VZCZCXRO5200
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHRH #1076 2301302
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181302Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1412
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0037

S E C R E T RIYADH 001076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNGA KTFN WE GZ XF SA LE SY
SUBJECT: SAUDI DEPUTY FM ON LEBANON, SYRIA, AND MORE 
 
REF: RIYADH 01070 
 
Classified By: CDA Ambassador Richard Erdman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  During an August 16 meeting with Charge on 
Afghanistan (reftel), Deputy Foreign Minister for Bilateral 
Affairs Khalid Al-Jindan acknowledged the need to do more to 
stop terrorist financing; was hopeful about Lebanese 
government formation; expressed his disappointment with 
Palestinian disunity; cautioned against an oversimplified 
approach to Hamas; and mentioned his plans to attend UNGA. 
Highlights follow.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (S) TERRORIST FINANCE:  Charge flagged U.S. concerns that 
despite joint U.S.-Saudi efforts, there was evidence that the 
Kingdom continued to be a source of terrorist financing, 
especially for the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The 
Saudis are "adamantly against this," Jindan responded, adding 
that banks were now obligated to follow strict regulations 
aimed at its prevention.  Charge said we appreciated Saudi 
cooperation, but that we both needed to do more.  Part of the 
challenge we faced was that with so many Pakistanis working 
in the Kingdom (some 800,000), or coming for the Hajj, it was 
possible money was leaving in relatively small amounts that 
were difficult to trace.  This was a source of concern in 
Washington.  "We are doing what we can, but there is always a 
need to do more," Jindan agreed, adding the Saudis could keep 
their "eyes open more." 
 
¶3.  (C) LEBANON AND SYRIA:  Jindan reaffirmed the Saudi 
government's support for PM-designate Hariri and hopes the 
Lebanese government formation process could be concluded 
soon.  Hariri would be able to overcome difficulties, he 
hoped, citing Jumblatt's recent about-face as evidence that 
Hariri would eventually succeed.  He said Syria's behavior 
was "better than before," and attributed the outcome of the 
elections to minimal Syrian interference.  (Jindan's 
assessment was subsequently reinforced by a Saudi government 
statement following the August 17 Council of Ministers 
meeting, expressing confidence that Lebanese groups would be 
able to overcome the obstacles facing the formation of a 
national unity government.)  Charge reiterated the importance 
of delaying any visit to Damascus until after the Lebanese 
government was formed and confirmed in a vote of confidence. 
Jindan agreed, adding that the Saudis would continue their 
"piecemeal" approach to Syria, rewarding concrete Syrian 
gestures with an appropriate Saudi response. 
 
¶4.  (C) FATAH AND THE PA:  Jindan said the Saudis remained 
"unhappy" that the Gaza Palestinians were absent from the 
Fatah conference, adding that all "important elements" should 
have a voice in the Palestinian political debate.  He cited 
the election of new Fatah leadership as a "positive step" 
which could help encourage reconciliation.  When asked 
whether Abu Mazen was stronger after the conference, he 
replied, "We must wait and see," adding that Fatah "needed 
change" and had to reduce internal corruption.  Charge 
mentioned progress Palestinian PM Salam Fayyad had made 
towards improving the PA's transparency and expressed USG 
appreciation for the Saudi government's recent $200 million 
contribution to the PA budget.  Jindan's statements were 
echoed a day later by the Council of Ministers in their 
official statement, which urged feuding Palestinian factions 
to "quickly settle their differences" and "understand the 
danger posed by their disunity." 
 
¶5.  (C) HAMAS:  As he has in the past, Jindan cautioned about 
the dangers of treating Hamas as a homogeneous entity.  In 
fact, there were two major political currents within the 
movement:  a nationalist current, consisting of many 
moderates who might be willing to compromise, and ideologues 
influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, with whom compromise 
was impossible.  Asked to place Khalid Meshaal on this 
continuum, he said Meshaal was "more of an ideologue," but he 
was not a true radical and "should not be ruled out." 
Meshaal used ideological language to serve political goals, 
and therefore might be willing to compromise on some issues. 
 
¶6.  (C) UNGA ATTENDANCE:  Jindan mentioned he would be in New 
York from September 22-October 2 as part of the Kingdom's 
UNGA delegation, which FM Prince Saud al-Faisal is expected 
to head. 
ERDMAN