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C O N F I D E N T I A L PARTO 000012 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2019 
TAGS: OVIP CLINTON HILLARY PREL JA KN CH
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's July 22, 2009 
Conversation with Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi 
Nakasone 
 
¶1.  (U)  Classified by:  Paul Wohlers, Deputy Executive 
Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. Reason 1.4.(d) 
 
¶2.  (U)  July 22, 2009; 3:10 PM Phuket, Thailand 
 
¶3.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
The Secretary 
EAP Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell 
NSC Senior Director Jeff Bader 
Deputy Chief of Staff Jacob Sullivan 
Ambassador Sung Kim 
Lieutenant General Paul Selva 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Robert Scher 
Nejdat Mulla(Embassy Notetaker) 
 
JAPAN 
Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone 
Deputy Vice-Minister Bessho Koro 
Press Secretary Kodama Kazua 
Director General Saiki Akitaka 
Director General Umemoto Kazuyoshi 
Director General Inomata Hiroshi 
Director Yoshida Tomoyuki 
Private Secretary to Foreign Minister Takizaki Shigeki 
 
¶4. (C)In a bilateral meeting on July 22 at the ASEAN 
Regional Forum in Phuket, Thailand, the Secretary and 
Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone discussed a 
broad range of issues relating to the U.S. { Japan 
bilateral security relationship.  The Secretary told FM 
Nakasone that U.S. security commitments to Japan were 
unwavering and that the United States was committed to 
working closely with Japan on the range of global 
security issues, and particularly on the irreversible 
denuclearization of North Korea.  Nakasone echoed the 
affirmation of the security relationship; both sides 
agreed to continuing close multilateral cooperation on 
North Korea.  Nakasone said recently passed United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 should be given 
time to have an effect on the DPRK, and expressed 
concern about recent North Korean overtures for 
Ambassador Bosworth to travel there.  He requested the 
United States consult with Japan and South Korea about 
North Korean issues before approaching China and Russia. 
On other issues, Nakasone said Japan was concerned about 
the opaque nature of China's military spending, and 
stood ready to assist with establishing a dialogue 
between the United States and Burma or Iran.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
Bilateral Commitment Unwavering 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The Secretary told FM Nakasone that U.S. security 
commitments to Japan were unwavering and that the United 
States is committed to working closely with Japan on a 
range of global security issues, and particularly the 
irreversible denuclearization of North Korea.  Nakasone 
said Japan looked forward to continuing our strong 
alliance "in a multilateral fashion" and appreciated the 
proposal for a presidential visit. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
-- 
North Korea:  Continued Cooperation and Close 
Consultation 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
-- 
 
¶6. (C) The Secretary expressed appreciation for Japan's 
response in the United Nations to North Korea's missile 
launch, and support for UNSCR 1874. She underscored the 
importance of working closely to respond to North Korean 
provocations, and said the United States would not be 
provoked.   She urged Japan to continue to work with 
China towards a concrete strategy for a denuclearized 
North Korea. 
 
¶7. (C)FM Nakasone advocated putting real pressure on the 
DPRK regime, while allowing UNSCR 1874 time to have an 
effect.  He expressed concern regarding a North Korean 
invitation to Ambassador Bosworth to travel to North 
Korea and said such a visit would be premature before 
1874 sanctions had some effect.  It was important to 
proceed cautiously and consult with Japan and South 
Korea before moving forward on any decision about 
engaging North Korea bilaterally.  Such a visit would 
undercut the collective will to allow the sanctions to 
put real pressure on the regime.  External cooperation 
must be visible to dissuade North Korea from taking 
escalatory steps; the United States, Japan, and South 
Korea must work together to set the pace for 
reengagement.  Although Five Party consultations are one 
way to move forward, they must be conducted in a way 
that would be conducive to re-starting Six Party talks. 
 
