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INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1893
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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6083

S E C R E T GENEVA 000741 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV): 
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, ADDITIONAL RUSSIAN 
QUESTIONS ON U.S.-PROPOSED TREATY TEXT 
 
REF: GENEVA 0735 (SFO-GVA-IV-001) 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-003. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 1, 2009 
                Time:  3:30 - 5:20 p.m. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) Ambassador Antonov stated his expectation that the 
United States would provide answers to the Russian 
Delegation's questions from the previous day and repeatedly 
complained that the United States had not included in the 
U.S.-proposed text of the treaty Russian proposals that had 
been provided at previous sessions.  He questioned whether 
the United States was retreating from the Joint Understanding 
that the Presidents had signed in July in Moscow.  A/S 
Gottemoeller stressed that it was Russia's responsibility to 
provide their own positions.  The United States was not 
responsible for drafting Russian language for the draft 
treaty.  The United States had provided its proposal on 
August 24, 2009, and had not yet received any response to 
that proposal.  Moreover, the United States was not 
retreating from what was agreed in the Joint Understanding. 
 
¶4.  (S) Gottemoeller offered an update on the U.S. Ballistic 
Missile Defense (BMD) review process.  She said that the 
review was nearing completion and that, once that process was 
complete, Russia would be informed of the results of the 
review.  The process should be completed by late September or 
early October of this year.  Antonov said he did not 
understand the U.S. reluctance to include language in the 
draft treaty on the interrelationship between strategic 
offense and strategic defense.  He implored the U.S. 
Delegation members from the Pentagon, Joint Staff and 
Department of Energy for a rationale on why the United States 
was reluctant to accept a provision in the new treaty. 
Gottemoeller explained that the responsibility of this group 
was to develop a treaty to replace the START Treaty.  That 
treaty would address strategic offensive arms.  Strategic 
defense would be addressed in another forum. 
 
------------------------- 
THE PROCESS IS IMPORTANT, 
BUT SUBSTANCE IS CRUCIAL 
------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Gottemoeller clarified her previous comments on the 
inclusion of Russian text in the U.S-proposed treaty text. 
She stated that, after careful reading of the U.S-proposed 
treaty text, there were several areas where Russian language 
was explicitly included.  Those areas, where the United 
States had known where Russian text was to be placed in the 
treaty, the United States had included it in its 
U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT).  She offered the 
preamble as an example where text reflecting the Russian 
position on the interrelationship between strategic offense 
 
 
and strategic defense and ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear 
configuration was included, in brackets.  Furthermore, there 
was specific bracketed Russian text in Article XV, Paragraph 
5, concerning qualitative improvements in missile defense 
systems.  The U.S. Delegation had prepared two U.S.-proposed 
JDTs, one on preambular language, and one on final articles 
and provided them to the Russian Delegation at yesterday's 
meeting.  Gottemoeller further stated that, although the 
Russians have provided other specific language, the United 
States did not know where to place it in the U.S-proposed 
treaty text.  Again, she emphasized that the United States is 
ready to create q JDT when the Russian Side indicates where 
its proposed language should fit.  Better yet, the United 
States would like to review a Russian-proposed text for the 
treaty and compare it with the U.S.-proposed text. 
 
¶6.  (S) Antonov followed with a dissertation on the many 
instances of U.S. unwillingness to consider Russian matters 
of principle.  After a lengthy rant, Antonov finally agreed 
that the task at hand is to create a joint draft text. 
Gottemoeller underscored that it is not a matter of 
reflecting both Sides' text in brackets, that is symbolic and 
a procedural issue, but rather it is a matter of how to take 
mutual views into account and reflect it in joint draft text. 
 
¶7.  (S) Antonov addressed translation issues.  He said that 
the specific Russian preamble proposals and additional 
paragraphs that were included in the Joint Understanding were 
not in the U.S-proposed treaty text.  Specifically, the words 
"impact on strategic stability" which were included in the 
U.S.-proposed preamble in the section on strategic offensive 
and defensive arms were not present in the Joint 
Understanding.  Antonov queried whether this was a 
fundamental change in the U.S. position.  Gottemoeller 
confirmed that it was not a change in the U.S. position and 
had nothing to do with the accuracy of the translation. 
 
------------------------- 
AND ON TO MISSILE DEFENSE 
------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Gottemoeller stated that she had spent time briefing 
the U.S. Senate recently on why the language on the 
interrelationship between strategic offense and strategic 
defense was in the text of the Joint Understanding.  She 
noted that the signing of the Joint Understanding by 
President Obama and President Medvedev was continuing a 
long-standing position first recognized by U.S. President 
Nixon in 1972 and, therefore, the Joint Understanding is not 
breaking any new ground.  Gottemoeller underscored that both 
Presidents agreed that the new treaty would be about 
strategic offensive arms; meanwhile, the United States and 
Russia have begun a separate process to address defensive 
systems with the Joint Threat Assessment. 
 
¶9.  (S) Gottemoeller reported that the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Review is moving along a timeline that President 
Obama mentioned to President Medvedev during the Moscow 
Summit.  The review will be completed very shortly and 
President Obama plans to discuss in early Fall both the 
process and results. 
 
¶10.  (S) Antonov again spoke at length on the 
 
 
interrelationship between strategic offense and strategic 
defense.  He concluded his statement by reiterating that the 
Russians could not agree to a treaty which did not include 
this point, adding he could not understand the U.S. problem 
with accepting the Russian proposal.  The Russian Side 
reacted with considerable surprise when Gottemoeller 
explained that the Russian insistence on freezing missile 
defense levels was interpreted by the United States as a 
limit.  The Russian Delegation remarked that it was meant 
only as a statement of fact, not a limit.  The Russian Side 
pointed to their proposal for Treaty Article XV where either 
Party could invoke the supreme withdrawal clause should there 
be a qualitative or quantitative increase in missile defense 
capability from the time of the signing of the treaty.  Both 
Sides agreed that they had interpreted the language 
differently. 
 
¶11.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- U.S.: 
 
    -- U.S. Non-paper on Concepts Behind U.S.-Proposed 
Treaty, dated August 31, 2009. 
 
¶12.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
A/S Gottemoeller 
Amb Ries 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Buttrick 
LtCol Comeau 
Mr. Dunn 
Ms. Eccles 
Mr. Elliott 
Mrs. Friedt 
Col Hartford 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Siemon 
Mr. Taylor 
Dr. Warner 
Mrs Zdravecky 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Amb Antonov 
Mr. Koshelev 
Gen (Ret) Buzhinskiy 
Col Ilin 
Ms. Ivanova 
Col Izrazov 
Ms. Kotkova 
Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov 
Mr. Leontiev 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Mr. Malyugin 
Mr. Neshin 
MGen Orlov 
Col Pischulov 
Mr. Rudenko 
 
 
Mr. Semin 
Mr. Shevchenko 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Tarasov 
Mr. Vasiliev 
Gen Venevtsev 
Mr. Vorontsov 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
¶13.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
GRIFFITHS