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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1891
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0885
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6081

S E C R E T GENEVA 000738 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV): 
(U) RUSSIAN AIDE-MEMOIR ON CESSATION OF CONTINUOUS 
MONITORING AT VOTKINSK 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-012. 
 
¶2.  (U) At paragraph 3 below is the text of the official 
translation of the Russian Aide-Memoir on cessation of 
continuous monitoring at Votkinsk that was provided to the 
U.S. Delegation on August 31, 2009. 
 
¶3.  (S) Begin text: 
 
                                  Official Translation 
                                  CONFIDENTIAL 
                                  To be Turned over to the 
                                  U.S. Side 
                                  Paper of the Russian Side 
                                  August 31, 2009 
 
        On the Issue of Completion of U.S. Inspection 
    Activities at the Production Facility for Mobile ICBMs 
                          at Votkinsk 
                         (Aide-Memoire) 
 
     The U.S. side's latest official papers on the issue of 
completion of U.S. inspection activities at the production 
facility at Votkinsk and the U.S. Department of State's 
reaction to the relevant demarche from the Ambassador of the 
Russian Federation in Washington show that our U.S. partners 
refuse to understand the logic of the Russian side's actions, 
which is in strict accord with the provisions of the START 
Treaty. 
 
     We are perplexed and seriously concerned by the 
substance of the non-paper of August 14, 2009, entitled "U.S. 
Views Regarding the Expiration of the START Treaty and 
Perimeter Portal Continuous Monitoring at the Production 
Facility (sic) at Votkinsk."   Above all, we cannot regard it 
as an official response to our Note No. 5405 of June 16, 
2009, either in form or in content. 
 
     The Russian side has not questioned and is not 
questioning the U.S. side's right "to carry out its full 
START Treaty rights with respect to PPCM at Votkinsk until 
the expiration of the START Treaty on December 5, 2009."  At 
the same time, the U.S. side has also never denied that after 
2400 hours on December 4 of this year there will be no legal 
grounds for the presence of the U.S. verification mission on 
the territory of the Russian Federation.  Therefore, in 
accordance with the existing practice of completing 
continuous (monitoring) inspection activities under the INF 
Treaty, preparation of the relevant package of documents 
governing the procedure for completion of U.S. verification 
activities in Russia was initiated as far back as a year ago. 
 In this connection, in a spirit of good will the Russian 
side expressed its willingness to provide the United States 
of America with the necessary assistance in ensuring the 
calm, orderly, and respectful withdrawal of its personnel and 
property from Votkinsk.  However, it would seem that the U.S. 
side is not interested in this. 
 
     The Russian Federation's position on the U.S. 
verification mission at Votkinsk is utterly transparent and 
 
 
consistent.  The issue of the U.S. continuous inspection 
presence at the Votkinsk plant is not and will not be a 
subject of negotiations in the context of working out the new 
treaty on strategic offensive arms.  This principled decision 
by the Russian side is not subject to discussion and, thus, 
there are no grounds for raising the question of 
"preservation in a caretaker status" of the U.S. continuous 
monitoring facility at Votkinsk "until such time as 
inspection activity (sic) is reestablished." 
 
     We believe that at present the discussion can involve 
only the time frame for signing the drafts, which were agreed 
upon earlier, of the Agreement on Principles and Procedures 
for Completion of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the 
Monitored Facility at Votkinsk and the letters of exchange on 
the use of ground transportation and settlement of accounts. 
In this connection, we reaffirm our proposal, which was 
transmitted to the U.S. State Department through Russian 
Ambassador S.I. Kislyak, to complete this process during the 
upcoming round of the negotiations on strategic offensive 
arms in Geneva on August 31-September 3, 2009. 
 
     We would again urge the U.S. side to comply with its 
obligations under the START Treaty and begin as soon as 
possible taking practical steps to complete its continuous 
presence at Votkinsk so as to ensure that both equipment 
belonging to the U.S. and U.S. personnel are removed from the 
territory of the Russian Federation by December 5. 
 
     We look forward to an early response from the U.S. 
 
End text. 
 
¶4.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
GRIFFITHS