¶8. (C)FM Nakasone said the Six Party talks needed a new 
approach.  Japan would no longer make "double payments" 
nor let North Korea use "salami tactics" to slice-up 
proposals and incentives.  Any new approach must 
convince North Korea of the necessity of taking 
verifiable, irreversible action to denuclearize.  Japan 
wanted close coordination between the United States, 
Japan, and South Korea prior to consultations with China 
or Russia.  He also underscored, however, the important 
role China can play in modifying North Korean behavior. 
Japan would like to have regular bilateral discussions 
on China's role in this issue.  He had spoken earlier to 
Chinese FM Yang regarding the future of the Six Party 
talks and the need to be cautious with China's military 
engagement with North Korea.  Nakasone said he was 
concerned that Thailand's move to introduce North Korean 
language for the Chair's statement would undermine a 
robust ARF message. 
 
¶9. (C) The Secretary emphasized we must do all we can to 
enforce UNSC 1874 and find specific ways to impose 
consequences; the United States had established a 
specific unit to coordinate our efforts.  The United 
States intended to continue close consultations with 
Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia and avoid double 
payments or "salami tactics."  China's role was 
critical, and five party talks were relevant to get 
North Korea back to Six Party talks about permanent, 
irreversible denuclearization.  The Secretary praised 
Japan's work on contingency planning for North Korea. 
 
-------------- 
Engaging Burma 
-------------- 
 
¶10. (C) The Secretary expressed appreciation for Japan's 
assistance and support on Burma.  The United States was 
primarily concerned with the state of democratic reform 
 
 
 
in the country and its growing relationship with North 
Korea.  The Junta continued to pursue advanced and 
offensive weapons; the possibility that North Korea 
might transfer nuclear technology to Burma was real.  It 
was critical for the regime to release Aung San Suu Kyi 
(ASSK), as such a move would open up real opportunities 
for engagement with the United States, including 
investment. 
 
¶11. (C) FM Nakasone said Japan was disturbed by the 
legal action against ASSK.  Japan had placed a high 
value on the visit by UNSYG Ban to Burma and was 
dismayed when the regime would not allow him to meet 
ASSK.  Nakasone had told his Burmese counterpart that he 
should seriously consider the U.S. offer for dialogue. 
 
------------------------------- 
China:  Need for More Transparency 
------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Japan was concerned with China's military 
opaqueness and apparent interest in expanding its 
influence eastward to the sea, and China's nuclear 
disclosures, Nakasone stressed.  The Secretary agreed on 
the need for more transparency in China's defense 
spending and planning.  The United States hoped to move 
forward with a U.S.-Japan-Chinese trilateral at the 
policy planning level; we must continue to include China 
in a multilateral dialogue to ensure its peaceful rise, 
but we need to see more transparency as well. 
 
---- 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶13. (C) Iran's continued violation of international 
nuclear obligations concerned the United States.  The 
Secretary asked FM Nakasone to convey to Iran that it 
had an opportunity it could not miss, and raised 
Japanese export credits.  The FM replied that while the 
post- election situation in Iran was deplorable, Japan 
planned to make the most of its unique position by 
maintaining a high level dialogue with the regime while 
taking into account U.S. and EU initiatives and concerns 
on the nuclear issue.  Iran must take measures to 
address uranium enrichment activities.  Nakasone had 
encouraged Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to 
engage the United States.  Japan was prepared to assist 
in laying down the foundations for a dialogue.  Nakasone 
asserted that Japanese export credits were decreasing 
and were not larger than those issued by European 
countries. 
 
----------------------------- 
Other Issues: India and Russia 
------------------------------ 
 
¶14. (C) Nakasone said the United States and Japan needed 
to continue strengthening relationships with India. 
Japan held a strategic dialogue with India earlier in 
July.  Japan also would like to hold a conference for 
intellectuals from Japan, Russia, and the United States 
on security in the Asia Pacific region; he requested 
U.S. support for the conference, as well as for Japan's 
efforts to deal with its territorial dispute with 
Russia. 
CLINTON