VZCZCXRO7971
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHSH #0148/01 2330310
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 210310Z AUG 09
FM AMCONSUL SHENYANG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8806
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0208
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0043
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0168

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000148 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM ECON KN KS CH
SUBJECT: PRC EXPERT FORESEES NO INSTABILITY IN DPRK POWER 
TRANSFER 
 
Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman Reasons 1.4 b/d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Jilin Province's foremost Korean Peninsula 
scholar does not foresee instability during the transfer of 
power to DPRK leader Kim Jong-il's successor, but predicated 
longer-term stability on an improved economic situation. 
After his reshuffle of the military in early 2009, Kim has 
renewed confidence in the allegiance of the military and 
places a great deal of trust in his brother-in-law Chang 
Sung-taek.  However, a number of factors will keep the DPRK 
from economic reform and recovery.  The missile launch and 
nuclear test, the international response, followed by the 
recent release of the two American journalists, are part of a 
familiar pattern by the North Koreans to engage the U.S. in 
bilateral dialogue.  Even if the U.S. were willing to conduct 
bilateral talks with the DPRK, Zhang said, he had little 
confidence that the North Koreans would abide by agreements. 
End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Kim Jong-un the Successor?  Too Early to Tell 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Embassy Beijing PolMinCouns and CG Shenyang PolOff 
called on Jilin Province Academy of Social Sciences (JASS) 
Director of Northeast Asia Research Center and Director of 
DPRK/ROK Studies Zhang Yushan on August 18.  Professor Zhang 
expressed confidence the most likely Kim Jong-il succession 
scenario was that a small cadre composed of Kim Jong-il's 
brother-in-law Chang Sung-taek and other military leaders 
would run the country until the formal successor was fully 
capable of taking over.  Kim's shuffle of military leadership 
in early 2009 had strengthened his confidence in his military 
leadership.  While all signs might point to the third son Kim 
Jong-un as heir apparent, Professor Zhang said, it was too 
early to say for sure.  It was clear that Jong-un was 
currently not capable of taking over.  This being said, Kim 
Jong-il now relied heavily on Chang, whose conservative 
character and strict adherence to the military over economic 
interests had had adverse effects on trade and economic 
activity. 
 
----------------------------------- 
The Meaning of the Nuclear Strategy 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Zhang said he believed the DPRK was following the 
Indian and Pakistani nuclear strategy of arming itself in 
pursuit of its ultimate goal becoming a regional military and 
political superpower.  Possessing a nuclear weapon was a 
precondition for said regional superpower status, according 
to Zhang.  Just as the DPRK still greatly feared the U.S., it 
was also wary of its neighbors and would much rather 
negotiate with them as a nuclear country.  "It is all they 
have," he said.  Zhang described the recent missile and 
nuclear tests and their aftermath, including the war of words 
with the U.S., the subsequent release of the two captured 
U.S. journalists, and the overtures it was making toward 
South Korea, as part of a pattern followed by the DPRK 
leadership.  Zhang noted that while he too saw no feasible 
channel for nuclear negotiations outside of the Six-Party 
Talks, the DPRK would like to force the U.S. to bilateral 
talks similar to those previously held in Singapore and 
Berlin.  Zhang said that the DPRK would like Japan removed 
from Six-Party Talks and looked for friendlier counterparts 
to take part in the negotiations. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
"The Needs of the Party and Needs of the People Are One" 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶4. (C) On the economic front, Zhang noted that the DPRK 
regime understood that North Korea's economic recovery was 
key to continued stability and security.  It had come under 
increasing internal and external pressure to open up, but a 
Chinese-style opening to investment and market reforms was 
untenable for many reasons.  First, Songun Politics, which 
allocates most resources to the military, left little room 
for economic experimentation.  Second, the slight economic 
improvements of 2005 and 2006 had been virtually wiped out by 
natural disasters and the economic sanctions resulting from 
the 2006 nuclear tests.  While he saw no indication that 
people were starving, the scarcity of goods and grains was 
ever more apparent.  Over the last few years, the country had 
experienced intermittent floods and droughts that had 
affected the balance between grain production and hydropower 
against an increased reliance on coal power.  With grain 
production important to the ration system and coal production 
 
SHENYANG 00000148  002 OF 002 
 
 
important to electricity production, balance had been hard to 
find. 
 
¶5. (C) When asked his views of the priority concerns of DPRK 
leaders, Zhang first said the needs of the party leadership 
and the needs of the people were one.  He subsequently 
allowed that the DPRK leadership would be unwilling to cede 
any of its hold on power to the market.  The need for control 
and stability was too great, he said.  Zhang said that since 
Chang had returned to the core of the leadership, a series of 
policies restricting markets and further tightening access to 
trade goods had made a noticeable impact on the common 
people.  He also noted that even though the DPRK had opened 
up Kaesong and Rajin as development zones, military leaders 
lacked sufficient confidence in industrial workers to remain 
a stable force in the face of economic change.  Kim Jong-il 
agreed with the military's assessment.  Both zones were 
plagued by underinvestment and sub-par management.  Current 
international sanctions and the lingering global financial 
crisis further limited DPRK investment.  Even if more 
investment were to come its way, the country could not afford 
the necessary infrastructure improvements.  The Greater Tumen 
Initiative Regional Development Cooperation Project--linking 
Mongolia, Russia, the DPRK, the ROK, China and Japan through 
water, rail, and land conduits -- had stalled.  Supposedly an 
excellent example of regional development cooperation, the 
project lacked the necessary cooperation and but especially 
lacked funding from the DPRK and Russia. 
 
-------------------- 
Rumors and Questions 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Zhang was interested in seeing whether the release of 
the two U.S. journalists would be a turning point for the 
U.S.-DPRK relationship.  He also expressed interest in the 
content of Kim Jong-il's meeting with former President 
Clinton.  Zhang expressed certainty that Kim Jong-il would 
now want a good will gesture from the U.S., like assurances 
for the safety of the DPRK.  Zhang also wished to know 
whether U.S. and DPRK would be open to bilateral negotiations 
similar to those that occurred in Singapore and Berlin.  In 
his frank opinion, even if such talks could occur, the DPRK 
could not be counted on to either honor or abide by 
agreements reached at the negotiation table. 
 
WICKMAN