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C O N F I D E N T I A L PARTO 000013 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2034 
TAGS: OVIP CLINTON HILLARY PREL PK
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's July 23, 2009 Meeting 
with Pakistani Foreign Minister Makhdom Shah Mahmood 
Qureshi, Phuket, Thailand 
 
¶1.  (U)  Classified by:  Paul Wohlers, Deputy Executive 
Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. Reason 1.4.(d) 
 
¶2.  (U)  July 23, 2009;  Phuket, Thailand 
 
¶3.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
The Secretary 
Deputy Chief of Staff Jacob Sullivan 
Deputy Chief of Staff Huma Abedin 
Lt. Gen. Paul Selva 
DAS-D Robert Scher 
Spokesperson Ian Kelly 
Nejdat Mulla (Embassy Note taker) 
 
Pakistan 
Foreign Minister Makhdom Shah Mahmood Qureshi 
Additional Foreign Secretary Masood Qhalid 
DG Foreign Minister's Office Zaheer Berviaz Khan 
Ambassador at Large Nasir Ali Khan 
Director Foreign Minister's Office Ameer Khurram Rathore 
Charge d'Affaires Embassy Bangkok Ahmed Amjad Ali 
 
 
¶4. (C) Summary: On July 23, the Secretary met Makhdom 
Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, on 
the margins of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Phuket, 
Thailand.  FM Qureshi expressed appreciation for the 
Administration's approach to South Asia, claimed 
Pakistan's fight with extremists was progressing, and 
requested assistance with an energy crisis, police 
training/funding, resettling displaced families, and 
disrupting the flow of money and weapons to extremists. 
On India, Pakistan wanted to move forward with a 
dialogue to normalize relations.  Regarding Afghanistan, 
Pakistan saw signs of progress in the run-up to 
presidential elections.  The Secretary pledged continued 
support for Pakistan's fight against extremists and 
dialogue with India that could move the two countries 
forward in normalizing relations.  She emphasized that 
Pakistan needed to deny extremists the ability to set 
the agenda for the relationship with India, and 
suggested Pakistan initiate a concerted media campaign 
to publicize its efforts to cooperate with India, as 
well as promote  better cooperation between Indian and 
Pakistani security elements to build needed confidence 
and trust.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Taking the Fight to the Extremists 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) FM Qureshi described progress made in the fight 
against extremists.  He said the Pakistanis had finally 
realized that the extremists were threatening their 
values, economy, and way of life.  The army now had the 
will to fight, and the people affected by the extremist 
agenda were no longer afraid to speak out.  Qureshi 
attributed this change, in part, to the U.S. 
administration's policy of  listening to local concerns. 
Pakistan still faced many challenges, however, and these 
could affect the current focus on the fight against the 
militants.  Pakistan was in the middle of an energy 
 
 
 
crisis that could result in political unrest.  This type 
of distraction would be tragic for efforts against the 
Taliban.  Qureshi requested energy assistance and 
support in disrupting the flow of money and arms that 
allowed militant extremists to continue their fight. 
Pakistan was prepared to expand the military offensive 
into Waziristan.  Pakistan also needed to disrupt the 
extremists' supply of weapons. 
 
¶6. (C) Qureshi spoke at length about internally 
displaced persons (IDPs).  Authorities had coped with 
the large number of IDPs that resulted from the military 
offensive, and over 56,000 families had already returned 
to their homes.  Pakistan needed more police to provide 
security against further extremist incursions and to 
rebuild infrastructure { it would cost some $2.5 billion 
to restore the Swat valley alone to a functioning level. 
 
