VZCZCXYZ0005
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #1224/01 2731151
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301151Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5338
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0275
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0798
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1202
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0425

UNCLAS BERLIN 001224 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL, GENEVA FOR BWC DEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC OPCW CBW GM
SUBJECT: CWC BWC CLOSE ALLIES MEETING SEPTEMBER 28-29, 2009 
 
REF: STATE 100317 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Meetings of Close Allies have always been 
valued for providing a useful venue for a frank exchange of 
views on, and an opportunity to coordinate approaches to, 
biological and chemical weapons-related issues.  This meeting 
showed the need to re-invigorate the process, from the 
perspective of &lighting a fire8 under some of our 
counterparts, to employing different approaches to work key 
issues, such as the planned in advance  &break-out8 
sessions on CWC incapacitants, and the scheduled session on 
BWC CBMs.  Close Allies could also be used to coordinate on 
related issues, e.g. BTEX and Global Partnership.  Exchanges 
on biological weapons demonstrated a shared satisfaction in 
the August Meeting of Experts, common objectives for the 
December Meeting of States Parties, and common concerns about 
the NAM and Iranian Article X proposals (that would mandate 
assistance and impact detrimentally on export controls), and 
how to handle them.  Approaches to BWC CBMs were reviewed and 
additional discussions on the margins of the December meeting 
were agreed.  The UK also advocated initiating Review 
Conference planning soon.  U.S. recalled BWC policy decisions 
to date, made clear opposition to the Iranian and NAM 
proposals regarding Article X, and on establishing a 
suggested core group for RevCon preparations.  On CWC issues, 
the critical decision on the future Director-General was 
hamstrung by two members having candidates, both of whom 
believe they have strong support.  Allies shared views on 
Iraq, CW destruction, the draft 2010 budget, industry issues, 
national implementation, and the future of OPCW with little 
new information and few new ideas.  Close Allies tentatively 
agreed to April 7-8 for the next meeting, to be hosted by the 
U.S. in Washington, D.C.  End Summary. 
 
BWC Meeting of Experts (August 2009) 
¶2. (SBU) Close Allies agreed that the August 24-28 BWC 
Experts Group Meeting exceeded expectations; the linkage 
between health and security issues had been undisputed.  The 
presentations from all quarters were insightful, the number 
of delegates sent from capitals with disease surveillance 
expertise and the vibrant interaction throughout the week 
where direct &assistance8 was being worked out more than 
offset Iranian and Cuban (NAM) rhetoric about the need for 
greater assistance under Art. X and the need for greater 
technology transfer.  There is a great deal of substance 
coming from the meeting that the December Meeting of States 
Parties can draw from for its Final Report, which is 
traditionally a set of agreed guidelines based on expert 
discussions and a compilation of the ideas expressed that the 
BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) distributed at the end 
of the Experts Meeting. 
¶3. (SBU) All shared concerns about the NAM and Iranian 
proposals regarding Article X (free-flow of S&T transfers) 
and export controls, and how to counter them at the December 
Meeting (reftel).  Dels noted that the Iranians weren,t able 
to garner NAM consensus for their paper, which states that 
every article of the BWC &bears the same value and 
importance.8 U.S. HOD noted the Iranians had attacked 
cooperation between States Parties (U.S.) and non-State 
Parties (Israel) as a way the non-States Parties &may 
strengthen their clandestine biological programs.8  The 
Chinese supported the purpose of both papers; there was no 
other direct support.  German Expert Beck noted the Iranian 
complaint about lack of access for researchers and surmised 
the &deemed export control8 efforts are having their effect. 
¶4. (SBU) Dels agreed there was a general recognition by the 
NAM of the need to strengthen national health infrastructure. 
 Algeria, India, Kenya, Nigeria, and Pakistan publically 
asked for assistance.  Unexpectedly, there was little 
resistance to the direct linkage to implementation of the 
WHO,s International Health Regulations (IHRs).  The WHO IHR 
Workshop on August 21 and the distributed report was credited 
with delivering the necessary background for all BWC dels to 
be aware of the intent and timelines for the IHRs.  There was 
recognition that coordination amongst even the group needs to 
be better (e.g., uncoordinated US-Georgia and UK-Georgia 
presentations). 
 
