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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DJIBOUTI 001171 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E 
STATE PASS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/09/30 
TAGS: EAIR ICAO ECON EAID PGOV PINR DJ
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI CIVIL AVIATION: GODJ PLEDGES PROMPT REMOVAL OF 
SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONCERN 
 
REF: 09 DJIBOUTI 451 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: E. Wong, CDA; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Five months into a largely USG-financed program 
to provide technical assistance to Djibouti's civil aviation 
authority, Safe Skies for Africa (SSFA) and International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) officials remained gravely concerned 
that the program had not achieved its first, most immediate 
objective: the removal of an official ICAO "Significant Safety 
Concern" (SSC) linked to Djibouti's improper issuance of an Air 
Operator's Certificate (AOC) to Daallo Airlines (in which the GODJ 
is now a majority stakeholder).  During a September 26-29 follow-up 
visit, ICAO, SSFA, and EmbOffs held frank and productive meetings 
with the head of Djibouti's civil aviation authority and the 
Minister of Transport, agreeing on a productive way forward to 
remove the immediate SSC, revise the technical assistance program 
to better meet Djibouti's needs and ICAO/SSFA expectations, and 
improve communication.  Current civil aviation capacity in Djibouti 
remains low, and lack of internal GODJ communication between key 
players is an ongoing concern.  However, senior GODJ officials 
reiterated that Djibouti is politically committed to addressing the 
immediate SSC, and that greater cooperation with ICAO and other 
international partners to improve civil aviation capacity is part 
of Djibouti's overall strategy to develop into a regional air hub. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) SSFA Program Manager Connie Hunter and SSFA International 
Transportation Specialist Cynthia Glass visited Djibouti September 
26-29, in coordination with the visit of ICAO's Nairobi-based 
Regional Director Geoffrey Moshabesha and Montreal-based Technical 
Cooperation Bureau head Roger Lambo.  EmbOffs joined the group in 
separate meetings with Djibouti Civil Aviation (DACM) Director 
Almis M. Haid on September 27, and with Minister of Transport Ali 
Hassan Bahdon on September 28 (accompanied by CDA). 
 
 
 
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"SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONCERN" NOTED 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) In April, President Guelleh and other senior GODJ officials 
warmly welcomed SSFA funding for ICAO to provide technical 
assistance to the DACM (reftel).  During an inbrief September 27 
with Ambassador, ICAO noted serious concern that this program had 
so far failed to correct the SSC noted in a recent ICAO Safety 
Oversight Audit.  ICAO's SSC was linked solely to Djibouti's 
issuance of an Air Operator's Certificate (AOC) to Daallo Airlines 
without having the capacity to properly control or oversee this 
technical safety document.  At any one time, ICAO notes SSCs in an 
estimated five countries worldwide.  These SSCs are publicly listed 
on ICAO's website.  If SSCs are not addressed, Article 54J of the 
ICAO's Chicago Convention allows ICAO to inform all contracting 
states that a particular member has not fulfilled its commitments. 
Technical Cooperation Bureau Head Roger Lambo told Ambassador that 
while 54J in reality does not "have all that many teeth," the 
greater hope was that the situation in Djibouti would never reach 
this stage, and that ICAO would work closely with Djibouti to help 
it reach and maintain compliance with all international norms. 
ICAO later informed EmbOffs that they understood the European Union 
(EU) was also considering putting Djibouti on its no-fly "black 
list"-which is normally derived from ICAO Safety Oversight Audit 
results. 
 
 
 
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CLEARING UP ICAO-GODJ COMMUNICATION GAPS 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------------- 
 
