VZCZCXRO1791
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSM #0552/01 2381643
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261643Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4668
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000552 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2019 
TAGS: KPKO KVIR MARR NATO PREL EUN SW
SUBJECT: NEW SWEDISH DEFENSE PRIORITIES: SWEDEN PUTS 
NEUTRALITY IN THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and 
NATO Policy (DASD) James Townsend met with Ministry of 
Defense (MoD) Director General for Political Affairs Johan 
Raeder for bilateral defense consultations (BDCs) on July 
17-18, the first such talks of what is expected to be an 
annual event.  Townsend also met with Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) Director for Security Policy Nils Daag and with 
MoD State Secretary Hakan Jevrell (the number two at MoD). 
The BDCs focused on the new Swedish Defense Bill and explored 
the possibility of expanding the level of U.S.-Sweden 
defense-to-defense  dialogue.  The new Defense Bill ends 
conscription, changing Swedish contingency planning from a 
large force deployable in one to three years to a small 
all-volunteer force deployable within a week to six months. 
In a significant break with the past, it also changes Swedish 
defense priorities, focusing on international threats to 
Swedish sovereignty and regional security, not just threats 
to its territorial integrity.  In addition, Sweden's changing 
security policy entails that any attack in the region would 
be viewed as affecting Sweden too, and Sweden "will not 
remain passive" in such an event.  Raeder noted that the new 
Defense Bill will be implemented in the 2010-14 time frame 
with all changes to be completed by 2017. 
 
¶2. (C) Daag and DASD Townsend discussed Afghanistan, with 
Daag noting that for the foreseeable future most of the 
increased EU activity in Afghanistan would be on the 
civilian, not the military side.  Jevrell expressed a desire 
to address NATO-EU relations during the Swedish EU 
Presidency, and views Afghanistan as an opportunity to expand 
NATO-EU cooperation.  Raeder argued for increased U.S.-Sweden 
dialogue on Russia, as "one must understand Russia" to 
understand defense issues in the Baltic Sea.  End Summary. 
 
U.S.-Swedish Defense Dialogue 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Dialogue between U.S. and Swedish defense ministries 
had been at a more strategic level in the 1990s, focusing on 
topics like the Balkans and the Baltics, MFA Director Daag 
noted.  However, in recent years it had become "more 
practical," dealing with procurement and defense trade 
issues.  Strategic talks remain important too, he implied. 
While noting the criticism that the EU has not been doing 
enough on major challenges like Afghanistan, Daag said that 
it is important to remember that the EU,s European Security 
and Defense Policy (ESDP) only began eight years ago.  Sweden 
would work to increase EU participation in Afghanistan during 
its Presidency, he stated. 
 
¶4. (C) MOD Director General Raeder commented that it would be 
quite helpful politically if the United States were to 
consult with Sweden on issues related to the Baltics, 
Afghanistan, and Russia.  Such bilateral cooperation 
strengthens the legitimacy of GOS policy positions.  Sweden 
views itself as among the most stable partners in Afghanistan 
and needs USG recognition of that to sustain the commitment 
politically. 
 
New Defense Posture 
------------------- 
 
¶5. (C)  On June 16, Parliament passed the new Defense Bill. 
The bill was initially scheduled for Parliamentary action 
last year, but it was delayed after the Russian invasion of 
Georgia.  This extra time allowed security experts to review 
the strategic assessments underpinning the conclusions in the 
bill and to analyze Swedish needs for future contingencies. 
The experts concluded that "a clear ability to rapidly deploy 
forces" was essential, and that Sweden's current defense 
capabilities--putting tens of thousands of troops into the 
field one to three years after a mobilization decision is 
made--was "obsolete."  Instead, Sweden needs forces readily 
available within one week to half a year, Raeder told DASD 
Townsend.  Due to this new posture, the Government of Sweden 
has decided to take the controversial step to end 
conscription and move to an all-volunteer force. 
 
