VZCZCXRO3091
RR RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBC #0053/01 2670652
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 240652Z SEP 09
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0921
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0499
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0959
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000053 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/24/2019 
TAGS: SOCI SCUL KPAO KMDR PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: BASRA JOURNALIST DISCUSSES MALIKI VISIT, JOURNALISTIC 
CHALLENGES, U.S. IRAQ LEGACY 
 
BASRAH 00000053  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: John Naland, PRT Team Leader, PRT Basra, US State 
Department. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Local journalist and close PRT contact Majed 
Al-Brekan (strictly protect) dismissed Prime Minister Maliki's 
recent visit to Basra, ostensibly undertaken to deal with water 
shortages, as "entirely political," and said that that "all his 
promises were just talk."  On the challenges of being a 
journalist in Iraq, he cited security concerns, and the need to 
not directly challenge the government, but rather "educate" the 
public about the government's actions and "promises."  Al-Brekan 
said that Basra Governor Shiltagh's public efforts to bring 
greater transparency are just "all propaganda," and that it is 
now actually harder than ever to get information from the 
provincial government.  Al-Brekan accused the Governor's press 
officials of handing out cash-filled envelopes to journalists at 
a recent press conference, and said that, in turn, many of these 
journalists will provide the favorable coverage that these 
bribes seek.  In response to PRTOffs questions about what the 
multi-year U.S. "legacy" in Basra and Iraq will be, he said that 
U.S. efforts and sacrifices "were not worth it," that there was 
"nothing to show for it," and it was "all a bad experience." 
End summary. 
 
Prime Minister's "political visit" to Basra 
=========================================== 
 
¶2. (C) Local print and radio journalist Majed Al-Brekan 
(strictly protect) spoke dismissively of Prime Minister Maliki's 
September 9-10 visit to Basra.  While the trip was ostensibly 
made to address, or to demonstrate concern for, Basra's water 
shortages, Al-Brekan said that the trip was "entirely 
political."  He said that a Maliki-Governor Shiltagh press 
conference capping the end of the trip was "not good."  He said 
that Maliki "promised a lot, and talked good, but it was just 
all talk."  He said that both Maliki and Shiltagh spoke only in 
"the future tense," knowing full well that these projects, even 
if acted on, would not address the present water shortages in 
parts of Basra Province. 
 
Challenges to being a journalist in Basra 
========================================= 
 
¶3. (SBU) Al-Brekan said that as a journalist, he has not covered 
any one particular area, but follows those issues of most 
importance to Basrawis.  He said that in the past he focused 
more on security-related matters, but as security has generally 
improved, he finds himself focusing more and more on economic 
issues.  Al-Brekan cited the problems that hamper the 
development of a more mature media establishment, including the 
lack of financial viability of fledging newspapers and radio 
stations.  He did acknowledge, however, that many of these 
problems were by no means unique to Iraq. 
 
¶4. (C) Al-Brekan also cited the many "challenges" that an Iraqi 
journalist like himself, a critic of local and national 
government, faces.  He said that his life had been threatened 
many times in the past, and was the target of an assassination 
squad in March 2007.  After this event, he said that his 
crewmembers and their families fled to Baghdad for safety, but 
he stayed in Basra.  (Note: Al-Brekan's own father, also a 
journalist, was killed by the Jaysh al-Mahdi militia in 2007. 
End note.)  He said that journalists, especially during an 
election season, are better off, "for their own good," not to 
focus too much on the "typically unmet and wild promises and 
lies" that politicians make during this time.  Instead, they can 
"raise awareness" of the issues.  As an example, he cited the 
ongoing water shortfalls and salinity problems.  Instead of 
focusing on the government's "wild promises," which will only 
bring scorn, or worse, to the journalist, a journalist should 
focus on the actual costs and time needed for these promised 
programs, and let the reader judge just how realistic these 
promises are.  (As an example, he said that Maliki and 
Shiltagh's plan to lay water pipes from Al Qurnah to Al Faw 
would cost one billion dollars and take years.)  In passing, he 
said that this was not at all the first such water crisis in 
recent times, and during each such crisis, there is "a lot of 
talk," but eventually the problem fades away, and nothing is 
ever done. 
 
¶5. (C) Al-Brekan also mentioned the recent complaint being heard 
in local media circles that Iranian companies are dumping 
industrial waste into the Shatt al Arab waterway in southern 
Iraq, affecting drinking water and irrigation.  He complained 
that, as this is a "controversial subject," provincial 
government environmental offices were not responding to media 
inquiries, or asking him not to bring up this subject. 
 
