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DE RUEHBO #3128/01 2731916
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FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0171
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0001
INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 BOGOTA 003128 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP, CA/VO/F/P, WHA/AND, DS/CR/OCI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC KFRD CO
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - COLOMBIA 
 
REF: 09 BOGOTA 001215 
 
¶1. This country fraud summary from the Bogota Fraud Prevention Unit 
(FPU) covers the period from February 2009 to August 2009. 
 
 
 
--------------------- 
 
¶A. Country Conditions 
 
--------------------- 
 
 
 
¶2. Despite improving security and positive, but slower economic 
growth in Colombia during 2009, violence and unemployment remain 
serious "push factors" for legal and illegal migration.  3.1 
million internally displaced persons have registered with the GOC 
since 1995, including more than 281,000 new displacements in 2009. 
Still, GOC steps to improve the human rights and security situation 
have showed significant results.  The number of displacements 
declined nearly 12 percent between 2007 and 2008 after increasing 
in each of the three previous years.  GOC statistics indicate that 
2009 continued the trend of decreasing violence and increasing 
stability in Colombia.  Kidnappings and acts of terrorism have been 
cut by approximately 80 percent since 2002.  To date, the GOC has 
extradited 149 criminals and terrorists to the U.S.in 2009, which 
is in line with the 2008 rate of extraditions. 
 
 
 
¶3. In terms of economic conditions, 2008 gross domestic product 
growth registered at 2.5 percent, down from 7.5 percent growth in 
¶2007.  Turmoil in the economies of Colombia's two largest trading 
partners, the United States and Venezuela, has adversely affected 
the outlook for 2009, with economic growth expected to be between 0 
and 1.5 percent.  The average unemployment rate rose to 12.6 
percent by July 2009, up from 11.2 percent in 2008.  The poverty 
rate decreased to 46 percent in 2008 -- down from 57 percent in 
¶2002.  Although the monthly minimum wage rose again in 2009, is it 
still equivalent to only about USD$250 per month, less than what 
most workers feel is necessary to meet basic household needs. 
Despite improving stability and a relatively stable economy, 
Colombia remained the second largest source country for affirmed 
asylum claims in the United States in 2008, after the People's 
Republic of China, as it has been in most recent years. 
 
 
 
¶4. "Pull factors" include the presence of large Colombian immigrant 
communities in Florida, New Jersey, and New York. According to 
Colombia's Central Bank, Colombians abroad sent an estimated USD 
4.8 billion in remittances to Colombia in 2008, -- with 36 percent 
of that amount originating from the US -- representing 3.3 percent 
of the country's gross domestic product.  However, due to the 
global economic crisis, remittances have fallen during 2009 and 
this drop is expected to affect household spending. 
 
 
 
¶5. Colombia continues to be a high-fraud country in terms of both 
the volume and the sophistication of fraudulent documents submitted 
by visa and passport applicants.  Despite efforts by the Government 
of Colombia to crack down on large-scale criminal operations, 
Colombia remains one of the top producers of counterfeit U.S. 
currency.  While some counterfeiting activity has moved to Peru, 
the criminal rings based in Cali are still generally acknowledged 
as being the most adept in Colombia. 
 
 
 
------------ 
 
¶B. NIV Fraud 
 
------------ 
 
 
 
¶6. Due to the high volume of NIV applicants at Embassy Bogota, the 
majority of the day-to-day work of the FPU involves the NIV Unit. 
The volume of NIV fraud is extremely high.  Colombians seeking to 
travel to the United States for business or pleasure continue to 
believe that their chances of securing a visa are best if they can 
demonstrate three factors: a legally binding relationship, a 
professional, highly-paid job, and high bank balances.  Even fully 
 
BOGOTA 00003128  002 OF 008 
 
 
qualified applicants will frequently present fraudulent bank 
statements showing inflated balances.  In an attempt to create a 
strong case, fraud perpetrators often present fraudulent marriage 
and birth certificates, employment letters, bank statements, and 
tax documents in support of their applications.  Applicants also 
frequently obtain new Colombian passports in an attempt to conceal 
previous overstays in the United States.  Applicants often are not 
forthcoming about the existence of relatives in the United States. 
 
