VZCZCXRO3628
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0973/01 2401516
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281516Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5633
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3572
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4105
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 4024
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000973 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA 
ALSO FOR IO A/S EBRIMMER 
P FOR AWELLS/RWALLER 
DRL/NESA FOR JBARGHOUT 
PARIS FOR DNOBLES 
USUN FOR AWOLFF/EGERMAIN/ASCHEDLBAUER 
NSC FOR DSHAPIRO/MMCDERMOTT 
DOD/OSD FOR FOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON 
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA 
 
E.O. 1295: DECL: 08/28/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE SY SAIR IS
SUBJECT: WITH CABINET NEGOTIATIONS STALLED, HARIRI HINTS AT 
BRINKMANSHIP 
 
REF: BEIRUT 966 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) The press and nearly all Embassy contacts have 
declared a stalemate in the government formation process, 
despite a series of public statements by major political 
leaders that briefly indicated a move to break the deadlock. 
Notably, wayward Druze leader Walid Jumblatt came out 
strongly in support of Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri's 
efforts to form a national unity cabinet "to confront any 
possible Israeli aggression," which Hariri echoed by 
remarking at an iftar, "Hizballah will be in the government 
whether the enemy likes it or not," in response to Israeli 
threats.   Nonetheless, the pundits' pessimism is still 
justified.  The major internal obstacle is ostensibly the 
Free Patriotic Movement's (FPM) General Michel Aoun, though 
Hariri's own demands and intransigence may be slowing down 
cabinet formation as well.  Meanwhile, many still speculate 
that no government can be forged without the approval of 
foreign powers.  As Hariri hints that he is ready to engage 
in brinkmanship to get his way, his best tactics may be 
direct communication with Aoun -- or simply waiting him out. 
End summary. 
 
COMING TOGETHER AGAINST 
"THE ISRAELI ENEMY" 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The week began with headlines proclaiming stagnation 
in government formation, as Saad Hariri's Future TV continued 
a media blitz against Aoun and Hizballah blamed the 
PM-designate for the blockage.  Nevertheless, some 
politicians began to soften their rhetoric.  First, after 
weeks of distancing itself from March 14 and Hariri, 
Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) issued a 
statement August 24 calling on Lebanese leaders to facilitate 
Hariri's attempt to form a government, a step which "should 
be above the calculations of sons-in-law," a clear reference 
to Aoun's demands that his son-in-law Gebran Bassil be 
reappointed as Telecom Minister.  Jumblatt followed up on 
August 25, saying he shares Hariri's view that the new 
government "should be a national unity government, in order 
confront the possibility of Israeli aggression." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Hariri picked up Jumblatt's baton of reconciliation 
and anti-Israeli fervor by reaching out to Hizballah in an 
iftar speech by reaffirming, "I want to confirm to the 
Israeli enemy...that Hizballah will be in the government 
whether the enemy likes it or not."  For its part, Hizballah 
reciprocated by expressing its desire for rapid government 
formation, articulating its faith in the Hariri, and urging 
progress.  Hizballah MP Mohammed Raad deflected blame from 
Hariri to "outside powers," and resisted criticizing Maronite 
Patriarch Sfeir, who had sharply criticized Hizballah while 
calling for a majority government.  Even FPM MP Alain Aoun, 
the General's nephew, issued conciliatory remarks in the 
press, lauding Hariri for finally calling off the media blitz 
against his uncle.  Hinting that the FPM would show more 
flexibility if other parties do the same, he called publicly 
for a meeting between Hariri and Aoun to settle their 
differences. 
 
AOUN THE PROBLEM? 
OR HARIRI? 
----------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The General does not fold easily, however, and 
underscored that his demands are firm and he will not "visit" 
anyone, adding cheekily that if "someone" wants to negotiate, 
he can visit the broad terrace of Aoun's house.  Caretaker 
Minister of Culture and Future Party stalwart Tammam Salam 
 
BEIRUT 00000973  002 OF 003 
 
 
told the Ambassador August 25 that despite being "unstable," 
Aoun is extremely intelligent, a political animal who does 
his homework and commits himself to a plan.  "Even his allies 
can't reel him in," said Salam.  "With or without the 
blessing of Syria, he will do what he wants."  Alain Aoun 
explained to PolChief August 26 that the General's obstinacy 
was the result of Hariri's marginalizing him (reftel) and 
insisted Hariri will need to find a way to meet with the 
General in order to move forward. 
 
