VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSW #0362/01 2432238
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 312238Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6028
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2883
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0089
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0335
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0238
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERN 000362 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/MNSA (S.DAVIS/W.ALBERQUE) AND EUR/CE 
(Y.SAINT-ANDRE); GENEVA (CD); UNVIE (IAEA), USUN (POL), 
USNATO (POL), AND USEU (POL) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2019 
TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA
IAEA, NPT, SZ 
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) REVIEW 
CONFERENCE 2010:  SWISS VIEWS AND POLICY-MAKING 
 
REF: A. STATE 83600 
     ¶B. BERN 342 
     ¶C. BERN 108 
 
Classified By: Acting POLE Counselor Chris Buck; reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The Swiss government strongly supports entry 
into force of the CTBT, negotiations on a verifiable FMCT, 
and efforts to reinforce the NPT, particularly with regard to 
disarmament and arms control issues.  The Swiss welcome 
U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament negotiations, and are 
convinced that near-term progress on U.S.-Russian nuclear 
disarmament negotiations will be essential to setting the 
stage for a successful NPT Review Conference in May 2010. 
The Swiss government tends to emphasize disarmament over 
nonproliferation in the framework of the NPT.  Switzerland 
plans once again to co-sponsor a resolution in the UN First 
Committee on de-alerting nuclear weapons.  It also is 
developing an initiative for a "ban on use" of nuclear 
weapons, but key contacts have been vague on the initiative's 
form, content, and timing, other than to indicate that, as 
conceived, it would be further reaching than negative 
security assurances and not likely ready for discussion until 
after this year's UN First Committee. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary continued:  As a general rule, Switzerland 
sees its comparative advantage in multilateral fora in 
pursuing variable diplomatic constellations of convenience to 
meet its national objectives.  Switzerland is a member of the 
IAEA BOG for 2007-2010.  Switzerland is a member of the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD).  FDFA contacts report that 
the Swiss government has proposed long-time Swiss PermRep to 
the CD, Ambassador Juerg Streuli, to chair negotiations on a 
FMCT.  The Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) has 
the overall Swiss government lead on arms control, 
disarmament, and nonproliferation policy issues.  The Federal 
Department of Economic Affairs (FDEA) also plays an important 
role in the policy process, particularly with regard to 
export controls and sanctions implementation.  The Swiss 
government will assess nuclear arms control and 
nonproliferation policies or positions based on whether the 
policies/positions are non-discriminatory, verifiable, and 
legally-binding.  Swiss academia and NGOs generally are a 
remote presence on NPT-related issues, as is the Swiss 
Parliament.  However, the Swiss chapter of the International 
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) has the 
task of organizing the next (19th) IPPNW World Congress, 
which will be held in Basel in August 2010.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
NPT-related Questions 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Per reftels A and C, post offers the following 
feedback on issues related to the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT), arms control, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT): 
 
Q:  What is the Swiss government's general attitude towards 
CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms control efforts?  What 
factors influence its attitudes and positions? 
 
A:  The Swiss government strongly supports entry into force 
of the CTBT, negotiations on a verifiable FMCT, and efforts 
to reinforce the NPT, particularly with regard to disarmament 
and arms control issues.  The Swiss welcome U.S.-Russian 
nuclear disarmament negotiations, and are convinced that 
near-term progress on U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament 
negotiations will be essential to setting the stage for a 
successful NPT Review Conference in May 2010. 
 
The Swiss government tends to emphasize disarmament over 
nonproliferation in the framework of the NPT, and Swiss 
officials and pundits are convinced that the success of the 
next NPT RevCon will depend more on further progress on 
nuclear disarmament than on nonproliferation.  This emphasis 
to some degree reflects Switzerland's unusual circumstance as 
 
a neutral nation standing outside of NATO and the EU, and 
thus disconnected from the security commitments ultimately 
underwritten (explicitly or implicitly) by Western nuclear 
weapon states.  Switzerland's views on the NPT also are 
driven by the same general forces shaping public attitudes in 
other European countries, with many Swiss finding it 
difficult to understand why the nuclear weapon states 
continue to maintain and to modernize large nuclear arsenals. 
 When evaluating arms control and disarmament agreements, the 
Swiss government's mantra is "non-discriminatory, verifiable, 
and legally binding." 
 