 
 
¶7. B1/B2 applications remain the overwhelming majority of post's 
workload, consisting of 90 percent of adjudications in the 
reporting period.  Although Colombia has not been as severely 
impacted by the global economic crisis as many other countries, the 
Colombian economy nevertheless contracted and unemployment rose 
during 2009.  However, unlike most other posts worldwide, Bogota 
has not seen a corresponding decrease in NIV volume.  Post's NIV 
volume is on track to rise by 2.1 percent in FY2009.  Over the next 
reporting period, Post will attempt to look into possible reasons 
for why volume did not decrease in Colombia as it has in many other 
countries affected by the worldwide economic recession and whether 
there are fraud trends involved in this phenomenon. 
 
 
 
¶8. Post's most recent validation study on B1/B2 visas (see reftel) 
showed that nearly half (44 percent) of the visa holders surveyed 
in the study did not travel.  Post hypothesizes three reasons for 
the high number of visa-holders who do not travel: having a U.S. 
visa is an important status symbol in Colombia; Colombian visa 
applicants believe that reapplying for a visa before the prior visa 
expires facilitates visa-issuance; and the historical inclination 
of Colombians to hold a U.S. visa as an alternative to remaining in 
Colombia in case the political or economic situation deteriorates. 
The validation study did not show a high overstay rate, in contrast 
to anecdotal evidence from the visa line and with the high number 
of Colombians turned around at the POE and deported from the U.S. 
Post's recent analysis of I-275s received between August 2007 and 
May 2009 indicates that most of post's issuances which get turned 
around have misused their visa on a prior trip, either by 
overstaying a prior admission or violating status, most commonly by 
working without permission. 
 
 
 
¶9. The J visa program continues to be a popular program in 
Colombia.  However, this category has also been affected by the 
economic downturn in the U.S. Post adjudicated 27.7 percent fewer 
J1 cases in this reporting period than in the same period in 2008. 
It is important to note that besides the downturn in the U.S. 
economy, some Colombian J1 participants were affected by the Aspect 
Foundation controversy, which may affect the future popularity of 
J1 programs.  To date, FPU has not seen significant fraud in the J1 
category. 
 
 
 
¶10. Applicants applying as a group continue to be an area of major 
concern.  The ARSO-I currently has 8 pending investigations that 
involve groups.  Groups consist of anywhere from a three-person 
P-visa band to a group of more than 80 B1/B2 cattle ranchers.  Post 
sees two major patterns:  legitimate groups in which either the 
group itself or the petition will include members who have never 
been affiliated with the group and are not familiar with the actual 
purpose of travel, or groups that have been constituted for the 
explicit purpose of obtaining a visa and contain few, if any, 
legitimate members.  FPU and the interviewing officers ferret out 
extra members through a variety of methods, including targeted 
interviews, fraud investigations, and examining past travel 
history.  FPU screens all groups applying at post prior to their 
appointment and verifies group travel with passport checks, ADIS 
checks and targeted follow-up interviews, when appropriate.  Post 
has adjusted and strengthened its group procedures and also 
provided group training to officers, and as a result, more group 
members that tried to previously apply individually are now 
completing the group procedure as required. 
 
 
 
¶11. Employment-based NIV fraud continues to be a concern, 
especially for the potential for using these visas for money 
laundering activities, as a means to simply move to the U.S., or to 
work in marginal jobs not as intended by the FAM.  Fraud in 
petition-based and E categories most often involves falsifying or 
exaggerating educational and professional credentials, as well as a 
few cases where it appears companies have been created solely for 
 
BOGOTA 00003128  003 OF 008 
 
 
immigration or money laundering purposes.  Though Bogota is not a 
high volume H, L,  & E processing post, due to the concerns of 
these visa categories being manipulated for nefarious purposes, a 
high percentage of these cases are referred to FPU for 
investigation. 
 
 
 
¶12. Before the recent change to the 9 FAM 41.58, there was a 
continued upswing in fraud related to religious visa applications. 
On several occasions, applications had been submitted for work with 
denominations that the Consular Section could not confirm as 
legitimate religious entities, and religious visa applicants often 
misrepresented their qualifications and ties to the organization. 
Now that this category is petition-based, post has seen both a 
decrease in the number of cases and a lower refusal rate: post 
adjudicated 48 R visa applicants during the reporting period, with 
a refusal rate of 37.5 percent, compared to 195 applicants and a 
58.5 percent refusal rate for the previous reporting period. 
 
