VZCZCXRO2387
PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0049/01 2531215
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101215Z SEP 09
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0907
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0485
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0945

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000049 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/10/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SOCI IZ IR
SUBJECT: BASRA INTELLIGENCE CHIEF ON LOCAL AND FOREIGN THREATS 
 
BASRAH 00000049  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jim Shearer, Deputy Leader, PRT Basra, Dept of 
State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
======= 
Summary 
======= 
 
¶1. (C) In a September 6 meeting, Colonel Hazam, head of the 
Iraqi Intelligence Service's Fusion Center for the Basra region, 
called the special cells of Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) the biggest 
security threat in southern Iraq and said Baathists and other 
insurgent groups were infiltrating their ranks to advance their 
own agendas.  Commenting on foreign interference in Iraqi 
affairs, he said that Iran was a bigger and more sophisticated 
threat than Syria, and was using ISCI as a strategic ally to 
advance its goals.  Hazam predicted an increase in violence 
leading up to the January national elections, and saw the recent 
attacks as a signal to PM Maliki to reconsider his refusal to 
join the Iraqi National Coalition.  Hazam assessed Basra's 
security forces as better prepared and more capable to counter 
the expected spike in violence, but said that insurgent 
infiltrators were still present within their ranks, including in 
senior positions.  Our dealings with Colonel Hazam has shown his 
intelligence on threats to be highly accurate, and his methods 
for flushing out the terrorist very effective.  End summary. 
 
 
========================= 
Baathists Pump Up the JAM 
========================= 
 
¶2. (C) Hazam gave an assessment of the security threat in 
southern Iraq.  He divided enemy forces into two groups -- the 
Iranian-backed JAM and all other groups.  Hazam stated that the 
special cells of JAM are a constant threat, one he deals with 
daily.  In the "other" category, Hazam included hard-core 
Baathists, the Badr Corps, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AIQ), and other 
unspecified groups.  While still a threat, he said these groups 
had become less active than JAM of late.  In fact, Hazam said 
that with so little activity coming from them, the security 
forces had been "poking" these groups to elicit useful 
information on their membership and possible plans.  AQI's 
profile in particular, said Hazam, was much lower as a result of 
a shift in its attention to Afghanistan.  AIQ, however, remained 
a threat since it still maintained sleeper cells in Iraq that 
could be activated at any time. 
 
¶3. (C) Hazam said that the Baathists and other insurgent groups 
were infiltrating special cells of JAM and using them as a 
platform to advance their own agendas.  Though the specific 
agendas of the various groups differed, they all shared common 
goals: 
- to weaken the central government; 
- to prove that the political groups supporting the attackers 
still had the power to create chaos, and could not be ignored; 
and, 
- to create instability in Iraq that would scare off potential 
foreign investors; (Hazam cited the early September mortar 
attack on a refinery outside of Basra as the latest "message to 
foreign companies" to stay away). 
 
============================================= ============= 
Iran and Syria: Pursuing Same Goals, Using Different Means 
============================================= ============= 
 
¶4. (C) Commenting on foreign interference in Iraqi affairs, 
Hazam stated that all of Iraq's neighbors benefitted from its 
insecurity and would welcome the failure of its democracy.  He 
said that Syria was supporting forces trying to destabilize 
Iraq, but not to the same degree as Iran.  In addition to 
supporting insurgents, Iran was using all available means -- 
political, economic, and diplomatic -- to exert influence in 
Iraq.  As the latest evidence of Iran's ill intentions toward 
Iraq, Hazam cited a cache of 1,500 Iranian-made IEDs and 
numerous launchers recently seized in al-Amarah.  He stated that 
since ISCI was involved the Bloody Wednesday bombings in 
Baghdad, Iran was greatly benefitting from PM Maliki's 
scape-goating of Syria. 
 
¶5. (C) Hazam said that Iran was using ISCI as a strategic ally 
in advancing its goals.  He said that recent change in ISCI 
party leadership would not alter this relationship since Iran 
had strong connections throughout party structure that ensured 
its influence within ISCI.  Hazam said that PM Maliki had not 
politically exploited the change in ISCI leadership or the 
involvement of one of ISCI Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi's 
body guards in the July 28 Rafidain Bank robbery in Baghdad, in 
which eight people were killed.  He said that Maliki understands 
that going after ISCI in any way would cross a red line with 
Iran. 
 
============================================= ============ 
Better Means to Counter the Expected Increase in Violence 
============================================= ============ 
 
 
BASRAH 00000049  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶6. (C) Hazam predicted an increase in violence leading up to the 
January national elections.  He expected a spike in 
assassination attempts from the Badr Corps against political 
opponents.  He also foresaw a rise in general violence aimed at 
sabotaging the economy and creating a sense of insecurity.  Much 
of the recent violence, according to Hazam, could be seen as a 
signal to Maliki to reconsider his refusal to join the Iraqi 
National Coalition, the successor to the Shiite-dominated UIC. 
 
¶7. (C) Asked to assess the ability of Basra security forces to 
counter the expected spike in violence, Hazam said that they 
were more willing to fight and much better at conducting 
surgical strikes as a result of experience gained in the 
April/May 2008 Charge of the Knights campaign.  He believed that 
these forces had managed to rid themselves of many low-level 
infiltrators from insurgent groups, but likely still had some 
infiltrators serving at much higher levels, making the 
infiltrators potentially more effective and dangerous. 
 
======= 
Comment 
======= 
 
¶8. (C) We have had multiple interactions with Colonel Hazam. 
His intelligence on terrorist threats has been highly accurate, 
and his methods on flushing out terrorists have proven very 
effective. 
SHEARER