Unmet promises of government transparency 
========================================= 
 
¶6. (C) Al-Brekan said that despite a recent Governor Shiltagh 
public directive to all government officials to "open up" to 
 
BASRAH 00000053  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
local media and exhibit "greater transparency," this has not 
occurred.  He said that, after all, Basra-based directors 
general (DG) "still work for the national government, so they 
are not going to change due to this [directive]."  He said that 
even in the Governor's office itself, there was "no detectable 
signs" of greater transparency, and concluded that Shiltagh's 
call is "just all propaganda."  Continuing on this theme, he 
said that despite a recent PRT-sponsored media relations 
workshop that sought, among other things, to improve relations 
between the local media and local DGs, it is now actually even 
harder to get information from DGs, and journalists are forced 
to "go around them" in order to "learn what is going on." 
 
Charges corruption 
================== 
 
¶7. (C) Al-Brekan was critical of the "low journalistic 
standards," and said that, as bad as local government can be at 
times, journalists "can also be part of the problem."  He said 
that at a recent provincial press conference, a Governor's 
spokesman was openly handing out envelopes to journalists with 
50,000 Iraqi dinar, or around $42, in each.  He lamented that 
this is an increasingly common occurrence, and that journalists 
who receive these kinds of favors "will not hesitate to follow 
up with favorable press coverage" for these "benefactors." 
 
¶8. (C) At the same time, Al-Brekan acknowledged that these kinds 
of occurrences are not unique to Iraq, and that corruption in 
journalism is a worldwide phenomenon.  However, he apparently 
drew a line as to just how similar Iraqi media standards are to 
those of other nations.  In response to a PRTOff's comment that 
journalists and media companies in some countries are sometimes 
accused of withholding favorable coverage (or threatening 
negative stories) in exchange for money from or access to public 
figures, Al-Brekan immediately shot back.  He said that this 
sort of problem would "never occur in Iraq," because if "anyone 
ever tried that, the person making the threat would be dead in a 
matter of moments." 
 
U.S. "legacy" in Basra "not good" 
================================= 
 
¶9. (C) In response to PRTOffs open question about what Basrawis 
will recall of the United States's multi-year presence in Basra 
and Iraq, Al-Brekan said that our efforts and sacrifices, and 
the Iraqi sacrifices, "were not worth it," and that there is 
"nothing to show for it."  He said that he does "not see any 
good that has come of the U.S. efforts" -- only a "bad 
experience."  He did not see any imminent changes to U.S. 
policy, and that while President Obama might have "slightly 
different policies [than former President Bush]," it will "not 
be a lot." 
 
Biography 
========= 
 
¶10. (SBU) A native of Basra and a self-described "Iraqi 
patriot," Majed Al-Brekan has worked as a radio and print 
journalist for several years, including with USG-funded Radio 
Sawa.  He enjoys the respect of the local media community, and 
is known for his aggressive reporting style.  He is also known 
to hold generally secular, non-sectarian, political views. 
Al-Brekan has been a close PRT contact for three years, has met 
many visiting senior State Department officials from Baghdad and 
Washington during this time, and to whom he is invariably candid 
and straightforward.  Al-Brekan has told PRTOffs that the media 
is the key element in creating the "new Iraq" because the media 
is the "main tool for public education."  He has said that 
"building roads and water lines are important, but the national 
rebuilding effort cannot succeed without Iraqis learning new 
ways of thinking," a task in which the media will play a big 
role.  Al-Brekan participated in the Edward R. Murrow Program 
for Journalists/International Visitor and Leadership Program in 
October 2008 and openly describes himself as pro-American.  A 
"secular" Muslim, he is married with two children, and speaks 
little or no English. 
 
Comment 
======= 
 
¶11. (C) Al-Brekan's longstanding and close PRT and Embassy 
Baghdad ties, as well as his openly pro-American outlook, could 
lend some credibility to his negative comments about the U.S. 
"legacy" in Basra.  He does not appear to have an axe to grind 
or secret agenda.   Unfortunately, this negative view of the 
U.S. "legacy" in Basra is not an uncommon view here.  Despite 
USG-provided figures that around $2.5 billion has been spent on 
hundreds of projects in Basra Province since 2003 (some actually 
executed by the United Kingdom on our behalf), contacts 
routinely state that they "see no evidence" of our work. 
 
BASRAH 00000053  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Al-Brekan and many contacts contend that for the vast majority 
of Basrawis, far and away the top priorities are the provision 
of electricity and water.  Yet for whatever reason, the 
situation since 2003 is not greatly changed in these areas, and 
power and water supply is largely the same as it was in 2003 
(partly due, no doubt, to security concerns hampering 
rehabilitation efforts).  While Basrawis can sometimes blame all 
their problems on outsiders, on the other hand, fair or unfair, 
many Basrawis appear to judge the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq 
through the prism of the provision of essential services, and 
through this prism, we come up short. 
NALAND