BWC Policy Roll-out/Interest in Review Conference Preparations 
 
¶5. (SBU)  UK Rep suggested that Close Allies initiate as 
early as December a discussion on preparations for the Review 
Conference, recognizing that political maneuvering would 
start as early as this year,s Meeting of States Parties.  He 
also noted that that this year,s topic didn,t address BWC 
compliance, an issue raised by others in UK bilats on the 
margins of the MXP.  In addition, some dels opined that 
intersessional issues to date will not provide sufficient 
substance for 2011. 
¶6. (SBU) U.S. Rep recalled U.S. policy decisions to date 
(shared with Close Allies on margins of August Expert,s 
meeting), including a decision not to return to Protocol 
negotiations.  Drawing on guidance reftel, he elaborated U.S. 
concerns with the NAM and Iranian proposals related to 
Article X.  In response to UK,s suggestion that Close Allies 
begin to focus on preparations for the Review Conference, 
U.S. Rep also signaled U.S. interest in working with a &core 
group.8  It was agreed that this question, among others, 
could be discussed at a German hosted close Allies meeting in 
December on the margins of the Meeting of States Parties. 
 
December Meeting of States Parties 
 
¶7. (SBU)  Drawing in guidance reftel, U.S. Rep summarized 
objectives for the December Meeting.  Allies agreed on 
desirable outcomes from the meeting, and Germany added 
&sustainability8 as a theme.  Those States receiving 
assistance need to be able to sustain the work initiated. 
All also shared concerns about the handling of the NAM 
proposals on Article X and Iran,s proposals on Export 
Control and Transfer Denials at the December meeting. 
Germany recalled that the proposals were outside the 2009 
mandate; the agenda item was narrowly circumscribed to 
discuss capacity-building in the context of disease 
surveillance.  Nonetheless, China, the NAM, and Iran all 
signaled an interest in export control discussions at the 
December meeting.  France suggested focusing, as at the 
Expert,s Meeting, on concrete proposals and the actual 
volume of assistance being offered globally.  UK suggested 
that the points about export control will require rebuttal at 
an appropriate time, and all agreed BWC Chairman Grinius 
should be sensitized to problems with the proposals, as 
outside the mandated agenda item, and on substantive grounds. 
 Germany offered to prepare a working paper identifying all 
countries with legislation regarding export controls, as a 
number of developing nations have now implemented such 
legislation.  UK also suggested working with developing 
nations that are now recipients of assistance, to counter the 
more radical proposals. 
 
BWC Confidence-Building Measures 
 
¶8. (U) CBMs.  German Expert summarized the Geneva Forum 
August workshop on CBMs, and circulated a matrix capturing 
the views of Close Allies on several CBM questions he had 
posed some months ago, requesting U.S. views.  U.S. Deloffs 
recalled the U.S. interest in enhancing participation in the 
CBM declarations, noting that it was reviewing ideas related 
to making the process of such submissions more user friendly. 
 Explaining that the U.S. was working on how to make its own 
submissions electronic, U.S. offered to work with others on 
such a project, which was welcomed.  The U.S. hoped to be 
able to provide more detailed views on CBMs for the matrix in 
the near future.  However, the U.S. suggested that before 
going too far down the road, it would be useful to know what 
views of non-Western delegations were on the CBMs. France and 
UK elaborated upon their respective papers.  Regarding the UK 
suggested &new proposals,8 they explained that they were 
brainstorming ideas, rather than advocacy proposals, and 
acknowledged that new proposals raise questions of political 
feasibility.   German Expert cautioned against being overly 
ambitious, favoring a modest approach focused on making 
submissions easier and clarifying existing CBMs. 
¶9.  (SBU) CBM Next Steps:  The four agreed to exchange views 
on the margins of the December BWC Meeting of States Parties 
in Geneva, prior to the second Geneva Forum hosted workshop 
on December 12. The U.S. offered a CBMs &break-out8 session 
during the Spring Close Allies meeting it will host; others 
agreed.  Germany will host a third CBM Workshop in Berlin in 
late spring/early summer 2010. 
 
