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ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 111629Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1006
INFO RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0188
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0293
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0304
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0203
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0147
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0145
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0492
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0478
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0134
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0465
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1270

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000181 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
USUN FOR DMUERS 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
NAIROBI  FOR AKARAS 
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL 
INR FOR CNEARY 
DRL FOR SCRAMPTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: CONTROVERSIAL ELECTORAL CODE SIGNED INTO LAW, FUTURE OF 
ELECTIONS STILL IN QUESTION 
 
REF: A. REF A (08 BANGUI 256, 251 AND PREVIOUS). 
     ¶B. REF B (09 BANGUI 68) 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On August 3, 2009, the controversial and much 
delayed Central African electoral code was signed into law by 
President Francois Bozize. Written as a consensus document after 
the Inclusive Political Dialogue (DPI) of December 2008, the law 
has since been reviewed by the Government, the National Assembly 
and the Constitutional Courts yet its passage comes with 
substantial discontent from the opposition. The contentious 
Article Twelve remains unchanged and the target of wide 
criticism by the opposition. It stipulates that the Prime 
Minister and President of the National Assembly, both of whom 
are considered President Francois Bozize's loyalists, are to 
pick the candidates for head of the Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC). With the signing of the law, the dispute is 
now an academic one, and of greater importance is that the 
electoral process is once again at a standstill as Bozize has 
yet to set a date for the IEC's creation. Though the government 
claims it will decree the creation of the IEC by the end of 
August, if this delay persists, prospects for a proper and 
timely ballot will dim. Stalling the elections appears 
increasingly to be in Bozize's interests and may explain why 
there have been so many delays in planning elections that are 
five years in coming.  END SUMMARY . 
 
------------------------------ 
Article 12: The Polemic 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) The 2010 electoral code is a redraft of the 2005 
version with heavy input from a committee set up in the wake of 
the DPI of December 2008 (Ref A) The follow up committee 
comprises twelve members, two from each of the following groups: 
The presidential majority (KNK), the opposition, the nonaligned 
political parties, political/military (read: rebel groups), 
civil society, and civil servants. The committee amended the 
2005 code and submitted the proposed law to the government on 
May 29. The law was then sent to the National Assembly for 
debate on June 11, modified, approved by acclimation as the 
opposition and the nonaligned parties boycotted the vote, and 
submitted to the Constitutional Court on June 27. It was in the 
modification of the law by the National Assembly that has caused 
an uproar, with the opposition crying foul over what they 
thought was to be a consensus document. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The original Article 12 of the code, written with the 
consent of the follow up committee, stated that each of the 
groups would nominate two candidates and then a President would 
be chosen by vote of the 30 members (five from each of the 
aforementioned groups) of the Independent Electoral Commission. 
The government-dominated National Assembly rejected this 
proposition because by enshrining this rule in law, they argue, 
political/military groups would in effect be institutionalized 
into the law - a dangerous precedent.  As a result, the National 
Assembly reverted Article 12 back to its 2005 language as the 
former system managed to pick a president who was accepted by 
all sides. But the political conditions of 2009 are very 
different than those of 2005. The National Assembly in 2005 was 
transitional and its president was considered neutral whereas 
today's president is a close associate of Bozize and the KNK 
dominate the legislature. The opposition therefore has no 
confidence that the commission will be independent or fair under 
such rules and are agitated. Though the opposition recognizes 
that the KNK is the elected majority and thus logically has the 
right to support the president's choices, they remain obstinate, 
exposing a fundamental breakdown in Central African democracy: 
the members of the National Assembly, though elected, are more 
responsive to the KNK and Bozize's needs than to their 
constituents due to patronage and other special favors granted 
to them. Thus, while in a more consolidated democracy the 
majority can dissent, in the CAR, it does not and this has led 
 
BANGUI 00000181  002 OF 003 
 
 
to the complete lack of faith from the opposition. 
 