 
 
¶13. FPU and the NIV Unit continue to encounter "imposter" and 
improperly presented relationship cases, usually involving minor 
children.  Often they are cases of individuals - whether family 
members or strangers - posing as "parents" applying for their 
"child's" NIV.  In most cases, the biological parent is living 
without status in the U.S. and the supposed parent or guardian 
intends to take the child to the U.S. to be reunited with the 
biological parent.  As the NIV Unit has learned better how to 
identify these scenarios, FPU has noticed that such cases now tend 
to include an easily-obtained, genuine legal document purporting to 
show that the supposed parent or guardian has either adopted or 
gained custody of the child.  However, the document merely grants 
limited custodial power.  Such authority can be easily transferred 
by a parent (either from within Colombia or from another country) 
without losing any normal parental rights.  FPU's close working 
relationship with Colombian Family Welfare Institute (Bienestar de 
la Familia) has facilitated identifying these improperly presented 
relationships.  Facial recognition software, the grouping function 
in the NIV program, as well as the verification of birth 
certificates have limited the number of these cases during the 
reporting period. 
 
 
 
¶14. FPU and the NIV Unit uncovered two apparently unrelated cases 
of minor children being presented under new, false identities in 
the reporting period.  In each case, the child presented a genuine 
Colombian passport and birth certificate under the new identity 
which had been fraudulently obtained.  Each child had previously 
been refused under his presumably true identity.  Post's ARSO-I is 
currently investigating these cases and the individuals who 
presented themselves as the parents of these children.  Close 
attention to the facial recognition results by the NIV Unit was 
critical to the detection of these cases.  These cases attest to 
the ease by which genuine Colombian documents can be obtained 
fraudulently. 
 
 
 
¶15. Post saw in the reporting period its first two cases of 
applicants who have intentionally mutilated their fingerprints. 
The prints showed exactly the same markings as example photos in 
the Fraud Digest article on mutilated prints.  Thanks to 
information in CLASS, the FPU was able to determine that one 
applicant, a male, was attempting to conceal illegal presence and 
deportation.  He claimed he suffered from severe dermatitis.  We 
suspect that the other applicant, a female, was attempting to 
conceal illegal presence, but were not able to confirm that.  She 
claimed to have cut her hands working as a shrimp-peeler.  Post 
expects to see more such cases in the future and remains on the 
look-out for fingerprint mutilation. 
 
 
 
----------- 
 
¶C. IV Fraud 
 
----------- 
 
 
 
¶16. Spousal and fiance(e) relationship fraud continues to be the 
predominant types of fraud encountered by the IV Unit during the 
reporting period.  Fraudulent marital and spousal relationships are 
 
BOGOTA 00003128  004 OF 008 
 
 
often arranged by family or friends whose extended families come 
from the same hometown in Colombia. 
 
 
 
¶17. Internet relationships continue to grow in popularity. Marriage 
brokers use the internet to facilitate the entire immigrant visa 
process, from frequently asked questions to the documentation one 
should submit to prove a legitimate romantic relationship.  Most of 
the marriage broker relationships appear to be real for 
petitioners.  However, based on several complaints from jilted 
petitioners and extensive interviews, the trend continues to be 
that a number of beneficiaries have pursued these relationships 
solely to emigrate to the United States.  The IV Unit continues to 
uncover extremely high levels of fraud when couples claimed to have 
met in internet chat rooms, but also had friends or family in 
common. 
 
 
 
¶18. The IV Unit continues to see fraudulent entry stamps purchased 
to conceal illegal entries or overstays in the United States.  A 
number of IV applicants in this reporting period attempted to 
conceal prior arrests, drug trafficking activity, and previous 
employment as prostitutes. 
 
 
 
¶19. The IV Unit processes a limited number of employment-based 
cases.  The majority of these applicants are following-to-join 
derivative beneficiaries.  The IV Unit continues to find limited 
marriage fraud and a few cases in which "fathers" were not the 
biological parents of minor children. 
 
 
 
----------- 
 
¶D. DV Fraud 
 
----------- 
 
 
 
¶20. Colombians are not eligible as principal applicants for 
Diversity Visas.  The IV Unit did not detect any evidence of fraud 
in the two Diversity Visa cases it processed during the reporting 
period. 
 
