VZCZCXRO5859
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #2107/01 2440855
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010855Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6044
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002107 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALILAND: UK EMBASSY VIEWS ON ETHIOPIAN 
INITIATIVE 
 
REF: ADDIS 2092 
 
Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, Michael C. Gonzales for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Acting Deputy Chief of Mission met with UK Charge 
d'Affaires John Marshall on August 31 to cross-check the 
Ethiopian Government's (GoE) report on political mediation 
efforts in Somaliland (reftel) and discuss Marshall's August 
28-29 visit to Hargeisa in support of that effort.  Marshall 
assessed that the UK and GoE share common views of dynamics 
in Somaliland as well as regarding the Ethiopian mediation 
initiative.  Marshall noted clearly that changes to the 
Somaliland National Election Commission (NEC) are necessary 
to formalize and build on the roadmap to a political solution 
as laid out in the Ethiopian non-paper.  Marshall argued that 
he visited Hargeisa over the weekend to reinforce to 
President Riyale that the UK backs the Ethiopian approach and 
to stress to him the need for changes to the NEC.  Marshall's 
visit also sought to reinforce to the Somaliland opposition 
that the introduction of a caretaker government is not an 
option.  While Riyale was adamant against changes to the NEC, 
Finance Minister and close ruling party confidant of Riyale, 
Hussein Ali Duale (Awil), conceded that the UDUB party is 
open to changes in the NEC, but only after all parties sign a 
Memorandum of Understanding formalizing the Ethiopian 
non-paper.  Other UDUB members reportedly told Marshall that 
changes to the NEC are possible without even being tied to 
timing of the MoU. 
 
¶2. (C) Marshall did confirm that despite Ethiopian State 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Tekeda's assertion that all 
party leaders did endorse the non-paper's provision to defer 
elections until a panel of experts has been able to address 
problems with the voter registry, the opposition parties are 
not/not yet on board with this issue.  He asserted that he is 
confident that unilateral action by President Riyale to make 
changes to the NEC in a credible manner would induce the 
opposition, under international pressure, to accept more 
overtly the provisions of the non-paper.  At this point, the 
UK plans to let Marshall's push on Riyale to sink in while 
the GoE further adds detail to its non-paper.  Marshall 
suggests that the U.S. defer direct engagement with 
Somaliland officials until it becomes clearer whether Riyale 
will take action on the NEC.  Post reiterates reftel request 
for guidance on how to respond to the GoE's request for 
increased USG engagement.  End Summary. 
 
FLESHING OUT DR. TEKEDA'S COMMENTS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) UK Charge John Marshall asserted that the UK and GoE 
share common views of dynamics in Somaliland as well as 
regarding the Ethiopian mediation initiative.  While he noted 
that Dr. Tekeda may have exaggerated the collaboration behind 
the development of the Ethiopian non-paper, he asserted that 
the bulk of the substance contained therein was consistent 
with the UK view of what needed to be presented.  He argued 
that the UK commented on an early draft, but only to remove 
overt criticism of Interpeace and of the NEC.  Despite press 
arguments that the GoE is backing Riyale's position over the 
opposition, Marshall argued that the GoE is, in fact, pushing 
President Riyale to compromise with the opposition.  In 
particular, Marshall argued that when Riyale pressed for 
another year in office, it was the GoE who reigned him in 
calling for a much shorter term extension only to accommodate 
technical issues with the NEC, election planning, and voter 
registry. 
 
¶4. (C) Pressed on the degree of buy-in among the opposition 
parties for the Ethiopian non-paper, Marshall conceded that 
Dr. Tekeda's report may be a bit skewed.  Tekeda was emphatic 
(with us as well as the UK) that the leaders of all three 
parties had agreed to the non-paper's provisions for 
deferring the elections and allowing President Riyale to 
remain in office until they are re-scheduled.  Despite this, 
Marshall noted that both Kulmiye and UCID parties deny 
supporting such provisions. 
 
¶5. (C) Marshall also gave insights into the administrative 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002107  002 OF 003 
 
 
challenges facing the electoral process.  Specifically, he 
argued that the duplication of names and integrity of the 
information that went into the voter registry will require 
extensive remediation.  He argued that while it is useful to 
retain the useful elements of the Interpeace registry effort, 
he admitted that once the panel of experts is in place, it is 
possible that they decide that starting afresh may make more 
sense than trying to clean a fundamentally flawed list. 
While he acknowledged the problem within the NEC of its slant 
toward the ruling party, Marshall expressed greater concern 
about the broader dysfunction of the NEC since its 
establishment.  He argued that the members have failed 
fundamentally in making decisions or taking actions required 
to prepare for the national elections.  Marshall emphasized 
that remedying this will be a key function for the panel of 
experts to monitor even if a new NEC is established. 
 
