VZCZCXRO9516
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #1525/01 2231146
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111146Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2016
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001525 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV RR GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: AMBASSADOR FRIED MEETS WITH GOVERNMENT 
LEADERS, DISCUSSES RUSSIA-GEORGIA SITUATION 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kent D. Logsdon for Reasons 1.4 (b) an 
d (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  During his visit to Tbilisi on August 5 
and 6, Special Envoy for Guantanamo Bay Ambassador Daniel 
Fried met with a range of senior Georgian officials, 
including Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigol Vashadze, 
Secretary of the National Security Council Eka 
Tkeshelashvili, Minister of Internal Affairs Vano 
Merabishvili, and Minister of Defense David Sikharulidze. 
During these meetings, much of the discussion revolved around 
the ongoing tension in the South Caucasus on the eve of the 
anniversary of the August 2008 war with Russia, and Georgian 
assurances that they would not be the cause of any renewed 
fighting.  Vashadze stressed that the Georgian government was 
lying "lower than grass," and Tkeshelashvili noted her belief 
that events were moving in a positive direction following a 
tense weekend.  Sikharulidze commented that though the 
situation remains tense, he did not think the Russians were 
positioned in an offensive military posture.  He further said 
that the alert status the Russian military had engaged in the 
entire North Caucasus region was rather to keep Georgia 
nervous.  He expressed concern that the Russians have started 
to work on military infrastructure in the disputed 
territories.  End Summary. 
 
LYING LOWER THAN GRASS 
 
¶2.  (C)  During his meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Grigol Vashadze, Ambassador Fried stressed the significance 
of the high level engagement in the current tension by senior 
policymakers in Washington, citing phone calls from both the 
President to the Russian President and from the Vice 
President to the Georgian President.  Ambassador Fried urged 
continued Georgian strategic patience in solving its 
separatist problems and urged Georgia not to fall into any 
traps laid by the separatists or Russians during this tense 
period.  Vashadze expressed his appreciation for the support 
of Georgia from Washington, and noted the more positive 
strategic position currently enjoyed by Tbilisi in comparison 
to Moscow as it tried to handle the separatist areas. 
Describing Russia's positions towards South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia as attempting to carry "two suitcases without 
handles," Vashadze said that the economic and political 
situation in Russia was continuing to worsen, and the 
difficult positioning left by the tactical success of the 
August 2008 war was increasingly realized by the Russians. 
He was convinced that Russia did not want a new war, and 
would not push it much further in the near term.  He noted 
that President Obama's call to Medvedev had been salutary for 
the Russians, who may have hoped to be able to pressure 
Georgia "in the dark" without U.S. reaction. 
 
RUSSIAN DIFFICULTIES 
 
¶3.  (C)  Vashadze emphasized his belief that the Russians had 
significant concerns about the status of their economy, with 
unemployment increasing and inflation running at 15 percent, 
while the Georgian economy was relatively stable and 
certainly better than that of any of the CIS countries.  He 
noted that everywhere the Russians went, they were forced to 
talk about the Georgia issue, and they had no coherent or 
realistic policy towards Georgia other than to keep the 
Georgian government off balance and scare away foreign direct 
investment.  He believed that the war had resulted in 
strategic losses for Russia, including cutting off Armenia 
and increasing the desire of the west to continue expanding 
pipelines and resource infrastructure in Georgia so as to 
bypass Russia.  Vashadze also speculated that the Russians 
Qbypass Russia.  Vashadze also speculated that the Russians 
had interest in causing tension and provoking incidents in 
Georgia during the anniversary of the August 2008 war based 
on a strong desire to talk specifically about the causes of 
last year's war.  Vashadze stated that according to a friend 
he recently visited in Europe, Russians were redeploying OMON 
units from their home regions to other areas because of a 
growing concern that they would not follow orders to subdue 
unruly crowds if those crowds were friends and family from 
the same towns and neighborhoods. 
 
