VZCZCXRO7974
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHHM RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHPW
DE RUEHGB #2381/01 2461449
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031449Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4575
INFO RUCNDMI/HUMANITARIAN DEMINING COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0854

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002381 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/I/POLMIL, NEA/I 
DEPT ALSO FOR PM/WRA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2014 
TAGS: KHDP PARM PGOV PREL UNDP IZ
SUBJECT: PROGRESS ON DEMINING PICKS UP PACE 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 1920 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 1816 
 
Classified By: Pol-Mil Minister Counselor Cameron Munter, for reasons 1 
.4 (b,d) 
 
BAGHDAD 1920 
BAGHDAD 1816 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Iraqi Minister of Defense Abd Al-Qadir 
Muhammad Al-Mufriji issued an order August 30 to allow 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to perform demining 
operations, according the Deputy MinEnv Kamal Hussein Latif. 
The directive represents a significant breakthrough for 
U.S.-supported humanitarian demining operations and tracks 
with new progress on landmine survey work in Basra.  The MOD 
and MOEnv reached an agreement July 5 permitting demining 
operations to continue (ref B).  After the MOU was signed, 
however, the MOD did not approve any NGOs to conduct actual 
projects, as threatened (ref A).  Dr. Kamal said August 31 
that MinDef appears to have softened his position by allowing 
NGO involvement because key MOD officials told MinDef that 
they need assistance with demining operations in the southern 
desert near Basra.  END SUMMARY. 
 
A VICTORY FOR NGO LEGITIMACY 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) UNAMI officials, MinEnv officials and Emboffs 
endeavored to restart NGO-led operations during August and 
found the MOU,s guidelines to be ambiguous.  The three 
parties encouraged more clarity from the MOD and warned that 
the international community could again find that weak 
support for demining was undermining humanitarian efforts. 
Dr. Kamal shared his view August 31 that assuaging MOD 
officials' concerns about NGOs and building rapport through 
offers of training was paying dividends.  Dr. Kamal also told 
Emboff that the combined effort to convince MOD officials 
that the Iraqi military lacks sufficient capacity to 
ameliorate Iraq,s severe landmine problem had been 
particularly effective.  Director General for Intelligence 
and Security Mr. Hazzim confirmed issuance of the order to 
Emboff September 1, but said that the order was limited to 
operations in Basra.  (COMMENT: The ultimate impact of the 
order remains to be seen.  Whether the order proves to be 
blanket permission for NGOs or narrow in scope, it implicitly 
acknowledges that NGOs have crucial capacity and expertise 
that MOD lacks.  END COMMENT.) 
 
¶3. (C) UNDP Senior Mine Action Advisor Kent Paulusson in 
particular pushed to expand NGOs' ability to do humanitarian 
operations under MOEnv,s supervision.  In an effort to 
combat the notion that MOD could "go it alone", Paulusson had 
agreed in July to convey to MOD officials repeatedly three 
key points: humanitarian demining is different from military 
demining, international standards and quality control are 
essential to safety and cost-savings, and landmine and 
unexploded ordnance contamination (UXO) in Iraq is vast but 
still unchartered in many areas.  Paulusson shared his 
opinion August 30 that the message had "sunk in" with parts 
of MOD and he expected MOD officials to adopt a more 
conciliatory approach toward demining NGOs in the future. 
 
NGO PROGRAMS REARRANGED 
----------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Also during August, a leading demining NGO, the 
Iraqi Mine Clearance Organization (IMCO), reshuffled its 
profile dramatically, moving resources into mine risk 
education and training for MOEnv officials, as well as 
relocating physical assets and survey teams to Basra.  IMCO 
is one the primary grantees of the Department's Weapons 
Removal and Abatement office (WRA) program in Iraq and has 
QRemoval and Abatement office (WRA) program in Iraq and has 
been a subject of MOD recriminations (ref A).  To escape 
MOD,s obstructive maneuvers, Post and WRA agreed to 
encourage IMCO to temporarily engage in less controversial 
operations under more welcoming military commands.  The Basra 
Operations Command provided a letter to IMCO welcoming their 
involvement in survey work and mine risk education projects 
(MRE) in Basra.  (NOTE: Surveys of potential and known 
landmine fields is a crucial part of demining but less 
alarming to the security forces since it rarely involves 
direct contact with or use of explosives in the way that 
clearance operations do.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) Other positive signs include that IMCO has nearly 
completed its U.S.-supported relocation to a new compound 
 
BAGHDAD 00002381  002 OF 002 
 
 
just outside of the International Zone, even though the new 
site was adversely affected by the August 19 bombing of the 
MFA building.  IMCO medics were on hand after the event 
providing care to the injured.  IMCO is not alone among NGOs 
in making progress.  Paulusson confirmed that the UNDP,s 
grantee, RDO, expanded its MRE projects and survey work in 
southern provinces of Nasiriyah and Basra during August.  The 
Danish grantee, DDG, is also operating in Basra. 
 
TIP-TOEING THE BUREAUCRATIC MINEFIELD 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Deputy MinEnv Dr. Kamal expressed confidence August 31 
that MinDef's order represents headway.  General Mohan, who 
had strongly resisted NGO involvement in demining (refs A and 
B), now rarely speaks for the MOD on demining, he said. 
Instead, MG Merza, MG Haddi and BG Faleh, who lead 
engineering and logistical commands, have become Dr. Kamal,s 
primary contacts in inter-ministerial meetings.  Dr. Kamal 
suggested to Emboff that MOEnv will continue to curry favor 
by offering to train the MOD technicians in landmine 
clearance.  If MOD officials accept, Dr. Kamal would seek to 
use IMCO experts in the trainings.  Dr. Kamal felt that 
"professional development" and offers of goodwill had helped 
defuse tension. 
 
¶7. (C) Next strategic steps for UNDP,s Paulusson will be a 
public relations campaign and project proposals that focus on 
provincial leaders rather than the capital.  He surmises that 
progress in rural areas will be difficult for Baghdad-based 
opponents to impede and will generate momentum of its own. 
For his part, Dr. Kamal intends to expand training for MOD 
and his own MOEnv staff, using IMCO where possible, and to 
develop the professional capacity of the Directorate for Mine 
Action under the MOEnv.  (COMMENT: Post will seek to support 
these efforts and let demonstrable progress in NGO-led 
demining speak for itself.  END COMMENT.) 
 
 
HILL