Implementation Support Unit 
 
¶10.  (SBU) ISU. France expressed interest in using the ISU to 
assist even more with CBMs, perhaps to issue reminders, and 
seek clarification regarding CBMs from States Parties.   The 
UK noted that it had circulated a paper addressing an 
expanded ISU role.  Germany said that while interested in 
addressing the ISU role, it should not be linked with CBMs, 
but rather with overall BWC objectives.  On the margins, 
French Rep asked U.S. Deloff for U.S views on the ISU, and 
its possible expansion.  U.S. Deloff noted that the U.S. had 
yet to address this question, but that the ISU,s roll was, 
and should be, directly related to its functions and any 
decisions the Parties take at the 2011 Review Conference that 
might require the assistance of an expanded ISU.  The U.S. 
sought a reinvigorated BWC program, which might call for a 
small and careful ISU expansion.  For now, we were pleased 
with the work of the ISU, and with the fact that it works 
within its circumscribed mandate. 
 
Universality 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Dels exchanged information on where national and 
ISU efforts stand.  Despite the fact that all non-States 
parties deemed to be capable of joining the BWC have been 
divided up between the four, responses to demarches have had 
little effect.  The real movement is coming from the ISU 
efforts on the ground, particularly in the South Pacific 
where the Cook Islands accession has motivated the Marshall 
Islands, Nauru and Niue to push the accession process.  U.S. 
del relayed the ISU view that the universality push will 
likely bring 5-6 new States Parties on board in the next six 
months.  The U.S. made contacts with the Tanzanian and 
Haitian delegates in August and will follow-through with a 
demarche to all countries listed here to provide the 
necessary political push to help keep their efforts moving 
forward. 
 
Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX) 
 
¶12. (SBU) Dels agreed on the value of maintaining an active 
BTEX process, although Russian push-back and ineffective G-8 
Presidencies in the last two years had let the process 
stagnate.  A policy discussion on the future of BTEX is 
necessary; both the U.S. and UK offered to host such a 
meeting on the margins of the December BWC meetings.  Canada 
will become G-8 President in 2010 and may wish to take the 
leading role in rejuvenating the process.  They are 
undertaking a large push for more resources behind the Global 
Partnership; this includes on bio.  All agreed that expanding 
the membership in the group was not helpful, although the 
group could certainly do more outreach once the purpose and 
goals of this group are more clearly defined.  No one 
expected bio issues to rise any higher on the agenda of the 
Nonproliferation Director,s Group (NPDG) given the plethora 
of pressing nuclear issues.  (There was no discussion of 
moving the group away from the G-8 NPDG process and into 
Lyon-Roma, which had been the preferred venue for the Allies 
in the past few years.)  UK MOD rep (Harrision) pointed to 
the overlap between the BWC, BTEX and Global Partnership 
where many of the same subjects are being discussed; there 
should be an effort to have them work in sync. 
¶13. (SBU) Responding to the U.S. suggestion that more needs 
to be undertaken in the prevention side. Beck opined that 
protecting the food chain, law enforcement and more emphasis 
on how intelligence is used to forecast an event would 
certainly be considered in support of national security. 
Mikulak asked that all consider the prevention aspects in 
prep for a December discussion with the wider group. 
 
Synthetic Biology 
 
¶14. (U) U.S. Rep (Mikulak) briefed the group in general terms 
on the draft U.S. screening procedures for gene synthesis 
orders.  He noted the complimentarity of customer screening 
and sequence screening, as well as the importance of a 
government point of contact for companies to call if they 
have identified an order of concern.  German expert (Beck) 
said that German regulations provided a strong foundation, 
but that designating a law enforcement point of contact was 
problematic in the German federal system.  All expressed 
interest in receiving copies of the draft procedures when 
they are published in the Federal Register in late 2009. 
 