 
 
------------------------------ 
 
¶E. ACS and U.S. Passport Fraud 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶21. The ACS Unit and FPU are especially sensitive to fraud in cases 
involving child applicants for CRBA's and first time passports.  In 
many of these cases, ACS requests DNA tests from the AmCit parent 
who subsequently never returns.  Some of the fraud has been more 
creative.  In one case the mother presented an AmCit dad with a DNA 
test result later proven to be fraudulent.  Post has also seen an 
increasing number of adult first time claimants who present little 
more than a U.S. birth certificate.  Although some of these 
eventually were able to prove a valid claim to U.S. citizenship, 
many of the applicants are never able to explain how they got to 
Colombia with no passport of any kind, nor how they have lived here 
all of their lives with no identification.  In these cases, the 
birth certificate is often legitimate, just not credible.  For 
example, in one case a woman claimed to have been born at home in 
Texas.  She left the U.S. for Colombia at age 6 and when she was 
12, her uncle went to the local Texas registry and obtained a 
delayed Texas birth certificate based only on his affidavit.  She 
presented no other proof of US residence.  All of the above types 
of cases are entered into PLOTS as appropriate. 
 
 
 
----------------- 
 
¶F. Adoption Fraud 
 
----------------- 
 
BOGOTA 00003128  005 OF 008 
 
 
¶22. Colombia continues to be a popular country from which to adopt 
children.  The process runs smoothly for adoptive parents, as the 
Colombian adoption process is transparent and straightforward.  The 
Consular Section maintains a good relationship with officials at 
the Colombian Family Welfare Institute and, as a result, the 
organization is very familiar with U.S. immigration procedures.  To 
date, the IV Unit has not discovered any adoption fraud on the part 
of government officials and/or Colombian adoption agencies. 
 
 
 
--------------------- 
 
¶G. Use of DNA testing 
 
--------------------- 
 
 
 
¶23. The IV and ACS Units primarily use DNA testing to confirm 
biological relationships between parents and children.  Post had 
used the panel physicians to collect samples and have had no cause 
to question their process.  No DNA tests have been conducted 
subsequent to new Department guidance, and the new procedures are 
being implemented for use in any subsequent DNA testing. Colombia 
does not have any known special circumstances for DNA testing.  The 
most common type of biological relationship fraud involves a 
"father" who legitimated a child several months or years after the 
child was born.  Some applicants fail to submit to suggested DNA 
tests, including a number who subsequently notify the IV Unit that 
the parent and child did not have a biological relationship.  Both 
the IV and ACS Units views DNA testing as an extremely useful fraud 
deterrent, especially in light of concerns about birth 
certificates. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶H. Asylum and Other DHS Benefit Fraud 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶24. The IV Unit carefully screens derivative spouse asylee cases 
for indicators of marriage fraud due to differing U.S. and 
Colombian definitions of the term "spouse" for immigration 
purposes.  For example, U.S. immigration law does not recognize 
Colombian common-law marriages, or the "separation of bodies and 
effects" as a basis for divorce.  In addition, under U.S. law, 
marriages by proxy are invalid for immigration purposes if the 
asylee petitioner has not returned to Colombia to consummate the 
marriage. 
 
 
 
¶25. During previous reporting periods, the IV Unit discovered large 
numbers of following-to-join derivative spouses of asylees were 
presenting fraudulent marriage certificates in connection with 
their applications.  As a result, FPU now confirms 100% of these 
marriage certificates. 
 
 
 
¶26. The IV Unit processed about 160 requests for transportation 
letters for lost or stolen lawful permanent resident (LPR) cards 
during the reporting period, an increase of nearly 60 percent over 
the last reporting period.  Many of the applicants had criminal 
histories and/or questionable claims to U.S. residency.  The IV 
Unit also strongly suspects that some applicants who reported the 
theft of their LPR cards after a several-week delay had in fact 
sold their LPR cards. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------------- 
 
¶I. Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist Travel 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------------- 
 
 
 
¶27. Colombia is the source of the majority of cocaine and heroin 
 
BOGOTA 00003128  006 OF 008 
 
 
entering the United States.  The Department of State has designated 
three Colombian illegally armed groups - two of which are heavily 
involved in the drug trade - as international terrorist 
organizations.  A full-time "2C/3B" consular officer working out of 
FPU is the primary investigator on all cases involving 
narco-trafficking, money laundering, and/or terrorism.  As a result 
of many Colombians being involved for many years in 
narco-trafficking and money laundering, and the long history of 
political violence in Colombia, post sees an extraordinarily high 
volume of cases with 2C and/or 3B ineligibilities.  The 2C/3B 
officer also ensures consular records reflect the status of cases 
involving extradition (revocations, lookouts, etc.), as well as 
cases involving high level politicians being investigated and often 
tried for their ties to paramilitary groups.  The 2C/3B officer 
works closely with U.S. and Colombian law enforcement, intelligence 
agencies, the political section and Department of Treasury 
officials, and coordinates post's monthly Visas Viper Committee. 
 
