VZCZCXRO9975
OO RUEHKW RUEHPOD RUEHSL
DE RUEHC #3574/01 2232148
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 112128Z AUG 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
INFO EU CANDIDATE STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 7283
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 5310
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0122
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 083574 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL SC EU XO RU IR
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU NONPROLIFRATION CONSULTATIONS 
 
REF: 08 STATE 33804 
 
------------ 
INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
 
1.(U)  This cable is sensitive but unclassified.  Please 
handle accordingly. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Summary:  On July 20 and 21, the Bureau of 
International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) and 
interagency officials hosted a delegation from the European 
Union (EU) to continue discussions on nonproliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Productive talks covered 
a wide range of mutual nonproliferation concerns, expressing 
broad agreement on initiatives by the G-8, EU, and USG. 
Discussions convened in executive joint sessions with both 
the European Council Secretariat (Council) and the European 
Commission (EC) representatives, after which the Council 
representative departed for separate meetings, and 
delegations settled in for expert-level discussions with the 
EC.  Topics included the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT) Review Conference (RevCon), the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the G-8,s Global Partnership Against 
the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction 
(Global Partnership or GP), UN Security Council resolution 
(UNSCR) 1540, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 
export control assistance, the G-77, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), and other outreach initiatives.  At the 
conclusion, delegates discussed means to further implement 
UNSCRs with regard to Iran.  The head of the visiting 
delegation commented that the EU,s priorities correspond to 
those of the United States. 
 
¶3.  (U)  Summary Continued:  This meeting is part of a 
long-term coordination based on the 2007 U.S.-EU Summit 
Declaration, which called for promoting greater coordination 
of nonproliferation efforts through UNSCR 1540.  The 2008 
U.S.-EU Summit Declaration reiterated this call.  Last 
November U.S. nonproliferation officials hosted consultations 
on the stability program and third country assistance 
(reftel).  The July 20-21 meetings continued this pattern of 
transatlantic nonproliferation coordination, and for the 
first time under this format with both the Council (which has 
primary responsibility for foreign and security policy in the 
EU system) and the Commission.  Annalisa Giannella, the 
Personal Representative of EU High Representative Javier 
Solana for WMD Nonproliferation, led the European delegation 
along with Richard Wright of the EC,s Directorate-General 
for External Relations (RELEX).  The delegation also included 
RELEX nonproliferation experts Bruno Dupre and Jean-Paul 
Joulia.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------- 
EXECUTIVE JOINT SESSION 
----------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  After welcoming remarks by EUR Acting DAS William 
Lucas, ISN DAS Eliot Kang described our top five 
nonproliferation priorities as ensuring success in the NPT 
RevCon; dealing with noncompliant states; ratification of the 
CTBT, negotiation of a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty 
(FMCT); and ensuring that peaceful nuclear energy does not 
contribute to proliferation.  Kang also briefed the Europeans 
on the Nuclear Security Summit, which the United States plans 
to host in March 2010.  Noting that the USG plans to use 
existing initiatives and fora to carry out the purposes of 
the Summit )- securing dangerous nuclear material )- he 
stressed that we intend to give priority to control of 
fissile materials.  Kang also made clear that the 
President,s reference to "institutionalizing" PSI and the 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (CICNT) does 
not mean the United States proposes to establish a 
secretariat or other similar body, but rather to secure 
multilateral buy-in.  Giannella and Wright opened with 
presentations of priorities and briefed interagency partners 
on the results of the 2009 New Lines of Action.  EU 
representatives discussed EU/EC contributions to the GP, 
GICNT, Centers of Excellence, and the PSI.  ISN responded to 
each subject and introduced discussions on UNSCR 1540; 
multilateral nuclear approaches (MNAs); and nuclear, 
chemical, and biological safety and security.  Giannella 
stressed throughout that transatlantic cooperation was 
 
STATE 00083574  002 OF 006 
 
 
becoming increasingly possible for the EU.  Her presence 
demonstrated that fact and was also intended to show the 
coherence of Council and EC actions. 
 