EU Joint Actions 
 
¶15. (SBU) When queried on details of the BWC and WHO EU Joint 
Actions (JA), Beck chuckled and said the BWC JA was a 
political and organizational mistake.8  The process of 
hiring the two people to implement the BWC JA had consisted 
of the European Commission and UN personnel officials going 
back-and-forth on who would advertise the positions.  The 
compromise is that the applications process had been open to 
all and EU persons would be chosen.  Anyone starting fresh 
will need start-up time to learn the intricacies of the CBM 
process and national implementation measures before 
attempting to promulgate these measures.  There will be five 
workshops on national implementation and universality in the 
remaining months of the JA.  U.S. asked which countries had 
applied for the eight &scholarships8 having heard from the 
Jordanians, Kenyans and Nigerians that they intended to 
apply.  Dels were awaiting the upcoming &CODUN8 for the 
answer from the EC WMD coordinator,s office.  U.S. 
reiterated its concern over &buying off8 staff to help the 
mandated three-person ISU; what is to keep the Iranian,s 
from doing the same.  The WHO JA will consist of 20 months of 
regional workshops on biosafety and biosecurity with 
particular focus on South East Asia.  Again, specific details 
will be forthcoming from the CODUN meeting.  EU member states 
have been kept out of the loop on EC-WHO and EC-ISU 
negotiations. 
 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
 
DESTRUCTION 
¶16. (SBU) The Quad discussion on CW destruction focused on 
how to manage the 2012 deadline and ensure a balanced 
approach, the Brazilian proposal for the EC Chairman to have 
consultations and report to the February Executive Council 
session, and the likelihood of Russia meeting the destruction 
deadline. 
¶17. (SBU) Managing 2012:  Burkhart stated that any special 
Conference of States Parties on destruction will require 
advanced planning.  The UK agreed and added that in late 2010 
State Parties will need to address the issue, in some regard, 
in order to determine the budget for 2011. Harrison added 
that it is time to have a discussion on 2012.  To date the EU 
position has been to urge possessor states to destroy CW as 
quickly as possible, but he assessed that this position will 
only last so long.  At some point credibility of the 
Convention comes into question.  It is clear that Russian and 
the United States have made great efforts to accelerate, but 
at some point a discussion needs to occur on how to address 
¶2012. 
¶18. (SBU) Brazilian proposal: US HOD noted the recent 
Brazilian proposal for the Chairman have consultations on the 
feasibility of meeting the destruction deadline.  He said the 
Brazilian approach seemed a constructive way to hold 
discussions;  this approach could help prevent a damaging 
venting on the issue if discussion was suppressed.  He went 
on to say that there have been past discussions by some State 
Parties to amend the treaty or make a technical change, 
neither of which are suitable options.  Burkhart agreed that 
the Brazilian proposal may be a good mechanism to prompt a 
discussion early rather than later.  France added that Brazil 
probably will raise his proposal at the October EC session 
and that there may be discussion of a facilitator. 
¶19. (SBU) Russia:  Germany expressed doubt on Russia meeting 
its 45 percent deadline on time, adding that it may be a 
close call.  US HOD said that he thinks Russia will make the 
45 percent deadline in December 2009, but then the real 
question will be when they acknowledge that they will not 
meet their 100 percent deadline.  The UK stated that Russia 
has consistently had a high level of confidence that they 
would meet the 45 percent destruction deadline.  He added 
that in the Destruction Informals, State Parties only hear 
the Russian side of the program and its national position. 
The UK proposed having Donor countries provide short 
presentations during the Destruction Informals before the EC 
session to present a balanced view of what assistance Russia 
is receiving at its various facilities.  Germany agreed, but 
cautioned that Russia may use it as a platform to criticize 
foreign aid.  The United States fully supported the UK 
proposal and added that Russia would blame donors with or 
without the presentations.  The UK suggested that donors 
consult in The Hague prior to the Destruction informals. 
 