¶4. (SBU) With the signature of the bill by the President, the 
process now rests upon the creation of the IEC and no date has 
been set. This step is likely to last into late August and 
possibly September, leaving the country and the international 
community just six months to organize the elections. As 
previously reported, the government has not earmarked any money 
for the elections in their 2009 budget, though they have 
promised to do so in an additional budget to be passed in the 
coming months. Problematically, the international community -- 
with the notable exception of four million Euros from the 
European Commission -- has refused to allot money before an IEC 
has been established. Therefore, with the time running low, very 
little money has been set aside nor have any meaningful 
organizational steps been taken, leaving the prospects for the 
elections murky at best. 
 
---------------------- 
The Game Afoot 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU)If the election was held today, Bozize would likely win. 
The opposition is in tatters with the strongest party, the MLPC, 
torn in two between former Prime Minister and presidential 
candidate of 2005 Martin Ziguele and former President Ange-Felix 
Patasse (Ref B). Yet still, Bozize is stalling. The reasons are 
likely twofold: 
 
- The longer it takes the IEC to set up, the longer it takes for 
the rules and dates of the election to be formalized. Because 
there are stiff penalizes levied upon those that electioneer 
before the official start of the campaign, Bozize's advantages 
of incumbency, and the better (relatively) organized KNK, 
markedly increase his advantage in a short electoral season. 
 
- The electoral lists of 2005 are in shambles and unusable. 
Therefore, a delayed electoral commission will be unlikely to 
complete the work of establishing inclusive electoral lists in 
time for the March ballot. The prefectures most affected by 
displacement and insecurity are exactly those that are least 
likely to vote for Bozize (Bamingui-Bangoran, Nana-Grebizi, 
Ouham, Ouham-Pende, with the last two being the most populous in 
the CAR). The instability and difficulty in accessing and 
registering displaced persons means that these areas will almost 
certainly suffer from disenfranchisement. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Some post contacts speculate that some in the 
opposition may actually want the elections to fail, thus causing 
a constitutional crisis similar to 1993, which ultimately 
granted power to some opposition leaders. After that election, 
President Andre Kolingba annulled vote results that were widely 
thought to have given the election to Patasse. As a result, a 
constitutional vacuum caused Kolingba to create the National 
Political Provisional Council of the Republic (CNPPR) as a 
parallel body that the President was forced to consult with 
before new elections were held. Made up of candidates from the 
election among others, this body is widely credited as helping 
pave the way to Patasse's election on the next ballot. It is 
therefore possible that secondary members of the opposition, and 
potentially even Ziguele/Patasse if they continue to lag far 
behind Bozize, are seeing the possibility of a constitutional 
crisis as a way to nullify the incumbent's inherent advantages 
and either force another election or simply try and place 
themselves in governing body that would give them access to 
political power. This theory was given further credence this 
week when a leading opposition figure demanded that an entirely 
new electoral code be written and debated. This would condense 
the electoral season down to a potentially impossible time frame 
as meeting the constitutionally mandated election date would be 
unfeasible and thus a constitutional crisis might ensure. 
 
BANGUI 00000181  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) COMMENT: President Bozize, therefore, is running a high 
wire act in playing with the date of the election: while he is 
in a strong position today, he worries that a fickle electorate 
could shift between now and March. While a short elections 
season benefits him, the longer he waits, the more the 
opposition and the international community will become 
frustrated. This may lead to mistakes on his part, a flawed 
election, or something akin to the constitutional crisis of 
¶1993. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Embassy Bangui is very worried about what ill organized 
and flawed elections may portend for the CAR.  Rebel groups in 
the northwest will undoubtedly use any perceived unfairness as 
further justification for rebellion and other regions may react 
the same way. Bozize, already held in low esteem by many 
observers, would suffer another blow to his legitimacy, which 
will threaten his already shaky regime. Lastly, the CAR, already 
tormented by 50 years of misrule, can ill afford another example 
of flawed electoral politics. By December 2009, at which time 
the IEC should be in place, a clearer picture will develop and 
Post will be in a better position to prognosticate the outcome 
of the 2010 election - but the initial signs are distressing. 
END COMMENT. 
COOK