--------------------- 
MULTILATERAL TREATIES 
--------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  The EU agrees that the NPT RevCon is the most 
important event on the horizon and that the three pillars of 
nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy must all receive adequate treatment.  U.S. leadership 
on the post-Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreement 
has set a conducive tone for the disarmament pillar, 
Giannella observed, but she remained concerned that the 
non-aligned states would hesitate to recognize progress. 
This situation requires selling the START follow-on 
agreement.  Giannella also had concerns regarding how the NPT 
review process will deal with peaceful uses, as evidenced by 
the opposition of the non-aligned countries to putting 
"multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle" on the 
agenda of the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG).  The 
Arab-Israeli dispute also had to be dealt with in the NPT 
process, and Giannella wondered what the United States was 
ready to do in this area.  She again noted a good atmosphere 
at the NPT Preparatory Committee, but worried that it was not 
stable. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Giannella described the EU's Action Plan to 
promote CTBT ratification and opined that China would ratify 
at the same time as the United States.  She thought that 
Israel, India, and Pakistan were greater problems.  On FMCT 
she noted the French concern that if negotiations on a 
verification protocol were lengthy, the normative prohibition 
on fissile material production would not take effect for a 
long time.  This concern led some to the idea of negotiating 
a verification protocol after the basic agreement had been 
concluded, and Giannella wondered what the United States 
thought of that approach.  She also said that the EU had the 
practice of always mentioning chemical and biological 
disarmament along with nuclear, noting that those issues were 
more directly related to terrorism. 
 
------- 
THE G-8 
------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, U.S. Coordinator for 
Threat Reduction Programs, thanked the EU for its strong 
support of efforts to expand the GP geographic scope and its 
funding for addressing global WMD threats.  Giannella 
mentioned the EU's interest in details regarding the 
announced March Global Summit on Nuclear Security , presuming 
the Summit would raise funds for international efforts. 
Jenkins reiterated that the United States views the Summit 
not as a new initiative but as a launching pad for the new 
international effort to secure all vulnerable material 
worldwide within four years.  Giannella noted that obtaining 
Russia,s active participation in the GP would continue to be 
a challenge, as a number of G-8 members have not fulfilled 
their 2002 GP pledge; however, she declared  that de facto 
expansion of GP program efforts had already begun and will 
continue. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Wright described the EU,s commitment to the GP 
)- one billion euros, of which nine-tenths had been 
committed and eight-tenths disbursed.  What was important now 
is to broaden the scope to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, 
and other regions.  A key part of the EU,s approach would be 
to develop Centers of Excellence.  Jenkins told the Europeans 
that the United States also supports the expansion of the GP 
and wonders how to move forward.  Dupre thought the GP could 
develop new forms of threat reduction programs, even 
"coalitions of the willing," and emphasized the utility of 
scientist engagement.  Giannella noted that a major problem 
with the GP now is the difficulty in convincing states that 
they should provide funding to Russia, with which the GP is 
closely identified. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Giannella addressed ISN on the Nonproliferation 
Directors' Group (NPDG) )- the policy-oriented 
nonproliferation activity of the G-8 )- which she pointed 
out, accomplishes little beyond agreeing on statements.  She 
was concerned that the NPDG had reached an impasse:  Russia 
absorbed much of the time of its discussions, and Canada )- 
the 2010 chair )- was not enthusiastic about multilateral 
approaches to nuclear energy, which Giannella considers the 
 
STATE 00083574  003 OF 006 
 
 
most important G-8 topic.  ISN expressed similar concerns 
over the way the NPDG had been developing.  ISN experts also 
raised the subject of the G-8 Bioterrorism Experts Group, 
noting that this group has held a number of useful workshops 
and exercises since 2004, but that there has been little 
policy-level discussion of bioterrorism.  They suggested that 
it might be useful to consider whether the list of topics 
agreed in 2004 should be updated, whether policy 
recommendations should be forwarded to senior officials, and 
if so, in what venue such policy discussions should be held. 
ISN experts stressed that the United States is seeking to 
stimulate discussion among G-8 partners on these questions, 
rather than making specific proposals at this time. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  On UNSCR 1540, Giannella encouraged consultation 
about a problem of perception.  Since developing countries 
see proliferation as a largely Western problem, developed 
states must think carefully about promoting 1540 under G-8 
auspices; promoting nonproliferation within a broader 
organization might encourage more robust international 
participation.  Despite this, both she and the EC staff were 
preparing to participate in the upcoming Berlin G-8 
expert-level meeting.  U.S. 1540 Coordinator Thomas Wuchte 
welcomed the EU 1540 G-8 nonpaper as a good basis of 
discussion to address developing countries' perceptions. 
Giannella agreed with the United States on the desirability 
of expanding the GP, noting existing programs outside Russia 
and other former Soviet states. 
 