IRAQ:  Bilateral with Germany 
 
¶20. (SBU) Before the Quad meeting started, the US Delegation 
met with Dr. Andreas Pfaffernoschke (Germany) to exchange 
information on U.S. and German CWC-related assistance to 
Iraq.  After the July Executive Council, GOI approached 
Germany on possible assistance pertaining to the Muthanna 
Bunkers, particularly on determining the contents and the 
condition of the bunkers.  GOI sees the bunkers as a priority 
in moving forward.  Germany expressed concern about Bunker 13 
due to its unknown state of its contents, possible rocket 
fuel, and unexploded ordinances.  As such, the German 
proposal to Iraq will consist of equipment and training for 
an air quality sampling and air composition assessment.  From 
there, Germany believes that a proposal could be put together 
for robotics to do an interior survey of the bunkers.  The 
German Rep indicated a number of issues with any German 
assistance and future Iraqi efforts:  the need to determine 
appropriate security (which should be a precondition of any 
work); a determination on whether or not work will be done 
E 
under the supervision of the OPCW; and additional information 
on the bunkers, to include where drilling may be possible to 
gain air samples and what known conditions exist inside the 
bunkers that could prevent robotics from conducting mapping. 
Although Germany is willing to develop a plan for an 
intrusive survey and provide training to carry it out, 
Germany does not intend to offer assistance to conduct the 
actual assessment.  Pfaffernoschke will meet Iraqi expert 
al-Saraa in Amman on October 6 to discuss these issues. 
¶21. (SBU) The United States overviewed the upcoming meetings 
in Washington with GOI on 8-9 October to exchange information 
on GOI,s CWC implementation and to discuss the Muthanna 
Bunkers.  Particularly, the U.S. DoD Rep highlighted the 
presentations that will take place on the bunkers:  the 
overview briefing on what we assess to be the current state 
of the bunkers and bunker contents and general considerations 
that could be applied to any intrusive bunker survey.  The 
German Rep was keen on receiving any information that the 
United States deems applicable to the German offer of 
assistance.  Both countries agreed to exchange readouts of 
their respective meetings with the GOI, possibly on the 
margins of the October Executive Council meeting. 
 
Iraq: Quad Discussion 
 
¶22. (SBU) Both Burkhart and Beik commented on GOI,s current 
effort in The Hague to solicit support for EC membership 
France, followed by other Quad countries agreed that GOI,s 
membership is an issue for the Asian Group and not one that 
should be left to the Conference of States Parties.  France 
added that any lobbying they could do would likely be 
counterproductive.  The UK agreed, adding that the Asian 
Group should be ultimately responsible. 
¶23. (SBU) The UK highlighted the National Authority training 
that they are co-hosting with the United States in Liverpool 
for the GOI.  Harrison added that it will be focused on 
industrial inspections.  The US HOD informed the Quad of the 
meetings in Washington next week that will have GOI 
representatives from across their interagency.  He noted the 
communication challenges that we have witnessed between 
Baghdad and The Hague. 
¶24. (SBU) The US responded to Burkart,s question on the 
South African proposal for a working group on future cases 
similar to the Iraq recovered munitions scenario by stating 
that it would proceed cautiously and that the objective of 
the working group needs to be made clear.  The US further 
noted that the South Africans will continued to push this 
issue at the OPCW. 
¶25. (SBU) In terms of Iraqi assistance, the UK stated they 
would be willing to provide training.  The US stated they 
were asked by the Director General to provide security for 
the OPCW delegation,s visit to Iraq but noted they would 
only provided security if the request came from Iraq. 
¶26. (SBU) Discussions regarding the letter the from DG noting 
past transfers to Iraqi were limited with each participant 
stating they were still investigating the issue with the 
exception of the UK, which did not receive a letter. 
¶27. (SBU) The U.S. stated they will be advising the Iraqi 
delegation on assistance when they visit the United States. 
The US also discussed the needed investigation of the bunkers 
of Muthana and that a discussion is needed of what needs to 
be done there. A report on the recovered munitions is going 
to the Executive Council soon. 
 
IRAN 
 
¶28. (SBU) On Iran, UK Rep Rampling stated that recent events 
in Tehran have affected Iranian actions at OPCW.  Although 
the nuclear and chemical issues should not be mixed, the 
broader context of what is happening on the nuclear side will 
likely have some impact at OPCW.  French Rep Raharinaivo 
agreed that we should not mix issues but others may do so. 
German OPCW PermRep Burkart noted that there is likely to be 
a new Iranian Ambassador in The Hague before the CSP and that 
the new Deputy is becoming more active over time. 
 
