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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021309Z AUG 09 ZDK CTG SEVERAL SVC'S
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4162
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002070 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR KELLY MAGSAMEN AND PUNEET TALWAR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR TU IZ
SUBJECT: ISCI/BADR OFFICIALS ON IRANIAN ELECTION, MEK, AND 
IRAQ'S TIES WITH TEHRAN 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 2059 
 
BAGHDAD 00002070  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
(C) Summary: During an introductory meeting with Post's new 
Iran Watcher (IW), senior ISCI/Badr officials made the 
following points about Iran and Iraq-Iran relations: (1) the 
Iranian election and its violent aftermath were unexpected 
and likely to result in new political accommodations between 
the government and opposition; (2) despite their differences, 
Iran's political leaders remain committed to the ideals of 
the revolution; (3) Iraq's ties with Iran are natural and 
long-standing given a shared Shia heritage; and (4) the 
Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK) must be dealt with conclusively for 
the sake of Iraqi and regional stability.  End summary. 
 
¶1. (C) On August 1, Post's IW and Poloff met with Tahsin 
al-Azzawi, deputy chairman of the Badr Organization and 
member of parliament, and Haitham al-Husseini, Senior Advisor 
and personal aide to ISCI Chairman Abdel Aziz al-Hakim.  The 
ensuing discussion covered post-election developments in 
Iran; Iraq's bilateral ties with Iran; and the recent GOI 
crackdown on the MEK in Camp Ashraf. 
 
Iranian Election: Accommodation Likely 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Azzawi noted that the scale of public discontent and 
support for Moussavi, which he acknowledged as ¬ mere 
thousands but millions,8 was not easy to dismiss and had 
forced the Iranian government to confront harsh new political 
realities.  Supreme Leader Khamenei,s efforts aimed to 
defuse the crisis were scorned by the opposition as impartial 
and biased in favor of Ahmadinejad.  Citing concern about the 
legitimacy of the election and its impact on the new 
government, Azzawi and Husseini said that the Iranian 
leadership would have to learn to accommodate the different 
camps.  The Iranian government will "have no choice but to 
change its outlook to accommodate internal pressures," Azzawi 
predicted. 
 
¶3.  (C) Intended to convey a cautionary message to the USG, 
Azzawi underscored that &despite their differences, 
Moussavi, Ahmadinejad, Karroubi, and others are still true 
believers in the Islamic revolution given their long 
history.8 Responding to IW,s point that the USG was 
wrongfully accused of trying to foment a velvet revolution, 
Azzawi said that &the Iranians were looking for fingerprints 
to blame others (U.S. and UK) and rally public support 
against foreign interference.8   "Al-Hurra,s pro-Moussavi 
coverage did not help your case,8 he stated, jokingly 
referring to the USG-funded media outlet.  &We cannot afford 
instability in Iran.  It is not good for Iraq or the 
region,8 Azzawi cautioned. 
 
Iraq-Iran: A Natural Relationship 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Asked about the future of Iran-Iraq relations, Azzawi 
and Husseini affirmed that bilateral ties between the two 
countries are &natural and long-standing8 and would 
continue to be reinforced through a shared Shia heritage. 
Most of Shia Islam's important shrines are in Iraq, they 
pointed out, therefore cultural linkages to the east are 
natural.  IW noted that some of Iraq's Arab neighbors accuse 
Baghdad of being too close to Tehran.  Azzawi blamed Iraq,s 
Arab neighbors for misconstruing Iraq,s ties to Iran as 
anti-Arab.  &Iraq is like a bouquet of different religions, 
ethnicities, and tribes each being courted by various 
powers,8 he explained.  &We want regional stability and 
Qpowers,8 he explained.  &We want regional stability and 
friendly relations with all our neighbors and this bothers 
some of our Arab friends.8 
 
MEK: Enemies of Iraq 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Regarding the recent GOI crackdown on the MEK in 
Ashraf (Note: The GOI has officially renamed Ashraf the "Camp 
of New Iraq."  End Note.) Azzawi, echoing the GOI Interior 
Ministry, exclaimed that &the MEK file must be resolved once 
and for all.8  Pointing to the dark days of the MEK,s 
alliance with Saddam during the Iraq-Iran war, Azzawi 
explained that the MEK, along with the PKK, are enemies of 
the Iraqi people.  "The Iranians think you are using the MEK 
and they accuse our intelligence ministry of doing so as 
well.8 (Note: The Iranian accusation against the GOI is 
likely tied to Iranian suspicions of Baathist remnants 
 
BAGHDAD 00002070  002 OF 002 
 
 
working in the Iraqi intelligence ministry.  End Note.) 
 
¶6. (C) According to Azzawi, a recent meeting between Iraqi's 
National Security Advisor Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie and a group 
of eight MEK defectors revealed the workings of an 
organization unwilling to accommodate dissent and defection. 
Azzawi criticized the MEK for their stubbornness and 
unwillingness to compromise and relocate to an alternative 
location, farther from the Iranian border.  Regarding a 
possible return to Iran, Azzawi said that the Iranian 
government has never objected to their return and is only 
interested in prosecuting a select few in the party 
leadership.  "No other country has offered to accept them as 
refugees," Azzawi commented.  &The Iraqi people cannot 
understand why they are still here.8 He added that it was 
unnatural for any country to have within its borders an 
organization plotting attacks on neighboring states.  &We 
are now being accused of wrong doing and so are you,8 he 
noted in reference to media reports criticizing the GOI 
crackdown on Ashraf (see reftel for latest update). 
 
Al-Hakim's Health 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Husseini commented that ISCI Chairman Abdel Aziz 
al-Hakim "was doing better" following another round of lung 
cancer treatment in Tehran and left the hospital weeks ago. 
Over the last several weeks, Iraqi officials have traveled to 
Tehran to pay their final respects to the ailing al-Hakim in 
anticipation of his death. (Note: Al-Hakim's son, Sayyid 
Ammar, is expected to succeed him. End Note.) 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
(C) The meeting was conducted in an ISCI house close to the 
Embassy in Baghdad's International Zone (IZ). Both men were 
cordial and at ease during the conversation, at times 
punctuated by light-hearted exchanges in Farsi.  Azzawi did 
most of the talking (in Arabic) given his seniority in the 
ISCI/Badr organization.  Both men have close personal and 
political ties to Iran, having resided there for many years 
(20 years in Azzawi's case).  They spared no effort in 
reaffirming ISCI's close ties to the USG and the value placed 
in nurturing the relationship.  Azzawi's cautionary point 
about the commitment of Iran's leaders to the revolution 
despite internal squabbles was intended to dispel any 
misgivings about the staying power of the regime or its 
ideology. Their views on the MEK reflect the GOI's distaste 
for the organization and the political liability it presents 
for Iraq-Iran relations.  End comment. 
FORD