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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000746 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, DAS KAIDANOW 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019 
TAGS: MARR PREL EZ RU IR PL CZ AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S REACTION TO MISSILE DEFENSE ALL ABOUT 
GABALA 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 47392 
     ¶B. BAKU 595 
     ¶C. SECSTATE 96526 
 
Classified By: Charge Donald Lu, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Charge briefed Foreign Minister Mammadyarov 
on the United States' new approach to missile defense in 
Europe on September 18.  The Minister focused on the 
relevance of Gabala radar station in the new architecture, 
and maintained the line the GOAJ has followed since the 
missile defense issue emerged in 2007: they are willing to 
consider U.S.-Russia joint use of the facility, but want to 
be informed every step of the way (Reftels A, B).  The news 
of the Administration's decisions on European missile defense 
has played prominently in Baku.  Media and chattering-class 
reactions vary.  The issue is generally viewed through the 
prism of U.S.-Russian relations, with much commentary 
suggesting that Russia gained from the U.S. decision, but 
media attention focused more heavily on implications for 
Gabala.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2. (C) Charge briefed Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov 
using Reftel C talking points.  Mammadyarov immediately 
steered the discussion to Gabala.  Charge explained that 
while the United States was open to considering cooperation 
with Russia at the Gabala (Azerbaijan) and/or Armavir 
(Krasnodar, Russia) bases; there is no agreement between the 
U.S. and Russia in this regard, and the United States would 
keep Azerbaijan apprised of any steps taken with respect to 
Gabala.  Mammadyarov appreciated this, adding that he had 
recently made the point to Russian FM Lavrov that Azerbaijan 
needs to be part of that conversation.  Mammadyarov then 
mentioned that discussion of Gabala also had to take into 
account the expiry of the Russian lease in September 2012 
(Note: The President and the Foreign and Defense Ministers 
have not hesitated to tell us of their dissatisfaction with 
the terms of the current lease.  End Note.)  The Foreign 
Minister also noted that his government appreciates the U.S. 
recognition of the threat posed to Iran's neighbors of its 
short and medium-range missiles.  He added that Azerbaijan is 
deeply interested in purchasing sensors and defensive weapons 
to protect itself from ballistic missile attack, saying "(w)e 
are ready to sign a check." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Azerbaijani press reaction was arrayed along the 
usual spectrum from neutral to conspiratorial.  Official 
media reported the story by quoting wire service reports from 
Washington.  Some opposition papers portrayed the U.S. policy 
shift as a betrayal of the Czech Republic and Poland.  More 
informed commentary focused on the implications for the 
Gabala radar station, with noted political scientist Rasim 
Musabeyov offering the most balanced commentary, speculating 
that the radar might be an avenue for cooperation but opining 
further that the question is far from decided.  Political 
scientist Vafa Guluzade, famous for his Russophobic views, 
said that the U.S. policy shift was likely the result of a 
promise by President Obama to President Medvedev at the 
Moscow summit in July. 
 
¶4. (C) Comment: While Azerbaijan is a peripheral (and 
hypothetical) player in missile defense at this stage, it is 
important to note that expectations are high here that the 
Gabala station is in play in U.S. missile defense plans.  The 
GOAJ would likely jump at the chance to be part of the 
architecture, especially if it is done in the context of 
cooperation with Russia.  However, the issue is complicated 
by the apparent gap in understanding here that use of Gabala 
would have more to do with the political symbolism of 
U.S.-Russian cooperation than the radar station's 
capabilities on the one hand, and further because the GOAJ 
will not be able to resist the urge to use U.S. interest in 
the site as leverage on the Russians as they negotiate the 
renewal of Moscow's lease, which will expire in September 
¶2012.  The Azerbaijanis also have big hopes for purchases of 
U.S. weapons, and may see U.S. interest in Gabala as a lever 
 
BAKU 00000746  002 OF 002 
 
 
for achieving those aims.  Expectation management will be key 
here.  End Comment. 
LU