DJIBOUTI 00001171  002 OF 004 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) While ICAO told Ambassador that they were concerned about 
the GODJ's "lack of commitment" to the program, DACM Director Almis 
¶M. Haid explained to ICAO and SSFA that he had been baffled by what 
he described as an initial six-month "observation" phase in the 
program.  ICAO knows the issues in Djibouti "very well already," he 
said, and the DACM had felt they should skip the observation phase. 
In addition, Haid said that he did not understand why operational 
inspectors had been sent to Djibouti before a legal advisor had 
finished his work on a badly-needed draft civil aviation code. 
Lambo and Moshabesha explained to Haid that this initial phase had 
been specifically designed to address and remove the immediate SSC 
before moving on toward general capacity building and training 
phases.  Therefore, ICAO first sent operational inspectors-who 
nonetheless were unable to complete their task of reviewing 
Daallo's AOC, because the DACM did not issue appropriate 
credentials and Daallo refused to provide required documentation 
for review in a timely manner. 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) Both Haid and Minister of Transport Ali Hassan Bahdon 
strongly objected to the tone and content of a recent letter sent 
by the President of the ICAO Council to President Guelleh.   Inter 
alia, the letter in question directed President Guelleh to annul 
Daallo's AOC and provide ICAO with proof that this had been done. 
ICAO's letter was answered by Presidency Secretary General Ismail 
Tani, who noted his objections to the letter's tone and directed 
ICAO to work with the Minister of Transport.  (NOTE.  Neither Post 
nor SSFA were aware that ICAO was planning to send this letter, and 
only received copies of it after the fact.  END NOTE).  Minister 
Bahdon said that the letter was "felt as an ultimatum" and that 
GODJ was "disappointed" with this approach.  "We know we need to be 
in conformity with the rules," Bahdon said, and the political will 
is already there to do so because civil aviation is a top 
government "priority."  ICAO told Haid and Bahdon that their 
concerns had been noted and would be brought back to the office of 
the President of the ICAO Council.  "We will always be on your side 
to assist you and make sure that Djibouti meets all international 
standards," Lambo assured Bahdon. 
 
 
 
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AGREEING ON THE WAY FORWARD: 
 
FOR NOW AND DOWN THE ROAD 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) In discussions with Haid and Bahdon, all parties agreed to 
take the following steps to move forward in the short and long 
term: 
 
 
 
-- IMMEDIATE REMOVAL OF SSC:  ICAO assured Haid and Bahdon that the 
GODJ's annulment of Daallo's AOC would not lead to the interruption 
of air services in Djibouti.  The DACM confirmed that all Daallo 
aircraft are currently leased from other companies.  Therefore, 
ICAO explained, Daallo can continue operations based on the AOC(s) 
issued to the leasing companies.   ICAO will provide technical 
assistance to the DACM to verify that these third-country AOCs (for 
example, one from the Comoros) conform with international 
standards.  Daallo would also need to continue leasing aircraft on 
an ACIM (aircraft, crew, insurance, maintenance) basis.  In 
addition, the GODJ can issue Daallo an Air Service Permit (ASP), (a 
"commercial" rather than a "technical" document), allowing Djibouti 
to retain full control over Daallo's permissions to operate as a 
business in Djibouti and to fly certain routes.  At a lunch 
September 28, Haid's de facto deputy told ICAO that the AOC would 
be annulled by October 1.  Once the AOC is annulled, the GODJ must 
publish the withdrawal notice and inform ICAO, which will then 
inform all ICAO members that Djibouti has remedied the SSC. 
 
DJIBOUTI 00001171  003 OF 004 
 
 
-- INTERIM SOLUTION AND LONG-TERM GOAL:  During an interim period, 
ICAO will assist the GODJ to conclude a cooperative agreement with 
another state which currently meets ICAO standards (possibly 
Ethiopia or the United Arab Emirates).  This agreement will allow 
Djibouti to issue AOCs, but with the understanding that the second 
state will provide all necessary technical oversight. 
Concurrently, ICAO and the second state will work with Djibouti to 
train Djiboutian inspectors capable of overseeing issuance of AOCs. 
Haid stressed that any such arrangement with another state needed 
to be an interim solution, and preferably last no longer than six 
months.  (NOTE.  ICAO told CDA that the duration of this phase 
would depend entirely on how quickly the GODJ can work to train its 
own inspectors.  Lambo estimated that one year was a more realistic 
interim time frame.  END NOTE.)  In the longer term, ICAO 
underlined, Djibouti may want to consider joining a regional 
grouping to pool human resource inspection capacity.  Qualified 
inspectors are in great demand and have proven enormously difficult 
to retain throughout Africa, with flight operations inspectors 
commanding salaries of up to ten thousand dollars a month. 
 
