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DE RUEHCHI #0130/01 2520804
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P R 090804Z SEP 09
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1149
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0088
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0068
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1232

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000130 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR WALTON 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, IO AND DRL 
PACOM FOR FPA 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/3/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PREF BM CH TH
SUBJECT: SHAN STATE UPDATE: BURMA ARMY COULD TARGET SHAN FIGHTERS 
NEXT 
 
REF: A. Rangoon 575 (Kokang Update) 
     ¶B. Rangoon 573 (Peace in Kokang Region) 
     ¶C. Rangoon 567 (Kokang Situation Tense) 
     ¶D. Embassy Bangkok August 28 O/I 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000130  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
-------------------------- 
 
Summary and Comment 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Several ethnic Wa troops reportedly supported the Kokang 
in the latter's fighting against the Burma Army (BA) August 
27-29, according to a knowledgeable expatriate source based in 
Chiang Mai. The fighting displaced approximately 50,000 people, 
according to his sources.  Our contact also said the Shan State 
Army-South (SSA-S) is preparing itself for what it sees as 
imminent combat with the Burma Army, and is expecting Wa troops 
based in southern Shan State to support them against the BA. 
Though our source believes the Wa in northern Shan State are 
safe from attack at this time, he made it clear northern Wa 
leaders have told him they will not shy away from a fight if the 
Burma Army encroaches on "one centimeter" of their territory. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Comment:  If these predictions regarding conflict in 
southern Shan State materialize, thousands of IDPs are likely to 
seek refuge in Thailand, entering through Chiang Mai and Chiang 
Rai Provinces.  Few camp-like sites suitable for housing 
refugees exist in these provinces.  Although there is space 
available at the Site 1 camp in Mae Hong Son Province, that camp 
is predominantly Karenni, and an influx of Shan would likely 
cause tensions. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Comment Cont.:  Embassy Rangoon's sources have been 
unable to confirm that ethnic Wa troops participated in the 
fighting between the Burma Army and Kokang.  Any combat between 
the Wa and BA would have serious consequences.  Embassy Rangoon 
also notes the figure of 50,000 people displaced by the late 
August fighting seems high, and has not been corroborated by its 
contacts.  Embassy Rangoon reports the United Wa State Army 
(UWSA) has reinforced its troops near the Nam Tit/ Chin Shwe Haw 
border crossing area in Special Region Number Two in response to 
Burma Army troop reinforcements in that region.  However, no 
fighting has occurred there.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
 
 
--------------------------- 
 
It Wasn't Just the Kokang 
 
--------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C) According to our contact, tensions between the Kokang 
and Burmese security forces rose to a fever pitch on August 8 
when the Kokang's Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army 
(MNDAA) prevented a mixed unit of police and Burma Army troops 
from raiding the home of its Chairman, Peng Jiasheng, a known 
drug trafficker, where they expected to find weapons and 
narcotics.  The Kokang also took dozens of police officers 
hostage, subsequently executing 12 at point-blank range. 
Affronted by this incident, the Burma Army (BA) responded by 
attacking the MNDAA on August 26.  The ensuing engagements, the 
heaviest of which took place August 27-29, included ethnic Wa 
fighters dressed in Kokang uniforms and taking up arms against 
the BA, he said. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Casualties on the Wa side were high, according to our 
contact; 17 fatalities with some 30 injured.  However, he put 
the number of BA casualties much higher -- anywhere from 100-200 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000130  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
-- due to the fortifications of the Kokang positions, BA 
unfamiliarity with the rugged terrain, and the use of 
anti-tank/anti-personnel mines by the Wa and Kokang.  Although 
China initially sealed the border area, it was eventually 
opened, and some 30,000 refugees crossed, according to his 
sources.  An additional 20,000 IDPs crossed into Wa territory 
and the Shan State capital Lashio, he asserted.  He corroborated 
reports that some IDPs have returned, but admitted he did not 
have a good handle on precisely how many. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Our contact asserted that this heavy-handed response on 
the part of the BA was somewhat surprising.  When Burmese 
General Maung Aye traveled to China earlier this summer, the 
Chinese made it clear that Burma had to tread lightly when 
operating against ethnic groups along the China border. 
Beijing, he said, was concerned that 1) refugees would cross 
into China and 2) oppression of their ethnic brethren might 
spark uprisings among ethnic minority populations residing in 
areas of China across from Kokang and Wa territory.  (Comment: 
Embassy Rangoon notes that Maung Aye is not favorably disposed 
toward China, and has been leading the fight against ethnic 
insurgencies for years.  These factors, when combined with 
Kokang involvement in the drug trade and the execution of 
Burmese police, provide plenty of motivation for the late August 
fighting.) 
 
 
 
---------------------------- 
 
The SSA-S May Be Next 
 
---------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) On September 2, SSA-S leaders told our contact they 
expected the BA would attack them and the "southern" Wa in the 
near future.  (Comment: It is unclear whether this attack would 
be qualitatively different from the constant engagements between 
the SSA-S and BA, i.e. perhaps an attempt to eliminate the SSA-S 
altogether.)  They reported that some 5,000 BA troops have moved 
into the area along the border between Shan State and Thailand, 
and that General Maung Aye traveled to Keng Tung on August 23 
for discussions with BA troop commanders.  They also reported 
that per its standard practice, the BA is "absorbing" militia 
units into its ranks, and preparing to issue these fighters 
weapons.  Separately, the Thai press has begun to speculate 
about the BA's next move and the refugee flows that would result 
from new fighting, with some publications stating that the UWSA 
will be the BA's next target. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Our contact estimated southern Wa and SSA-S strength in 
the area at 4,000 troops, adding that they were well-armed, had 
fortified their defenses, and were holding positions on high 
ground that would give them the advantage over attacking troops 
coming from lower elevation areas.  (Comment: Embassy Rangoon 
cannot verify this figure.)  He predicted that if fighting takes 
place, some 50,000 individuals would be displaced, many of whom 
would likely flee to Thailand.  According to his Thai 
intelligence contacts, Provincial governments in Chiang Mai and 
Chiang Rai have begun making initial preparations to deal with a 
potential influx of refugees. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C) Fighting in southern Shan State could last for months, 
he opined.  However, the northern Wa would be unable to assist 
in the south, he asserted, noting that a lack of passable roads 
and a limited number of routes would make it relatively easy for 
the BA to cut northern Wa territory off from southern Shan 
State.  Northern Wa leaders told him they were prepared to sit 
tight if fighting in the south broke out, but that they would 
fight if the BA encroached on northern Wa territory. 
 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000130  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
 
¶10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassies Rangoon and 
Bangkok. 
MORROW