GEORGIAN NSC DIRECTOR FOCUSED BUT CONFIDENT 
 
¶4.  (C) In a lunch meeting with Secretary of the National 
Security Council Eka Tkeshelashvili, Ambassador Fried 
reiterated points that the Georgian government must be calm, 
calculating, and patient as it sought to win the strategic 
dialogue with the Russians about the future of the separatist 
zones.  Tkeshelashvili was confident in the Georgian 
government's ability to weather this most recent storm and 
survive relatively unscathed, and believed that thus far 
events were moving in a positive direction.  She stressed 
that the most disturbing thing for the Russian government was 
that the Saakashvili government did not fall either during or 
 
TBILISI 00001525  002 OF 002 
 
 
after the war in August 2008, and instead managed to survive 
in a "decent way."  She was confident that the prospects for 
the future, both politically and economically, were quite 
good, and relations with Europeans also continued to improve. 
  In assessing Moscow, she stated that while there was a 
willingness to do something militarily in Georgia, pragmatism 
and a sense that significant action would be immediately 
denounced internationally was restraining them.  Events over 
the weekend were concerning, particularly what she viewed as 
a media campaign ("probing the ground" as she called it) to 
gauge the willingness of the international community to 
engage.  Since the strong response from the Americans and a 
weaker, but still important, EU statement, the risk of war 
had been significantly reduced. 
 
ECONOMY FRAGILE BUT STABLE 
 
¶5.  (C)  She believed that a proposed free trade agreement 
with the EU was moving forward, in spite of some significant 
negotiating hurdles necessary to clear before any final 
agreement.  While this would be a boon to the Georgian 
economy, there remained a sense of fragility that continues 
to impede the economy and overall interest of foreign 
investors to stake long term claims in Georgia. While 
investment flows obviously dropped significantly following 
the war in August 2008, the naturally conservative Georgian 
banking sector managed to survive certainly better than its 
counterparts in Russia and even parts of the west.  She noted 
that Georgia only receives 10 percent of its gas from Russia, 
and events in2006 taught the government the importance of 
diversification. 
 
DEFENSE MINISTER CALM; DOESN'T RULE OUT FUTURE AGGRESSION 
 
¶6.    (C)  In his meeting with Defense Minister David 
Sikharulidze, Ambassador Fried mentioned and expressed 
agreement with the point made by NSC Secretary Eka 
Tkeshelashvili that the Russians were testing the Georgians 
psychologically.  He emphasized the need for Georgian 
restraint, and stressed that Georgia needs to make the story 
about the Russians being provocative, rather than the 
Georgians being unstable.  The Minister reiterated the need 
for proper, targeted responses to recent Russian press 
outlets accusing Georgia of shelling South Ossetia, including 
the EUMM statement on August 1 denying that they had seen 
evidence to confirm any firing had taken place toward 
Tskhinvali. The Minister expressed concern that Russia has 
started to work on military infrastructure in the disputed 
territories.  Though Sikharulidze  noted that the Russian 
military had declared an alert status for the entire Northern 
Caucasus region, including air units, he perceived the move 
as an effort to keep Georgianervous rather than pre 
paration for aggressive action. 
 
TROOP READINESS, EUMM and NATO 
 
¶7.  (C)  Minister Sikharulidze discussed Georgian troop 
readiness, stating that the normal 30 percent of the Georgian 
military is in barracks at this time and they are following 
their regular training cycles.  He also mentioned that all 
air equipment that Georgia currently has is operable, and 
that they are working on special anti-armor and anti-tank 
units.  He said that the Georgian MOD's main priority is 
education and that the ministry recently announced a tender 
on the rebuilding of a defense academy.   The Minister 
further stated that the Georgian Joint Staff is continually 
working on contingency and operation plans, and that they 
have asked for U.S. assistance.  Sikharulidze raised the 
upcoming anti-insurgency training of Georgian infantry by the 
Qupcoming anti-insurgency training of Georgian infantry by the 
Marines, with  Sikharulidze expressing appreciation for the 
assistance.  Sikharulidze described relations with EUMM, 
stating that Georgia gives EUMM access to Georgian military 
bases, invites EUMM to all military exercises and works to 
develop good relations between Georgian military commanders 
and EUMM officers.  On NATO membership, Sikharulidze 
mentioned that, by keeping the situation on the ground tense 
andtrying to prevent investment in Georgia, Russia's 
ultimate goal is to encourage Europeans not to take Georgia's 
prospect for NATO membership seriously.  Sikharulidze stated 
that Georgia places great importance on continuing to work on 
technical issues which will lead to NATO membership. 
Ambassador Fried, agreeing that working on technical military 
development for NATO is positive, encouraged the Minister to 
focus on economic development and security.  Fried further 
agreed that the EUMM has proven its value. However, he noted 
many hurdles to U.S. involvement, including an EU willingness 
to enlarge the mission. 
 
¶8.  (U)  Ambassador Fried has cleared on this cable. 
LOGSDON