VZCZCXRO2965
PP RUEHPA RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNK #0503/01 2150817
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030817Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8677
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0729
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0805
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2335
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1158
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0181
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1252

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 NOUAKCHOTT 000503 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2014 
TAGS: PREL EAID MASS ASEC PTER AMGT MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA -- ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY WITH THE AZIZ 
GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: NOUAKCHOTT 496 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for Reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
¶1.  (C) New Environment Needs New Strategy:  Mission Country 
Team (including visiting Rabat-based LEGAT) held an off-site 
July 27 to consider revisions of the Mission Strategic Plan 
in light of the July 18 election of President-elect Mohamed 
Ould Abdel Aziz and the June 23 killing of Christopher 
Leggett -- the first American victim of AQIM terrorism in the 
region.  The Ambassador briefed the Country Team on his 
meeting with President-Elect Aziz of July 26 (REFTEL) where 
Aziz said all the right things about being a president for 
all Mauritanians and paying attention to the many challenges 
facing the country rather than picking fights with the 
opposition.  Aziz said he looked forward to close cooperation 
with the U.S. on counterterrorism but also hoped to engage 
the U.S. in all areas of bilateral cooperation.  The 
Ambassador told the Country Team that, while Mauritania will 
not be able to regain the reputation as a "model of democracy 
for Africa and the Arab world" that the Abdallahi Government 
had enjoyed, there were good prospects to rebuild a normal 
relationship with Mauritania. 
 
¶2.  (C) New Assumptions:  Before discussing how to engage the 
new government, the Country Team took stock of changes in the 
environment that will affect our ability to do business. 
 
On the Positive Side: 
 
--  CT Commitment:  Having seen the Mauritanian response to 
the Christopher Leggett murder, we are convinced of the depth 
of Mauritanian commitment as a partner against terrorism. 
President-Elect Aziz told the Ambassador he is ready to "open 
the floodgates" in terms of security cooperation.  New 
relationships forged with the police, Attorney General, and 
Ministry of Justice open new areas of vital CT cooperation in 
the judicial and police field where Mauritania is weakest. 
 
-- Good Will:  The principled position held by the U.S. has 
gained the U.S. the admiration of those Mauritanians who 
fought the coup and perhaps the respect even of those who 
supported the coup.  That, coupled with the region-wide boost 
in the U.S. image driven by President Obama's election and 
new policies for Africa and the Arab World, provides the 
opportunity to cultivate a Mauritanian public that is well 
disposed to the U.S.  Beyond the general interest in having a 
positive U.S. image, this shift in public sentiment has a 
direct impact on our counter-extremism efforts and, 
ultimately, on embassy security. 
 
-- Better Contacts:  The past year has significantly 
increased the breadth of Mission contacts as the Mission 
worked hard to monitor the political crisis with all parts of 
Mauritanian society.  Our political contacts at the level of 
parties but also in the parliament have greatly expanded as 
have contacts with media and civil society.  The depth of 
many of these contacts, especially with those who were 
opposed to the coup, has also increased as we built an 
effective international/domestic pro-democracy partnership 
that forced our Mauritanian partners to go well beyond 
superficial diplomatically nice talk. 
 
-- Better Mission Base:  The Mission is better prepared for 
an expansion of our engagement than we were following the 
2007 elections.  Additional American positions have been 
created and staffed in all our reporting offices that will 
allow us to handle increased programs in Mauritania while 
maintaining reporting contacts.  Our LES ICASS base has also 
increased compared to 2007. 
 
-- More Sophisticated Partners:  The past year has 
significantly increased the professionalism and effectiveness 
of political parties.  Important institutions such as the 
Constitutional Council and the Independent National Electoral 
Commission have played well their important constitutional 
role.  Cybermedia has grown in impact and sophistication. 
 