¶6. (C) Regarding Sweden's changing security policy, Raeder 
underscored the new declaration of solidarity Sweden has 
made: "we cannot foresee that a military attack would be 
directed only at Sweden."  Rather, aggression in the region 
would affect more than one country.  Therefore, "we will view 
any attack in the region as affecting us too.  If Denmark, 
for example, were attacked, then Sweden will not remain 
passive," he said.  Similarly, if Turkey were to join the EU, 
Sweden's policy is now that it could not 
remain passive if Turkey were attacked; "of course, what we 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000552  002 OF 002 
 
 
can do there is different from what we can do here in our 
region," Raeder said.  Given these new policies of 
solidarity, Sweden must be prepared to give and receive 
military assistance. 
 
¶7. (C) Swedish security experts also concluded that the 
military material supply system needs to be more responsive. 
Sweden can no longer afford to develop all defense systems by 
itself; instead, it will need to buy more products "off the 
shelf," including from other countries.  "We will develop it 
if we cannot find it overseas, but our first priority will be 
to look in the international market," Raeder said, in a 
marked departure from the postwar symbiosis between defense 
industries and the military. 
 
Changing Priorities 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Sweden's new priorities for the armed forces have not 
been discussed publicly, Raeder said.  For years, Swedish 
military forces were directed to: defend Sweden; uphold 
Sweden's territorial integrity; engage in peacekeeping; and 
support civil society in times of crisis.  Under the new 
policy, participation in peacekeeping operations obliges 
Swedish forces to be ready to conduct operations in Sweden, 
its region, and outside of its region.  Protection of Sweden 
has been extended beyond defending its territorial integrity, 
to encompass national sovereignty as well, which can include 
national sovereign rights outside of Swedish territory. 
Raeder said "we now understand that our interests do not stop 
at our national borders.  Instead of protecting our ships 
only in our waters, we now must be able to protect sea lines 
of communication.  We want armed forces that can conduct 
operations nationally or internationally in support of our 
sovereign rights."  Raeder noted that the new Defense Bill 
will be implemented in the 2010-14 time frame with all 
changes to be completed by 2017. 
 
EU and Afghanistan 
------------------ 
 
¶9. (C) MFA Director Daag indicated that for the foreseeable 
future most of the increased EU activity in Afghanistan would 
be in the civilian activities.  He noted that it is important 
to put the "R" (reconstruction) back into "PRT" (Provincial 
Reconstruction Team).  Daag also raised the growing 
importance of explaining to the Swedish public why Swedish 
troops are patrolling in Afghanistan.  "It must be clear that 
what happens there affects us here," he said.  Jevrell noted 
that Sweden was "impressed" by the renewed American efforts 
in Afghanistan, but conceded that many EU agencies were 
skeptical of the ability of the U.S. to do the "civil side" 
well.  He agreed, however, that Afghanistan is an opportunity 
to expand the NATO-EU partnership. 
 
Russia 
------ 
 
¶10. (C) Raeder said that "to understand the High North and 
issues in the Baltic Sea (the U.S.) has to understand 
Russia."  He noted that, "for (Sweden), Russia is always 
present."  Raeder said that Sweden wants expanded dialogue 
with the USG on Russia, "to share our views about what's 
happening there."  Sweden assesses that Russia has lowered 
the threshold to use violence, though Moscow understands that 
the Caucasus are not the Baltics.  Jevrell noted that 
different Nordic countries have different views on Russia, 
conceding that there is a vigorous debate in Sweden on 
Russia's regional role and intentions. 
 
Nordic Solidarity 
----------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Peter Gothe, MoD Deputy Director-General and Head of 
Department for Security and International Affairs, noted that 
the Nordic foreign ministers have discussed military 
solidarity, but their declaration was weaker than what the 
Swedish MoD had hoped for.  Denmark and Norway were hesitant 
to go further, out of concern for their NATO obligations, 
whereas the Finns were more positive.  In reply to DASD 
Townsend's question about why the Nordic nations felt the 
need to issue a solidarity declaration now, Raeder explained 
that the Nordic solidarity declaration arose from joint 
defense planning, "which shows real intent, even more than 
political statements." 
 
¶12. (U) DASD Townsend has approved this cable. 
BARZUN