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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6832
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000669 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, ELA, NEA/IZ 
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT/PHEE/VROOMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PMIL IZ SY
SUBJECT: GAUGING SYRIAN VIEWS OF RISING REGIONAL TENSIONS 
 
REF: DAMASCUS 456 
 
Classified By: CDA Chuck Hunter for reasons 1.5 b and d. 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: After briefly showing signs of more 
constructive policies towards its neighbors earlier this 
summer, Syrians are expressing shock over rising tensions in 
the region and perceive "anti-Syrian forces" at work.  The 
Syrian Government's response has been to harden its position 
toward Lebanon, Iraq, and Israel.  Asad's recent visit to 
Tehran and his hosting of Venezuelan President Chavez evoked 
the language of resistance, criticism of Western 
interference, and images of Syria's days in isolation.  At 
the same time, Syrian contacts welcomed recent gestures from 
Washington to ease the application of some sanctions and 
advance the goals of comprehensive peace, and they hope 
U.S.-Syrian relations do not suffer because of regional 
trends.  They nonetheless perceive mixed signals in 
statements by U.S. officials, see a lack of progress toward 
rejuvenating the Golan or Palestinian tracks, note the 
absence of high-level official visits to Damascus, and wonder 
why there has been no visible action on the U.S. promise to 
return an ambassador.  Syrian officials believe they 
demonstrated an intent to participate in the trilateral 
border assessment initiative; now, they might insist, it is 
Washington that is reneging. End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF)  This cable is the first of a two-part series on 
engaging Syria over the next six months that focuses on 
assessing Syrian views of recent regional developments and 
U.S.-Syrian relations.  It should be read in conjunction with 
a second cable on developing a six-month engagement plan. 
 
---------------------- 
Syrian Policy Toughens 
---------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S/NF)  Only six weeks ago, in late July, most of our 
Syrian contacts were upbeat about regional trends.  The 
government was actively pursuing better relations with Iraq, 
and it was engaging Saudi Arabia on the prospects of a new 
majority-led government in Lebanon.  While the prospects of 
renewing negotiations with Israel on the Golan track appeared 
dim, Syrians could take some comfort in U.S. efforts to push 
Israel to implement a settlement freeze and with Washington's 
commitment to achieving comprehensive peace.  The month of 
August, however, witnessed a series of events that exposed 
continuing tensions in Syria's relations with its neighbors. 
Syrian officials adopted a defensive posture that did not 
acknowledge Syria's role in stirring the problems escalating 
in the region. 
 
--  Lebanon:  Syrian officials made public statements 
recognizing the June 7 election results and expressed a 
willingness to work with the Lebanese government.  The SARG 
then retreated into a huff after Mustaqbal Party leader Saad 
Hariri and Saudi King Abdullah decided it would be better to 
hold off any visits to Damascus until after the Lebanese 
majority formed a government.  Signs of Syrian interference 
soon followed.  On August 5, Syrian VP Shara hosted Lebanese 
Tawheed leader Wiam Wahhab, a strong pro-Syrian proxy inside 
Lebanon, for a three-hour meeting.  Wahhab returned to 
Lebanon and leaked to the pro-Syrian daily al-Ahkbar that 
Shara had declared Democratic Gathering bloc leader Walid 
Jumblatt to be welcome in Syria.  Three days earlier, 
Jumblatt had announced his departure from the March 14 
coalition, effectively undermining Hariri's efforts to form a 
government.  Syrian officials continued to claim Syria had no 
role in internal Lebanese politics, but Saudi envoys stopped 
coming to Damascus and Washington officials began hinting at 
a Syrian hand behind the delay in government formation. 
Syrian frustration flared, with the government-controlled 
media unhelpfully suggesting on August 21 that the inability 
of Lebanese political players to form a government could 
create a security vacuum that might require a return to the 
Doha process that had (temporarily) resolved Lebanon's 
political crisis in May 2008.  Subsequently, Syrian President 
Bashar al-Asad continued to insist to a steady stream of 
European visitors -- notwithstanding the inferences that 
could be drawn from his ambassador to Lebanon's making his 
first public appearance after meeting in late August with 
former President Lahoud -- that Syria was not interfering in 
Lebanon's internal affairs and that the Lebanese "needed 
time" to reach a deal "by themselves." 
 
