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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
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RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1897
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0891
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6087

S E C R E T GENEVA 000742 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV): 
(U) TAYLOR/KOSHELEV DISCUSSIONS REGARDING POSSIBLE JCIC 
SESSION BEFORE START TREATY EXPIRATION ON MARGINS OF SFO 
NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA, SEPTEMBER 3, 2009 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 87998 
     ¶B. SECSTATE 91521 
     ¶C. RUSSIAN-PROPOSED TEXT FOR A JCIC AGREEMENT 
        PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR COMPLETION 
        OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES AT 
        THE MONITORED FACILITY AT VOTKINSK DATED 
        JANUARY 26 2009 AND ASSOCIATED LETTERS 
        ON GROUND TRANSPORTATION AND COST 
        SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES (E-MAILED TO 
        WASHINGTON -- NO REPORT CABLE.) 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-007. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 3, 2009 
                Time:  3:30 - 4:30 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
        Participants: 
 
U.S.                    Russia 
 
Mr. Taylor              Mr. Koshelev 
Mr. Johnston            Mr. Malyugin 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) Russian Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission 
(JCIC) Representative Koshelev requested a meeting with U.S. 
JCIC Representative Taylor on the margins of the Start 
Follow-on (SFO) negotiations in Geneva on September 3, 2009. 
Koshelev wanted to discuss the possibility for further work 
in the JCIC prior to its expiration in December 2009. 
Koshelev wanted to know whether it would be possible to 
finish the work on the pending agreement on close-out 
procedures for Votkinsk.  Taylor used the opportunity to 
raise two possible issues for resolution/consideration by the 
Parties -- resolution on the MMIII RVOSI question and 
possible agreement on a final, close-out Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) at Treaty expiration. 
 
¶4.  (S) Koshelev began the meeting in a frenzied state. 
Taylor commented, saying he could appreciate Koshelev's 
state, given the hectic pace of the week and the fact that 
Koshelev had to endure a day of Conventional Forces in Europe 
(CFE) discussions.  Koshelev lamented that it was not so much 
the CFE discussions as it was the pressures back in Moscow. 
It was becoming more and more difficult to be away from 
Moscow, especially at the same time as his boss, Antonov. 
This was the reason he would not be coming back to Geneva for 
the opening week of negotiations later in September.  He 
would be the only deputy in Antonov's directorate and, 
therefore, he would have to stay in Moscow to keep everything 
in order.  He would be arriving on September 27. 
 
¶5.  (S) Turning to JCIC issues, Koshelev began by noting the 
U.S. response (REF A) to Ukraine's non-paper on its position 
in connection with the expiration of the START Treaty that 
Ukraine had delivered at the previous JCIC session in July 
 
 
 
¶2009.  Moscow appreciated very much the U.S. approach and, in 
fact, Koshelev believed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
would use many of the same points in their discussions with 
Ukraine.  Ukrainian JCIC Representative Nykonenko would be 
arriving in Geneva on Friday, September 4, 2009, for 
bilateral discussions on expiration of the START Treaty. 
Koshelev said that he would like to get clarification on one 
point in the U.S. paper.  Koshelev was having a difficult 
time explaining the phrase "the 'reset' of relations with 
Russia would not come at Ukraine's expense."  This phrase had 
raised many questions within the MFA.  It seemed as if the 
United States was offering much more than a reaffirmation of 
the security assurances contained in the Trilateral Statement 
and in the Budapest Memorandum.  Koshelev fully understood 
that the United States and Ukraine had a bilateral 
relationship and that Vice President Biden's remarks in Kyiv 
were for political purposes.  However, the questions Ukraine 
had raised were within the context of the START Treaty and 
Ukraine was a member of one side of the treaty with Russia. 
Therefore, it seemed strange that the United States would be 
approaching Ukraine differently from Russia in this context. 
In Russia's view, there should be nothing more than a 
reconfirmation of the Trilateral Statement and the Budapest 
Memorandum.  Malyugin offered that many in the MFA had 
imagined a similar statement could be made for another state, 
such as Poland.  Did the U.S. statement mean there was more 
to be offered? 
 
¶6.  (S) Taylor thanked Koshelev for sharing his concerns and 
said that he would inform Washington of the concerns raised. 
It was his personal view that because Ukraine had raised the 
question of assurances, coupled with the fact that the United 
States had been adamant that the follow-on negotiations with 
Russia would be bilateral, the United States wanted to assure 
Ukraine the U.S./Ukraine bilateral relationship would not 
suffer. 
 
------------ 
RVOSI ISSUES 
------------ 
 
¶7.  (S) Taylor turned to potential issues that could be 
raised at a JCIC for resolution citing the upcoming MMIII 
RVOSI demonstration.  Taylor noted that the United States had 
received the previous day the Russian notification listing 
the observers from Russia and Ukraine that would be coming to 
the demonstration at Malstrom Air Force Base September 9-11 
(REF B).  Koshelev agreed saying that, just the week prior, 
Col Ryshkov had spoken with Koshelev saying that he had been 
working very hard to address U.S. concerns with the SS-27 
RVOSI and that he hoped there would be some new approaches to 
this issue that could be demonstrated at the next SS-27 RVOSI. 
 
