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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6837
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S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000671 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, ELA, NEA/IZ 
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PMIL IZ SY
SUBJECT: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA:  TOWARD A SIX-MONTH PLAN 
 
REF: DAMASCUS 669 
 
Classified By: CDA Chuck Hunter for reasons 1.5 b and d. 
 
¶1.    (S/NF)  Summary:  March 2010 will mark the end of the 
first year of U.S.-Syrian engagement.  As reported reftel, 
this period poses a series of formidable challenges.  Syrian 
policies continue to impede government formation in Lebanon, 
support foreign fighters going into Iraq, maintain close ties 
with Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas, and reject calls from the 
IAEA to cooperate.  Our engagement efforts have established 
relationships that will enable us to discuss these subjects, 
but Syrian officials remain less willing to accept their 
responsibility in addressing core issues. 
 
¶2.     (S/NF) With the trilateral border assessment 
initiative now all but dead, we need a replacement to 
demonstrate the ability of both sides to work together 
constructively.  Beyond our focus on national security 
issues, we should be considering how to expand our contacts 
in other technical areas in which initial U.S.-Syrian 
contacts could lead to more routine interaction.  Syrian 
interest in judicial and law enforcement reforms, expanding 
educational contacts, water management issues, urban 
planning, and NGO development provide just a few examples of 
areas in which U.S. government and private sector contacts 
could dramatically expand our access and influence.  We need 
to frame these initiatives in broader terms of choices facing 
the Syrian regime and the need for concrete Syrian actions on 
Lebanon and Iraq for our engagement to continue.  We also 
need to dangle what the Syrians really want -- relaxation of 
sanctions and visits by high ranking officials to expand our 
dialogue on core issues -- as a payoff once Syria has 
demonstrated its intent to utilize these contacts to build a 
more solid foundation.  If we can advance these ideas over 
the next six months, we may increase our ability to persuade 
senior Syrian leaders that their country's interests is 
better served by more constructive policies that would bring 
even closer U.S.-Syrian ties. End Summary. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) This cable is the second of a two-part series on 
engaging Syria over the next six months.  It presents a few 
ideas on how to refine and our engagement strategy in the 
national security area and other fields. It should be read in 
conjunction with an overview of Syrian views of recent events 
in the region. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Engaging Syria:  Happy Six-Month Anniversary 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S/NF)  September 7 marked the six-month anniversary of 
the opening of the Administration's engagement policy by the 
visit to Damascus of NEA A/S Jeffrey Feltman and NSC Senior 
Director Dan Shapiro.  In those six months, as noted in 
reftel, we have seen both positive and negative movement by 
the SARG.  On core issues -- Iran, Hizballah, Hamas, Iraq, 
the IAEA, and Lebanon -- the current SARG position has 
hardened and poses a variety of challenges.  At the same 
time, we have seen some progress in the normalization of our 
dialogue between capitals and embassies, and we have the 
sense Damascus is keen to continue the dialogue. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF)  The next six months pose a series of challenges 
for managing our relations with Syria.  Government formation 
in Lebanon, defusing Iraqi-Syrian tensions while getting at 
the core issue of foreign fighters, winning Syrian 
cooperation for our efforts to promote the Palestinian and 
Syrian tracks, and finding a resolution to Syria's lack of 
cooperation with the IAEA represent the major tasks that lie 
ahead.  Our engagement efforts have established relationships 
that will enable us to discuss these subjects, but Syrian 
officials remain less willing to accept their responsibility 
in addressing core issues. 
 
---------------------- 
What is The Objective? 
---------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) From our vantage, the goal of engagement remains 
reaching a point at which the U.S. can constructively frame 
what it assesses to be the strategic choices facing the U.S. 
and Syria and how those choices bode for U.S.-Syrian 
relations.  Syrian policymakers certainly do not view 
regional issues exclusively through the lens of bilateral 
relations with the U.S., but a better understanding of 
Washington's vision for better relations, and where positive 
choices by both countries could lead, might affect the Syrian 
calculus about what it stands to gain and/or lose.  In this 
context, we would be able to explain to President Asad and 
others why continuing Syrian support for foreign fighters 
going into Iraq and Syria's interference in Lebanese affairs 
would make it politically impossible for the U.S. to continue 
engaging Syria unless we saw an end to these activities.  It 
might also provide an opening to express our hope and 
expectation that Syria would support (or at least not oppose) 
U.S. efforts to create more favorable conditions for the 
resumption of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. 
Sometime during in this heart-to-heart dialogue, we need to 
find a moment to discuss Syria's ongoing problems with the 
IAEA as well. 
 
