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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2629/01 2731633
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301633Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4894
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0874
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002629 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019 
TAGS: IZ KDEM PGOV
SUBJECT: UNAMI TECHNICAL ADVISOR LAYS OUT PLANS FOR IRAQ 
ELECTION 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 2568 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 1997 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor William R. Roebuck for reason 
s 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  At their meeting on September 22, the head 
of UNAMI's technical assistance team for elections, Sandra 
Mitchell, advised Pol/C that the 2005 election law would 
provide the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) with 
adequate guidance to carry out elections by January 16, 2010. 
 Though new legislation would provide better guidance and 
political cover, Mitchell was confident that IHEC could 
address constitutional problems in the 2005 election law 
through regulation.  Mitchell seeks to ensure that IHEC 
adheres to an operational timeline that will result in 
elections on time.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
UNAMI Advises Use of the 2005 Election Law 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C)  The head of UNAMI's Electoral Assistance Team, 
Sandra Mitchell, told Pol/C that the CoR is distracted from 
passing a new election law, and in her view time is running 
out for them to pass new legislation (Ref A).  She said that 
her instructions are to help Iraq hold parliamentary 
elections on January 16, 2010, and that in her view it is too 
late for Iraq to change from the closed-list system called 
for in the 2005 election law to an open-list electoral 
system.  When Pol/C reminded Mitchell that Ayatollah Sistani 
supports open lists, Mitchell replied that former SRSG 
Staffan de Mistura told her that Sistani would prefer 
closed-list elections to no elections. 
 
¶3.  (C)  According to Mitchell, the best option would be for 
the CoR to pass limited amendments to the 2005 law instead of 
a new law.  She cautioned that UNAMI estimates that the CoR 
needs a minimum of 21 days to pass a new law or an amended 
law -- and that at this point, such an effort would exceed 
the CoR's self-imposed deadline of October 15.  As a 
technical advisor, Mitchell said she viewed the mid-October 
date as a hard deadline.  She predicted to the Pol/C that the 
CoR's Legal Committee will remain deadlocked until that date, 
at which point someone -- she suggested UNAMI -- would need 
to come forward to tell the Parliament that the only option 
is to use the 2005 election law without amendment. 
 
¶4.  (C)  When Pol/C raised the question of how to establish 
voting rules for Kirkuk, Mitchell replied that Kirkuk would 
not present a problem if IHEC is asked to use the 2005 
election law without amendments.  She agreed with Poloffs 
that some politicians are trying to make an issue of Kirkuk, 
but faulted the procedural rules of the CoR's Legal 
Committee.  Mitchell explained, "as long as the Legal 
Committee works on a consensus rule, the Sunni Arabs can keep 
any election law from leaving the committee," whether or not 
their objections have any real bearing on the draft law under 
discussion.  She said that UNAMI's view is that Kirkuk should 
vote along with all of the other provinces, in accord with 
the Federal Supreme Court ruling issued in July (Ref B). 
 
------------------------------- 
Without A Law, IHEC Plans Ahead 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Mitchell has already told IHEC to initiate election 
preparations using the basic parameters of the 2005 election 
law.  For example, during registration for political entities 
(parties) in August, IHEC used the rules from the 2005 law. 
IHEC is also preparing as though elections will be held in 
multiple districts, as was the case in the December 2005 
parliamentary elections.  Overall, Mitchell said that basic 
Qparliamentary elections.  Overall, Mitchell said that basic 
procurements and logistics are on track at this point in the 
operational time line.  She predicted that IHEC will 
eventually get the money promised for elections operations, 
but noted that IHEC has sacrificed relationships with 
previous election vendors due to its failure to pay tenders 
on time. 
 
---------------------------- 
This Will Not Be Afghanistan 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C)  Mitchell assured Pol/C that unlike Afghanistan, Iraq 
has a strong network of trained domestic monitors that will 
ensure the credibility of the elections.  As they did for the 
January provincial elections and the July KRG elections, 
UNAMI and DRL-funded NGOs will train over 100,000 domestic 
election observers for the parliamentary elections in 2010. 
In addition, Mitchell expressed confidence in IHEC's voting 
 
BAGHDAD 00002629  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
rules, which require voters to cast ballots at the polling 
station where their names are listed on the voter registry. 
Because IHEC workers will tally the ballots at the polling 
station level, Mitchell explained, administrators can 
immediately evaluate whether too many ballots have been cast 
at a polling site.  Questionable results from a specific 
polling can be quickly quarantined for further investigation 
without affecting overall vote count. 
 
------------------------ 
Top Operational Concerns 
------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C)  Pol/C then asked Mitchell if she saw any issues or 
events that could possibly prevent Iraq from holding 
elections on time in January.  Mitchell replied that her top 
concern is that compressing the timeline for preparations 
will degrade the quality of the election.  For this reason, 
she is vigorously defending IHEC's operational time line and 
seeking solutions that will enable timely results.  As part 
of this concern, Mitchell fears that the CoR might try to 
pass a law later than October 15, or that the CoR might -- 
after delaying too long -- choose complex electoral rules 
that are difficult or impossible for IHEC to implement on 
time.  She cited the technical challenges faced by IHEC in 
fall 2008 when the CoR introduced the hybrid open-list 
electoral system roughly four months before that election. 
Mitchell also opined that the July 2009 Kurdistan Region 
elections lacked sufficient poll worker training, due to 
IHEC's deviation from its operational timeline when the KRG 
threatened to add a constitutional referendum to the election 
date.  Finally, Mitchell encouraged the U.S. to show support 
for the institution of IHEC in the face of recent political 
attacks.  She warned that with the election date nearing, 
IHEC's operations could be severely affected by the removal 
of even one IHEC Commissioner. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Mitchell has been embedded as an advisor to IHEC for 
nearly three years.  She is intimate with the institution -- 
she began her Iraq tour as it was being created in 2007 -- 
and she has unparalleled insight into the Board of 
Commissioners, key parliamentarians and many of Baghdad's 
political elite.  Mitchell confided to us that she believes 
Iraq's national elections will not meet "the platinum 
standard", but that they will meet UNAMI's standard of 
"accepted by the people."  Mitchell has shown herself to be 
more than capable of influencing the IHEC and others to 
deliver a credible electoral outcome by January 2010. 
HASLACH