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Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD2319, BLAMESTORMING" OVER BAGHDAD BOMBINGS SHARPENS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BAGHDAD2319 2009-08-28 15:44 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO3660
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2319/01 2401544
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281544Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4487
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002319 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2019 
TAGS: IZ PGOV PINR PTER SA SY POL
SUBJECT: "BLAMESTORMING" OVER BAGHDAD BOMBINGS SHARPENS 
SECTARIAN RHETORIC 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 2270 
     B. BAGHDAD 2294 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gary A. Grappo for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:   The August 19 bombings in Baghdad prompted 
a flurry of finger-pointing, with government officials and 
politicians blaming various Sunni groups, especially 
Ba,athists in Iraq and Syria, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)and 
rival Shi,a groups.  The Saudis and Syrians, too, have come 
under suspicion; in the latter case, serious enough to result 
in the recall of respective ambassadors.  While the bombings 
have seen a rise in sectarian rhetoric, intra-governmental 
schisms that emerged in the immediate aftermath of the 
bombings appear to be closing, at least on the surface, and 
rhetoric has not translated into the kind of sectarian 
violence seen in 2006-2007.  Still, the GOI and the public ) 
Shi'a and Sunni alike ) are nervous and further attacks 
could yet reverse recent political and security gains.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
RUSH TO JUDGMENT 
 
2. (SBU) The August 19 bombings in Baghdad (ref A) prompted 
public statements by Government of Iraq (GOI) officials 
blaming Sunni interests and criticizing Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF).  Hours after the attack, Major General Qasim Atta said 
the Baghdad Operations Command blamed a "Ba'athist-Takfiri 
alliance" (the latter is shorthand for Sunni extremist 
groups).  Later that day, PM Maliki said  Sunni extremists 
had carried out the bombings, which he characterized as "a 
desperate attempt to derail the political process and affect 
the (upcoming) parliamentary elections."   Hours later, a 
Sadrist Trend statement held U.S. forces responsible, but 
excoriated Iraqi security forces and said they should be 
purged of former Ba'ath Party members. 
 
PARLIAMENTARIANS ALLEGE "GAPS IN SECURITY SYSTEM" 
 
3. (SBU) On August 21, the Council of Representatives (COR) 
convened an extraordinary meeting of heads of parliamentary 
blocs, the Ministers of Defense and Interior, the Minister of 
State for National Security, members of the Security and 
Defense Committee, and the Baghdad Operations Command senior 
officer to review the situation.  Participants called for a 
national commission to review security forces' performance, 
improvement of the dissemination of intelligence, and 
military trials for soldiers at bombing sites who were deemed 
to have been negligent in their duties.  First Deputy Speaker 
Khalid al-Attiya chaired the meeting and said the bombings 
"revealed gaps in our security system."  Implying that ISF 
elements at checkpoints helped the attackers, Sadrist MP 
Falah Shanshal, who chairs the Accountability and Justice 
Committee (formerly the De-Ba'athification Committee), said 
there had been "infiltration into the security and defense 
apparatuses by ... senior Ba'athists."  Shortly after the 
meeting, GOI officials announced that they arrested within 
hours of the attack members of a Ba'athist network involved 
in planning and executing the bombings, and had detained 11 
members of the Iraqi Army and Police -- including a brigadier 
general, a lieutenant colonel, and a major -- for negligence. 
 
 CALLS FOR RESIGNATIONS 
 
4. (C) During the meeting, some MPs urged Minister of Defense 
 Abd al-Kadir al-Ubaidi and Minister of Interior Jawad 
al-Bolani to resign.   GOI Spokesperson Ali al-Dabbagh told 
Pol M/C on August 24 that VP Tariq al-Hashimi had recommended 
shortly after the bombing that he (al-Hashimi) and Maliki 
resign over what happened; al-Dabbagh told him that was not 
the proper course.  (Note: As reported ref B, Ambassador and 
Emboffs have engaged with members of the Presidency Council, 
QEmboffs have engaged with members of the Presidency Council, 
COR, and Maliki's inner circle to strongly advise against 
politically motivated dismissals of Cabinet ministers or 
senior security officials. End note.)  Senior advisers to VP 
al-Hashimi and Deputy PM Rafi al-Issawi told Emboffs that 
Iraqis were angry with the finger-pointing between GOI 
officials and the government's ineffectual response to the 
bombings.  The advisers did not believe that Cabinet 
ministers would be dismissed, but did expect that more senior 
security officials would be fired. 
 
FANNING THE FLAMES ... 
 
5. (SBU) In a series of remarks on August 21 and 22, FM 
Zebari said he could "not rule out complicity (in the attack) 
by government security services."  Claiming regime opponents 
had shifted their focus to Baghdad, he said there had been a 
clear deterioration in security conditions for some time and 
"what is coming might be worse."  He called on the GOI to 
"stop making overly optimistic statements" about ostensibly 
 
BAGHDAD 00002319  002 OF 003 
 
 
improved security conditions.  Influential Shi'a preacher 
Sayyid Muhammad al-Haydari sharply criticized the alleged 
involvement of Ba'thists and al-Qaeda in the attacks during 
his 'khutba' sermon on August 21, called  for purges of 
Ba'thists from security services and dismissed Sunnis' calls 
for national reconciliation as disingenuous.  Shi'a imam 
Sheikh Muhammad al-Hasani of Baghdad's al-Rasul Mosque was 
less subtle: "Once again, brothers, the Ba'athists and 
supporters of al-Qaeda have exposed their pale faces and 
black rancor." 
 
