VZCZCXRO3042
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMS #0823/01 2150954
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 030955Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0658
INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000823 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/08/03 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR MU
SUBJECT: OMAN - IRAN: WITHER THE SULTAN 
 
REF: A. MUSCAT 633; B. MUSCAT 737; C. MUSCAT 637; D. MUSCAT 761 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: L. Victor Hurtado, CDA, Department of State, Embassy 
Muscat; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
1.(S) Summary:  After days of conflicting speculation, the Sultan's 
previously announced, then deferred, visit to Iran is now under 
way.  Several scenarios, each with a fact or two attached, had 
circulated, but Tehran is the primary destination with the 
possibility of additional travel.  The Sultan's visit, in tandem 
with a large, high-level, and varied entourage, will be spun 
locally to enhance Oman's role as a neutral regional player seeking 
stability.  End summary. 
 
 
 
2.2.(S) The Sultan's visit to Iran was originally scheduled to take 
place June 28-30 (Ref A), soon after the Islamic Republic's 
elections.  The trip would in any case have been a challenge, not 
least because it would be the Sultan's first since a state visit to 
his ally the Shah in 1974, but even more because of the perceived 
imperative of protecting the monarchy from any hint of controversy. 
Post-election events in Tehran have significantly compounded this 
conundrum, leaving the court the unenviable choice of offending the 
Iranians by cancelling outright or (possibly worse given the 
Sultan's carefully maintained low international profile) of making 
news by being one of the first heads of state to visit a 
post-election Tehran in turmoil. 
 
 
 
3.3.(S) To date, the announced visit has officially only been 
postponed (Ref B) - although the postponement has been made public 
only via leaks by "official sources" to Gulf and Iranian media and 
not mentioned locally.  A reliable Omani government official told 
Charge' on August 2 that the Sultan would "travel" later the same 
day, and a senior officer of the Royal Yacht Squadron confirmed 
that the Sultan's primary destination is Iran.  Al-Sharq al-Awsat 
reported on August 3 that Qaboos would begin an official three-day 
visit to Iran on Tuesday. 
 
 
 
4.4.(S) In any case, the Sultan's travels are now under way.  The 
court, always discreet about the monarch's whereabouts, may wait 
several days before formally announcing his departure, and even 
then may give few details about his plans.  Nonetheless, the signs 
are clear:  The royal yacht left its usual berth late Thursday, 
July 30; a contact associated with the royal flight has said he 
will be "traveling with the boss"; in a possibly related support 
operation, observers reported vehicles of the Royal Court crossing 
into the United Arab Emirates on Saturday, August 1. 
 
 
 
5.5.(S) A likely scenario could see the Sultan travel to the UAE 
and from there depart via the royal yacht to the Iranian port of 
Bandar Abbas, followed by inland travel on the royal flight.  If he 
departed as reported to us on the evening of Monday, August 2, and 
travels by boat, he could easily be in Bandar Abbas as early as 
Tuesday morning, August 4. 
 
 
 
6.6.(S) In June, the court issued a statement that the Sultan's 
three-day visit would combine an official call on Ahmadinejad in 
Tehran with a private tour (Ref C); other senior officials, 
including the Supreme Leader, will likely also figure on the 
schedule.  Contacts indicate that the private tour will feature a 
stop in the historical cultural center of Isfahan, in line with the 
Sultan's strong interest in both history and the visual arts. 
 
 
 
7.7.(C) Previously announced as accompanying the Sultan was a very 
large retinue of senior officials including his chief of staff, 
national security advisor, the Minister Responsible for Foreign 
Affairs (who visited Iran in July, presumably in connection with 
this visit), the Minister of National Economy, the Advisor for 
Cultural Affairs (long the court's principal connection to Tehran, 
but also in expectation of possible Iranian cultural assistance), 
The Minister of Health (with local chatter focusing on the possible 
role Iranian professionals might play in addressing Oman's medical 
deficiencies), the Minister of Commerce and Industry, The Chief 
Inspector of Police and Customs (to sign any so-called "security" 
agreement), and the Minister of Oil and Gas.  Surrounding the 
 
MUSCAT 00000823  002 OF 002 
 
 
Sultan with an entourage of this magnitude has the effect of 
lessening the impact of his personal presence and of focusing the 
outcomes of the visit on the various ministries involved rather 
than Qaboos personally. 
 
 
 
8.8.(S) COMMENT: Whatever is stated publicly about this visit, it 
will provide an opportunity for the Sultan to reinforce privately 
and directly with the Iranian leadership Oman's highest 
foreign-affairs priority, regional stability, giving him a chance 
to personally restate the message laid out by his Advisor for 
Cultural Affairs in his extremely rare mid-July (Ref D) interview 
that Iran "should clearly seize the approaches of the new U.S. 
Administration and respond positively to these policies."  At the 
same time, Oman has also made clear that it does not desire or seek 
an intermediary role. 
 
 
 
9.9.(S) COMMENT continued:  Other outcomes of the visit address 
smuggling, energy, and cultural issues.  What has been reported in 
the Iranian and international press as a "Security Cooperation 
Agreement" between Oman and Iran is in reality meant to help Oman 
to protect its borders by combating coastal smuggling and illegal 
immigration.  This agreement, along with assistance on 
cultural/heritage issues and progress in getting much-needed 
natural gas (essential if the Sultanate's ambitious 
industrialization and diversification plans are to continue on 
schedule) from the Iranians, seem to be the primary public results 
sought by Oman in proceeding with what must be to Qaboos personally 
(given both his longtime friendship with the exiled Pahlavis and 
his personal abhorrence of publicity) a difficult visit. 
 
 
 
1010.(S) COMMENT continued:  Whatever the Sultan's travel plans, it 
is unlikely he will attend any of the festivities related to 
Ahmedinijad's inauguration.  Absent the presence of other heads of 
state or senior Arab or European royalty, the reticent Qaboos would 
be loathe to feature in Iranian publicity as a high-profile 
presence at such events.  Arriving after the inauguration would 
also provide the Sultan a fig leaf of cover that the post-election 
period of turmoil is over.  More likely is the hope that by 
arriving in the shadow of the inauguration, he will be able to 
carry off a visit that, whatever hay Tehran may make of it, can be 
noted, but minimized, for local consumption in the context of 
maintaining friendly relations with all of Oman's neighbors and 
enhancing regional stability. END COMMENT. 
HURTADO