-- Stronger Donor Liaison:  The continual meetings between 
European embassies, the UN, EU and the U.S. embassy followed 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000503  002 OF 006 
 
 
by the more formal International Contact Group (ICG) have 
built a greater degree of discussion and coordination between 
main donor countries.  A similar level of coordination took 
place during the 2005-2007 political transition but fell away 
following Abdallahi's election.  As the Dakar Accord speaks 
of continued ICG engagement with the new government, it will 
be important to keep our partners meeting with us and we, as 
a group, meeting with the Aziz government. 
 
On The Negative Side: 
 
-- Weakened Economy:  No matter who had won July 18, the 
stark economic realities would have been the same.  The 
government coffers are assumed to be empty, hard currency 
remains scarce, investor interest in petroleum and minerals 
is reduced somewhat by lower world prices and increased 
political and security risk in Mauritania, and the value of 
Mauritania's exports is low.  Under the best of 
circumstances, Mauritania will have three lost years in terms 
of international development assistance -- the year Abdallahi 
spent negotiating development programs, the year of the coup, 
and now another year for Aziz to (re)negotiate agreements. 
 
-- Less "Benefit of the Doubt":  While Mauritania has passed 
the technical steps to once again be considered to have a 
democratically elected government, nobody is likely to 
embrace the Aziz government with the same hope and enthusiasm 
as Abdallahi.  Where Abdallahi's government may have enjoyed 
a softening of criteria for some development programs (like 
the MCC threshold program) for heading in the right 
direction, we expect the Aziz government will be held to 
strict criteria. 
 
-- Damaged Opposition: The electoral loss comes as a blow to 
the opposition parties that had successfully built and 
sustained a remarkable political coalition during the coup. 
Whether from an internal unraveling or due to harassment by 
the new government and Aziz' majority party, that coalition 
runs the risk of collapse.  Such a collapse would promote 
negative tendencies in the new government. 
 
-- Increased Terrorist Risk:  The past year has increased 
both push and pull factors that have strengthened Al Qaeda in 
Mauritania.  Economic stagnation and undemocratic governance 
have added to the factors that convince some young 
Mauritanians to join AQIM.  A number of successful (from 
their perspective) AQIM operations have increased the street 
credibility and drawing power of this northwest African 
franchise of Al Qaeda, even as multiple ransom payments have 
increased AQIM's financial ability to conduct operations in 
the region. 
 
-- Reduced Stability:  The economic challenges alone ensure 
that Aziz will not be able to meet his multiple campaign 
promises.  We anticipate financial shortages, currency rate 
changes, and inflation will make life more difficult for 
average Mauritanians leading to the risk of food riots as 
seen in September-October 2007.  With an opposition keen to 
highlight every misstep, Aziz will face criticism no matter 
how well intentioned his efforts.  Should he simultaneous 
re-arrange the security apparatus, he may find some other 
general or colonel thinking he could do better. 
 
-- Diplomatic Rivalries:  After their tacit (and 
not-so-tacit) support for Aziz over the past year, European 
bilateral partners (especially the French) may challenge U.S. 
re-engagement with Mauritania.  Though they may see 
otherwise, this is clearly not a competition.  We have no 
trade interests here -- we were never able to generate 
serious U.S. business interest during the Abdallahi period. 
If the French were prepared to do everything needed to ensure 
Mauritanian counterterrorism capacity, we would likely say 
"you're welcome to it."  But we don't see the French having 
the resources or desire to do much more than embed with the 
Mauritanians -- giving them access and influence -- but not 
doing much to build capacity. 
 
¶3.  (C) Reporting Priorities:  With a fragile democracy that 
must demonstrate its commitment to civil liberties within a 
changing security environment, the Mission will need to 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000503  003 OF 006 
 
 
maintain a significant level of reporting contacts.  We see 
our main priorities as: 
 
-- Political Stability:  This encompasses a wide range of 
issues including (a) building an understanding of the inner 
dynamics of the military and security hierarchy, (b) 
monitoring alliances and tensions within and between the main 
political groups, and (c) monitoring alliances and tensions 
between tribal, ethnic and regional groups.  Reporting on 
parties is relatively easy while getting a clear picture of 
High Command or tribal dynamics is challenging. 
 