---------------------------- 
VOTKINSK CLOSE-OUT AGREEMENT 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Koshelev raised the issue of the Votkinsk agreement 
(REF C) asking if it would be possible to complete work on 
that agreement as time was quickly passing to get everything 
done prior to expiration of the Treaty.  Taylor said that 
once he had authority to bring the document to the table 
 
 
 
again, he believed all that remained was to conform the 
document and prepare it for signing.  In his conversations 
with the U.S. Delegation lawyer, Mr. Brown, it would take no 
more than a couple of days to complete the conforming. 
Koshelev said he appreciated this information and hoped that 
the Parties could move forward on the document, perhaps as 
soon as the first week of the next SFO session beginning 
September 21.  Taylor said that it would all depend on 
whether Washington was ready to work on the document. 
 
------------------ 
FINAL-CLOSEOUT MOU 
------------------ 
 
¶9.  (S) Taylor next addressed the issue of a final-closeout 
MOU.  Taylor explained that the Treaty did not provide for 
such, noting that the Treaty expired before the next 
six-month update would be submitted.  Moreover, there was no 
authority to provide such an update after December 5, 2009. 
Taylor believed that it would be important to have a clear 
understanding of each Side's data at expiration of the START 
Treaty.  The Parties could agree that MOU data, as of 0001 
hours December 4, 2009, could be transmitted not later than 
2400 hours on December 4, 2009.  This would be important also 
to our work in the START Follow-on negotiations as the data 
would form the basis for our work on the SFO MOU.  Koshelev 
said that this was an interesting proposal and that he would 
discuss this with his colleagues in Moscow. 
 
------------------------------- 
TIMING FOR JCIC IS THE QUESTION 
------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Taylor asked Koshelev what his thoughts were on 
timing for a JCIC session between now and December.  Koshelev 
said that it would depend on when his delegation would be in 
Geneva for SFO negotiations.  The Russian SFO Delegation 
would be limited to two weeks in Geneva at a time and then 
back to Moscow.  Taylor offered that Koshelev had to be 
kidding.  It would be impossible to complete work on a START 
Follow-on treaty with that kind of limited schedule.  The 
Parties had only a little more than three months before START 
expired.  Koshelev said that it was unfortunate but Antonov 
could not devote all his time to negotiation of this treaty. 
Koshelev had seen a transcript of the phone conversation 
between President Obama and President Medvedev where Obama 
said that the U.S. Negotiator would spend 100 percent of her 
time on the negotiation of the new treaty and Medvedev had 
offered the same commitment.  Unfortunately, this had not 
filtered down to Antonov.  It was extremely difficult for 
personnel in Antonov's department to be away.  Either Antonov 
or one of his deputies had to be present in Moscow to keep 
things on track.  This was why Koshelev would not be arriving 
in Geneva until September 27. 
 
¶11.  (S) Koshelev offered September 28-30 as possible dates 
for the JCIC.  Taylor opined that his expectations for work 
on the SFO treaty would be very intense during this period 
and it would be difficult to focus attention on a JCIC 
session.  He offered that it might be possible during 
mid-October during the ministerial.  Koshelev said that he 
was concerned that a mid-October date could present problems 
 
 
 
with arranging to remove equipment and supplies from Votkinsk 
in a timely manner.  Koshelev was also concerned about giving 
Ukraine a platform to stir things up with talk about joining 
the negotiations.  Taylor offered that Ukraine's insistence 
on being a part of the negotiations should not be a surprise. 
 The United States had been very clear that the negotiations 
for a START Follow-on treaty would be bilateral between the 
United States and Russia.  Koshelev agreed, saying that 
Moscow was keen to end START on a positive note and did not 
want Ukraine to create problems.  His view was that with the 
U.S. and Russian Representatives in Geneva, the Belarusian 
and Kazakhstani representatives to the UN in Geneva could be 
empowered to represent their governments in the meeting.  He 
felt certain that Nykonenko would want to travel to Geneva. 
If the United States and Russia could conform the Votkinsk 
agreement during the first week of the SFO negotiations 
beginning September 21, the document could be ready for 
signature quickly.  The session would not need to be more 
than a couple of days. 
 
---------------------- 
ANOTHER APPROACH ON 
THE VOTKINSK AGREEMENT 
---------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Taylor offered that the Votkinsk agreement did not 
have to be concluded in the JCIC.  He had briefly discussed 
this with the Legal Advisor.  The agreement could be 
concluded as an Executive Agreement between the United States 
and Russia.  We would probably need to include Belarus in 
some form as the plan for transporting the equipment and 
supplies involved ground transportation through Belarus. 
Koshelev said that this was an interesting idea and that he 
would review this approach with his lawyers.  It would be 
helpful if this could be done without the possibility of 
Ukraine's participation to prevent possible problems.  This 
might all be unnecessary as Ukraine had spoken about calling 
for an extraordinary session of the JCIC and he expected he 
would know more after the meeting with Nykonenko on September 
¶4. 
 
¶13.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
GRIFFITHS