--------------------------- 
After the Trilat, Now What? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S/NF)  The trilateral initiative represented an 
important stepping stone to establishing a relationship that 
would sustain such a conversation.  Now that the trilat has 
fallen victim to Syria's dispute with Iraq, we need to find a 
suitable alternative and persuade the Syrians to go along 
with it.  Part of the challenge will be to convince the 
Syrians the U.S. is not acting in bad faith by proposing 
another option for Syria and the U.S. to demonstrate their 
ability to cooperate.  Syria believes it met this requirement 
and the U.S. should deliver on its part of the bargain. 
Overcoming this challenge will be difficult, particularly if 
Syrian officials perceive other indicators that the U.S. has 
weakened its commitment to engagement. 
 
¶8.  (S/NF)  One approach might involve an effort to cast the 
trilat's unfortunate but unavoidable demise as an opportunity 
to develop a plan to navigate the difficult challenges that 
will face Syrian-U.S. relations during the next six months. 
The trilateral initiative succeeded as a concept not just 
because it triggered high-level governmental contacts, but 
also because it represented a true effort to expand bilateral 
U.S.-Syrian relations in an area in which there had been very 
little previous contact.  Syrians might be persuaded by the 
argument that, in addition to maintaining a dialogue on 
priority issues for both sides, the U.S. attaches a high 
value to deepening relations in the security realm.  While 
Syrian receptivity to this idea would probably depend to a 
large degree on who was conveying it, they may be willing to 
listen if we proposed it as a first step in a six-month trial 
that, if successful in the eyes of both sides, would yield 
some of the U.S. deliverables (visits, easing of sanctions, 
positive rhetoric, and closer bilateral coordination) the 
Syrians say they seek.  At the end of this six-month period, 
the sides could each assess their progress and determine how 
to proceed. 
 
¶9.  (S/NF)  Post views all of the ideas currently under 
discussion in Washington as tenable alternatives, including a 
counterterrorism dialogue and consultation on port security. 
Indeed, assuming the interagency supports these ideas, we 
would suggest that there would be merit in pursuing these 
options and others, to include assessments of airport 
security, infrastructure security, and eventually, if 
conditions ever permit, border security. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Additional Areas Ripe for Exploration 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S/NF) The next six months offer an opportunity not just 
to develop an alternative set of national security-related 
discussions with the SARG, but also to expand our contacts in 
other technical areas in which initial U.S.-Syrian contacts 
could lead to more routine interaction.  If we can 
demonstrate our interest in expanding bilateral contacts, the 
Syrians might view our engagement more favorably.  Syrian 
efforts to advance judicial and law enforcement 
administration, educational reforms, water management issues, 
urban planning, and NGO development provide just a few 
examples of areas in which U.S. government and private-sector 
contacts with Syrian counterparts could dramatically expand 
our access and influence. Some of these projects could by 
covered by International Visitor, Fullbright, or expert 
speaker programs.  Others might require more coordination and 
funding that could draw at least in part on the FY 2009 $2.5 
million ESF allocation for promoting civil society 
development and democracy in Syria.   A few ideas: 
 
-- Joint study on alternative futures:  One method to 
underscore the potential benefits of a Syria at peace with 
Israel and working constructively with its neighbors is to 
commission a study by RAND or another appropriate think tank 
that would examine how Syria would fare under different 
future scenarios, e.g., the status quo, achieving peace with 
Israel, or a regional war involving Syria and Israel.  Syrian 
participation would be desirable to encourage buy-in. 
 
--  An interagency team to explain sanctions:  Recent 
announcements regarding an easing of the application of some 
U.S. trade sanctions have generated widespread interest in 
the business community about pursuing business with U.S. 
companies.  An interagency team of experts from Commerce, 
Treasury, State, and other appropriate agencies could meet 
with official Syrian counterparts, business groups, and other 
audiences to explain the revised policy guidelines and how 
they affect Syrian businesses.  Such a group might also 
explain other reforms under consideration.  This step, like 
the previous suggestion, would constitute a tangible response 
to President Asad's request for a blueprint for improving the 
bilateral relationship.  It could also be a logical follow-on 
to discussions that may take place during a hoped-for visit 
by Vice FM Miqdad to Washington in the coming weeks. 
 
--  Youth education:  The Syrian First Lady has established 
an umbrella for a number of NGOs that focus on youth 
education issues.  She and her staff have worked closely with 
the Harvard Business School.  We might consider proposing the 
visit of a team of public- and private-sector experts that 
could develop a plan of coordination and action with the 
First Lady's organizations and relevant ministries.  As a 
reciprocal step, the U.S. side might consider inviting the 
Syrian First Lady to the U.S. to develop ties to U.S. 
organizations and expand potential cooperation. 
 