-- Economics:  As an early warning device for political and 
social unrest or for pending humanitarian emergencies, we 
will need to monitor economic trends carefully recognizing 
that official data may be intentionally altered to hide 
problems.  We will also look for the expansion of negative 
trends in corruption as well as indicators of narcotics money. 
 
-- Regional Dynamics:  Any trend towards instability in 
Mauritania will be of keen interest to neighbors Morocco, 
Algeria, and Senegal with the two countries to the north 
having the ability to influence domestic affairs.  The 
possible development of a relationship with Iran will be of 
importance to us and is likely to affect both internal 
politics as well as relations with Morocco, Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf States.  The possibility of greater 
counterterrorism cooperation between Mauritania and Algeria, 
Mali, and Niger will be of keen interest.  The evolution of 
policy relative to Israel will continue to have international 
as well as domestic interest.  As many of these issues have a 
North African and Middle East focus, Post will increase its 
emphasis on diplomats from those regions. 
 
-- Abuses:  The new government will be judged by many in the 
West on its performance in preserving and improving human 
rights.  We will be particularly concerned about respect for 
political and press freedoms.  Given Mauritania's slide into 
Tier III TIP status, reporting on slavery, trafficking, and 
child abuse will have a priority. 
 
-- Security:  We will, of course, closely follow Al Qaeda 
activities in Mauritania as well as the government's response 
to the AQIM threat.  Reporting will also look at social 
issues and public awareness related to extremism. 
 
------------------ 
PROGRAM PRIORITIES 
------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Counterterrorism (Hard):  The June 23 killing of 
AQIM's first American victim in the region coupled with 
increased AQIM capacity for operations here and elsewhere in 
the region makes "hard" counterterrorism cooperation our 
first priority and the area where we expect to have a great 
deal of access with the new Aziz government.  Looking out at 
a six month timeframe, we would hope to accomplish the 
following: 
 
-- Mauritanian Strategy:  We will engage the new government 
to ascertain the status of the comprehensive "Hard" and 
"Soft" CT strategies that were in development prior to the 
coup. 
 
-- Agreement on military needs:  We will first want to assess 
the current capabilities and needs of Mauritania's three 
military counterterrorism units as well as other related 
units (the parachutists and camel battalions) with a view of 
renewing training and equip with, at least, the former GLATR 
and FUMA units in FY-10.  In principle, we would be open to 
5-7 JCETS and possibly the creation of two JPATs in FY-10. 
 
-- Discussion on Police and Judicial cooperation:  We would 
like to start a dialogue with the new government to see areas 
of greatest common concern.  The need for increased forensics 
capability as well as training in defusing IEDs was clearly 
demonstrated in our liaison with the Mauritanians following 
the Leggett killing.  Over the long-term, we would like to 
see Mauritania actively participate in a new regionally-based 
ILEA academy as well as FBI advanced training courses. 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000503  004 OF 006 
 
 
 
-- Staffing SOFLE Programs:  We will again be able to fully 
staff the SOFLE, CMSE and MIST offices to build upon programs 
already underway and prepare for new mil-to-mil engagement. 
Resolving questions of SOFLE LES personnel requirements (we 
need them to get some local staff of their own), temporary 
CAA space, and delinquent/discontinued ICASS payments will be 
needed before any JCETs commence. 
 
-- Creeksand:  We will want to have Creeksand complete its 
familiarization of local air bases where it may be needed to 
conduct operations in support of the Mauritanians.  Depending 
on AFRICOM determination of regional operating priorities, 
Mission would be open to renewed non-emergency operations in 
Mauritania. 
 
-- French Deconfliction:  Whether done bilaterally in 
capitals, as part of the P3 security assistance review 
scheduled for September or October, or done locally, we will 
want to have a comprehensive review of counterterrorism 
programs with the French to ensure we neither get into an 
unproductive competition or leave key assistance areas 
uncovered.  We would look for Department guidance on the best 
route for these consultations but caution that we should not 
let our own engagement strategy get to far advanced without 
that consultation. 
 