 
 
--REVISED PROGRAM OF SUPPORT: ICAO will revise the technical 
assistance program project document to reflect the current plan of 
action.  The current ICAO inspector detailed to the DACM will 
become an ICAO "advisor," with a broader mandate.  The advisor will 
report directly to ICAO, and will be able to brief the Minister of 
Transport regularly.  In addition, ICAO can provide any additional 
assistance required to help Djibouti complete and adopt a civil 
aviation code.  Minister Bahdon complained that the ICAO expert 
sent to Djibouti to work on this code had consulted only with the 
DACM and not with the Ministry of Transport (a charge refuted by 
ICAO).  Since President Guelleh had made the passage of a civil 
aviation code a top priority, Bahdon said, he had also engaged his 
own advisor to complete a draft.  The two existing drafts, however, 
had only "very small" differences. 
 
 
 
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MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT-DACM DYNAMICS 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Bahdon told ICAO that he had not been receiving adequate 
communication from the DACM (whose director he nominally 
supervises), and that he wanted future ICAO communications to come 
first through the Ministry of Transport.  Moshabesha and Lambo told 
Bahdon that ICAO would communicate with whichever entity the GODJ 
designated as the main point of contact, but that this decision 
would need to be transmitted to ICAO in a formal request. 
(COMMENT.  There is a complete lack of communication and near-open 
animosity between Bahdon and Haid.  During the ICAO-SSFA visit, 
neither agreed to meet together, and both bowed out of a planned 
lunch when it appeared that there would be both Ministry of 
Transport and DACM representation.  Both are connected by family 
ties to First Lady Khadra Mahamoud Haid-Haid is her brother, and 
Bahdon is married to her daughter from a previous marriage.  Bahdon 
was appointed Minister of Transport in a 2008 cabinet shuffle.  He 
is somewhat of an up-and-comer, and appears to have enough of 
President Guelleh's trust that he acted as interim Foreign Minister 
on one occasion.  He is not, however, immune from gossip that he 
holds his position solely because of his wife, and not by personal 
merit.  Haid, who is considerably older than Bahdon, has long been 
associated with the DACM.  The First Lady is sometimes said to be 
more favorable towards another brother, Central Bank Governor Djama 
¶M. Haid.  END COMMENT.) 
 
 
 
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MAKING A REGIONAL PORT A REGIONAL AIR HUB 
 
DJIBOUTI 00001171  004 OF 004 
 
 
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¶8. (SBU) "We are weak in civil aviation," Minister Bahdon said, 
"but we are learning."  Djibouti, he emphasized, does not want any 
bad publicity in the civil aviation field, and is strongly 
motivated to address any safety concerns.  The GODJ is now a 
majority stakeholder in Daallo, Bahdon said, and would like to 
"upgrade" the airline.  To do this, the GODJ will need to give 
certain assurances to potential investors.  In the long term, he 
said, Djibouti wants to match strong growth in the port sector with 
commensurate development in aviation, transforming Djibouti into a 
regional air hub.  Bahdon asked ICAO and the USG for continued 
support in building Djibouti's human resource base in support of 
this goal. 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) Minister Bahdon highlighted the urgent need to establish a 
regional center to control airspace for the Horn of Africa (i.e. 
Ethiopia, Djibouti, and its neighbors).  Due to the 1998-2001 
Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, for example, neither country coordinated 
on airspace.  Somalia's air traffic control ("Mogadishu 
Information") operated from a villa in Kenya, and no country in the 
region coordinated with Sanaa except Djibouti.  Djibouti controlled 
its own airspace up to 24,500 feet, and coordinated closely with 
Israel's El Al Airline (which, for political reasons, could not use 
Sudanese airspace). 
 
 
 
-------------- 
 
COMMENT 
 
-------------- 
 
 
 
¶10. (C) Fulfilling President Guelleh's long-term vision of Djibouti 
as a regional transport and services hub depends on addressing 
safety concerns shadowing the country's aviation authority. 
Communication hiccups between ICAO and the GODJ-and within the 
GODJ-are likely responsible for delaying Djibouti's response to 
ICAO's Significant Safety Concern (SSC).  Now that the key players 
fully understand both the gravity of the situation, and that the 
remedy will not/not involve grounding Daallo Airlines, Post 
assesses that the GODJ is likely to keep its word in annulling the 
improperly issued AOC.  The GODJ deregistered 13 aircraft, 
following USG demarches, in March 2008.  Communication between the 
DACM and the Ministry of Transport will likely remain a challenge. 
Post will continue to follow up with relevant parties to help 
ensure that newly-opened lines of communication between ICAO and 
the GODJ do not close, and that the SSFA-funded program can move 
forward to accomplish its objective of building capacity for 
Djibouti's civil aviation authority.  END COMMENT. 
WONG