--  Israel:  Syria's confrontational position has hardened 
considerably since PM Netanyahu's government made clear its 
preference for direct negotiations on the Golan without 
preconditions.  Syrian officials have shared their 
frustrations publicly and privately over the Israeli tendency 
to ignore the commitments of previous governments on the 
Golan.  Asad has made clear Syria will not move to direct 
negotiations without Israeli agreement to six geographical 
references along the June 6, 1967 border.  Privately, we have 
heard Asad has expressed his doubts that negotiations with 
Israel can resume with the current Israeli government. 
Publicly, Syrian officials have described Israel as an 
"obstacle" to peace.  Israel's recent announcement of a 
decision to authorize the construction of some 450 units in 
the West Bank has prompted Syrian observers to doubt whether 
the U.S. can achieve its regional policy goals. 
 
-- Palestinians:  Syria's relationships with various 
Palestinian factions continue to emphasize balance and the 
need for consensus.  The SARG hosted a positive visit by 
Palestinian Authority (PA) Mahmoud Abbas in early July, 
encouraged other Palestinian groups not to protest Abbas's 
presence as they had done during previous visits, and 
persuaded Hamas Politburo Chief Khaled Meshaal to delay and 
moderate a speech in response to PM Netanyahu's elaboration 
of controversial conditions upon which Israel would pursue a 
two-state solution.  The SARG also reportedly encouraged 
Fatah delegates from Syria and Lebanon to attend the August 
Fatah Congress in Bethlehem, while unsuccessfully lobbying 
Hamas to allow delegates from Gaza to attend.  Syria has 
rejected, however, international calls for Hamas to agree to 
Quartet principles calling for recognition of Israel, 
acceptance of previous PA peace commitments, and renunciation 
of violence. 
 
-- Iraq:  Showing signs of progress after PM Maliki's August 
18 visit to Damascus, Syrian-Iraqi relations took a nosedive 
after the August 19 bombings in Baghdad and subsequent Iraqi 
allegations that former Iraqi Baathist regime elements, 
acting with Syrian support, were responsible for the attacks. 
 After Iraq recalled its ambassador "for consultations," 
Syria followed suit but without any "for consultations" 
qualifier.  President Asad termed the GOI accusations 
"immoral" and demanded proof.  SARG officials dismissed Iraqi 
information regarding foreign fighters and former regime 
elements (FREs) in Syria as a subject of past discussions. 
Asad is reportedly focused on discrediting the Maliki 
government's allegations of SARG involvement in the August 19 
attacks.  Taking the set-to very personally, Asad would not 
mind at all if Maliki lost his job in the January 2010 Iraqi 
elections.  Meanwhile, Syria continues to support selected FF 
networks and defend Iraqi FREs in Syria as "political 
exiles."  Syrian officials have taken note of Washington's 
emphasis on dialogue as a means of resolving the standoff 
between Baghdad and Damascus, but they remain suspicious that 
Iraq is using the spat to drive a wedge in Syrian-U.S. ties. 
 
-- Lebanese Special Tribunal (STL): Syrian legal experts and 
a British law firm have reportedly worked up a long list of 
grievances against the UN International Independent 
Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) and the STL for review by 
the UN Security Council.  We understand this report focuses 
on allegations based on the testimony of discredited 
witnesses claiming Syria's involvement in the assassination 
of former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri and other Lebanese 
officials.  FM Muallim has publicly criticized the legitimacy 
of the STL's proceedings. 
 
-- Asad visits Tehran and receives Chavez:  On the day of the 
August 19 bombings in Baghdad, Asad visited Tehran to 
congratulate President Ahmedinejad on his electoral victory 
and inauguration.  In meetings with Grand Ayatollah Khamanei, 
Asad criticized Western interference in Iran's political 
affairs and reaffirmed the depth of Syrian-Iranian ties. 
Most of Asad's remarks, however, were not published in the 
Syrian press.  Two weeks later, Asad received Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez in Damascus on September 4 to initial 
trade agreements, criticize Israel, and denounce "imperialist 
intervention" in the region. 
 