Q:  What positions on CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms 
control efforts is the Swiss government likely to take in 
upcoming fora, such as the Conference on Disarmament, the 
UNGA First (Disarmament) Committee, and the NPT RevCon in 
2010? 
 
A:  Switzerland is a CTBT Annex 2 country that ratified the 
Treaty in 1999.  The Swiss government strongly supports entry 
into force of the CTBT. 
 
As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Switzerland 
strongly supports immediate commencement of negotiations on a 
verifiable FMCT. 
 
For the Swiss, a successful substantive outcome of the 2010 
NPT RevCon would be a consensus document that contains new 
obligations for nuclear weapon states, along the lines of the 
1995 NPT RevCon objectives and the 2000 NPT RevCon "13 Steps" 
-- especially with regard to CTBT ratification and 
commencement of negotiations on a verifiable FMCT. 
 
The Swiss government is developing an initiative for a "ban 
on use" of nuclear weapons, but key contacts have been vague 
on its form and content, other than to indicate that, as 
conceived, it would be further reaching than negative 
security assurances.  Those same Swiss contacts report that 
they do not think that the "ban on use" idea will be ripe 
enough for the UN First Committee.  While explaining that the 
idea is still a work-in-progress, they indicate that they 
view it as a possible initiative for the NPT RevCon.  It is 
unclear whether the Swiss have already shared the idea in 
detail with other countries, with a view to garnering 
support, but Swiss contacts indicate they expect to do so. 
 
In assessing progress in U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament 
negotiations, Switzerland can be expected to emphasize 
transparency, verifiability, and that any agreement should be 
legally binding. 
 
As in recent past years, the Swiss government, in cooperation 
with a number of other governments, plans once again this 
year to table a UN First Committee resolution on decreasing 
the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems (i.e., 
de-alerting).  Swiss experts are convinced that the barriers 
to de-alerting are political, not technical/operational, and 
argue that acceptance of a de-alerting resolution by nuclear 
weapon states in the First Committee would help to set a 
positive atmosphere for the subsequent NPT RevCon. 
 
Q:  With which countries does Switzerland work most closely 
on these issues? 
 
A:  In 2008, Switzerland co-sponsored its UN First Committee 
de-alerting resolution with Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Nigeria, and Sweden.  As a general rule, Switzerland -- as a 
neutral "Western Group" nation -- sees its comparative 
advantage in multilateral fora in pursuing variable 
diplomatic constellations of convenience to meet its national 
objectives.  In promoting initiatives in multilateral fora, 
the Swiss generally favor working closely with small- to 
medium-sized states, and consciously steer clear of the 
company of bad or otherwise controversial actors with regard 
to anything they co-sponsor or collectively champion. 
Against this backdrop, some Swiss affinity for working with 
Nordic states and Ireland is evident. 
 
Q:  Who are key government personnel involved in nuclear arms 
control and nonproliferation decision-making in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, related ministries, and their diplomatic 
missions to arms control fora? 
 
A:  The Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) has the 
overall Swiss government lead on arms control, disarmament, 
and nonproliferation policy issues.  The Federal Department 
of Economic Affairs (FDEA) also plays an important role in 
the policy process, particularly the FDEA's State Secretariat 
for Economic Affairs (SECO), which is responsible for export 
controls and sanctions implementation.  The Federal 
Department of Environment, Transport, Energy. and 
Communications (DETEC) has a secondary role in NPT-related 
policy making, and defers to FDFA and SECO on issues that do 
not have direct relevance for the nuclear industry or 
environment. 
 