¶11.  (U)  Treasury Department representatives briefed the 
Europeans on ongoing efforts of the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) to stop proliferation.  The FATF has issued 
three sets of guidance and one typology report.  These 
issuances are not part of the FATF 40 plus nine 
recommendations and, as such, are not considered as criteria 
for assessment in the mutual evaluation process.  A 
proliferation finance project team is considering the 
following four general issues:  legal systems, preventive 
measures, awareness, and investigation.  The team's goal is 
to present policy options to an upcoming FATF plenary. 
 
------------------------- 
EXPORT CONTROL ASSISTANCE 
------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Visiting delegates stated that the EC has six to 
10 million euros for export control assistance, but noted the 
absence of a consistent funding rationale.  Before the end of 
the year, they would like to implement a strategic approach 
for selecting countries for their outreach, and hope to 
coordinate with the United States to avoid duplication.  In 
order to determine funding priorities, the EC will evaluate 
activities that have been executed, assess risks and threats, 
and consult with Member States.  Dupre prefers a regional 
approach.  There will be no additional EC export control 
funding this year, since the German export control authority 
(BAFA) is still implementing previously-funded activities and 
they are wrapping up projects with Russia.  ISN notionally 
proposed organizing an information-sharing meeting with BAFA 
and the EC in Europe in late September or early October.  The 
EC representatives agreed to this notion. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  ISN provided an overview of the EXBS program and 
observed that the EC treats its border security efforts, 
including those related to preventing "illicit trafficking," 
as distinct from "export controls" (e.g., laws regulations, 
licensing processes).  ISN noted that the EXBS program takes 
a holistic approach and that enforcement at the border is a 
critical component of effective strategic trade controls. 
The Europeans noted that funds go separately to export 
control and illicit trafficking enforcement groups, which are 
not talking to each other, and seemed inclined to try to 
combine them the way EXBS does.  They mentioned that their 
illicit trafficking experts are part of the Energy Department 
(DoE)-chaired Border Monitoring Working Group and committed 
to look into EC support for expanding the group to include 
those working on "export controls."  ISN also confirmed 
agreement by the EC representatives to the donor coordination 
process that had been discussed at the EXBS program's recent 
International Export Control Conference in Istanbul, and 
proposed working to expand formal coordination beyond 
information sharing to include the project planning phase and 
development of strategies in approaching key countries.  EC 
representatives were receptive. 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  ISN provided updates on EXBS program activities 
in countries of interest to the EC and made suggestions for 
 
STATE 00083574  004 OF 006 
 
 
engaging most effectively.  EC delegates noted they would 
like to create more international Centers of Excellence and 
discussed countries to which the EC may expand assistance by 
next year.  The Centers' concept seems to still be evolving, 
but is consistent with ISN,s suggestion that the EC take a 
regional approach to assistance where possible, given 
limitations to date on EXBS' ability to do so.  With respect 
to Thailand, ISN recommended assistance on the licensing 
process, including provision of an automated licensing system 
(such as the one developed by South Korea), as well as 
support for Thailand,s idea to reach regional agreement on 
adoption of an EU-based control list.  EC representatives 
noted that Tunisia has expressed interest in working with the 
EC and that the EC started a regional program in North 
Africa.  The EU has an existing program in Malaysia and the 
Europeans noted that the Malaysians have expressed interest 
in moving forward, in careful coordination with other donors. 
 With respect to EC interest in Egypt, ISN noted a lack of 
traction for the EXBS program outside of enforcement, and 
suggested the EC focus on legal or regulatory training.  ISN 
supported the EC's interest in working with Pakistan and 
Central Asia, as well as program expansion in Afghanistan. 
The EC would like to expand in Africa and is considering 
launching programs in South Africa, Kenya, Botswana, Nigeria, 
Cameroun, and Ghana.  They favor exchanging plans for Africa. 
 The Europeans also mentioned China and Ukraine as potential 
funding priorities.  European delegates said they need to 
have solid recommendations for specific activities to fund by 
spring 2010, and welcomed additional input. 
 