-- Expanded business-to-business contacts:  Building on 
previous visiting speaker programs, we believe Syrian 
entrepreneurs would respond positively to a visit by a group 
of visiting CEOs from high tech and other cutting edge firms 
to explain their vision of the future economy and the 
opportunities they envision for a developing country like 
Syria.  Syrian officials and private-sector leaders are 
increasingly keen on attracting foreign investment, and such 
a visit would allow them to hear firsthand from American 
counterparts on how to develop viable strategies to achieve 
their objectives.  We have also heard a great deal of 
interest in organizing a trip for Syrian businessmen to the 
U.S.  This type of program could expose Syrians to a wide 
array of private and government organizations, establish 
personal and institutional ties, and stimulate advocacy for 
political and economic reforms in Syria. 
 
-- Urban planning exchanges:  Our contacts in the President's 
urban planning have responded enthusiastically to PD efforts 
to organize a special International Visitor trip.  They have 
not only used their access to help obtain the necessary 
government approvals, but have also established a precedent 
for other government advisors to participate.  They express a 
deep desire for access to their American counterparts. 
Building upon this desire and their upcoming trip, we could 
organize a visit by a U.S. team of experts for consultations 
on water and waste management, public transportation, and 
urban development planning. 
 
-- Management reform experts: Many Syrian ministries are in 
the throes of efforts to streamline their organization and 
improve their ability to provide public services.  Syrian 
businesses, moreover, are struggling to adapt their 
organizations to changes in the global economy.  A team of 
government- and private-sector management experts would 
provide welcome expertise at a time when many Syrian 
organizations are desperate for outside guidance. 
 
-- Drought and water management expertise:  Syria's four-year 
drought has caused widespread dislocation and led the SARG to 
work with the UN on a $50 million request for international 
assistance. 
 
-- Justice system reforms:  Syria's justice system suffers 
from rampant corruption, insufficient information management 
capabilities, and inadequately trained personnel.  Supporting 
a UN project to improve customer service might pave the way 
for more cooperation in the law enforcement field. 
 
¶11.  (S/NF)  We recognize this list is far from 
comprehensive, and many of the ideas will require refinement. 
 If we can initiate even a modest effort to engage Syria 
organizations in some of these areas, however, our ability to 
understand and influence Syrian thinking will increase. 
Without a clear signal of approval from their government, 
Syrians will react reluctantly at first to our proposals. 
But if we persevere and are able to advance a more systematic 
approach to bilateral engagement, we can dramatically expand 
our base of contacts and slowly coax Syrian counterparts away 
from their preferred approach of limiting discussions to a 
small group of diplomats and the Syrian President.  For 
bilateral relations to advance and endure, especially in 
times when political contacts are strained, investing in a 
more robust approach will increase U.S. access and 
potentially its influence. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Giving Engagement Six More Months 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S/NF)  We also fully acknowledged some may see little 
utility in seeking to expand our bilateral contacts at a time 
when there remain strong doubts whether engaging Syria can 
produce concrete results in the first place.  Suspending our 
engagement or even returning to a policy of confrontation and 
isolation are always tempting options in reaction to the 
frustrating, stubborn, and sometimes disingenuous tactics of 
the Syrian regime.  But we would argue that the policy of 
isolation ultimately failed because other countries, 
including Israel, France, Turkey, the UK, and others, saw 
value in engaging Syria as a way to provide alternatives to 
Syria's reliance on Iran and to offer positive incentives for 
Syria to behave constructively.  Walking away from our policy 
of engagement after making a substantial investment in 
developing a relationship would not advance our goals of 
comprehensive peace, an independent Lebanon, and a stable 
Iraq.  To be sure, engaging Syria provides no guarantee of 
success in reaching these goals.  But if we are serious about 
giving our current policy a chance, we should give fair 
consideration to trying it in earnest and make an assessment 
after a reasonable period has passed.  Convincing the Syrians 
will be difficult, but patience and persistence have achieved 
modest results since March.  March 2010 will mark a year 
milestone in our new policy and would represent an 
opportunity for us and the Syrians to take stock. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Emphasize Stronger Bilateral Relations 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S/NF) In the interest of full transparency, we also 
need to be sensitive to how our policy would play in Iraq, 
Lebanon, and Israel.  We defer to our colleagues in Embassies 
Baghdad, Beirut and Tel Aviv on reading how U.S. engagement 
of Syria will affect our bilateral relations in these 
capitals.  We recognize our shared concern with these 
countries about Syrian-Iranian relations, Syria's support of 
Hizballah and Hamas, its interference in Lebanon, and its 
continuing tolerance of foreign elements supporting and, in 
some cases, committing violence against U.S. and Iraqi 
targets.  At the same time, if we are to resolve differences 
with Syria on these and other issues, we need to take 
advantage of the opening created by our engagement policy to 
develop a more robust bilateral relationship not defined 
simply by these regional problems alone.  Showing Syrians 
that we also value the pursuit of that more robust bilateral 
relationship may increase our leverage in addressing other, 
more intractable core issues. 
HUNTER