-- Counter-narcotics Engagement Decision:  We are aware of 
the growing significance of narcotics trafficking through 
Mauritania and the region.  While the U.S. is not generally 
seen as a destination for these drugs, the trade itself poses 
a risk in terms of money paid to AQIM by traffickers and the 
potential for internal corruption of Mauritanian civil, 
security and judicial authorities by narco-traffickers. 
While all reporting offices in Nouakchott have reported on 
the drug trade, we do not have a program response.  We 
understand that AFRICOM is looking at a regional program and 
DEA is also interested in increasing its attention to west 
African trade; however, we look to Washington to decide 
whether this is an area we are prepared to put personnel and 
program money against. 
 
¶5.  (C) Counterterrorism (Soft):  While the "hard" threat 
posed by AQIM forces operating out of Mali poses the greatest 
immediate risk for the Mission and Mauritania, the gradual 
internal radicalization of Mauritanian society remains the 
greater long-term threat to U.S. interests.  We are serious 
when we speak about Mauritania's form of Islam as being 
peaceful and moderate.  The vast majority of Mauritanians 
abhor the terrorism they have seen in their country and are 
horrified to see radicalization take root in their country. 
That said, we are seeing some young Mauritanians drawn to Al 
Qaeda.  Our six-month goals: 
 
-- Reactivate USAID Counter-extremism Program:  We were 
making excellent inroads prior to the coup in creating an 
anti-extremism program with key ministries, moderate Islamic 
leaders, other donor partners, and civil society for programs 
that would start to address the root causes of extremism and 
to bolster the positive elements of Mauritanian society. 
While the USAID funding itself was modest relative to the 
task, USAID's presence had a catalyst effect in driving the 
discussion with Mauritanians and international partners.  The 
DOD MIST team has been able to advance some of this program 
during the coup with a pilot program in Aleg, but we see 
limitations on taking this to a national level or working 
with the GIRM without USAID. 
 
-- National Strategy:  As we engage on a "hard" CT strategy, 
we will also want to engage the new government on their 
"soft" strategy.  Many of the concepts of our own USAID 
program were mirrored in a draft strategy developed during 
the Abdallahi administration -- with key elements concerning 
the drivers of extremism coming from Mauritania's security 
services.  We will need to see how great a priority an Aziz 
government will give to this area of counterterrorism and how 
comfortable they will be working with the U.S.  As before the 
coup, we will be keen in assisting the Mauritanians develop 
their strategy.  The MIST program would be well placed to 
support public information aspects of such a strategy. 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000503  005 OF 006 
 
 
 
-- Country Specific TSCTP Conference:  We would welcome an 
August Mauritania TSCTP conference in Nouakchott in August 
or, at the latest, early September to develop a coordinated 
"hard" and "soft" strategy.  We would like the conference to 
include State AF/RSA, INL and S/CT as well as USAID, AFRICOM, 
LEGAT and possibly DHS and Coast Guard. 
 
¶6.  (C) Democratization:  We cannot expect Mauritania to 
serve as the example of emerging democracies we had seen 
after President Abdallahi's election.  Over the next year or 
so, our goal is to promote a stable government that respects 
its own law and constitution that pursues a positive social 
and economic agenda while maintaining a constructive 
relationship with opposition parties.  Support for this goal 
will drive much of our reporting and contact work.  Our six 
month programming goal: 
 
-- Implement the FY-09 program submitted to the Department 
and USAID July 23 for an NDI and NEDWA collaboration to 
support grass-roots civic education, the National Assembly, 
and press professionalization. 
 
-- Develop an FY-10 program to support fragile institutions 
including capacity training for civil society, support of the 
Association of Mayors, and development of partnerships 
between the Constitutional Council as the National 
Independent Electoral Commission with U.S. and good regional 
counterparts. 
 
-- We would like to develop a strategy to expand ties to the 
future leaders of Mauritania.  Part of this would include 
expansion of language training programs at the National 
Administration School (where all mid-level and senior-level 
civil servants are trained) as well as new programs at the 
National Military Academy, Command and General Staff School, 
and Police Academy.  English language skills are in dire 
demand across the Mauritania government.  English courses 
allow interaction with future leaders and, through guest 
speakers and instructional materials, offers the opportunity 
to stimulate democratic discussion. 
 