DG SELECTION 
 
¶29. (SBU) Discussion centered on process over the next few 
weeks and whether the EC will be able to make a single choice 
as agreed during the July EC.  Rampling raised the question 
of Ambassador Dani,s role complicating the process.  Mikulak 
outlined the Chairman,s plans for a straw poll, or possibly 
two, before the EC, but raised the question of what happens 
should there still be three candidates at the end of the EC 
session.  Burkart noted the importance of confidence in the 
Chairman and his ability to convince candidates to withdraw. 
Raharinaivo noted indications that Dani might consider the 
Deputy DG position in withdrawing from the DG race; however, 
others noted that decision does not lie with the Council but 
with the new DG and that Dani is now known for strong 
managerial skills.  Rampling emphasized the likely necessity 
in the new future of governments approaching the Algerian 
government to withdraw Dani, but said that countries with 
candidates would not be able to make that approach.  As all 
eyes turned to the French, Raharinaivo stated that the French 
delegation was ¬ best placed8 to do so. 
¶30. (SBU) UK and German dels exuded confidence in their 
respective candidates and in private conversations with U.S. 
and French dels dismissed suggestions that they &work out a 
deal.8 
BUDGET: 
¶31. (SBU)Burkart reported that in the first wrap-up meeting 
for the budget held the day before, the only apparent 
stumbling block remains the number of Other Chemical 
Production Facilities (OCPFs).  UK Rep Foggo noted the strong 
defense that the DG had made for his inspections proposal, 
the same proposal he had made for the 2009 budget and so not 
one that he considers an increase in inspections, and 
therefore not requiring discussion in the industry cluster. 
U.S. Delrep Beik said the budget meetings had an air of 
&dj vu8 from the previous year, with virtually the same 
budget and same contentious items.  Mikulak noted that the 
Chinese had taken a new tack in his meeting the week before, 
stating that destruction would need to be completed before an 
increase in industry inspections.  Raharinaivo noted that the 
increase is only two inspections and thought there was not 
much to fight over. 
 
INDUSTRY ISSUES 
 
¶32. (SBU) All Quad participants expressed frustration over 
the stalemated negotiations which have been underway for a 
decade.  Mikulak suggested putting the negotiation on hold 
for a couple of years if a resolution could not be reached by 
the end of the year (when the facilitator,s term will end). 
Foggo (UK) considers that the Canadian proposal injected new 
energy into the discussions, that the UK can support the 
proposal, and that the UK sought the Quad,s views on it. 
Ruthe (DE) and Raharinaivo (FR) consider the Canadian 
proposal less than perfect.  In particular, Pellay (FR) noted 
that French law would probably have to be amended to 
implement.  (In a side bar conversation, Pellay also 
commented that the Canadian proposal was illogical.)  Mikulak 
said the Canadian effort, and that while the U.S. is taking a 
serious look at the Canadian proposal, the U.S. situation is 
similar to that of France.  Furthermore, the proposal has no 
concentration threshold, which will result in each relevant 
facility having to track its production levels (unlike all 
other declaration regimes) to determine whether to declare. 
Therefore, this proposal is not as simple as a straight 
concentration threshold.  The discussion ended with Foggo 
(UK) noting that the Italian facilitator had not scheduled 
any further sessions after next week,s industry 
consultations and won,t unless a compromise looks possible. 
 
FUTURE OF THE OPCW 
 
¶33. (SBU)At Mikulak,s suggestion the Quad agreed it was a 
good idea to individually approach the Director General in 
regards to the DG creating and circulating a &legacy paper8 
that would detail strategic issues States Parties should 
consider for the OPCW,s future.  This paper would assist in 
initiating discussions among States Parties on the direction 
of the OPCW.  France noted that the turning point for the 
OPCW,s focus to transition from destruction to 
nonproliferation is nearing and the Quad needed to manage the 
transition.  Mikulak stated that this transition will impact 
upcoming budgets and there needs to be a mechanism for 
discussing strategic directions. The UK listed their focus 
for the 2010 CSP which included: Science and technology (as 
it relates to the TS), Training and Preparation for 
Inspections of Alleged Use, and Experience within the TS. 
 
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION 
 
¶34. (SBU) The U.S. had added this item to the agenda, Mikulak 
said, to stress its ongoing importance and encourage the TS 
and governments to assist States Parties in their 
implementation efforts.  Burkart noted that the new 
facilitator should be encouraged to draft a decision for the 
CSP, as it was the last decision that resulted in the recent 
comprehensive report by the TS to the Council on progress 
made by countries working on legislation and establishing 
procedures.  Rampling agreed that the issue needs to be given 
the prominence it deserves, and that a decision by the 
Conference that makes permanent the requirement for an annual 
TS report.  Raharinaivo recalled the difficulty in getting a 
decision on Article VII at last year,s CSP but agreed that 
it is important to work toward that end. 
 
