 
 
        (e) strategic offensive arms of new types; 
 
        (f) the conduct of inspections, visits, and 
     exhibitions. 
 
     ¶4. Each Party may provide additional notifications on a 
voluntary basis, besides the notifications specified in 
paragraph 3 of this Article, if it deems this necessary to 
provide assurance of the fulfillment of the obligations 
undertaken under this Treaty. 
 
     ¶5. In order to provide and receive notifications, unless 
otherwise provided for in this Treaty, each Party shall use 
the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established in accordance 
with the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the United States of America on the 
Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 
15, 1987. 
 
     ¶6. If a time is to be specified in a notification 
provided pursuant to this Article, that time shall be 
expressed in Greenwich Mean Time.  If only a date is to be 
specified in a notification, that date shall be specified as 
the 24-hour time period that corresponds to the date in local 
time, expressed in Greenwich Mean Time. 
 
     ¶7. Neither Party shall release to the public data 
specified in Section II of the Annex to this Treaty or the 
photographs appended to it, unless otherwise agreed. 
 
                          Article IX 
 
     In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of 
this Treaty, and to enhance confidence, openness, and 
predictability concerning the reduction and limitation of 
strategic offensive arms, each Party shall, on a voluntary 
basis,  in those cases where it believes ambiguous situations 
might arise, take measures, including providing information 
in advance, inter alia through diplomatic channels, on 
activities being conducted with respect to strategic 
offensive arms, which are associated with their deployment or 
increasing their readiness, so as to preclude the possibility 
 
of a misinterpretation of its actions by the other Party. 
 
                          Article X 
 
     For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance 
with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes: 
 
        (a) to use national technical means of 
     verification at its disposal in a manner consistent 
     with the generally recognized principles of 
     international law; 
 
        (b) not to interfere with the national technical 
     means of verification of the other Party operating 
     in accordance with this Article; 
 
        (c) not to use deliberate concealment measures 
     that impede verification of compliance with the 
     provisions of this Treaty. 
 
                          Article XI 
 
     ¶1. For the purpose of ensuring verification or 
confirming data on compliance with the provisions of this 
Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct 
inspections, visits, and exhibitions. Inspections, visits, 
and exhibitions shall be conducted (BLANK) days (to be agreed 
upon) after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter. 
 
     ¶2. The procedures for conducting inspections, visits, 
and exhibitions shall be governed by Section V of the Annex 
to this Treaty. 
 
     ¶3. Each inspection team conducting an inspection or 
taking part in a visit or exhibition shall include the number 
of inspectors specified in Section V of the Annex to this 
Treaty. 
 
     ¶4. In order to perform their functions effectively, for 
the purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their 
personal benefit, inspectors and aircrew members shall be 
accorded the privileges and immunities specified in Section V 
of the Annex to this Treaty. 
 
     ¶5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more 
than one inspection or one visit or take part in one 
exhibition in the territory of the inspected Party at any one 
time. 
 
     ¶6. Inspectors shall not disclose information obtained 
during inspections, exhibitions, or visits, except with the 
express consent of the inspected Party.  They shall remain 
bound by this obligation even after termination of their 
activities as inspectors. 
 
     ¶7. The purpose of inspections is to verify data on the 
number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed HBs 
and the number of warheads on them, as well as data on the 
number of deployed launchers of ICBMs and deployed launchers 
of SLBMs. 
 
     Each Party shall have the right to conduct a total of no 
more than five such inspections each year, with no more than 
one such inspection each year at the same facility. 
 
 
 
     Inspections shall be conducted at ICBM bases, bases of 
submarines equipped with SLBMs, and air bases. 
 
     ¶8. The purpose of visits is to confirm data on the 
number of non-deployed ICBMs, non-deployed SLBMs, and 
non-deployed HBs, on the number of non-deployed launchers of 
ICBMs and SLBMs, data on new facilities provided during an 
exchange of information, and technical characteristics of 
strategic offensive arms provided during an exchange of 
information or demonstrated at exhibitions of new items of 
SOAs or in the course of confirming that items of SOAs have 
been converted for new kinds of SOAs. 
 