¶7.  (C) Human Rights:  Mauritania continues to slide against 
key human rights criteria making the promotion of viable 
development less credible and creating the conditions that 
promote extremism.  Mission goals: 
 
-- Slavery Framework:  We hope to work with the new 
government to develop an ambitious but achievable strategy 
allowing Mauritania to address the vestiges of slavery still 
present in the country including child servitude.  The 
strategy would also need to address newer trafficking issues 
that have arisen over the past year including the export of 
child brides to Gulf states.  We will also seek Department 
programming resources aimed at reinforcing Mauritania 
enforcement of existing legal structures and forging greater 
trust and cooperation between anti-slavery advocates and the 
Mauritanian authorities charged with the problem/ 
 
-- Refugee Assistance:  We expect the repatriation of 
refugees from Senegal to Mauritania to be completed within a 
short period.  Reintegration of those refugees remains a 
significant challenge.  We will welcome a visit by PRM to 
develop an engagement strategy with the GIRM and our partners. 
 
-- Human Rights Monitoring:  We will develop a proposal to 
increase the professional capacity of local human rights 
organizations and interested media to identify and document 
human rights abuses to a level that meets legal requirements. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Public Diplomacy: Post will be opening its first 
public access Information Resource Center in October 2009. 
PD is hiring an additional staff member who will direct this 
IRC as well as the outreach in posts existing American 
Corners in Nouakchott and help with the opening of another in 
the interior of the country. PDQ,s outreach will extend to 
contacts it could not reach post-coup and will continue to 
work with journalists, alumni and cultural contacts to 
forward missionQ,s priority goals.  The new on-embassy public 
access space will increase outreach to key audiences and 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000503  006 OF 006 
 
 
provide a platform from which to disseminate information on 
democracy, human rights and counter-extremism.  Given that 
the assumption among Mauritanians had been one of lack of 
activity on the part of the US Embassy in Mauritania, post 
intends to combat this misperception highlighting all of the 
activities since August 2008 including visiting speakers and 
cultural events, book donations, humanitarian aid to refugees 
and journalist training. 
 
 
¶9.  (C)  Development and Humanitarian Assistance:  We expect 
humanitarian assistance priorities to remain high over the 
coming year both because of the habitual natural impact of 
desertification but because of anticipated financial 
difficulties for the new government that may lead to severe 
shortages of food in urban areas -- or at least of food 
Mauritanian poor can afford.  We expect the next year to 
focus on the creation and negotiation of new development 
assistance projects with donors.  Mission goals: 
 
-- Proceed on OFDA and FFP staffing proposals for Mauritania. 
 
-- Review USAID expansion plan for Africa to consider 
bilateral mission in Mauritania starting in FY-10 focused not 
only of humanitarian programs but also on democracy and good 
governance initiatives. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Resource Management:  Our 2007-2008 experience 
provides lessons learned on the challenges of rapid program 
expansion.  The year of the coup allowed the Mission to build 
its personnel base to avoid the "flooding of the engine" we 
encountered before, but we will remain keenly aware of the 
risks of taking on more programs than we have staff and 
facilities to support.  The new political and security 
environment raise quality of life issues we will want to 
address as well.  Mission Goals: 
 
-- New Rightsizing exercise:  We expect to revive our efforts 
to obtain property for an NEC (or gain permission for our 
preferred option of building the NEC on our existing 
compound) in the coming months.  As a part of that effort, we 
are reviewing our Rightsizing data to ensure that the NEC 
reflects the increased counterterrorism reporting and 
operations activities as well as long-term USAID presence. 
 
-- School:  We will gauge the new government to determine 
whether this is the time to seek a bilateral school agreement 
that will give the American school a more secure legal and 
tax status in Mauritania.  Avoiding any problems in this 
regard is key to the schools survival and has significant 
impact on our ability to recruit American staff. 
 
 
BOULWARE