---- 
G-77 
---- 
 
¶15.  (U)  ISN described plans to engage key G-77 BOG members 
such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and the Philippines, and 
noted that criteria of supply were a major unresolved issue. 
Giannella seemed surprised that the USG regards the June GOG 
debate as a positive development.  She made the point that 
Argentina and Brazil already hold technologies for uranium 
enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing technologies 
(ENR), and speculated that our efforts should instead 
concentrate on BOG members that do not already have such 
technology.  ISN replied that the ENR holders, Argentina, 
Brazil, and India, are among the most vocal critics  of the 
MNA proposals, noting that some of the other BOG members, 
e.g. Ghana, Mexico, and Malaysia, where rather positive in 
the BOG discussion.  EU representatives sought assurances 
that ISN does not think the MNA issue was dead after the June 
BOG.  The Europeans are awaiting political direction before 
being able to engage on criteria of supply. 
 
---- 
IAEA 
---- 
 
¶16.  (U)  ISN briefed the Europeans on USG commitment to 
strong and effective IAEA Nuclear Security and Safety 
Programs.  Since 2002, the USG has contributed USD 51.8 
million through the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund.  Supported 
activities include physical protection of radioactive 
materials.  ISN emphasized that it is important for the IAEA 
to become more proactive in identifying nations most in need 
of security enhancements and encouraging them to seek 
assistance.  A stable and predictable funding stream for 
IAEA's nuclear security activities is vital to its success. 
ISN urged support for the IAEA's proposed 2010-2011 budget to 
begin regularizing funding for the Office of Nuclear Security. 
 
-------- 
OUTREACH 
-------- 
 
¶17.  (U)  ISN briefed the experts on the Preventing Nuclear 
Smuggling Program's collaboration with the Instrument for 
Stability on nuclear forensics assistance and efforts to 
promote the use of national nuclear forensics libraries as a 
basis for cooperation among governments investigating illicit 
uses of nuclear material.  Joulia and Dupre view the 
collaboration as successful and expressed support for nuclear 
forensics libraries.  ISN will work with the DoE to produce a 
cost estimate in response to the Europeans' request. 
 
¶18. During the executive session, Gianella argued for 
official EU participation in the PSI. ISN answered that the 
EU provides a complementary and supportive legal basis for 
the PSI, but that decisions to participate in any specific 
 
STATE 00083574  005 OF 006 
 
 
interdiction actions, and thus formal PSI participation, 
remain with national governments.  Furthermore, since all EU 
states are PSI partners and 10 of 20 Operational Experts 
Group (OEG) participants are EU states, EU interests are 
already well-represented in PSI activities. Additionally, ISN 
conveyed that interdictions are conducted on a national basis 
and a formal EU role, especially in the OEG, risks 
unnecessary bureaucratization of the PSI. ISN also stressed 
that the PSI is not a legal forum to write or make new laws 
related to interdiction related actions. Regarding future 
participation, ISN conveyed that the EU has been invited to 
observe PSI activities, and there may be room for formalizing 
observer status for the EU in PSI, as is currently done in 
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. 
 
¶19.  (SBU)  ISN outlined its position on the International 
Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and briefed 
Wright on indications from Russian officials over the past 
year, without elaboration, that their government is giving 
serious consideration to withdrawal from the ISTC.  Russian 
officials argue that the original objectives of the ISTC )- 
helping Soviet-era weapons scientists transition to 
non-weapons work in order to reduce the chances they might 
offer their expertise to proliferant states or terrorist 
groups )- have been fully accomplished.  From a Russian 
perspective, the original mission, paying scientists because 
the GoR could not, is now an embarrassment.  ISN noted that, 
although USG funding has dropped significantly, there is 
continued value in an ongoing ISTC mission in some form, 
preferably including addressing nonproliferation and 
counterterrorism objectives.  Despite this, the Russian input 
on a viable future for the ISTC is necessary before any real 
transformation can take place.  ISN strongly encouraged the 
EU to join the United States in raising this issue with 
high-level Russian officials.  Wright noted that it has a 
similar view on ISTC transformation and the need for Russian 
input and also mentioned that the EC funds for ISTC 
activities are decreasing in light of the need to address 
other global threats. 
 
