VZCZCXRO1071
RR RUEHAST RUEHDH RUEHHM RUEHLN RUEHMA RUEHPB RUEHPOD RUEHSL RUEHTM
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHMO #2199/01 2380537
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 260537Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4631
INFO RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 3680
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 3327
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RHMFIUU/DTRA CT WASHINGTON DC
RUEAEPA/HQ EPA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002199 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR USAID, OES/IHB, EUR/RUS, ISN/CTR 
HHS FOR OGHA 
HHS PLEASE PASS TO NIH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO SOCI SCUL TSPL TNGD PREL PARM EAID OSCI RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA DECLINES USG REQUEST TO EXTEND JOINT SMALLPOX 
RESEARCH THROUGH ISTC 
 
REF: A. 08 Moscow 1420 
 ¶B. State 18854 
 
MOSCOW 00002199  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On August 12, Russian federal authorities informed 
the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) that the 
government will not support resumption of three U.S.-funded smallpox 
projects at the Vector Center for Virology and Biotechnology near 
Novosibirsk.  In a curt letter, Russia's chief medical officer 
notified ISTC that the Russian government already has sufficient 
funding for smallpox research.  Although this puts an end to two 
years of USG efforts to convince the Russian government to resume 
USG-supported smallpox research at Vector through ISTC, there are 
signs that Vector might be allowed to work with international 
scientists on certain projects under certain conditions.  Although 
the Russian government is clearly sensitive about U.S. cooperation 
with Vector on smallpox and other issues, the USG should consider 
whether and how it wants to continue a dialogue with the GOR on 
joint work on smallpox, with or without access to Vector.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On August 12, ISTC received notification via a sharply 
worded letter from Dr. Gennadiy Onishchenko, Chief of the Russian 
Federal Service for Consumer Protection and Human Welfare 
(Rospotrebnadzor), that USG-funded support for orthopoxvirus 
research at the high-security Vector Center for Virology and 
Biotechnology near Novosibirsk is no longer required.  (Note: Vector 
is the only Russian facility with declared smallpox samples.  End 
note.)  Onishchenko's letter, dated August 4, came in response to an 
inquiry from State Duma Deputy Boris Nikonov asking Rospotrebnadzor 
to support amendments to continue and expand the three ISTC smallpox 
projects at Vector.  Onishchenko's letter reminds ISTC that all 
project proposals presented to ISTC require approval of the Russian 
government, which reserves the exclusive prerogative to decide on 
the suitability of those projects for implementation by Russian 
organizations.  The letter concludes that orthopoxvirus research at 
Vector is already adequately funded by the Russian government. 
 
TWO YEARS OF EFFORTS TO EXTEND THREE PROJECTS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The following three joint smallpox projects with funding 
from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and 
Department of Defense began at Vector in 2001: 
 
-- "Conservation of Genetic Material and Study of Genomic Structure 
of Different Variola Virus Strains"; 
 
-- "Combinatorial Antibody Libraries to Orthopoxviruses"; and 
 
-- "Search for Antivirals for Treating and Prevention of 
Orthopoxviral Infections, Including Smallpox." 
 
In 2007, the U.S. proposed extending the projects to build upon the 
completed research and expand cooperation.  Former HHS Secretary 
Leavitt raised the request in several letters to Russian Ministers 
of Health, and senior U.S. officials brought up the subject in 
discussions with Russian health officials.  In late 2007, the 
Russian side indicated vaguely that the first two projects would be 
restarted, while the antivirals project would require additional 
review and changes.  Dr. Onishchenko made a similar statement to a 
senior HHS delegation in May 2008 (ref A), but without giving a date 
for resumption of the projects.  Vector's Director, Dr. Ilya 
Drozdov, told HHS DAS Gerald Parker in February 2009 that he was not 
aware of the reasons behind the delay in approval, but he noted that 
the GOR was providing significant funding for smallpox research and 
was considering building a new facility for it (ref B).  Drozdov 
told us that the funding came from the Federal Targeted Program on 
Chemical and Biological Safety, approved in October 2008. 
 
THE NAGGING ISSUE OF ACCESS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The stipulation that U.S. government personnel have 
periodic physical access to Vector probably contributed to 
Onishchenko's decision to refuse extending the three smallpox 
 
MOSCOW 00002199  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
projects.  In recent years, U.S. project partners have only rarely 
received access to Vector's facilities.  Under Russian procedures, 
partners must request access at least 60 days in advance, and Dr. 
Onishchenko must approve the requests personally.  With isolated 
exceptions, those requests have been rejected or gone unanswered for 
the past two years.  In a recent example, in April 2009, 
Rospotrebnadzor declined a Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 
request for USG personnel to meet with Vector personnel on site or 
in Moscow to verify that work was completed on a biosafety 
enhancement project.  When U.S. partners counterproposed a 
teleconference with Vector personnel, Vector responded that written 
permission would be required.  Onishchenko in July rejected another 
ISTC proposal for USG-funded biomedical research cooperation between 
Vector and the Tarasevich Institute of Standardization and Control 
of Biomedical Preparations, reportedly declaring, "We don't need any 
more projects with ISTC."  Most recently, a Defense Contract Audit 
Agency delegation canceled a planned August visit to Russia for 
audits of Biotechnology Engagement Program (BTEP)-funded projects at 
Vector and other facilities, because with one week remaining before 
the visit, Rospotrebnadzor had not yet approved access to Vector. 
 
COMMENT: HOW TO CONTINUE SMALLPOX COOPERATION? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5. (SBU) Onischenko's response appears to rule out U.S. 
government-financed collaboration with Russia on smallpox.  We do 
not believe that Onishchenko denied the proposal only because of the 
U.S. origin or ISTC management of the funds.  Rather, Russian 
authorities are wary of any U.S. government cooperation with Vector. 
 So we see little hope for direct U.S. access to Vector and probably 
to other similar facilities controlled by Rospotrebnadzor, such as 
the Center for Applied Microbiology and Biotechnology at Obolensk. 
The decision on joint smallpox research also suggests that the 
Russian government remains unconcerned by the growing chorus of 
voices at the World Health Organization's World Health Assembly 
calling for a WHO resolution to destroy official smallpox 
repositories. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Despite these negative signals, however, there are other 
signs that Onishchenko may allow Vector to collaborate with the 
international scientific community on public health issues of global 
concern.  In June 2009, Vector was designated as a World Health 
Organization (WHO) collaborating center on avian (H5N1) influenza, 
the result of an application filed on Onishchenko's initiative more 
than two years earlier.  If the USG views cooperation on smallpox 
with Russia as still being valuable, even without physical access to 
Vector, and with limited access to its scientists, post believes it 
would be worthwhile to pursue discussions on the subject with the 
GOR. 
 
BEYRLE