REFORMING THE NEC IS CRITICAL 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Marshall made clear that reforming the NEC -- both in 
its composition and its substantive preparations for the 
elections -- is critical for the successful implementation of 
the Ethiopian initiative and UK support.  Marshall confided 
that before even disclosing his planned visit to Hargeisa to 
anyone but Dr. Tekeda, Somaliland Foreign Minister Abdullahi 
Duale called him to request that he not/not visit.  After 
working the issue out, Marshall's first meeting upon arriving 
in Hargeisa was a one-on-one session with President Riyale. 
Marshall recounted Riyale's formality in which he remained 
seated at the desk in his office while Marshall was directed 
to a seat at the table extending perpendicularly from the 
desk.  Marshall admitted that the objective of the one-on-one 
session was to privately convey to Riyale the need to change 
the NEC.  Riyale, in turn, was emphatic that he would not 
move on either altering the NEC or allowing Interpeace to 
return to Somaliland.  Despite starting the meeting with a 
request for another, follow-up meeting the following day, 
Marshall received a call the next day reporting that Riyale 
was ill and would not be available to meet.  Marshall 
assessed that the move was to express Riyale's displeasure 
with hearing the message, but expected that it may require 
time and reinforcement before fully sinking in with the 
president. 
 
¶7. (C) Marshall noted that he met with Somaliland Finance 
Minister and close ruling party confidant of Riyale, Hussein 
Ali Duale (Awil), after meeting with the president.  Awil 
reportedly showed greater flexibility on the question of 
changing the NEC, but was adamant that such a change to the 
NEC could only be done after all parties have signed the 
Ethiopian MoU.  Marshall pushed back noting that the NEC 
changes are a necessary -- and hopefully sufficient -- 
confidence building measure needed to secure the opposition 
parties' support for the MoU.  Marshall further stressed the 
value of changing the NEC in 1) re-engaging the donor 
community, whose support has been seriously eroded by the 
current political crisis, 2) offering a popular gesture to an 
increasingly restive public, and 3) gaining the confidence of 
the opposition that the ruling party is prepared to engage 
sincerely.  Despite this entreaty, Awil retained his 
entrenched position and theatrically accused Marshall of 
taking a decision that risks plunging Somaliland into chaos. 
The Charge reported later seeing several UDUB party members 
and parliamentarians who actually showed receptivity to make 
changes to the NEC and recognized the need to do so before 
signing the MoU. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
¶8. (C) Marshall was clear that changing the NEC is critical 
to making the Ethiopian initiative work and he reported that 
the Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry 
confirmed to him on August 31 that Ethiopia shares this view. 
 For the time being, he suggested, it is important for the 
UK's clear message to Riyale to sink in.  Marshall admitted 
that the UK government has long provided assistance and 
support to Somaliland without conditions and even when doing 
so meant having to ignore problematic dynamics.  He suggested 
that the nature and tone of the UK message to Riyale 
certainly must have been a surprise which will take time to 
internalize. 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002107  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) In the interim, he argued that the GoE will have to 
flesh out details of their non-paper to render it a much more 
specific MoU for eventual signature.  From the UK side, the 
DfID office in Nairobi has begun discussing ideas for an 
eventual Terms of Reference for the panel of experts with 
counterparts from the donor community.  Still, Marshall 
recognized that many donors have limited engagement on 
Somaliland in recent months in light of the poor handling of 
this crisis by Somaliland officials.  As such, he suggested 
that a change of the NEC may be required to re-engage the 
donors adequately to produce a quality Terms of Reference and 
secure additional donor assistance. 
 
¶10. (C) In response to a specific question as to how, or if, 
the USG should engage at this point to support efforts, 
Marshall's initial reaction was to urge the USG to defer 
direct engagement with Somaliland officials until it becomes 
clearer whether Riyale will take action on the NEC.  Once 
Riyale's intentions become clearer, he suggested that a call 
from Assistant Secretary Carson or PDAS Yamamoto to Riyale 
may be of greater utility. 
MEECE