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FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6041
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
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RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002106 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/E, AF/PDPA, 
IIP/G/AF, RRU-AF, DRL/RSPRING 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC
SUBJECT: U.S. EFFORTS IN SUDAN "LAST HOPE" TO AVOID 
IMPLOSION 
 
Classified By: CDA Roger Meece for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) During an August 22 meeting with U.S. Special Envoy to 
Sudan Gration, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles said the United 
States, efforts in Sudan were "the last hope" for a country 
on a near-certain path to implosion.  He underscored his 
support for the Obama Administration's approach to creating a 
conducive environment for solutions through engagement. 
Meles outlined three main points he believed should shape the 
Administration's thinking about Sudan.  First, only the 
United States could prevent the implosion in Sudan by 
facilitating a "civil divorce" between the North and South. 
Second, the North's strategic thinking revolves around 
maintaining its firm grip on power.  Third, the South is 
crippled by both the inability of its leadership to make 
strategic decisions and by the expectation that the United 
States will be its caretaker.  Meles closed by pleading that 
the U.S. leadership take advantage of the positive momentum 
to assist in crafting a solution in Sudan before consequences 
of inaction lead to repercussions from Djibouti to Dakar. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan General J. Scott Gration 
traveled to Addis Ababa from August 21-22, 2009 to 
participate in the concluding days of Darfur movement 
unification meetings which took place from August 18-22.  At 
the conclusion of his stay, he met with Prime Minister Meles 
to brief him on the outcome of the talks and to solicit his 
views on the situation in Sudan. 
 
Meles:  More Hopeful Than Before 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Following General Gration's summary of the 
reunification talks, Meles opened by admitting he had given 
up hope of any solution to the conflict in Sudan.  Ethiopia 
is now much more hopeful than it has been in the past 
four-to-five years due to the efforts of the Obama 
Administration and the work of General Gration.  Meles 
underscored his support for the Administration's approach to 
creating a conducive environment for solutions through 
engagement.  He called U.S. efforts in Sudan "the last hope" 
for a country on a near-certain path to implosion. 
 
The U.S. Should Facilitate a "Civil Divorce" 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Meles stated that only the United States could prevent 
the implosion in Sudan by facilitating a "civil divorce" 
between the North and South.  He admitted that he used to 
believe a long term status quo would have been the best 
option - a "Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) beyond the 
CPA" - but that is now out of the question.   He suggested 
the U.S. find a way to postpone the 2011 referendum, and that 
this could be accomplished through legislative rather than 
political means.  He was not worried that the South would 
make a unilateral declaration of independence following the 
referendum.  Meles also emphasized that the North and South 
needed to engage in dialogue on post-referendum issues. 
 
North Will Not Loosen Firm Grip on Power 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The North's strategic thinking revolves around 
maintaining its firm grip on power, according to Meles. 
Khartoum's assumption was that signing the CPA was the 
necessary price to be in the good graces of the United 
States.  Meles emphasized the NCP's fear that that USG 
remains intent on regime change in Khartoum and until that 
fear is addressed, broader engagement will not be possible. 
He continued by saying that the North believed international 
assistance would start to flow and that it would be removed 
from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. 
 
¶6. (C) Meles said the National Congress Party (NCP) craves a 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002106  002 OF 003 
 
 
solution with the United States to resolve the Darfur and 
North-South crises.  He warned, however, that any solution to 
Darfur and the North-South crises must allow Bashir to retain 
power or &he will take Sudan and the region to hell.8  The 
United States, Meles recommended, should not pursue regime 
change, and offered former South African president Thabo 
Mbeki's truth and reconciliation commission as a possible way 
out. 
 
¶7. (C) When General Gration queried Meles on his perception 
of Bashir's team, Meles cautioned that it was "unwise to 
'play it' because it is too easy to make a miscalculation." 
He said they were arrogant, self-centered and always stayed 
together at all costs.  They are jostling for power and money 
on a daily basis and Ethiopia has stopped trying to speculate 
on internal movements in Khartoum, Meles said. 
 
South Crippled by Lack of Strategic Leadership 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8. (C) Turning to the perspective of the South, Meles 
emphasized that Juba is crippled by the inability of its 
leadership to make strategic decisions.  This situation has 
been exacerbated since the CPA was signed, and the vacuum is 
now bigger than before.  The lack of leadership is a "fact of 
life that will be with us for quite some time," he added.  In 
addition, the South harbors the expectation that the United 
States will be its caretaker.  "The South expects the U.S. to 
do everything they have failed to do without chipping in 
anything," he lamented. 
 
¶9. (C) Meles said Juba fully expected events to move in a 
"negative direction" including a referendum result of 
independence for the South and a destabilized North that 
would go to war prior to, or after, the referendum.  Meles 
felt the South expected others to solve the situation for 
them and that they believed the previous U.S. Administration 
gave them assurances of that type.  He said Ethiopia had 
tried to disabuse them of any such expectations of assistance 
from the GoE, saying Ethiopia would not do their job for 
them. 
 
¶10. (C) Meles said he told the South they needed to work out 
broad parameters for after the 2011 referendum, but Salva 
Kiir responded he did not trust the North and did not trust 
the CPA.  Meles concluded that if there was to be a 
postponement of the referendum, if would have to be "imposed 
on the SPLM with expectations." 
 
Sudan's Downfall Could Lead to Regional Crisis 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶11. (C) Meles reiterated several times his fear that 
implosion of Sudan would engulf the region.  In particular, 
Ethiopia is worried about the wave of religious extremism 
emerging from a failed state.  Meles added that Sudan cold be 
ten times worse than Somalia, and that in the South, 
massacres might mirror those in Eastern Congo multiplied by a 
factor of ten.  He also underscored that promises from the 
Bush Administration and some Congress members to President 
Salva Kiir have served to create a dependency in the South, 
which expects that the United States will provide unlimited 
economic and military support if it is threatened.  Meles 
stressed that the United States must correct these 
expectations if they are unrealistic. 
 
U.S. Leadership Should Build on Positive Momentum 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶12. (C) PM Meles closed by "pleading to the U.S. leadership" 
that it assist in fashioning a solution for Sudan that can 
come out of positive movement and momentum.  He stressed his 
"deeply held fears" that if the United States fails in this 
effort, there is not hope for Sudan and the consequences will 
be felt from Djibouti to Dakar. 
 
Participants in Prime Minister Meles Meeting 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002106  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶13. (U) General J, Scott Gration, U.S. special Envoy to Sudan 
Tim Shortley, Deputy to the Special Envoy, Office of the U.S. 
Special Envoy to Sudan Miriam Estrim, Office of the U.S. 
Special Envoy to Sudan Charge D'Affaires, Ambassador Roger 
Meece Kathryn Pongonis, Deputy Political/Economic Counselor, 
U.S. Embassy Addis Ababa, Notetaker. 
 
¶14.  (U) SE Gration's Office has cleared on this cable. 
MEECE