 
 
¶28. Colombia is primarily a source for illegal travel, yet the 
country's multi-ethnic character and its proximity to other 
countries used as transit points to the United States and Canada 
make it an appealing alternative routing for smuggled and 
trafficked persons. While mala fide travelers from neighboring 
countries, e.g., Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru, continue to use 
Colombia as a transit point for flights to the United States, their 
numbers appear to have diminished.  This is likely due to increased 
document scrutiny at their departure airports and at Bogota's El 
Dorado airport.  Other visa-issuing missions in Bogota, especially 
the Canadian and Mexican missions, report an increase in applicants 
from Africa, China and the Indian subcontinent who cannot explain 
credibly why they are in Bogota or how they arrived in Colombia. 
Post has not yet seen an increase in third-country national (TCN) 
applicants, but vigilantly monitors TCN numbers for changes and 
trends. 
 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶J. DS Criminal Fraud Investigations 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶29. FPU refers cases that appear to involve organized fraud to the 
Assistant Regional Security Investigator (ARSO-I), who determines 
if and when or where a criminal element is present or if the case 
merits further investigation.  The ARSO-I program maintains a 
robust investigative capability.  Critical to the program's 
historical success is the joint DS-ICE vetted Colombian law 
enforcement team.  This vetted team consists of investigators from 
the Administrative Security Department (DAS).  The GOC recently 
announced that the DAS will be dissolved and all of its 
investigative authorities will be transferred to various agencies 
within the Colombian National Police (CNP).  The dissolution of DAS 
is due to its involvement in illegal domestic espionage of 
Colombian political and business leaders, as well as critics of the 
GOC. 
 
 
 
¶30. The ARSO-I program has fifteen investigations pending with the 
vetted unit (four of the fifteen are joint DS/ICE investigations). 
Post is pushing for a quick closure of these cases and/or immediate 
transfer to the appropriate CNP agency.  The CNP is assessing which 
agency to assign investigations of document fraud and human 
smuggling.  Once a decision is made, Post  will begin to 
re-establish the investigative unit. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------- 
 
¶K. Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------- 
 
 
 
¶31. Colombian documents are relatively easy to falsify or obtain 
legitimately, especially marriage certificates, birth certificates, 
and bank statements.  Birth certificates present especially 
difficult cases as a genuine birth certificate can be obtained for 
a child at any point in the child's life if a "parent" presents the 
 
BOGOTA 00003128  007 OF 008 
 
 
child as his or her own with the testimony of two witnesses.  This 
is a completely legal means of obtaining a birth certificate, but 
highly vulnerable to abuse.  FPU is vigilant to fraud indicators 
such as home births, delayed registration of the birth and 
registration with witnesses, rather than medical documentation. 
Corrupt notary officials - some in coordination with criminal fraud 
rings - have also been known to accept payment to issue authentic 
marriage and birth certificates using fake personal data.  Falsely 
obtained birth certificates can then be used as a base document to 
obtain genuine passports and national IDs. 
 
 
 
¶32. The GOC has made efforts recently to incorporate anti-fraud 
security features in newly issued documents, e.g., the national 
identity card ("cedula") and to remove from circulation the 
earlier, more easily falsifiable versions. 
 
 
 
¶33. The Colombian passport is still a laminate document that is not 
secure - and the previous lack of a central tracking database meant 
that new passports were easily obtained, for any reason.  According 
to the Coordinator of the Passport Office at the Colombian MFA), 
the MFA expects to have a sample of the new Colombian passport in 
January 2010 and to introduce it on or before April 1, 2010. 
However, they have not put the project out for bid yet. Each of 
their passport issuing offices is gradually gaining access to a 
central database whereby the issuances of passports can be tracked. 
With these new developments, the Colombian passport should be a 
more secure document that is more strictly controlled, though older 
passports will remain valid until they expire. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶L. Cooperation with Host Government Authorities 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
 
¶34. Colombian authorities view visa fraud as a serious matter and 
cooperate fully with mission efforts to investigate and prosecute 
human smugglers, traffickers and fraud rings.  For example, persons 
caught attempting to smuggle a child out of the country face a 
five-year jail sentence; the penalties for document falsification 
that leads to alien trafficking can include jail terms and asset 
forfeiture. 
 
