VZCZCXRO6180
RR RUEHBZ
DE RUEHBZ #0275/01 2711809
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281809Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1550
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0009
INFO RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 1860

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRAZZAVILLE 000275 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP, DHS FOR CIS/FDNS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC CF
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - BRAZZAVILLE 
 
REF: BRAZZAVILLE 0272 
 
¶1.  Embassy Brazzaville is an unclassified post. 
 
¶2.  For the first time in 12 years, full scale NIV, IV and ACS 
consular services are now available at Embassy Brazzaville. NIV 
and ACS operations went live with the opening of the New Embassy 
Compound in February 2009. IV operations resumed in late July 
¶2009. Brazzaville is a high fraud environment and this new 
Consular Section continues to train its new staff, develop fraud 
prevention techniques, and build the strong relationships with 
local institutions necessary to effectively combat fraud. 
 
------------------ 
Country Conditions 
------------------ 
 
¶3.  The Republic of the Congo (ROC), commonly called 
Congo-Brazzaville to distinguish it from the DRC, is 
geographically slightly larger than the State of New Mexico. The 
country is bordered by Cameroon and the Central African Republic 
to the north, Angola (the Cabinda enclave) to the south, the DRC 
to the east and the Republic of Gabon and Atlantic Ocean to the 
west. ROC remains a post-conflict country and the years of 
conflict have had a devastating impact on the economy, 
educational system, infrastructure, health and medical systems, 
and welfare of its people. However, since the signing of peace 
accords between the government and the last remaining rebel 
forces the peace trend has been progressively consolidated. 
ROC's sparse population, estimated at nearly 3.8 million, is 
concentrated in the southwestern portion of the country, with 
about 70 percent of its total population living in Brazzaville, 
Pointe-Noire or along the 332-mile railway connecting the two 
cities. Years of mismanagement, neglected infrastructure, 
corruption, and conflict have left the ROC with per capita 
income of about USD $1,100 per year, widespread unemployment, 
and an economy dominated by the informal sector. In fact, the 
2007/8 United Nations human development index ranked the ROC 
139th out of a total of 177 countries. 
 
¶4.  All these factors create a strong recipe for fraud in ROC, 
as people seek to flee the rampant poverty, ingrained corruption 
and low standards of living. Thus, widespread fraud is found 
among all categories of visa applicants, albeit typically at a 
low or rudimentary level. Genuine birth certificates and other 
forms of identity are easily obtained using fictitious 
biographic information and the attestation of three witnesses, 
thereby facilitating the issuance of multiple passports with 
different names and dates of birth. Names continue to pose a 
problem for current fraud detection algorithms, as passports are 
frequently issued with different variations of family or first 
names (with first names either omitted or included as part of 
the surname in subsequent passports). 
 
--------- 
NIV Fraud 
--------- 
 
¶5.  Approximately 60 percent of B1/B2 applicants present 
fraudulent documents such as fake bank statements or letters of 
introduction. Post has also witnessed a recent increase fake 
entry and exit stamps from the ROC and the United Arab Emirates. 
The fraudulent documents are of varying qualities. Most fakes 
are low level fraud easily detectible. However, given that many 
banks often use several varieties of statements, a close working 
relationship with financial institutions has proved essential 
for higher levels of fraud. The most challenging type of fraud 
related to bank statements involves applicants who present a mix 
of real and fake documents. In the last three months post has 
encountered numerous individuals who present real check books 
and real bank id cards with a fake bank statement. These 
individuals actually have legitimate accounts at the banks, 
however, they use fake bank statements to misrepresent their 
balance. 
 
¶6. West African (primarily Malian and Senegalese) merchants who 
control retail trade in the ROC represent about 10 percent of 
B1/B2 applications received at post, but 40% of all refusals. 
Overall, post refuses approximately 60 percent off all Malian 
applicants and 70 percent of all Senegalese. 
 
¶7. About 20 percent of post's NIV applicants are official or 
governmental travelers. An area of particular concern with 
official travelers isthe noted increase over the past several 
years in the instances of official passports and government 
travel orders issued to mala fide applicants. In July 2009, an 
applicant with an official passport and travel orders came back 
with IDENT/FR hits for having previously applied for a visa 
using a different identity in December 2008. A joint 
investigation with the RSO revealed that the applicant had 
actually purchased all the documents from a vendor. The vendor 
was was subsequently located and arrested by Congolese 
 
BRAZZAVILL 00000275  002 OF 003 
 
 
authorities. 
 
--------- 
IV Fraud 
--------- 
 
¶8.  Brazzaville resumed Immigrant Visa operations in late July 
¶2009. This is the first time in twelve years that IV 
applications are being processed in country and the staff is 
still working to develop the skills and contacts necessary to 
carry out the thorough document checks that IV applications 
necessitate. 
 