FDFA:  Aside from Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey, who only will 
be familiar with the broad outlines of the issues, the key 
senior policy-maker for NPT-related issues at the FDFA is 
State Secretary (Deputy Minister/PolDir) Michael Ambuehl. 
The most important NPT-related, expert level policy-maker is 
Andreas Friedrich, Head of the FDFA's Arms Control and 
Disarmament Section.  Friedrich has been working on arms 
control, disarmament, and nonproliferation issues for decades 
at the FDFA, and is widely respected for his expertise within 
Swiss government circles.  In addition to Friedrich, Ambuehl 
has appointed Dr. Christian Schoenenberger as Head of the 
"Swiss NPT Task Force."  However, Schoenenberger appears thus 
far to be focused on working on the "ban on use" initiative 
that the Swiss government is developing, and indications thus 
far are that Friedrich remains the main overall POC for the 
range of NPT-related topics. 
 
FDEA/SECO:  Aside from Economic Minister Leuthard, who only 
will be familiar with the broad outlines of the issues, State 
Secretary (Deputy Minister) Jean-Daniel Gerber is the key 
senior policy-maker for NPT-related issues at the FDEA. 
Below Gerber, our key interlocutor is Erwin Bollinger, Head 
of the Sanctions and Export Policy Division. 
 
DETEC:  Aside from Energy Minister Leuenberger, who only will 
be familiar with the broad outlines of the issues, Dr. Walter 
Steinmann, Director of the Federal Office of Energy (FOE), is 
our most important DETEC interlocutor.  Steinmann serves as 
Switzerland's Governor on the Board of Governors (BOG) of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  Below Steinmann, 
Pierre Multone, the FOE's Special Representative for 
International Nuclear Affairs is the most important DETEC 
interlocutor for NPT-related issues. 
 
Q:  What role does Switzerland play in arms control and 
nonproliferation organizations?  Do the Swiss take a 
leadership role on any issues? 
 
A:  Given Switzerland's unique international profile and the 
presence of UN agencies in Geneva, the Swiss government often 
enjoys disproportionate influence in international fora. 
However, the Swiss government often takes a low-key approach 
to politically contentious issues in arms control and 
nonproliferation organizations -- probably at least in part 
to preserve its real or perceived capacity to mediate 
disputes. 
 
Switzerland is a member of the IAEA BOG for 2007-2010. 
 
Switzerland is a member of the Conference on Disarmament 
(CD).  FDFA contacts report that the Swiss government has 
proposed long-time Swiss PermRep to the CD, Ambassador Juerg 
Streuli, to chair negotiations on a FMCT. 
 
Switzerland has been a member of the UN since 2002, and in 
recent years has co-sponsored a UN First Committee resolution 
on de-alerting nuclear weapons. 
 
Q:  How does the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation 
policy-making process work in Switzerland, and what is the 
 
interplay among government officials and agencies?  Which 
people and agencies carry the most weight, and on which 
issues? 
 
A:  As noted above, the FDFA has the overall policy lead on 
NPT-related issues, in close coordination with the FDEA/SECO 
and, to a lesser extent, DETEC.  There are no more than 15-20 
experts on NPT-related issues in the entire Swiss government, 
and interagency coordination appears to function smoothly. 
The FDFA (Ambuehl/Friedrich) enjoys primacy on all high 
policy issues.  FDEA/SECO (Gerber/Bollinger) has more 
leverage on sanctions implementation and export regime 
topics.  DETEC (Steinmann/Multone) has the greatest input on 
topics affecting significant equities of the nuclear industry 
and environment -- i.e., technical cooperation, such as 
proposals for multilateral nuclear fuel banks and nuclear 
waste disposal. 
 
Q:  What are the key factors that drive Swiss adoption or 
rejection of particular policies or positions on nuclear arms 
control or nonproliferation issues? 
 
A:  The Swiss government will assess nuclear arms control and 
nonproliferation policies or positions based on whether the 
policies/positions are non-discriminatory, verifiable, and 
legally-binding.  The Swiss will tend to favor nuclear 
disarmament and arms control over nonproliferation, arguing 
that greater progress on nuclear disarmament will allow 
like-minded states to gain more traction on nonproliferation 
initiatives. 
 