 
 
¶35. FPU maintains close working relations with many GOC entities, 
including the MFA (for Colombian passport issues), the National 
Police's investigatory and intelligence offices (DIJIN and DIPOL, 
respectively) for criminal records and intelligence reports, the 
Administrative Security Department's (DAS) Migratory Affairs Office 
for airport entry/exit reports, and the National Prisons Institute 
(INPEC) for prison records, as well as government notaries. 
 
 
 
¶36. In addition, FPU works hand-in-hand with the Colombian private 
sector, and with contacts in various banks, companies, universities 
and churches.  This allows the investigators and officers to 
conduct checks and request information from these entities, with 
timely responses, and a general willingness to assist in our 
efforts. 
 
 
 
¶37. As part of efforts to prevent mala fide travelers from boarding 
flights to the United States, FPU works closely with airport and 
security personnel.  The FPU and ARSO-I provide anti-fraud training 
to airport personnel at all airports with international flights, 
conducting several training sessions during the reporting period. 
 
FPU does not currently have the funding to travel to all airports 
that request training, though authorities are pro-actively 
requesting more and more training, both in the areas of passport 
and visa fraud, but also in areas such as detecting counterfeit 
money. 
 
 
 
------------------------------ 
 
BOGOTA 00003128  008 OF 008 
 
 
¶M. Areas of Particular Concern 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶38. According to the "Cases Referred to FPU" report in the CCD, 
during the report period, FPU conducted 952 fraud investigations in 
NIV and IV cases, with fraud confirmed in 59 of the cases. 
Beginning with the previous reporting period, FPU requires that all 
cases be referred to FPU before any type of investigation or 
inquiry is initiated. 
 
 
 
¶39. FPU staff has an excellent working relationship with consular 
officers from other diplomatic missions, in particular the Canadian 
and UK embassies, with whom we regularly share information about 
fraud trends and practices in Bogota.  FPU has worked in close 
coordination with the UK, Canadian, and Schengen embassies to hold 
quarterly fraud meetings to discuss trends and share relevant 
information. 
 
 
 
¶40. FPU is maintaining the license for the i2 Analyst Notebook 
software program that allows for charting and analyzing 
sophisticated fraud schemes, utilizing data from the nonimmigrant 
visa applicant database.  Two FPU employees received training on 
the software during the reporting period. 
 
 
 
------------------------ 
 
¶N. Staffing and training 
 
------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶41. Embassy Bogota's FPU consists of one full-time Fraud Prevention 
Manager, one full-time entry-level officer deputy who rotates 
through the Unit every four months, a one full-time entry-level 
2C/3B officer who rotates through the Unit every six months, the 
ARSO-I, one Eligible Family Member investigator, three Locally 
Employed Staff investigators, one of whom works for the ARSO-I and 
an LES administrative assistant. 
 
 
 
¶42. In addition to conducting investigations on individually 
referred cases from the ACS, IV and NIV Units, FPU also vets all 
new journalists traveling to the United States; registers and 
houses a database of C1/D companies; works closely with the NIV 
Unit to vet groups traveling to the United States on both their 
departure and return; enters all lost and stolen passports into the 
system; and answers diplomatic notes, "oficios" and correspondence. 
FPU also assists U.S. agencies at Post with law enforcement-related 
information inquiries, in particular, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration and the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign 
Assets Control, and regularly responds to Colombian law enforcement 
authorities' requests for information, providing information as 
allowed under Department regulations. 
 
 
 
¶43. Fraud Prevention Manager - Deborah Robinson.  Completed PC-541, 
Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers in Washington, June 2008, 
and attended i2 training in April.  Fraud Prevention Unit Deputy - 
Adelle Gillen.  Adelle rotates back to the NIV Unit in October. 
Completed PC-541, Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers in 
February 2007.  2C/3B officer - Laura Hochla, as of September 1. 
She has not completed any fraud or 2C/3B specific training. 
Eligible Family Member investigator - Antonio Campillo Hernandez. 
Antonio began work in FPU during the reporting period and has taken 
no fraud-specific training.  Locally Employed Staff investigators - 
Sandra Fonseca and Maria Gomez.  Maria completed the Fraud 
Prevention Workshop for FSNs in 2000, and Sandra in 2002.  Sandra 
attended the LES Fraud Prevention Workshop in March 2009, and 
attended i2 training in June 2009. ARSO-I - William Ferrari.  Has 
not completed any fraud specific training.  ARSO-I Locally Employed 
Staff investigator - Eduardo Caro.  Will receive RSO fraud training 
in the U.S. in September. 
BROWNFIELD