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DE RUEHBUL #2161/01 2141655
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O 021655Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0500
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 7680
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3858
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4489
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3762

S E C R E T KABUL 002161 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2029 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: POST-ELECTION COMPACT: CONSULTING KARZAI ADVISORS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary:  Previous message (notal) laid out our action 
plan to develop a compact with the next Afghan administration 
for post-election progress in five key areas of strategic 
interest to the United States and Afghanistan.  The first 
structural engagement occured July 28, with President 
Karzai's most senior advisors: National Security Advisor 
Rasul, Minister of Defense Wardak and Miniser of Interior 
Atmar, Director of National Intelligence Saleh and the 
Director of the Independent Directorate of Local Government 
Popal. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (S) At the outset of our meeting we proposed to Karzai's 
advisors an extended, structured conversation towards 
developing a compact on shared U.S.-Afghan strategic 
interests in five areas: sovereignty, reconciliation and 
amnesty, governance/justice, economic development and 
regional status.  We listened to their responses and their 
preliminary suggestions (see paras 3-7) and then proposed we 
meet again within a week to have further explorations.  They 
agreed.  We are working to ensure that this process reflects 
Afghan buy-in and their own method of ensuring results; we 
have seen many a formal agreement come and go without 
implementation. 
 
¶3. (S) On sovereignty, the team categorically agreed that 
this is key for the political future of the next government 
and for the eventual stability of the nation.  There were 
some conflicting views between the desire to take on 
leadership of security issues and the need to "assure" that 
the U.S. will not desert Afghanistan too soon and leave it to 
the depredations of its neighbors.  One suggested action 
item: reconfirmation of the "Strategic Partnership" that 
walks the fine line between 'permanent bases' which would set 
off other countries, and too abrupt a withdrawal.  They 
suggest a "permanent alliance" formulation. 
 
¶4. (S) On reconciliation and amnesty, given the close 
tracking of the U.S. policy with this group's line, there was 
little variance in their response.  They warned of the risk 
of Afghanistan,s fragmentation and the need for "nation 
building as well as statebuilding."  They held that 
extremists would fill a power vacuum in the south in the 
event of an Abdullah victory.  Wardak opined that 
reconciliation had a "big potential to end the war quickly 
and cheaply."  According to Saleh, Taliban members are simple 
but their masters are sophisticated ) they are counting most 
on the U.S. leaving. 
 
¶5. (S) On governance and justice they accepted that it would 
be hard to convince us that a second Karzai government would 
be different in its approach.  They admitted candidly that 
Karzai is simply "the least bad of the candidates" in his 
ability to govern, even if he has made sordid deals.  MOI 
Atmar defended Karzai,s governance, saying there were both 
good and bad officials in the administration, and the trend 
was positive.  Wardak admitted that "we,ve made lots of 
mistakes" in this area; Saleh and others said that progress 
on governance and real anti-corruption measures would have 
"massive appeal" to Afghans who are sick of the lack of 
accountability.  IDLG wants more tangible power over local 
administrators.  All agreed that benchmarks and audits would 
be useful. 
 
¶6. (S) On economic reconstruction, IDLG Director Popal 
emphasized that ministries need more line authority, 
decision-making powers and direct access to funding ) for 
example, IDLG cannot spend money on what it sees as 
priorities at the same time that millions of dollars of aid 
money is channeled directly by foreign donors.  Our emphasis 
on "Afghanization" of development assistance was much 
applauded; the warning about misuse was well understood. 
Atmar pointed out that despite failures under Karzai's 
leadership there also have been significant successes in 
education, health and building the military.  Speaking 
outside his area of expertise, Atmar also strongly advocated 
a focus on irrigation over all other agriculture projects. 
 
¶7. (S) On the status of Afghanistan in the region, Minister 
Wardak and others want the U.S. to express a permanent 
strategic interest in Afghanistan in order to warn off 
predatory neighbors, and to this end they want a 
re-definition of the Bush Administration,s articulation of a 
"Strategic Partnership."  Saleh warned that the Taliban,s 
war is a total one and we have to stay to defeat them on 
ideological grounds (democracy vs. totalitarian/religious 
extremism) or Muslim extremists will be emboldened throughout 
the Middle East and elsewhere.  The ministers also demanded 
to know more about the US strategy in Pakistan. 
 
¶8. (S) From this team, as could be expected, one of the 
over-arching themes we heard was the need to keep competent 
ministers in place vs. replace them through political 
patronage deals ) which applies equally to a second Karzai 
term or a new President.  The ministers noted that Karzai 
could make political deals that took them from their current 
positions and that they have no personal political power base 
or group that would oppose that outcome, except the United 
States.  One said - rightly - that "we can deliver the 
fastest, most efficient service in any of these areas" of 
bilateral concern. 
 
¶9. (S) We agreed to meet again in the near future, with 
Karzai's team responding to our proposed framework and for us 
to discuss in detail a compact outline for the "sovereignty" 
pillar, with the others to follow.  Meanwhile, my weekly 
one-on-one meeting with President Karzai will continue, as 
will meetings with the Abdullah and Ghani camps. 
EIKENBERRY