¶20.  (U)  ISN's Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI) 
team continued its discussions with the EC on possible 
contributions from the Instrument for Stability Fund to 
anti-nuclear smuggling assistance projects in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia.  The NSOI Coordinator provided to the EC 
reps a paper on the detection equipment needs of Georgia and 
other Caucasus countries to support monitoring of green 
borders.  The EC representatives agreed to review hat paper 
and provide a response in the coming months.  The sides also 
discussed EC plans for assisting at ports of entry in Central 
Asia.  EC delegates confirmed that they had set aside funds 
for such assistance, probably to be used in one or more of 
the three countries, i.e. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Turkmenistan, on Afghanistan,s northern border.  As a next 
step, NSOI agreed to provide the Europeans with the names of 
contacts in the U.S. Embassies and host governments in these 
four countries.  The NSOI Coordinator also updated the 
delegation on NSOI,s efforts as well as plans to engage 
countries in South Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. 
 
¶21.  (SBU)  ISN briefed the experts on the Chemical Security 
enhancement program (CSP).  The threat consists of 
proliferators and terrorists seeking to use industrial 
chemicals as a low-cost alternative, recruit scientists, and 
use chemical weapons.  ISN recalled the 1984 accident in 
Bhopal, India, the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack in Tokyo, 
and more recent chlorine bomb attacks in Iraq.  Terrorist 
intent, poor lab security, and widespread availability also 
contribute to the threat.  CSP seeks to deter malefactors 
from accessing expertise and materials.  The Program works 
with governments and industry to grow capabilities and 
engages scientists through training, particularly at the 
Centers of Excellence in Thailand and Jordan.  Joulia 
expressed interest in future EC projects in this area and 
mentioned that this could be of interest in the industrial 
context. 
 
¶22.  (SBU)  Joulia and Dupre expressed the EC's continued 
interest in coordinating global biological threat reduction 
activities with the Departments of State and Defense 
worldwide to reduce the biological threat.  ISN expressed a 
desire to closely coordinate with international donors such 
as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.  Joulia and 
Dupre welcomed this to avoid duplication of effort.  ISN 
briefed on the Biosecurity Engagement Program, which provides 
over USD 27 million in FY2009 to engage biologists, secure 
dangerous pathogens, improve biosafety, and build capacity to 
 
STATE 00083574  006 OF 006 
 
 
combat emerging infectious diseases.  Joulia outlined the EC 
biological threat reduction priority regions, referencing 
future focus in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and possibly 
Africa. 
 
¶23.  (SBU)  Joulia and Dupre highlighted the 2.5 million 
euros that have been earmarked for Iraqi scientist 
redirection, and ISN thanked the EC for its significant 
contribution.  (Note:  ISN provided the EC with information 
on needs in this area last year, and this funding is a result 
of our request.  End Note.)  Joulia stressed that the funding 
was not yet a certainty, but that he would learn the final 
outcome of members, decision in the fall.  ISN stressed that 
the United States stands ready to work with the EC to 
coordinate this funding if awarded, which the EC plans to use 
for radiation safety and non-destructive testing activities 
spearheaded by the Iraq Scientist Engagement Program.  Dupre 
requested an ISN DAS-level endorsement of the importance of 
EC efforts on these activities to help the EC make the case 
during an internal management meeting in September. 
 
---- 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶24.  (SBU)  ISN urged the Europeans to maintain robust 
implementation of the UNSCRs, uphold a unified message, and, 
if necessary, increase the pressure on Iran.  The USG is 
monitoring UNSCRs 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008); 
advising our partners on implementation; and effectively 
implementing the resolutions through domestic legislation. 
ISN proposed cooperation on UNSCR 1737's third operative 
paragraph to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of 
all items, goods, materials, equipment, and technology that 
could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related reprocessing or 
heavy water-related activities, or to the development of 
nuclear weapon delivery systems.  Specifically, ISN singled 
out the Stability Instrument as a tool that could be used to 
engage African countries in the monitoring of their uranium 
mines.  Such an effort would serve to help ensure that Africa 
does not wittingly or unwittingly transfer uranium, a 
proscribed item, to Iran, and to ensure private-sector 
compliance with UNSCR obligations.  ISN also emphasized to 
the Europeans that the United States is committed to 
resolving the matter diplomatically, but that the current 
opportunity for engagement will not last forever.  The USG 
will realistically consider the next steps should Iran fail 
to respond to our overtures.  EC representatives welcomed 
these ideas and committed to further discussion. 
CLINTON