-- Syria continues to ignore the IAEA:  Syrian officials 
appear to believe they can best manage the IAEA's 
dissatisfaction by ignoring Vienna's latest report 
documenting their lack of cooperation in resolving questions 
about al-Kibar. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Syrians Perceive Mixed Signals From Washington 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶4.  (S/NF)  In defense of the SARG's sterner policies, Syrian 
contacts expressed shock at the coincidence of ill-fated 
developments that have confronted the country with a series 
of unexpected challenges.  While hopeful Syria's relationship 
with Washington will not fall victim to regional events, some 
Syrian contacts are suggesting a plot by "anti-Syrian forces" 
in the U.S. and elsewhere to undermine rapprochement between 
Damascus and Washington.  Very much desiring that Washington 
continue its engagement policy, some Embassy contacts have 
registered concerns about what they perceive as mixed signals 
coming from Washington: 
 
-- Statements by the Secretary and other officials:  A number 
of Embassy contacts commented that the Secretary's remarks on 
Syria reported by the Wall Street Journal on August 14 
suggested a new tone in U.S. policy.  In particular, many 
Syrians interpreted the statement that "The U.S. wants Syria 
to help secure the Iraqi border, cease meddling in Lebanon, 
make peace with Israel, and break with Iran" as a list of 
accusations and demands rather than as an invitation to 
dialogue.  A Department spokesman's erroneous assertion that 
a U.S. military delegation discussed Iraqi internal security 
during an August 12 meeting in Damascus infuriated the Iraqis 
and, despite a correction and clarification the next day, 
detracted from our apparent desire to reach agreement quickly 
on getting to work on a border assessment. 
 
-- Perception of no movement on U.S. ambassador:  Syrian 
contacts reacted in a similar manner when Lebanese daily 
an-Nahar ran an August 11 article citing a U.S. official as 
saying "No ambassador (to Syria) would be named before 
September."  Though not usually raised in official exchanges, 
virtually all of our conversation with Syrians begin with the 
question, "So when is the new ambassador arriving?"  Some 
contacts wonder whether Washington has decided to delay the 
selection process to register its displeasure with Syrian 
behavior. 
 
-- Perceived lack of movement on the Palestinian and Golan 
Tracks:  Syrian officials have characterized U.S. policy to 
achieve comprehensive peace in positive terms, but they are 
sharing their pessimism with European and other visitors over 
whether the U.S. will achieve its objectives.  Some Syrians 
view the recent Israeli decision to authorize construction of 
new buildings in Jerusalem as the beginning of the end of 
U.S. efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement. 
 
-- Lack of high-level USG contacts:  Bashar's July 4 Sky TV 
invitation to President Obama revealed what he truly wants 
from U.S. engagement: prestige and international recognition 
of his legitimacy.  Bashar and other Syrian officials have 
issued public invitations to CENTCOM Commander General 
Petraeus and other senior U.S. officials.  A 
recently-departed French Embassy colleague confided Syrian FM 
Muallim remarked that meaningful U.S.-Syrian engagement could 
begin only after the U.S. signaled its seriousness by sending 
high-level visitors. 
 
--  Whither the Trilat:  Syrian officials believe they 
demonstrated an intent to participate in U.S.-proposed 
trilateral border assessment initiative, reportedly even 
sending members of its team to the border in anticipation of 
a suggested August 20 start date before we confirmed the 
assessment would be postponed.  Despite acknowledging how the 
climate has changed in the wake of the August 19 bombings, 
the Syrians might now insist that it is Washington that is 
reneging on the gambit it broached. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶5.  (S/NF)  September 7 marked the six-month anniversary of 
the visit to Damascus by NEA A/S Jeffrey Feltman and NSC 
Senior Director Dan Shapiro, the opening of the 
Administration's engagement policy with Syria.  In those six 
months, we have seen both positive and negative movement by 
the SARG.  On core issues -- Iran, Hizballah, Hamas, Iraq, 
the IAEA, and Lebanon -- the SARG position appears to have 
hardened.  At the same time, we have seen some progress in 
the normalization of our dialogue between capitals and 
embassies, and we sense Damascus is keen to continue the 
dialogue in order to establish ties at higher levels.  As 
noted in reftel, it will take patience, persistence and focus 
to develop a useful dialogue with Syria.  We would suggest 
that Washington consider the development of six-month plan 
that would take us to the end of a full year of engagement 
and provide an opportunity to take stock of our policy in 
March 2010.  Post has developed some preliminary ideas it 
will submit septel. 
HUNTER