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R 041324Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4011
INFO AMEMBASSY FREETOWN 
HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
CIA WASHDC
DIA WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T CONAKRY 000537 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
FOR DS/IP/AF AND DS/IP/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2029 
TAGS: ASEC KDEM PGOV PREL PMIL GV
SUBJECT: CONAKRY SECURITY SUMMARY - SEPTEMBER 4, 2009 
 
REF: A. CONAKRY 493 
     ¶B. CONAKRY 494 
     ¶C. CONAKRY 503 
     ¶D. CONAKRY 506 
     ¶E. CONAKRY 509 
     ¶F. CONAKRY 513 
     ¶G. CONAKRY 518 
     ¶H. CONAKRY 519 
     ¶I. CONAKRY 528 
 
Classified By: RSO Philip W. Nazelrod for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (U)  The security situation in Guinea is calm but tense. 
The last two weeks ushered in violent protests upcountry, 
anti-CNDD demonstrations in Conakry, and an unremarkable 
Presidential rally at the People,s Palace.  The following 
serves as summary of significant security-related events 
during this timeframe. 
 
---------- 
The Marker 
---------- 
 
¶2.    (C)  On August 20, 2009, the US Government issued a 
press release highlighting, among other things, that the 
transparency and credibility of any elections would be 
weakened if a member of the CNDD announced candidacy.  This 
elicited an immediate response from the GOG condemning the 
press release and accusing the USG of interfering in domestic 
affairs.  Sparking intense debate, the GOG issued a series of 
communiques which, in turn, were answered by a declaration by 
the political group Les Forces Vives. (Reftel A and Reftel 
D). 
 
------------------ 
The Demonstrations 
------------------ 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  On August 24, 2009, residents of Kamsar, Guinea 
gathered to protest the increasing lack of available 
electricity.  Their protest turned violent, resulting in 
razed buildings and accusations of looting which forced the 
GOG to respond by dispatching military personnel.  Minister 
of Presidential Security, Claude Pivi (aka Coplan), was sent 
to the region to lead the GOG,s efforts to quell the 
demonstrators.  Two civilian fatalities were reported along 
with an unknown number of casualties. (Reftel B). 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  On August 24, 2009, youth in Macenta, Guinea 
(forest region) reportedly demonstrated in protest of fiscal 
mismanagement by local government authorities.  Sources claim 
that the youth were promised money by the CNDD in return for 
orchestrating pro-CNDD demonstrations. The youth protested, 
believing the CNDD paid the promised monies to the local 
authorities, but that those same authorities kept the money 
for personal use. (Reftel F). 
 
¶5.  (U)  On August 27, 2009, youth in Conakry, Guinea 
established makeshift roadblocks in the capital city. 
Earlier, sources claimed that Conakry,s youth would protest 
in opposition to the CNDD.  The demonstrations failed to 
materialize in any substantial quantity. (Reftel E). 
 
¶6.  (U)  On August 30, 2009, a group of approximately 200 
youths demonstrated in front of the US Embassy. 
Demonstrating against the CNDD, the group called itself the 
Movement that Dadis Must Leave (MDDP).  Later that afternoon, 
a group numbering between 40 and 60, gathered momentarily in 
front of the US Embassy to demonstrate in support of the 
CNDD.  (Reftel H). 
 
¶7.  (C)  On August 31, 2009, tensions rose as CNDD President 
Dadis Camara hosted a planned rally at the People,s Palace 
in downtown Conakry. It was a widely held belief that Dadis 
would use the rally to announce his candidacy for president. 
Impromptu, short-lived, and unremarkable demonstrations were 
reported throughout Conakry.  (NOTE:  President Dadis, in his 
speech at the Peoples Palace, referred to the killing of one 
Gendarme by demonstrators during the recent protests.  One 
fatality was later confirmed, a result of careless motor 
vehicle operation. END NOTE).  (Reftel G). 
 
------------------- 
The CNDD,s Response 
------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) On August 25, 2009, local media reported that the 
CNDD ordered cellular phone companies to turn off their 
texting services.  This reportedly was ordered in response to 
the proliferation of anti-Dadis text messages being sent 
through the community.  Texting services were turned back on 
two days later.  (Reftel C). 
 
¶9.  (U)  Uniformed members of both the Ministry of Defense 
and Ministry of Security saturated Conakry,s major traffic 
arteries during the August 27, 2009 demonstrations and again 
for the rally on August 30, 2009.  Gendarmes (many recent 
academy graduates) alongside special police units (BAC and 
MAMBA) and a smattering of Red Berets established an 
overwhelming show of force at traffic circles which included 
displays of armored vehicles and the brandishing of automatic 
weapons. 
 
¶10.  (U) On September 2, 2009, the CNDD,s National 
Communications Council (CNC), which regulates Guinea,s 
media, officially banned political debates from being 
broadcast by radio and television stations.  Local media 
reports claim the order was issued in response to pressure by 
the junta.  (Reftel I). 
 
---------- 
The Putsch 
---------- 
 
¶11.  (S)  On August 24, 2009, sources reported an 
unsuccessful counter coup was attempted in Camp Alpha Yaya. 
Reportedly, seven soldiers were mortally wounded and another 
19 were arrested and interrogated.  The putsch reportedly 
occurred while Minister of Presidential Security Claude Pivi 
was in Kamsar to quell the violent demonstrations which 
occurred earlier that same day.  However, diplomatic contacts 
did not pick up and indicators of a counter-coup. 
 
¶12.  (S)  Sources report that President Dadis, along with his 
close advisors, responded by bringing in additional 
(estimated between 1,000 and 3,000) soldiers from the Forest 
Region; thus, cementing Dadis, supreme position in Alpha 
Yaya. 
 
--------- 
The Crime 
--------- 
 
¶13.  (S)  Sources report that military officers continue 
their night time raids of residences in an effort to 
intimidate youth and political opposition leaders. 
Checkpoints, legal and illegal, continue to be constructed at 
night and remains staffed by 'men in uniform' bent on 
securing payment for passage. 
 
¶14.  (U)  Crime in Guinea continues the upward trajectory 
often seen during Ramadan.  Thefts and other acts of banditry 
plague Guinea,s cities and countryside, often peaking during 
the final week of Ramadan. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶15.  (S)  Tensions in Guinea are palpable.  Military and 
police units continue to patrol the city in a striking show 
of force.  Police and gendarme vehicles (including newly 
purchased or donated trucks) patrol the city frequently and 
units appear to 'camp' at all major traffic circles. 
Furthermore, sources relayed that some in the President,s 
entourage believe the US Embassy actively encouraged the 
recent anti-Dadis demonstration.  The same sources report 
that pro-CNDD youth are planning future demonstrations at the 
US Embassy, including staging a 'sit-in' on NEC grounds. 
 
 
BROKENSHIRE