¶5. (C) Hariri has remained stoic in his responses to Aoun's 
recent rants, winning praise from his allies, including 
Salam, who assessed that his performance has been "perfect" 
to date.  Nonetheless, Hariri's attempts to isolate Aoun have 
brought criticism from the opposition (reftel).  Opposition 
MP Yassine Jaber, who is closely allied to Nabih Berri's Amal 
party, suggested Hariri should have started negotiating with 
Aoun from the beginning instead of expecting Hizballah to 
push him.  Indeed, Raad has insisted consistently in his 
public comments that Hizballah is Aoun's ally, but not his 
mediator. 
 
HARIRI'S UNSPOKEN DEMANDS 
------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) While Hariri's maneuvering has made Aoun appear to be 
the only remaining obstacle to government formation, Hariri 
himself has been silent on his cabinet demands, which may 
also be slowing the process.  In an August 25 meeting with 
the Ambassador, Mazen Hanna, Hariri's chief economic advisor, 
said Hariri intended to focus his reform efforts as PM on 
electricity, information technology, environment, traffic 
management, poverty alleviation, and streamlining business 
practices.  When asked if Hariri had approached opposition 
parties whose ministers might be involved in these areas, 
Hanna was adamant: "We cannot wsldtQ=V2Q(oQs]2ajority might explain his hardball 
tactics with the FPM. 
 
HARIRI TO TAKE 
RADICAL MEASURES? 
----------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Hariri, still smarting from Aoun's brusque rejection 
of his invitation to dinner at Qoreitem, refuses to yield to 
Aoun's insistence that any negotiations between the two of 
them happen at Aoun's home in Rabieh.  With negotiations 
therefore blocked, Hariri told the Ambassador at his August 
27 iftar, "There are things we can do," and indicated he may 
simply take his cabinet proposal directly to President Michel 
Sleiman, without further consultations.  This would 
presumably occur after a meeting of the 71 majority MPs to 
consolidate their position and present a united front, an 
event that Lebanon First Sunni MP and caretaker Minister of 
Economy Mohammed Safadi told the Ambassador will take place 
on August 31.  Jumblatt told the Ambassador August 28 that 
his bloc of 11 MPs will attend the event, which he said is 
not definitively scheduled, but when asked what progress 
would happen afterwards, he replied, "Nothing."  Meanwhile, 
Jumblatt advisor Marwan Hamadeh downplayed the significance 
of the PSP joining March 14 MPs at such a meeting, noting 
that other "independent" MPs would attend as well, including 
Christian strongman Michel Murr and Tripoli Sunni Najib 
Miqati. 
 
¶8. (C) Safadi reported that President Sleiman had indicated 
he still wanted to work for cabinet formation through 
"consultation and consensus," making it doubtful that Sleiman 
would accept Hariri's cabinet proposal if it does not have 
broad agreement from across the political spectrum.  If 
Hariri fails to form a government this way, the process would 
 
BEIRUT 00000973  003 OF 003 
 
 
go back to square one.  Hariri's cousin and advisor Nader 
Hariri told the Ambassador, "We need an action-forcing event." 
 
OUTSIDE FORCES 
-------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Many contacts still contend that the Hariri-Aoun spat 
cannot be the only thing holding up the government and that 
outside pressures are the real source of stalemate.  Salam 
suggested that Syria, working from a strengthened regional 
and international position, must be working to freeze the 
process.  Jaber assessed that the Egyptians had been 
interfering in Lebanon's cabinet formation to serve its own 
regional interests.  Numerous Embassy interlocutors insist 
that nothing can move forward in Lebanon until the Saudis and 
Syrians return to the negotiating table.  The mood of many is 
summed up by Jumblatt's comment to the Ambassador that 
Lebanon cannot form a government "while Saudi Arabia and Iran 
are fighting from Yemen to Iraq." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) Although contacts from all the political blocs 
(except for the FPM and Kataeb) indicate they have come to 
agreement with Hariri on their ministerial allocations, 
Hariri has kept his cards close to his chest with Aoun.  With 
Aoun playing hardball in respose to Hariri's tactics, Hariri 
seems to be ready to use brinkmanship to bring things to a 
head and get his way.  Given the President's desire for 
consensus and Aoun's intransigence, this tactic could very 
well backfire.  While Hariri's differences with Aoun appear 
very personal and possibly irreconcilable, some believe the 
most effective way for Hariri to handle the current situation 
is to sit down with Aoun -- the consummate political animal 
-- personally.  Barring that, he may do well to heed the 
advice Jumblatt told the Ambassador he would offer Hariri: 
"Wait.  They are waiting for you to be impatient and make a 
mistake." 
SISON