VZCZCXRO5276
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2350/01 2431525
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 311525Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4527
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002350 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR DS/DSS/IP CHARLENE LAMB AND DS/DSS/TIA ROBERT 
ECKERT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2019 
TAGS: ASEC IR IZ KCRS MARR PGOV PREL PTER
SUBJECT: PM MALIKI DECIDES THAT IT IS TOO DANGEROUS TO OPEN 
THE IZ FURTHER BEFORE THE JANUARY ELECTIONS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Cameron P. Munter for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary.  At the August 30 meeting of the 
International Zone (IZ) Security Joint Sub-Committee (JSC), 
the Government of Iraq (GOI) declared its intention to delay 
opening of the north-south highway bisecting the IZ until 
after national elections are complete.  The GOI also stated 
that it would not make any modifications to the current 
barrier system in the IZ without prior concurrence from 
Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I).  While clearly in line 
with Embassy and MNF-I preferences, the move came without any 
U.S. prompting, and the Iraqis admitted their concern that 
opening the highway to normal traffic now could be an 
invitation to more incidents similar to the August 19 
bombings jut outside the IZ.  Prime Minister (PM) Maliki 
appears to have concluded that he has more to lose from 
another security failure in the capital than by prolonging 
the traffic jams wrought by current security measures.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S) At the regularly scheduled August meeting of the IZ 
Security JSC (note:  the JSC coordinates implementation of 
Article 28 of the Security Agreement), attended by Major 
General Hummer, Management Counselor Jackson, Deputy Regional 
Security Officer Moretti, and Iraqi General Faruq al-'Arji, 
who heads the Prime Minister,s personal military staff in 
the Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC), stated that the 
PM had ordered a delay in the opening of the IZ segment of 
the July 14 highway.  The six-lane road runs through central 
Baghdad connecting the northern and southern districts across 
the July 14 Bridge.  Faruq clarified that in the wake of the 
August 19 bombings on the periphery of the IZ that 
temporarily shut down the Council of Representatives (COR) 
and devastated the Foreign Ministry (MoFA), the GOI 
anticipated that the threat of attacks in central Baghdad 
would remain at levels that would make the opening of the 
July 14 highway a potential vulnerability which militants 
would be happy to exploit. 
 
¶3.  (C) General Faruq also stated that the GOI would not 
undertake to move any barriers in the IZ absent prior 
consultation and coordination with MNF-I.  According to 
Faruq, the OCINC will confer with the PM,s National 
Operations Center (PMNOC) to determine at what date after the 
January national elections the road can be opened.  In the 
interim, jointly planned preparations for its opening, 
including the placement of new barriers, and modifications to 
existing checkpoints, will continue so that all of the 
necessary security measures will be in place once the 
decision is made. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Though neither MNF-I nor the Embassy had made any 
request to delay the opening of the highway beyond September 
15, the target date proposed by the GOI, all U.S. 
stakeholders were pleased that the GOI opted to postpone. 
Once opened, the thoroughfare will cut the IZ in two from 
north to south, leaving only a two-lane underpass at the 
northern end of the July 14 Bridge to facilitate the movement 
of all IZ traffic from east to west.  While the bulk of the 
U.S. presence in the IZ is now concentrated in its western 
half, including the Embassy, Forward Operating Base (FOB) 
Prosperity, and FOB Union III,  the eastern portion is home 
to USAID, Phoenix Base, LZ Washington, numerous contractor 
Qto USAID, Phoenix Base, LZ Washington, numerous contractor 
support facilities, and key GOI institutions such as the 
PM,s Office, Ministry of Defense, and the COR.  Though the 
GOI must at some point open this route, forcing all of the 
internal IZ traffic through a single narrow chokepoint is 
clearly preferable later rather than sooner, especially in 
the face of recent GOI security failures at the margins of 
the IZ. 
 
¶5.  (S)  Comment:  The PM has been under considerable 
pressure from Baghdad residents to improve the traffic 
congestion that plagues the capital.  Burdened by more than 
twice as many vehicles as it is designed to handle, 
Baghdad,s road network suffers in part because the IZ, 
sitting at the city,s core, blocks several of the highways 
that could help to relieve much of the gridlock.  Combined 
with the omnipresent barriers that narrow already crowded 
streets, the closed highways are a source of unending 
frustration for millions of the PM,s constituents.  His 
decision to postpone the opening of the July 14 Highway 
appears to reflect a realization that he will have more to 
lose from another spectacular attack in Baghdad than from the 
snarled traffic that the IZ,s security measures produce. 
 
BAGHDAD 00002350  002 OF 002 
 
 
End Comment. 
HILL