Chemical Incapacitants 
 
¶35. (SBU) As a follow-on to discussions, begun at the 
previous meeting, about how best to address chemical 
incapacitants within the context of the CWC, the allies 
focused their attention on the overall threat of such 
chemicals and those countries that may be pursuing research 
and development efforts.  The United States presented a 
briefing entitled &Incapacitant Proliferation and Threat 
Overview,8 which provided key points on the growing interest 
in fentanyls and a country specific overview.  The U.S. 
briefing (given by Scott Brittain of DIA) concluded that 
chemical incapacitants are currently not a threat to U.S. or 
allied forces and are unlikely to be used in traditional 
battlefield scenarios.  Worldwide interest in fentanyls, 
however, as evidenced by research publications will continue 
to increase. 
¶36. (SBU) German expert Beck, inquired about the increase in 
publications on incapacitants (i.e., fentanyls), noting that 
such chemicals have been known for decades.  The German and 
UK dels further noted the legitimate, medical uses for such 
chemicals, albeit in smaller quantities.  Delegations agreed 
that the potential military interest in incapacitants in some 
instances remain a serious issue that information should 
continue to be monitored. 
¶37. (SBU)  UK MOD expert Harrison also read a short statement 
that mirrored many of the U.S. observations and conclusions. 
Although allies agreed that we should stay clear from trying 
to define the term incapacitants or attempt to define the 
scope of the term &law enforcement8, the UK did provide a 
definition for the purposes of their presentation and 
highlighted many of the same points in the U.S. presentation 
and further noted that such chemicals were currently not a 
threat to UK forces as well. 
¶38. (SBU) The French delegation also welcomed the U.S. 
presentation but admittedly had not looked closely at other 
countries, interests.  Rahanaivo was reluctant to give too 
much significance to open source publications, which are 
generally tied to commonly known applications (i.e., 
pharmaceutical).  He further noted the need for the group to 
continue to coordinate on this issue. 
¶39. (SBU)  The UK delegation noted inquiries made by their 
Parliament on the issue of incapacitants.  They also pointed 
to studies by UK academics and the British Medical 
Association as evidence of interest in the UK. 
¶40. (SBU)  Allies noted the value of these small group 
discussions and agreed to continue to work closely together 
to be prepared to manage this issue in the OPCW.  UK expert 
Harrison offered to prepare a brief paper on potential 
options for transparency measures for the next close allies 
meeting in Washington in April 2009. 
 
Delegates 
 
¶41.  (U) France:  Mr. Jacques Raharinaivo, MFA; MFA; Mr. 
Frank Tecourt, MFA; Ms. Marie-Gaelle Robles, MFA: Mrs. Raja 
Rabia,Deputy Representative, Permanent Representation to the 
OPCW; Mr.Augustin Baulig, MOD; Mr. Delapschaidieu,MOD. 
¶42.  (U)  Mr. Chris Rampling, FCO; Mr. Steve Crossman, FCO; 
Mr. James Harrison, MOD; Dr. Jim McGilly, MOD; Dr. Lorna 
Miller, MOD; Mr. Clive Rowland, MOD; Mr. John Foggo, DECC (NA 
for the CWC); Mr. Karl Rodrigues, DECC. 
¶43.  (U) USA:  Dr. Robert Mikulak, DOS; Ms. Jennie Gromoll, 
DOS; Mr. Johnathan Beckett, DOS; Mrs. Janet Beik, Permanent 
Representation to OPCW; Ms. Katharine Crittenberger, DOS; Mr. 
Doug Brown, DOS; Mr. Damon Prather, DOS; Mr. Scott Brittain, 
Defense Briefer; Mrs. Sarah Rodjom, DOD; Mr. Hugo Guevara, 
U.S. Embassy Berlin. 
¶44. (U) Germany:  Ambassador Peter Gottwald, FFO; Mr. Roland 
Grafe, FFO; Amb Werner Burkart,Permanent Representative to 
OPCW; Dr. Holger Ruthe, FFO; Ms. Juliane Thummel, FFO; Dr. 
Volker Beck, FFO; LtC Ewald Helmut Nau, MOD; LtC Nicholas 
Keen, MOD. 
Murphy