VZCZCXRO6937
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHDH #0234/01 2451339
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021339Z SEP 09
FM AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0274
INFO RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE
RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0357

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAHRAN 000234 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP (HARRIS/BERNDT), EEB/ESC/IEC (SULLIVAN), 
AND INR/EC(WOOD) 
DOE FOR DAS HEGBURG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/2/2019 
TAGS: ENRG EPET ECON PGOV SA
SUBJECT: FORMER SAUDI ARAMCO EXECUTIVE BULLISH ON OIL PRICES 
 
DHAHRAN 00000234  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Kevin Kreutner, Acting Consul General, EXEC, DOS. 
 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶1. (C/NF) Saudi Aramco's former Executive Vice President, Dr. 
Sadad al-Husseini (strictly protect), recently commented on the 
likelihood of oil prices rising sharply over the next couple of 
years.  In his view, the bearish energy analysts arguing that 
the oil price shocks of last summer are not likely to be 
repeated anytime soon are making inaccurate assumptions.  Dr. 
al-Husseini maintains that volatile political factors in 
Venezuela, Nigeria, Iran, Iraq, and Libya are bound to hamper 
OPEC supply over the next several years.  He believes that these 
political uncertainties, coupled with a rise in demand and 
increasingly more expensive and difficult production, will once 
again lead speculators to drive oil prices upwards.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
FORMER ARAMCO EXECUTIVE:  GEOLOGY AND 
 
GEOPOLITICS WILL LEAD TO HIGHER PRICES 
 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶2. (C/NF) Dr. Sadad Ibrahim al-Husseini manages his own energy 
consultancy, primarily serving international private equity 
funds, financial institutions, and energy firms.  He is a 
geologist by training and holds a PhD from Brown University. 
Dr. al-Husseini retired from Saudi Aramco in March 2004 as 
Executive Vice President and a member of its Board of Directors. 
 Once appointed to the number two spot at Aramco (Executive Vice 
President) in 1996, he was widely considered to be the heir 
apparent for the CEO position.  However, when Dr. al-Husseini 
found out that he was passed over for the top spot allegedly due 
to his non-Saudi roots (both of his parents are naturalized 
Saudi citizens of Syrian extraction), he left the national oil 
company.  However, the al-Husseini family enjoys a privileged 
status with the royal family due to Dr. al-Husseini's father's 
role as a key advisor to King Abdullah in establishing the Saudi 
Arabian National Guard. 
 
 
 
¶3. (C/NF) Dr. al-Husseini is a well-established contact of 
Consulate General Dhahran.  He frequently offers candid views on 
the importance of geopolitical factors on energy markets.  In 
previous conversations with EconOff, Dr. al-Husseini predicted 
that another oil price shock would likely hit sometime in the 
next year or two.  We are forwarding his views below not just on 
the merits.  His access to influential circles, both in the 
royal family and business sectors, means his opinions on this 
topic likely both influence and reflect the views of Saudi 
leaders. 
 
 
 
¶4. (C/NF) The following text is Dr. al-Husseini's written 
response to EconOff countering recent arguments in the press and 
elsewhere by energy analysts that oil prices are unlikely to 
rise again to record levels in the next few years.  Bracketed 
text is ours.  Begin Dr. al-Husseini's text: 
 
 
 
COMMENTS REGARDING "NOT SO BULLISH 
 
CASE FOR ENERGY PRICES" 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
 
The commentary that was posted on ftalphaville.ft.com on 
08/29/2009 in regards to an article by Edward Morse in Foreign 
Affairs Magazine is consistent with several similar commentaries 
that appear to be directed at cooling down what might become 
overheated energy prices.  Michael Lynch in the New York Times 
of 08/25/2009 is pretty much in the same vein and so are others. 
 
 
 
Let's take Edward Morse because Michael Lynch's write-up is 
totally off the mark. 
 
 "Oil prices at $147 per barrel are the result of a convergence 
of circumstances that are unlikely to be repeated soon." 
 
 
 
Actually this is a very inaccurate assumption.  The rising oil 
prices through 2007 were due to structural factors including 
population and economic growth, improved standards of living, 
flattened new capacity exacerbated by severe production declines. 
 