6. (SBU) In a televised address on August 22, PM Maliki 
defended Iraq's security forces, blamed an alliance of the 
Ba'ath Party and al-Qaeda for the bombings and vowed to 
punish those responsible.  On August 23, the GOI televised 
the confession of a former Diyala Province police chief and 
self-described Ba'athist, who claimed he organized the attack 
on the Ministry of Finance on orders from Syria-based 
Ba'athist Sattam Farhan (a member of the Muhammad Yunus 
al-Ahmad group).  The alleged perpetrator said his group paid 
USD 10,000 to facilitate passage of the explosives-laden 
truck through checkpoints.  Baghdad's Governor, Salah Abdel 
Razzaq (a member of Maliki's Da'wa Party), said in interviews 
on August 23 that the bombers were acting under the orders of 
Iraqi Sunni parliamentarians and that  Arab states -- 
especially Saudi Arabia -- supported the Ba'athists, who 
carried out the attacks to weaken confidence in Maliki's 
government and influence upcoming elections. 
 
GOI UPS THE ANTE WITH SYRIA 
 
7. (C)  On August 25, AQI claimed responsibility for the 
bombings, saying they were meant to "wreck the bastions of 
infidelity" belonging to Maliki's "pro-Iranian" government. 
The statement concluded that "it would be better for the 
citizens of the Islamic state to perish to the very last one 
than to be governed by (Shiite) renegades."  On the same day, 
GOI Spokesman Dabbagh issued a statement saying Iraq's 
Council of Ministers demanded that Syria expel terrorist 
organizations and extradite to Iraq senior Ba'ath Party 
leaders Muhammad Yunus al-Ahmad and Sattam Farhan for their 
alleged role in the bombings.  Iraq's ambassador to Damascus 
was recalled to Baghdad for consultations, and the MFA was 
tasked with seeking UNSC support for establishing an 
international criminal court to prosecute those who carried 
out "genocide and war crimes" against Iraqis.  Maliki advisor 
Sadiq al-Rikabi told Emboffs that the GOI issued the 
statement against Syria because "we could not remain silent," 
but conceded more information was needed to link the bombings 
to Yunus. 
 
SUNNIS LOW-KEY IN PUBLIC, BUT PRIVATELY ANGRY AND FEARFUL 
 
8. (C) Sunnis have largely avoided public commentary on the 
attacks; however, two pro-Saddam Ba'athist groups issued 
statements blaming the bombings on the GOI, political 
militias, and U.S. forces.  Others were more moderate: Sunni 
imams called on the GOI to deal firmly with the perpetrators 
of the attack in their sermons; Sunni MP Omar al-Jaburi said 
the bombings aimed to weaken Maliki as politicians were 
scrambling to form election coalitions; and Sunni MP Omar 
Abdel Sattar worried the attack could exacerbate Sunni-Shi'a 
tensions.  Privately, some Sunnis seethed at the Maliki 
government's perceived rush to judgment.  Many believe the 
GOI's capture of the alleged bombers and televised confession 
were fabricated; several contacts dismissed as "ridiculous" 
Maliki's public statement blaming Sunni extremists and 
criticized him for not appearing sooner on television to 
Qcriticized him for not appearing sooner on television to 
offer condolences.  An influential Sunni sheikh and senior 
advisers to VP al-Hashimi and DPM al-Issawi argued that the 
bombings were an intra-Shi'a affair, supported by Iran and 
designed to signal to Maliki that the security gains of his 
government could be easily undone, and it would be in his 
interest to join the resurrected United Iraqi Alliance 
coalition. (Note: Maliki's former Shi'a coalition partners 
announced a new coalition on August 24 that Maliki's Da'wa 
declined to join.  End Note.)  Several sheikhs told Poloff 
they fear Maliki's government will use the attacks as a 
pretext to delay further integration of Sons of Iraq/Sahwa 
elements into GOI positions. 
 
9. (C) COMMENT:  If the intent of the August 19 bombers was 
to heighten sectarian tension and weaken the GOI, the 
"blamestorming" and finger-pointing in the immediate 
aftermath suggests that they achieved some initial success. 
The bombings may also have complicated ongoing electoral 
coalition negotiations, including efforts by Maliki to 
maintain his Shi'a base while reaching out to other potential 
partners.  Reaching a modus vivendi with Sunni political 
groups could be more difficult in light of the PM's quick 
blaming of Sunni extremists and Ba'athists for the August 19 
attacks.  More significantly, the attack calls into question 
 
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the premise that Iraq had weathered the worst and arrived at 
a political space in which leaders and voters could seek to 
transcend old sectarian divisions.  Divisions within the 
government over the bombings seem to have closed, at least on 
the surface.  The Presidency Council has issued a statement 
calling for national unity (ref B) and public recriminations 
appear to be waning.  FM Zebari told Pol M/C August 26 that 
the Cabinet had shifted away from casting blame, partly out 
of a sense that people were coming together.  Further 
high-profile terrorist attacks, however, could reverse those 
gains and further stoke sectarian differences.  END COMMENT. 
HILL