¶9. Post inherited approximately 70 pending IV cases from 
Kinshasa. The majority of these cases are incomplete 
follow-to-join asylee beneficiaries. We have also processed 
approximately 5 immediate relative applications since IV 
operations began. As ever, a loose definition of family - with 
cousins, uncles and so on considered part of the nuclear family 
- combined with a critical lack of reliable civil documentation 
make IV cases challenging. ROC still has no standard format for 
documenting the major life points - birth, death, marriage, 
adoption or divorce - and civil law regarding issuance of these 
documents is unevenly applied. DNA testing is recommended in 
many cases involving children. Marriage fraud exists in asylum 
cases as well as IR petitions and while post has not yet found 
evidence of payment for marriages, most applicants have a very 
difficult time demonstrating an ongoing relationship. Age fraud 
is common among IV applicants and post has uncovered through 
interviews married children attempting to pass as unmarried sons 
and daughters. 
 
--------- 
DV Fraud 
--------- 
 
¶10.  Post finds instances of fraud in the vast majority of its 
DV cases, typically via falsified diplomas and other 
"supporting" educational documentation. Pop-up marriages also 
are common, with applicants fraudulently claiming as a spouse 
someone with whom they cannot prove a legitimate relationship. 
Post relies upon FPU investigations and strategic interviews 
with applicants to discern fraud. 
 
--------------------------- 
ACS and U.S. Passport Fraud 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11.  With a small-sized, resident American citizen community, 
few tourists, and a solid fraud prevention program in place, 
post has had no cases of ACS or U.S. passport fraud since 
October 2007. 
 
--------------- 
Adoption Fraud 
--------------- 
 
¶12. Adoption cases are historically rare in ROC, with few cases 
in the last six years. Thus, post has had to deal with some 
adoption cases related to IV visas issuances. The cases were 
proven to be conformed to the local procedures although it was 
somehow difficult to establish the relationships.  But post will 
remain vigilant on these issues. 
 
------------------- 
Use of DNA testing 
------------------- 
 
¶13. In some cases, post recommends DNA testing as a means of 
verifying claims of parental/child relationships in IV cases, 
predominately for Visas 92/93 applicants. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Asylum (and other DHS benefits) Fraud 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  As with DV fraud, most of post's asylum fraud is related to 
false relationship claims. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------ 
Alien smuggling, trafficking, organized crime, terrorist travel 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------ 
 
¶15.  ROC was on the Tier 2 Watch list for the second year in a 
row on the 2009 Trafficking in Persons Report and is a source 
and destination country for persons being trafficked. 
 
--------------------------------- 
DS criminal fraud investigations 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
BRAZZAVILL 00000275  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶16.  The RSO office provides excellent support for the Consular 
office regarding fraud investigation.  In recent months there 
have been several referrals to the RSO office that have led to 
arrests.  Most recently, a fraud pattern was exposed where 
applicants acquired bogus immigration entry and exit stamps for 
the United Arab Emirates and the Republic of Congo ostensibly to 
bolster the legitimacy of status as businessmen.  The 
collaboration of the Consular, the RSO and Congolese law 
enforcement, resulted in the arrest of four individuals over a 
span of 3 days (REFTEL). 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
Host country passport, identity documents, and civil registry 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
¶17.  New machine-readable, computer-generated passports in 
circulation since February 2008 have vastly improved the quality 
and security of previous ROC passports. The new passports 
include such security features as holograms, and come in three 
types: diplomatic (red), official (blue) and regular (brown). In 
2007, ROC ran out of its supply of regular passports and began 
using a system of annotated official passports, with the "Code 
ETR" denoting official travelers and "Code A" denoting regular 
travelers. Those annotated passports will remain in circulation 
through their expiration dates, meaning a mixture of valid ROC 
passports will be in use for the next several years to come. As 
always, there are no indications that the lax passport issuance 
controls of the past have been improved and post continues to 
watch for instances of passport fraud. Genuine birth 
certificates and other forms of identity are easily obtained 
using fictitious biographic information and the attestation of 
three witnesses, thereby facilitating the issuance of multiple 
passports with different names and dates of birth. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Cooperation with Host Government Authorities 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶18.  The level of cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the immigration authority remains excellent and, 
through post's RSO and security staff, relations with police and 
law enforcement officials are good. Local capacity, however, is 
limited. Local officials do not see visa or passport fraud as a 
high priority, but they have been willing to pursue cases 
developed by post. 
 
---------------------------- 
Areas of Particular Concern 
---------------------------- 
 
¶19. Brazzaville is resuming full scale operations after a twelve 
year hiatus. Most consular operations including Fraud Prevention 
must be rebuilt from the ground up. This reconstruction project 
is being led by a first tour junior officer and three locally 
engaged staff The only LES with more than 9 months experience 
has just left the section to take a new job. 
 
--------------------- 
Staffing and Training 
--------------------- 
 
¶20.  Brazzaville is a one officer post. Consular operations were 
re-launched under the supervision of a TDY WAE Consul. The 
entire operation was turned over to a first tour officer 10 days 
after arrival at post. All three locally engaged staff working 
in the consular section have less than one year's experience. 
 
¶21.  The limited experience of the section makes training a 
priority for all staff. The LES have all completed PC 102, PC 
103, and PC 104. The LES in charge of fraud investigations is 
also enrolled in the online Fraud Prevention course. The 
Consular Officer has not had any additional fraud prevention 
training beyond ConGen. 
PRATT