 
 
The reference to "disappearance of OPEC spare capacity" is a 
clear sign of lack of understanding of the industry -- prices 
were low and demand went up by several million barrels.  There 
is no way to maintain "idle" capacity in the face of low prices 
and unmitigated demand.  This could be the recurring situation 
today. 
 
 
 
The other factors such as "political impediments," "civil 
disorder," "resource nationalism," "war on Saddam," etc. are not 
exceptions, but the normal state of affairs throughout the 
world.  We had the Iran/Iraq war, invasion of Kuwait, and 
liberation of Kuwait since the 1980's.  That didn't create $147 
barrels.  On the other hand, we can expect the collapse of 
Mexico's [oil] production, Russian resource nationalism, the 
meltdown [i.e., increasing decline rates] of the North Sea and 
Alaska, the drying up of West Africa, and the continued growth 
of Strategic Environmental Assessments to make oil prices 
steeper and steeper.  Demand destruction will generate any 
excess supplies in the future, not sustainable growth in 
[production] capacity.  > 
 
 
 
The notion that the absence of Saudi production was a major 
factor driving prices upwards is also in error.  A careful look 
at actual demand for North America, for example, will show that 
demand was falling off from mid-2007 as prices took a steep turn 
upwards.  Demand destruction was working at higher prices, even 
though there was some capacity available and commercial OECD 
inventories to be drawn down. 
 
 
 
In any case, Saudi Arabia does not have 12.5 million barrels per 
day (mbd) in the market today and at 8 mbd, it's certainly not 
flooding the market.  It's the global economy that is setting 
demand levels and hence oil prices, not Saudi Arabia. 
 
 
 
The assumption that OPEC will be at 37 mbd in 2010 is a 
short-term conclusion.  What about incompetence in Venezuela, 
civil disorder in Nigeria, embargo on Iran, paralysis in Iraq, 
resource nationalism in Kuwait, freeze in Qatar, delays in UAE, 
exploration and production failures in Libya and Algeria and a 
cap in Saudi Arabia (after Manifa)?  The question is what 
happens [with OPEC production capacity] in 2011 and 2012, and 
aren't people smart enough to see the writing on the wall and 
follow up with speculation? 
 
 
 
So the international oil companies will go into deep water and 
look for deep water prospects.  Given the steep offshore decline 
rates, they will have to work very hard indeed as they get 
driven off the continental shelf, into the continental slope and 
then into the deep ocean basins (where fields are small, 
recoveries limited and costs keep rising).  Again, higher costs 
lead to higher prices.  Even OPEC has run out of cheap oil and 
they're not even talking about the deep offshore.  BP is talking 
about $25 billion over 5 years to get Rumaila [oil field in 
Iraq] up to 2.8 mbd.  Kashagan 1 and 2 [in Kazakhstan] now stand 
at over $54 billion for about 1 mbd.  Costs are rising... 
 
 
 
Morse then moves into shale [gas], which has nothing to do with 
oil and, in any case, is grossly overstated as reserves.  Europe 
would opt to coal not gas, if it has to do something -- European 
coal reserves are much more abundant than shale gas.  Gas prices 
are down in the U.S. because demand is down, not because there 
is a sudden surge in supplies. 
 
 
 
So the Marcellus shale [in the Northeastern U.S.] contains more 
gas than the North field of Qatar? 
 
 
 
Well that's great, but at even 3.4 million square cubic feet per 
day (scfd) per well per year its going to take a long time and 
many wells to replace a field with 900 trillion cubic feet of 
reported reserves.  In the meanwhile, the U.S. consumes 63 
billion scfd of gas -- that would require something like 20,000 
wells at 3 million scfd per well.  Given the very rapid 
declines, this translates into a requirement to drill something 
like 10,000 wells per year to stay even. 
 
 
 
Morse concludes demand will flatten or go down.  Well of course 
it will -- at higher prices, the only serious and near term 
option is greater energy efficiency. 
 
 
 
¶5. (C/NF) End Dr. al-Husseini's text. 
 
 
 
COMMENT 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶6. (C/NF) Dr. al-Husseini's text may indeed reflect Saudi 
thinking on oil markets, particularly their sensitivity to being 
blamed for high oil prices.  Hence, he stressed other potential 
drivers of price volatility.  His skepticism on non-OPEC 
supplies and on the potential for non-traditional energy 
supplies is also noteworthy. 
KREUTNER