     Each Party shall have the right to conduct a total of no 
more than five such visits each year, with no more than one 
such visit each year to the same facility.  Additional visits 
beyond the established number may be conducted at the 
invitation of the inspected Party. 
 
     Visits shall be conducted at ICBM bases, bases of 
submarines equipped with SLBMs, and air bases, at storage 
facilities, repair facilities, conversion or elimination 
facilities, test ranges, and training facilities. 
 
     ¶9. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions in order to 
confirm the technical characteristics and differences of new 
items of strategic offensive arms, and to confirm that 
procedures for converting items of SOAs for new kinds of SOAs 
have been completed. 
 
                         Article XII 
 
     To promote the objectives and implementation of the 
provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the 
Bilateral Consultative Commission, procedures for the 
operation of which are set forth in Section VI of the Annex 
to this Treaty.  The Parties agree that, if either Party so 
requests, they shall hold sessions of the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission to: 
 
        (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with 
     the obligations assumed; 
 
        (b) agree upon such additional measures as may be 
     necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness 
     of this Treaty; and 
 
        (c) resolve questions related to the application 
     of the provisions of this Treaty to a new kind of 
     strategic offensive arm. 
 
                         Article XIII 
 
     To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this 
Treaty, each Party shall not assume any international 
obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its 
provisions.  The Parties shall not transfer strategic 
offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in 
this Treaty to third parties.  The Parties shall hold 
consultations in accordance with Article XII of this Treaty 
in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this 
regard.  The Parties agree that this provision does not apply 
to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations in the 
 
area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of 
signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third state. 
 
                         Article XIV 
 
     ¶1. This Treaty, including its Annex, which is an 
integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification and 
shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of 
instruments of ratification. 
 
     ¶2. This Treaty shall be concluded for 10 years, unless 
prior to the expiration of that period it is superseded by a 
subsequent treaty on the reduction and limitation of 
strategic offensive arms. 
 
     ¶3. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. 
Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with 
the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty. 
 
     ¶4. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to 
make changes in the provisions of the Annex to this Treaty 
that do not affect substantive rights and obligations of the 
Parties under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission to reach agreement on such changes, 
without resorting to the procedure for making amendments that 
is set forth in paragraph 3 of this Article. 
 
     ¶5. Each Party shall, in exercising its national 
sovereignty, have the right to terminate this Treaty if, in 
its view, further compliance with the Treaty will jeopardize 
the Party's supreme interests, including in the event of a 
quantitative and qualitative buildup in the capabilities of 
strategic missile defense systems. 
 
     ¶6. A Party that has decided to terminate this Treaty 
shall inform the other Party of its decision through 
diplomatic channels at least three months prior to 
termination of this Treaty, specifying the extraordinary 
events that it regards as having jeopardized its supreme 
interests. 
 
     ¶7. As of the date of its entry into force, this Treaty 
shall supersede the Treaty between the Russian Federation and 
the United States of America on Strategic Offensive 
Reductions of May 24, 2002, which shall terminate as of that 
date. 
 
                          Article XV 
 
     This Treaty will be registered in accordance with 
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
     Done at (BLANK) on (BLANK) in two copies in the Russian 
and English languages, both texts being equally authentic. 
 
For the Russian Federation  For the United States of America 
 
President of the            President of the 
Russian Federation          United States of America 
 
------------------------------- 
BEGIN TRANSLATER'S NOTES 
: 
1:  The Russian verb translated here as "shall be assumed" in 
 
accordance with standard treaty usage, may also be translated 
as "are assumed." 
 
2:  The Russian term rendered here as "door" differs from the 
term for "silo door" used in the START Treaty.  Our 
preliminary research indicates that the term used in this 
text does in fact refer to the silo door although further 
clarification is required. 
 
END NOTES 
------------------------------- 
 
End text. 
 
¶4.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
GRIFFITHS