Q:  How many people in Switzerland's Missions (New York, 
Geneva, and Vienna) to arms control fora deal with arms 
control and nonproliferation issues?  Who are they?  Are 
Swiss Mission personnel and resources augmented during key 
relevant meetings? 
 
A:  Post does not have access to detailed information 
regarding which staff at the Swiss multilateral Missions have 
expertise in NPT-related issues, but it is certain that the 
Swiss Missions to the UN-New York, CD-Geneva, and IAEA-Vienna 
are relatively thinly staffed in general, and must routinely 
be augmented by experts from capital during major meetings. 
Ambassador Streuli, Swiss PermRep to the CD, is reputedly a 
subject expert in the field of arms control and disarmament, 
but post has not had contact with him or the other Swiss 
Mission PermReps.  FDFA contacts report that the FDFA has 
submitted to the Swiss Parliament a request for a 
multi-million dollar budget increase for arms control and 
disarmament programming, in part to allow the FDFA to fund 
additional staff to support Streuli, if he is selected to 
chair the FMCT negotiations. 
 
Q:  What are the roles and influence of Switzerland's nuclear 
power industry, academia, and non-governmental organizations 
in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation decision-making? 
 
A:  The influence of the Swiss nuclear power industry on 
NPT-related issues is generally limited, except for in the 
area of nuclear cooperation and fuel cycle technology 
controls.  Whether in response to urging that Switzerland 
move from observer to participant in the Global Nuclear 
Energy Partnership (GNEP), or with regard to calls for Swiss 
support to possible multilateral nuclear fuel initiatives, 
the Swiss argue that current commercial supply of nuclear 
fuel is working fine, and claim that Switzerland is leery of 
becoming part of a nuclear "cartel" that could end up 
undercutting Swiss options for nuclear cooperation. 
 
Swiss academia and NGOs generally are a remote presence on 
NPT-related issues, as is the Swiss Parliament.  However, the 
Swiss chapter of the International Physicians for the 
Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) has the task of organizing 
the next (19th) IPPNW World Congress, which will be held in 
Basel in August 2010.  Swiss IPPNW representatives already 
have been in touch with post regarding their request for an 
appropriate USG speaker at that event. 
 
Q:  What are the key alliances with other governments on arms 
control and nonproliferation issues?  For example, the 
Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77)?  To 
what extent does Switzerland appear to influence, follow, or 
diverge from the NAM or G-77 line? 
 
A:  Aside from Switzerland's de-alerting resolution in the UN 
First Committee, post is not aware of any key alliances or 
relationships that the Swiss have with other governments on 
NPT-related issues.  Switzerland's emphasis on nuclear 
disarmament issues generally parallels some NAM and G-77 
recurring themes, and the Swiss often demonstrate sensitivity 
to NAM and G-77 views.  However, Switzerland is not, of 
course, a member of either organization, and quite frequently 
laments (at least behind closed doors) unreasonable and 
unconstructive positions taken by the NAM/G-77.  The Swiss 
ability to influence NAM/G-77 positions appears limited, and 
perhaps not used to its full potential, presumably due to the 
Swiss inclination to avoid controversy. 
 
Q:  How much flexibility do the Swiss Missions to the UN, CD, 
and IAEA appear to have, and to what extent do they appear to 
receive guidance from capital?  To what extent do they need 
further guidance from capital to engage on RevCon objectives? 
 
A:  This is difficult for post to assess, though FDFA 
discipline and hierarchy is less pronounced than in many 
European foreign ministries, and Swiss diplomats sometimes 
appear to take a more interpretive approach to their 
instructions than diplomats in some other European countries. 
 We have on some occasions (particularly with regard to the 
IAEA), had indications that timely interventions here in 
capital in close coordination with U.S. Mission colleagues 
have helped to move the Swiss position in positive ways. 
However, it was not clear whether such occasions represented 
a reigning in of free-lancing Swiss Mission representatives, 
or simply a change in the Swiss government's position. 
 
¶4. (U) Post will continue to report on NPT-related Swiss 
developments, and appreciates Department's support as we work 
to leverage Swiss engagement in this area toward positive 
outcomes. 
BEYER