¶7. (C) The Secretary congratulated Qureshi on Pakistan's 
handling of the military offensive in Swat.  The United 
States had identified the source for some of the 
militant funding, and a concerted effort by the United 
States and Pakistan might disrupt the stream of money. 
The Secretary agreed that continued security was 
essential for IDPs to return home.  The United States 
was ready to assist, having already provided $300 
million in short-term aid to IDPs.  In the longer term, 
Pakistan needed to extend governance to the region.  The 
Kerry /Lugar aid package was being finalized and the 
World Bank's damage assessment report could be helpful 
in outlining specific needs to the Friends of a 
Democratic Pakistan group, which needed to find a 
suitable coordinator. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Setting the Agenda: India and Terrorism 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Regarding India, FM Qureshi said Pakistan wanted 
to normalize relations.  Despite political posturing, 
Pakistanis were not interested in confrontation; they 
wanted tangible improvements in their lives.  He 
emphasized Pakistan's willingness to resume the 
comprehensive dialogue with India, which was the only 
option for ensuring stability in South Asia.  Pakistani 
Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani and Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh had agreed earlier in  July in Sharm el- 
Sheikh that the Foreign Secretaries of each country 
would meet as needed, and the Foreign Ministers would 
meet in New York at the upcoming UNGA.  The New York 
meeting would be successful if both countries could 
agree on a resumption of the dialogue. 
 
¶9. (C) The Secretary pledged continued support to 
Pakistan's renewed engagement with India.  PM Singh had 
been heavily criticized inside India for his meeting 
with PM Gilani.  Regardless, Singh was committed to 
proceed with the dialogue.  India had acted with 
restraint after the Mumbai terrorist attacks, but such 
restraint would not be possible if there were another 
attack.  Pakistan's tangible cooperation on terrorism 
issues, such as bringing terrorists to trial, had helped 
strengthen the arguments of those in India who advocated 
restraint.  While there would always be differences 
 
 
 
between India and Pakistan, two democratically elected 
governments offered the best opportunity to resolve 
those differences. 
 
¶10. (C) FM Qureshi told the Secretary that he felt PM 
Singh was a leader of integrity, but he was frustrated 
that Pakistan's relationship with India could be 
determined by a small group of extremists.  India and 
Pakistan had a common interest in fighting terrorism, 
but the terrorists were setting the agenda for conflict, 
aided by negative, pessimistic commentary in the media 
about the prospects for bilateral relations.  The large 
constituency supporting progress in relations with India 
was not being heard.  Pakistan was now taking the 
initiative against the extremist threat.  The United 
States could help by sharing threat information in a 
timely manner. 
 
¶11. (C) The Secretary responded that Pakistan needed to 
be explicit in not allowing terrorists to determine the 
course of its relationship with India.  There was 
popular support for Pakistan's efforts to fight 
extremism and normalize the relationship, but the 
message was not being reflected in the media.  The 
Secretary told FM Qureshi that his message needed to get 
out, particularly in India, as there needed to be a 
concerted outreach effort to get moderate Pakistani and 
Indian commentators to talk about the benefits that 
would flow from normalization.  More contact between 
civilian and military security forces and better 
intelligence sharing with India would build trust and 
demonstrate Pakistan's commitment to working with India. 
She committed to carrying the message to India about 
more intelligence and security cooperation. 
 
 
 
----------- 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
¶12. (C) FM Qureshi thought Afghanistan was moving in a 
positive direction.  Pakistan was closely monitoring the 
run-up to elections and hoped that results would reflect 
the will of the people.  Pakistan was willing to launch 
the next round of the Cross-Border Jirga peace process 
and was moving forward with the transit trade agreement. 
 
¶13. (C) The Secretary said the United States also hoped 
that the election outcome would reflect the will of the 
Afghan people, but was committed to working with the 
elected government.  She thanked Qureshi for his 
cooperation on the transit trade agreement.  Cross 
border trade was in everyone's interests and providing 
livelihoods was one of the best weapons against 
extremism.  While in India, the Secretary said she had 
urged the Indian government to be transparent in its 
work in Afghanistan.  India's interest was in preventing 
Afghanistan from becoming a failed state, not in 
undermining Pakistan.  It would be useful if India and 
Pakistan could find ways to work together to prevent 
Afghanistan from failing. 
CLINTON